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 ABSTRACT  
In the context of a global crisis, it is necessary to ask what are the philosophical 
limitations of political critique? This thesis addresses this broad question through a 
critical reading of the work of Richard Rorty and his theorization of the connection 
between philosophy and politics. Rorty’s philosophy dissociates philosophical questioning 
and political thinking. Through a critique of foundationalism, Rorty establishes new limits 
to philosophy which prescribe its involvement in politics. However, the critical literature 
fails to connect these two aspects. They accept Rorty’s position that his philosophical 
pragmatism is unconnected to his political liberalism. In contrast, this thesis is a critical 
account of Rorty’s theorization of the connection between philosophy and politics that 
explicitly links his pragmatism to his liberalism. It refutes Rorty’s wider philosophical 
claim from within a reading of his own work. 
By situating Rorty within his critique of epistemology and his relation to the 
philosophy of John Dewey, and confronting him with an alternative, ontological line of 
thinking that runs from the work of Martin Heidegger to that of Herbert Marcuse, this 
thesis exposes the mechanisms by which Rorty reduces philosophical and political 
thinking. It reveals that rather than opening thinking and providing a basis for political 
criticism, Rorty’s political pragmatism restricts thought to the present range of options. 
What Rorty offers is not a method for cultural change, as he claims, but a self-reinforcing 
mode of thought for contemporary liberalism. 
The implications of this analysis exceed Rorty scholarship. Rorty attempts to 
theorize the implicit assumptions of the liberal West. While he could never exhaust that 
culture, he does reveal a real set of pragmatic assumptions and justifications for liberal 
democracy. As such, he offers a opportunity to critically engage a particular form of 
liberalism that informs much of the dominant discourse about democracy today.  
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Peering, the mind could see nothing sure, nothing in all human 
experience to be grasped as certain, except uncertainty itself; 
nothing but obscurity gendered by a thick haze of theories. Man’s 
science was a mere mist of numbers; his philosophy but a fog of 
words.  
Olaf Stapledon, Starmaker 
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INTRODUCTION.  PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS:  
THE PROBLEM OF RORTY’S PHILOSOPHY  
 
Rorty’s anti-epistemological radicalism and belletristic anti-academicism are refreshing 
and welcome in a discipline deeply entrenched in a debased and debilitating isolation. Yet, 
ironically, his project, though pregnant with rich possibilities, remains polemical 
(principally against other professional academics) and hence barren. It refuses to give birth 
to the offspring it conceives. Rorty leads philosophy to the complex world of politics and 
culture, but confines his engagement to transformation in the academy and to apologetics 
for the modern West.1 
INTRODUC TI ON:  QUESTI ON IN G RORTY  
Philosophy is perhaps unique amongst contemporary forms of human enquiry in still 
having widespread controversy over its role and limits. What is the function of philosophy 
in our social and political lives? How does it relate to these other areas? What can it think 
and what is beyond it comprehension? Does it merely reflect (on) the present? Or can it 
ground or unveil it? Can philosophy prescribe? A plethora of such questions arise in this 
very basic issue in philosophical thought. While he engaged in discussions of many specific 
philosophical, the enduring value of Richard Rorty’s work is exactly on this meta-level. 
Rorty thought philosophy as a project on the whole; he considered its general form and 
function and the historical development therein. Further, he pursued this task in response 
to a crisis in the foundations of philosophical thought which is still compromising the 
status of its enquiry.2 Finally, while the critical object of this thesis, Rorty theorized a novel 
response to this situation that re-envisioned the philosophical project outside of its 
traditional boundaries. It is thus without overstatement that he has been referred to as 
‘the most influential contemporary American philosopher.’3 His work established a new 
                                                 
1 West, Cornel. The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism. London: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1989. p.207 
2 Gutting, Gary. “Rorty’s Critique of Epistemology” in Richard Rorty (eds. Charles Guignon and David R. Hiley). 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003. pp.41-3 
3 Klepp, L.S. “Every Man a Philosopher King” in New York Times Magazine. Dec 2, 1990. – cited in: Gross, Neil. 
Richard Rorty: The Making of an American Philosopher. London: Chicago University Press, 2008. p.5 
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understanding of and limits to the philosophical project, one that formalized its existing 
capacity rather than inventing a new role. As such, it presents both a unique opportunity 
and a danger. Unopposed, his thought reinforces the existing mode of thinking about 
philosophy and politics. Critically confronted, it offers an opportunity to (philosophically) 
engage the present universe of thinking and its limitations. Rorty drastically separates 
philosophy from politics. In his pragmatic reformulation of the limits of philosophical 
enquiry, he reconceptualized its public role within the bounds of the present. He 
formulated an epistemological and political pragmatism designed to maintain the current 
liberal context. By reading his philosophy explicitly through the relation between 
philosophy and politics, this thesis confronts this (contemporary) limitation of our 
intellectual and political lives.   
This introduction situates Rorty within a particular philosophical matrix in terms of 
this question of the roles of and relationship between philosophy and politics. Examining 
several positions in this field, it clarifies how Rorty’s response stands apart from those 
positions. Building upon this frame, it will illustrate both Rorty’s own project with respect 
to this question and the problematic he develops. It will show the various questions of his 
work in order to offer an understanding of the unity behind his thought. The question of 
the relation between philosophy and politics structures his philosophical project. His anti-
foundational response to the crisis of philosophical foundations establishes the 
boundaries of his philosophy. This limitation must be revealed. This thesis argues that an 
ontological engagement with Rorty’s work clarifies the assumptions, mechanisms, and 
boundaries of his thinking. Where Rorty argues that his philosophy frees thought from the 
deadweight of philosophical tradition, it reveals how his response to this crisis results in a 
circumscribed philosophical and political universe. Finally, this introduction will 
demonstrate the failure of the critical literature on Rorty to explicitly engage his work 
from this perspective. While his work has been thoroughly confronted by pragmatists, 
Habermasians, and Analytic philosophers, his Continental critics have failed to engage the 
relation between his philosophy and politics in any depth. The result is that the only 
rigorous, critical engagement Rorty has received has been from perspectives that share 
many of his own problematic assumptions.  
THE STATE OF POLIT ICA L  PH ILOSOP HY:  QUE STI ONIN G THE ROLE OF  TH OUGH T  
Contemporary political philosophy is divided by two questions. What are the role and 
limits of philosophical thought? And, how does this question affect that discipline’s 
relations to politics? Many different visions structure this field. Most are beyond the 
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present discussion which narrows its focus to the positions relevant to Rorty. Thus, this 
section will engage the current matrix of political thought that has attempted to confront, 
in some manner, this problem of the foundations/grounds/metaphysics of philosophical 
and political thought. While such groupings are always problematic impositions, three 
principle clusters can be identified: Pragmatism, (Habermasian) Critical Theory, and post-
foundational thought.4Rorty either explicitly drew on or implicitly engaged with these 
positions. In a sense, his position attempts to think beyond this matrix. This section will 
establish its parameters. Subsequent sections will illustrate Rorty’s own problematic and 
the critical framework for this thesis. In this manner, it will outline the scope of the 
present study and its significance for the relation between philosophy and politics.  
Initially it is important to make a comment on Analytic philosophy and its relevance 
to this question. While Analytic philosophers often criticized Rorty, this literature is not 
the focus of this thesis. Quite simply, Analytic philosophers approach Rorty’s work, and the 
problem of philosophical foundations, from a different angle. They seek to reground 
logical analysis in an analytic method that assures correspondence between thought and 
the world. They seek to overcome, rather than confront, the problem of foundations.5 
Commenting on the Analytic-Continental divide, Rorty notes that the former have a 
fundamentally different conception of philosophy’s role in culture. They continue to model 
philosophy on the natural sciences to establish secure foundations for knowledge. Thus, in 
spite of the divide’s weaknesses, for Rorty, some division between Analytic and non-
Analytic forms of philosophy is necessary. Consequently he offers a division between 
Analytic and “conversational” thought; in this methodological, rather than geographical, 
distinction an opposition to the aforementioned self-image of philosophy defines the 
latter. This broad group seeks confront the lack of foundations and, as a result, has a 
different understanding of philosophy and it relation to politics. Rorty is clear that his 
preference is for, and his work more directed at, this conversational variant.6Thus, here, 
Analytic philosophy will only be encountered insofar as it relates to the development of 
Rorty’s thought.  
                                                 
4 These groupings will be clarified below. They represent selective clusters of similarities rather than defined 
traditions or schools. They are selective in that the similarities emphasized and the differences ignored are 
useful for the present study. However, they also have reality in that their common dynamics are not imposed 
but represent similar responses to the aforementioned question of philosophy and politics.  
5 For example, Brandom, Robert. Rorty and his Critics. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2000. – especially 
the contributions from Daniel Dennett and John McDowell.   
6 Rorty, Richard. “Analytic and Conversational Philosophy” in PCP.p.126 -- As will be discussed in Ch. 1, Rorty’s 
early work was firmly rooted in Analytic debates within the philosophy of mind. The point here is that in his 
larger arguments regarding the relation between philosophy and politics, he was addressing conversational 
thinkers.  
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In opposition to Analytic philosophy, pragmatism, critical theory, and post-
foundational thought all broadly fit Rorty’s conversational model. They have divorced 
philosophy from science (in some manner), and rejected absolute correspondence 
between thought and the world. Their fundamental similarity is deeper than Rorty 
perceives. It is the basic attempt, in some way, to confront the crisis of metaphysics in 
philosophy. In this, they all attempt to address the problem of contingency. However, in 
order to clarify how they do this, it is necessary to generally define what they oppose. 
Foundationalism works on the assumption that society and politics are somehow 
grounded by principles that are 1) undeniable and immune to revision (i.e. universal) and 
2) exterior to the realms of society and politics. It aims at providing foundations that 
transcend the order they ground. These foundations assure stability in the social and 
political structures built on their principles.7 Rorty and others8 problematized this 
assumption within the Analytic context and attempted (in very diverse ways) to reorient 
philosophy away from this task and the notion of perennial problems in philosophy. This 
post-Analytic turn away from foundationalism in the Anglo-American context involved a 
revival of pragmatism.9 
Pragmatism was the first distinctly “American” philosophy. Beginning in the late 19th 
century, it is mainly associated with the work of Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, 
and John Dewey. While these three figures differed greatly, they were united by a focus on 
enquiry, a reorientation of thought to human action, and a rejection of abstract European 
idealisms.10 Falling out of fashion in the 1930s with the rise of Analytic philosophy, both 
pragmatism in general and the work of classical pragmatist was revived by Rorty and 
others in the 1960s and 70s. Three basic issues motivated this renaissance. First, the 
aforementioned crises in the traditional image of philosophy as a transcendental mode of 
enquiry capable of grounding claims to “Truth, Goodness, and Beauty.”11 Second, this 
                                                 
7 Marchart, Oliver. Post-foundational Political Thought: Political Difference in Nancy, Lefort, Badiou and Laclau. 
Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 2007. p.11 -- Analytic philosophy embraced such a position. See; 
Rajchman, John. “Philosophy in America” in Post-Analytic Philosophy (eds. Rajchman, John and Cornel West). 
New York: Columbia University Press, 1985. p.x 
8  Other key figures include: Hilary Putnam, Thomas Nagel, Arthur C. Danto, Stanley Cavell and Donald 
Davidson. For an account of both these figures and the post-analytic movement, see: Post-Analytic Philosophy, 
op cit. 
9 The post-Analytical movement is not exhausted by pragmatism. Rather, many would reject the label. It has 
been only briefly mentioned here because despite it opposition to Analytic thought, it is still centered on 
epistemological issues and rarely strays into the political or the cultural. Nonetheless, the two are deeply 
interconnected. See: Bernstein, Richard J. The Pragmatic Turn. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2010. p.13 
10 For an excellent introduction to the history of Pragmatism up to and including the revival currently under 
discussion, see: Ibid. pp.1-25 – Bernstein notes that pragmatism is a contested tradition. See also his: 
Bernstein, Richard. “American Pragmatism: The Conflict of Narratives” in Rorty and Pragmatism: The 
Philosopher Responds to His Critics (ed. Herman J. Saatkamp Jr.). London, UK: Vanderbuilt University Press, 
1995. 
11 West, American Evasion of Philosophy, op cit. p.3 
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disenchantment led to a concern with the relation between knowledge and power. 
Pragmatism re-politicized American philosophy. Further, it did this within a lens 
emphasizing the role of knowledge in our social practices and political organization. Third, 
these changes returned the focus to human agency. The humanist assumption of an 
autonomous unencumbered agent is not revived, but neither is the post-structuralist 
death of the subject assumed. Human desires and values are primary. This balancing act is 
essential. As Cornel West argues, contemporary pragmatism is defined by two moves. 
First, the move away from Analytic thought involved opening Anglo-American philosophy 
to the European traditions of Marxism, structuralism, and post-structuralism (among 
others). However, this was matched with a turn back to American philosophical thought 
(i.e. pragmatism). This latter development was the acknowledgment of the inability of 
these traditions to address the specific American context. While richer for them, they were 
unable to reinvigorate America’s academic, political and cultural life.12 
The differences between pragmatists and Continentals are most clearly illustrated in 
West’s hint regarding the return to human agency and a distinctly American mode of 
thought. Pragmatists generally, while receptive to contingency, have attempted to retain 
some sense of objectivity. While rejecting the notion of foundations, they still envisage 
philosophy as a way of supporting enquiry. Our knowledge and our norms may be 
embedded in social practices, but those practices (say for enquiry or democratic society) 
are oriented towards the world and our engagement and actions in it. For example, 
regarding truth, Rorty is in the minority of pragmatists in rejecting this notion. For most, 
truth is a necessary human enquiry within a community.13Due to this, pragmatists have 
often allied themselves more with Critical Theory than Continental philosophy.14Critical 
theory in this context refers to the school dominated by Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen 
Habermas. Along with Hans Joas and Axel Honneth, these thinkers have extensively 
connected the intersubjective model of communicative action to pragmatist theories of 
enquiry.15 As notable in general and for Rorty specifically, it should be emphasized that 
                                                 
12 Ibid. p.4 
13 Why this is the case, differs amongst pragmatists. For a selection of articles within this position, see: Misak, 
Cherly. New Pragmatists. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2007. – Misak notes that the “New Pragmatists” 
orient themselves against Rorty. (p.2) 
14 This distinction is admittedly problematic as most of the prominent names of this school are in fact 
Europeans. However, there seems to be a convention that “Continental Philosophy” refers more to the 
philosophy that works within the broad lineage of Nietzsche and Heidegger. What this thesis means by this 
term will be clarified below.   
15 Bernstein, Pragmatic Turn, pp.23-5; Rehg, William and James Bohman. Pluralism and the Pragmatic Turn: 
The Transformation of Critical Theory. London: MIT Press, 2001; and, Couzens Hoy, David and Thomas 
McCarthy. Critical Theory. Oxford: Blackwell, 1994. – Most focus on their similar calls for a ‘nonfoundational, 
self-corrective conception of human inquiry’ combined with a humanist disposition. -- Bernstein, Pragmatic 
Turn, p.x 
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Habermas has been especially significant regarding the issue of foundations. Similar to 
pragmatism, he argues that the proper response to the crisis of foundations is to reground 
our thinking in a procedural rationality. Metaphysics is a totalizing philosophical idealism. 
While it depended on an intrinsically rational world, his post-metaphysical thinking 
constricts rationality to approaches and procedures. Now, ‘what counts as rational is 
solving problems successfully through procedurally suitable dealings with 
reality.’16Importantly, one of the consequences of the proceduralization of reason is the 
disappearance of the appearance-essence distinction. In the absence of a totality, the 
question of essence recedes. This response to the issue of philosophical foundations is 
both key to Rorty’s own response and a major position on this nonfoundational matrix of 
thought.  
Post-foundational philosophy17has confronted the crisis in philosophical foundations 
through turning to ontology and explicitly theorizing the concept of contingency. While 
problematic, it is identified with post-war French philosophy working within Heidegger’s 
legacy18; specifically, with a “Heideggerianism of the Left” that has emerged since post-
structuralism. It is important to emphasize that this cluster is defined against anti-
foundationalism. In totally rejecting the notion of foundations and attempting to 
reformulate philosophy without them, anti-foundationalism remains within the 
foundationalist logic. This is the logic of ‘either/or,’ either there are universal foundations 
or there are not.19 Instead, post-foundational thought grapples with the simultaneous 
necessity and contingency of foundations in political philosophy. Instead of attacking 
“metaphysics," it subverts the terrain on which foundationalism operates. Foundations 
cannot simply be negated. Rather, we must understand how foundations are erected and 
what they authorize.20We must question their ontological status. This “quasi-
                                                 
16  Jürgen Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking (trans. William Mark Hohengarten). Oxford, UK: Polity Press, 
1992. p.35 
17 While post-foundational thought exceeds any particular account, this discussion is indebted to Oliver 
Marchart’s systematic account of this cluster in Post-foundational, op cit. 
18 This tendency among theorists to locate it solely with the Continental tradition is problematic. While this 
can be attributed to fact that this approach stems mainly from Heidegger, it has gone well beyond that 
tradition. For examples of theorists who discuss it in these narrow terms, see: Marchart, Post-foundational, op 
cit; and, Silverman, Hugh (Ed.). Questioning Foundations: Truth/Subjectivity/Culture. London: Routledge, 1993. 
For a dissenting discussion, see: White, Stephen K. Sustaining Affirmation: The Strengths of Weak Ontology in 
Political Theory (Oxford, UK: Princeton University Press, 2000). p.5 
19 Bernstein, Richard J. The New Constellation: Ethical-Political Horizons of Modernity/Postmodernity. 
Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1991. p.8 – see also: Fairlamb, Horace. Critical Conditions. Postmodernity and the 
Question of Foundations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. pp.7-13 
20 Butler, Judith. ‘Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of ‘Postmodernism’, in Judith Butler and 
J. W. Scott (eds), Feminists Theorize the Political, New York and London: Routledge, 1992. p.7 
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transcendental” move depends upon Heidegger’s notion of ontological difference21 and its 
incorporation into a distinction between politics and the political.22 There is an ontological 
dimension to politics (the political) that necessitates an understanding of contingency. The 
ultimate impossibility of a final ground makes all political forms necessarily contingent for 
post-foundational thinkers.23Consequently, the task of political philosophy is to think the 
simultaneous impossibility and necessity of foundations. It must examine the 
consequences of this contingency for our political thought and world.  
It is these three clusters of responses to the problem of foundations that structured 
and guided Rorty’s own response and rethinking the role between philosophy and 
politics.24 As argued subsequently, pragmatism sets the intellectual priorities for Rorty’s 
project. From Critical theory, particularly Habermas, Rorty derived a critique of 
Continental philosophy and a justification of liberal democracy. Finally, from post-
foundational thought, Rorty gained an ally in undermining the foundationalist project of 
Western philosophy.25 Thus, he selectively drew on elements of these clusters, but only to 
serve his project of reconstructing pragmatism and rehabilitating American cultural and 
political life. With this, it is now necessary to turn to the broad shape of that project to 
clarify how this thesis will critically confront Rorty’s philosophy.  
RORTY ’S  P ROBLE MA TIC:  PHI LOSOPH Y A ND POLI TI CS  
The questions of the role and status of philosophical thought and its consequent 
relation to politics structure Rorty’s philosophy. He is perhaps unique amongst 
philosophers in explicitly answering both of these questions and in linking his two 
answers in a common intellectual vision. This is a humbled form of philosophical 
reflection that responds to the problems and needs of its context, rather than discovering 
perennial philosophical questions. In an oft-repeated phrase, for Rorty philosophy should 
be a “good servant, rather than a bad master.”By limiting philosophy’s capacities and 
redrawing its role in human life, Rorty developed a form of thought explicitly designed to 
avoid assumed foundations. In this manner, he sought to avoid the problems he diagnosed 
                                                 
21 This concept is discussed in Ch. 3. Here, it is only necessary to understand it as a distinction between the 
ontological and ontic (i.e. empirical) levels of existence.  
22 Mouffe, Chantal. On the Political. London, UK: Routledge, 2005. pp.8-9 
23 Marchart, Post-foundational, op cit. pp 15, 25-6 
24 This schema is not exhaustive. Rather, it seeks only to situate Rorty amongst his major sources and critics 
regarding the question of the relation between philosophy and politics. Hence, the absence of other groups, 
such as the recent development of “speculative realism,” in this discussion. For an account of this group, see: 
Bryant, Levi; Nick Srnicek, and Graham Harman (eds.). The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and 
Realism. Melbourne: re.press, 2011.  
25Rorty’s exact relation to these groups will be clarified throughout this introduction and thesis.  
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in both Analytic and Continental philosophy.26This section will illustrate the basis of 
Rorty’s philosophical project as well as set the frame for the critical reading offered here.  
While Rorty began his career in Analytic thought, and thus responded to its questions, 
his own understanding of his work is meta-philosophical. For him, a particular 
understanding of the entire philosophical project and its use motivated it. In fact, the 
attempt to fundamentally divide the philosophical and political projects of contemporary 
Western culture frames Rorty’s understanding of his own philosophical career and its 
most central thematic threads. In his autobiographical essay, “Trotsky and the Wild 
Orchids,” he describes his original philosophical project as an attempt to link these two 
projects.27Here, Rorty both articulates his attempt to theorize the relationship between 
philosophy and politics and relates this project to the critical reception of his work. This 
connection is important. Under Rorty’s reading, he is rejected by both the political Left and 
Right, but for contradictory reasons.28 ‘My philosophical views offend the right as much as 
my political preferences offend the left.’29 For the Right, Rorty, as post-modern relativist, 
fails to support the politics of American democracy he advocates. He denies the 
foundations necessary to sustain Western traditions. Ignoring the details of his political 
preferences, they criticize how he argues for his political liberalism. The Left’s criticism is 
reversed. Largely supportive of Rorty’s critique of epistemology, as they share a critique of 
the foundationalism of Western philosophy, their rejection of Rorty stems from his 
politics. For them, Rorty remains within the political discourse of bourgeois elitism. He 
cannot see how the failure of Western rationalism its project of Modernity compromise its 
political project.30 This essay comprises Rorty’s unified response to both critical positions. 
His argument is that these groups assume the philosophical demand to unite philosophy 
and politics within a single vision. They demand that political form flow from 
philosophical principles. For Rorty, these two projects, philosophy and politics, must be 
separate.31 
                                                 
26 Unique for his time, Rorty worked across this divide drawing on strengths and identifying weaknesses in 
both of these traditions.  
27 For an insightful, critical account of this essay, see: Habermas, Jürgen. “Richard Rorty’s Pragmatic Turn” in 
Rorty and his Critics (ed. Robert Brandom). Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2000. And; Voparil, 
Christopher J. Richard Rorty: Politics and Vision. Oxford : Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006. pp.20 
28 While there are exceptions to any generalization of a body of critical literature, Rorty’s characterization is 
largely accurate. See the subsequent discussion of Rorty’s critical literature in this introduction.  
29 Rorty, “Trotsky and the Wild Orchids” in PSH, p. 5 
30 For an example of this sort of critique, see: Eagleton, Terry. “Culture and Barbarism” in CommonWeal 
Magazine. March 27th, 2009. For a dissenting approach to this specific criticism, see; Mouffe, Chantal (ed.) 
Deconstruction and Pragmatism. London, UK: Routledge, 1996. pp.1-2  
31 Rorty, “Trotsky and the Wild Orchids” op cit. p. 4 
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The idea that philosophical originality and political justice are necessarily distinct 
projects is the central lesson of this narrative. The young Rorty, representing Western 
philosophy here, wanted to reconcile the project of social justice with his idiosyncratic 
interests in a single intellectual framework. ‘Insofar as I had any project in mind, it was to 
reconcile Trotsky and the orchids. I wanted to find some intellectual or aesthetic 
framework which would let me… “hold reality and justice in a single vision”.’32 As 
discussed in Ch. 1, this is the platonic desire for a single framework, for certainty in 
knowledge. Rorty’s philosophy rejects such a single total framework(epistemological or 
ontological) for resolving all questions. Instead, in Contingency, Irony and Solidarity 
(hereafter: CIS) he asked what philosophy would be without this desire. For Rorty, this 
argument is an argument for finitude; an argument to acknowledge the limitations of 
human thought. Similar to his strategy in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (hereafter: 
PMN), where he did not argue philosophically against correspondence but sociologically as 
to how justification occurs within human communities,33here Rorty argues that 
reconciling these two projects, attaining universality, is beyond humanity. Further, this 
limitation is unproblematic.34 To attempt more is the desire for certainty, the desire to 
connect your prescriptions to something larger that guarantees their truth. Consequently, 
we cannot argue for our political perspectives. They are entirely situated and bound to a 
cultural and historical context.  The only sense that objectivity can be given is 
intersubjective agreement. What this claim amounts to will be clarified in later chapters.  
Rorty’s reading of the American political context is essential to his understanding of 
the relation between philosophy and politics.35For him, there are two current cultural 
wars in the US. The first, between progressives and conservatives, is irrelevant here.36 The 
second is internal to “the Left.” It is important to emphasize that Rorty’s critical reading of 
this group is central to his politics, his theorization of liberalism, and his understanding of 
the relation between philosophy and politics. Thus, it will be a persistent topic of 
discussion. For present purposes, the connection between this diagnosis and Rorty’s 
division of the political and philosophical projects is essential. For him, two things divide 
the Left: first, opposing interpretations of the value of modernity and the necessity of 
liberalism as piecemeal politics; second, the role of philosophical and theoretical analysis 
                                                 
32 Ibid. p. 7 
33 For my account of Rorty’s epistemological behaviourism, see Ch. 1.  
34 Rorty, “Trotsky and the Wild Orchids” op cit. pp.13-4  
35 This is further developed in Ch. 5 and will only be introduced here.  
36 This research is concerned with the critical gap in Rorty criticism from the Left. This group is largely 
complacent about his philosophy and has failed to critically interrogate the philosophical bases of his political 
positions.  
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in the understanding of politics. Rorty (problematically)37 describes this as a conflict 
between postmodernists and pragmatists.38 The difference between these groups is 
political rather than philosophical. Postmodernists reject the political heritage of the 
Enlightenment. They neither acknowledge its accomplishments nor hope for its future. 
Past celebration and future hope are necessary to progressive politics for Rorty. 
Postmodernists39 assume the inability to reform the liberal democratic present. 
Consequently, they desire a revolutionary politics to overturn the present. This longing is 
the result of their misunderstanding the relationship between philosophy and politics.  
Postmodernists (the Continentally inspired Left) assume the need for philosophical 
analysis to uncovering present society. Essentially, they assume the necessary connection 
of philosophy and politics. Whether uniting a thinker’s philosophical and political work or 
seeking to understand politics through philosophy, they fail to see, in spite of their anti-
foundationalism, that a single vision is not possible.40 Rorty’s does not argue that 
philosophy is socially useless; it has a social role with respect to our vocabularies. 
Philosophy can hold our time in thought. It can be a meta-level articulation of our implicit 
cultural and historical vocabulary. However, he emphasizes that philosophy cannot 
provide a grounding vision or “deep theoretical analyses.”41 As argued in this thesis, this 
aversion to a political role for philosophy is part of Rorty's critique of “depth” and 
“unmasking.” The assumption of a hidden reality beneath some obscuring veil (e.g. 
ideology, phenomena, or beings) relies upon the appearance/reality distinction he 
rejects.42 Consequently, the desire for radical analysis, which pierces a veil, is 
metaphysical. It confuses two projects. When we speak politically (i.e. collectively) we 
must necessarily speak to our time (i.e. the current vocabulary). Only piecemeal 
movements from the present can be made. The desire for a radical perspective is the 
desire for an unveiling, for a new form of thinking beyond our present. While not invalid, 
this is necessarily non-public (i.e. private). It is an exercise in private autonomy not public 
solidarity. The attempt to unite these two projects is the central object of critique in 
                                                 
37 The failure of Rorty to account for socialists and Marxists in his work has been noted. See, for example: 
Geras, Norman. Solidarity in the Conversation of Humankind: The Ungroundable Liberalism of Richard Rorty. 
London, UK: Verso, 1995. p.2 
38 Rorty, “Trotsky and the Wild Orchids” op cit. p. 17 
39 Rorty’s relationship to this term has a long and varied nature. Originally, he embraced the label and its 
rejection of metanarratives and foundational claims (Especially in ORT). While he uses the term here, he also 
rejects it in this volume (See: “Afterward”). Here, it is problematically used to refer to a disparate group of 
philosophers on the Left who are unite by an extensive critique of contemporary Western politics, a refusal to 
base this critique in traditional Western epistemic models, and a desire for dramatic political change.  
40 Rorty, “Trotsky and the Wild Orchids” op cit. p. 19 
41 Ibid. p.19 
42 The rejection of this distinction was discussed above as a key element of Habermasian thought and its 
proceduralization of reason. The connection between Rorty and his perspective is discussed in Ch. 4 
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Rorty’s work. Thus, if there is a philosophical difference between postmodernists and 
pragmatists, it is only within philosophy’s political role. In this manner, the role of 
philosophy and its relation to politics structures both Rorty’s relation to philosophy and 
his reading of contemporary politics.  
Rorty’s philosophical project presents a unique critical opportunity. For him, 
philosophy must speak to the present. Given its epistemological constriction to its present 
social context (i.e. without foundations), it can and should only speak within the current 
vocabulary. It cannot radically reshape or unveil. Progress can only occur on the pace that 
social change actually occurs. He thus placed politics over philosophy in what he called a 
“priority of democracy to philosophy.” Postmodernists, for him, misunderstand the 
relation between philosophy and politics and end up with fallacies in both. Philosophically, 
they assume the ability to unveil and ignore the consequences of the situatedness of our 
thought. Politically, they fail to speak to their present. In contrast, Rorty’s philosophical 
and political projects were firmly entrenched within American narratives (pragmatism 
and the Emersonian individualism respectively).43As argued throughout this thesis, the 
(often intentional) result is that Rorty’s philosophy and politics end up formalizing rather 
than critiquing the present. In revealing the current intellectual and political cultures of 
the modern West (specifically, America) Rorty’s work offers the unique opportunity to 
critically engage the assumptions that lie beneath those entities. While his work can only 
represent one strand within these larger cultural constellations, it is nonetheless, a unique 
opening to critically engage one set of  assumptions that structure the present universe of 
thinking.  
ASSU MI N G THE D IV I DE :  RORTY ’S  CRI TIC AL  RE CEPTI ON  
The state of the critical literature around Rorty makes taking this opportunity all the 
more necessary. While this thesis focuses on connecting Rorty’s philosophical pragmatism 
to his political liberalism, taking Rorty at his word his critics have often failed to do this. 
Specifically, his post-foundational critics have refrained from tracing the connections 
between that pragmatism and liberalism. Rorty specifically works across the Analytic-
Continental divide and engages thinkers from all of the three aforementioned clusters. Yet, 
only his Anglo-American and Habermasian critics make any effort to connect his 
philosophy and politics. His post-foundational critics, finding an unexpected 
nonfoundational ally, abstain from critically engaging his philosophy in detail. They focus 
                                                 
43 West, The American Evasion of Philosophy, pp.199, 203-4 – see also: Gross, Richard Rorty, p.23  
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only on his problematic politics. Consequently, that politics is little understood and Rorty’s 
philosophy is critically engaged only by those clusters that share his politics. He is not 
philosophically criticized from non-liberal paradigms.44 The opportunity to undermine the 
assumptions of the pragmatic and liberal present that Rorty reveals is lost. This section 
will proceed by briefly addressing the critical literature on Rorty from these three clusters 
in order to demonstrate this consistent lacking.  
In the critical literature around Rorty, he finds few friends. His philosophy has, in 
recent years often been treated as an opportunity for casual dismissal and polemical 
attack rather than serious engagement. One commentator has gone as far as to describe 
him as being the necessary object of dismissal in contemporary academic philosophy.  
‘Conservatives demonize him as a threat to civilization as we know it; Marxists and 
other political radicals deplore what they see as his complacent and uncritical 
defence of American capitalism; postmodernists disdain his shallowness compared 
with the arcane profundities of their European gurus; analytical philosophers 
shake their heads sadly at a good man gone to the bad; and the leading liberal 
political theorists for the most part ignore him.’45 
It is significant that the most negative response to Rorty’s work comes from the only group 
he himself claimed membership in. Pragmatists, with few exceptions,46 have rejected his 
work with great invective. Often, these take the reductive form of arguing that Rorty, in 
rejecting objectivity in human enquiry, is not a genuine pragmatist. Further, his “vulgar 
pragmatism” compromises the whole project of human enquiry and our ability to make 
judgments between various beliefs.47 The emphasis from pragmatists is consistently on 
the consequences of his philosophy for enquiry and truth.48Even those who read his work 
                                                 
44 This is not to suggest that there are inherently liberal or non-liberal philosophies. As this thesis will argue, 
while there is no necessary connection between a philosophy and a particular politics, there are intuitive 
linkages and predisposed dynamics. This is all part of the larger argument of this thesis that you cannot 
absolutely divide philosophy and politics. They entail one another. See Ch. 2.  
45Horton, John. “Irony and Commitment: An Irreconcilable Dualism of Modernity,” in Richard Rorty: Critical 
Dialogues (eds. Matthew Festenstein and Simon Thompson). Cambridge, UK: Politiy Press, 2001. p.15 – The 
sheer breadth of this criticism has its disadvantages. It requires many choices and exclusions from this 
discussion. These have been made according to the priorities and questions of this thesis.  
46These include: Richard J. Bernstein, Cornel West, Robert Brandom, and Stanley Fish.  
47 Haack, Susan. “Vulgar Pragmatism: An Unedifying Prospect” in Rorty and Pragmatism: The Philosopher 
Responds to His Critics (ed. Herman J. Saatkamp Jr.). London, UK: Vanderbuilt University Press, 1995. p.139 For 
further examples of this position, see, Haack, Susan. Manifesto of a Passionate Moderate: Unfashionable Essays. 
London, UK: University of Chicago Press, 1998. p.63; Rescher, Nicholas. Realistic Pragmatism: An Introduction 
to Pragmatic Philosophy. Albany, NY: State University Of New York Press, 2000. p.52, 80; Gouinlock, James, 
"What is the Legacy of Instrumentalism? Rorty's Interpretation of Dewey." in Rorty and Pragmatism (ed. 
Herman J. Saatkamp,). Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 1995.; Lavine, Thelma Z,"America & the 
Contestations of Modernity: Bentley, Dewey, Rorty." in Rorty and Pragmatism (ed. Herman J. Saatkamp,). 
Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 1995. Finally, for a series of essays distinguishing Rorty from 
pragmatism, see: Misak, “Introduction” in New Pragmatists, 2007. For a defence of Rorty’s pragmatism, see: 
Bernstein, Richard. “American Pragmatism: The Conflict of Narratives” in Rorty and Pragmatism: The 
Philosopher Responds to His Critics (ed. Herman J. Saatkamp Jr.). London, UK: Vanderbuilt University Press, 
1995. 
48There are some notable exceptions that unify Rorty’s work: Bacon, Michael. Richard Rorty: Pragmatism and 
Political Liberalism. Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books, 2007; Gascoigne, Neil. Richard Rorty: Liberalism, Irony and 
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more sympathetically, repeat this emphasis.49Further, communitarians, obvious political 
opponents to Rorty’s liberalism, based their criticisms within what they perceived as 
Rorty’s misunderstanding of the community, the nature of justification therein, and the 
effect on its members. For example, for Alasdair Macintyre, Rorty ignores how the nature 
of communities allows for rational progress.50Critical theorists have mostly repeated this 
myopia. Habermas famously lumped Rorty in with other “postmodernists” in a rejection of 
their common emphasis on the world-disclosive function of language. 51Thomas McCarthy 
made a similar criticism of Rorty including him in with those philosophers, mainly 
poststructuralists, who only see a negative lack in terms of reason. For both of these 
theorists, it is not contingency but the universality of reason and validity-claims that 
provides for social critique.52However, some critical theorists have attempted to connect 
Rorty’s philosophy to his politics through analyses of the consequences of Rorty’s anti-
theory. Continuing, McCarthy rightly sought the consequences of Rorty’s “depoliticized 
theory and detheorized politics.” However, he failed to develop this connection in any 
detail.53Nancy Fraser repeats this emphasis contending that Rorty builds his 
public/private divide overtop of a division between theory and politics. The former is 
relegated to the solely poetic function of self-creation and the latter is confined to the 
intersubjective sphere where homogenized solidarity is the single goal. This leads to a 
strict dichotomy in Rorty’s philosophy between a romantic, individualized and anti-social 
private sphere and an almost totalitarian political “we.”54 In both of these examples 
however, the connection is only nascent. Neither relates these points to substantial 
                                                                                                                                               
the Ends of Philosophy. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2008; Voparil, Richard Rorty, op cit.  However, these tend 
to remain solely with Anglo-American traditions and thus do not bring significantly different criticisms to bear.  
49 See, for example: Putnam, Hilary. Renewing Philosophy. London, UK: Harvard University Press, 1992. pp.67-
71; Putnam, Hilary. “Richard Rorty on Reality and Justification” in Rorty and His Critics (ed. Robert B. 
Brandom). Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2000. pp.84-6; Williams, Bernard. “Auto-da-Fé: Consequences 
of Pragmatism” in Reading Rorty (ed. Alan Malachowski). Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell Inc, 1990; and, Williams, 
Bernard. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2006. pp.136-8 
50 MacIntyre, Alasdair. “Moral Arguments and Social Contexts: A Response to Richard Rorty” in Hermeneutics 
and Praxis (ed. Robert Hollinger). Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1985. p.223 – Charles 
Taylor also makes this point but he focuses on the relation to the epistemological tradition. He argues that its 
questions will always confront us in some form and thus, ignoring them fails to reflect on how they have 
already been answered. See: Taylor, Charles. “Rorty and Philosophy” in Richard Rorty op cit. pp.175-6; and 
Taylor, Charles. “Rorty in the Epistemological Tradition.” in Reading Rorty (ed. Alan Malachowski). Oxford, UK: 
Basil Blackwell Inc, 1990. p.271 
51 Habermas, Jürgen. The Philosophical Discourses on Modernity: Twelve Lectures. Cambridge, UK: Basil 
Blackwell, 1987. pp.205-7 
52 McCarthy, Thomas. Ideals and Illusions: On Reconstruction and Deconstruction in Contemporary Critical 
Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991. p.5 
53 Ibid. pp.25-6 
54 Fraser, Nancy. “Solidarity or Singularity: Richard Rorty between Romanticism and Technocracy.” in Reading 
Rorty (ed. Alan Malachowski). Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell Inc, 1990. pp.314-5 – see also, Fraser, Nancy. “From 
Irony to Prophecy to Politics: A Response to Richard Rorty” in Pragmatism: A Contemporary Reader (ed. 
Russell B. Goodman). London, UK: Routledge, 1995.  
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analyses of how Rorty connects and dissociates philosophy from politics. They rely on 
simplistic understandings of his anti-theory that do not explore his replacement and the 
political consequences therein.   
Post-foundational theorists share these deficiencies. However, instead of ignoring 
politics, like Critical theorists they provide a political critique that ignores a substantial 
engagement with the details of Rorty’s philosophy. Consequently, they ignore the real 
political effects of his thought. Eager to establish connections across philosophical divides, 
this has led to casual dismissals of philosophical differences in favour of political ones. 
Ernesto Laclau is perhaps the archetypal example here. He notes, ‘though I certainly agree 
with most of Rorty's philosophical arguments and positions, his notion of 'liberal utopia' 
presents a series of shortcomings which can only be superseded if the liberal features of 
Rorty's utopia are reinscribed in the wider framework of what we have called 'radical 
democracy'.’55While Laclau, elsewhere, correctly identifies Rorty’s anti-theory and its 
stabilizing effect on politics, he, like Critical theorists, fails to develop this in an actual 
exploration of the contours of that anti-theory.56 Post-foundational thought’s readings of 
Rorty are compromised by the desire to defend Continental philosophers from Rorty’s 
readings of them.57 Consequently, they focus more on dissociating themselves from his 
politics rather than examining, in depth, the relation between his philosophy and that 
politics. They broadly identify the problems in his thought, but fail to expose its nature and 
mechanism. Why does Rorty reject theory? How do we counter his argument for a social-
practice based understanding of philosophy and politics? In the end, post-foundational 
theorists repeat the aforementioned tendency to superficial readings. The result is that 
Rorty’s critical literature ignores a whole set of questions regarding the detailed 
connections between his pragmatism and liberalism.  
                                                 
55 Laclau, Ernesto. Emancipation(s). London, UK: Verso, 1996. p.105 – for a similar approach, see also: Mouffe, 
Chantal. “Deconstruction, Pragmatism, and the Politics of Democracy” in Deconstruction and Pragmatism (ed. 
Chantal Mouffe). London, UK: Routledge, 1996. 
56 Laclau, Ernesto. “Deconstruction, Pragmatism, Hegemony” in Deconstruction and Pragmatism (ed. Chantal 
Mouffe). London, UK: Routledge, 1996. pp.63-4 See also, Critchley, Simon. “Metaphysics in the Dark: A 
Response to Richard Rorty and Ernesto Laclau” in Political Theory. Vol. 26, No. 6 (Dec 1998). p.813 
57 See: Derrida, Jacques. “Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism” in Deconstruction and Pragmatism (ed. 
Chantal Mouffe). London, UK: Routledge, 1996; Critchley, Simon. “Deconstruction and Pragmatism – is Derrida 
a Private Ironist or  Public Liberal?” in Deconstruction and Pragmatism (ed. Chantal Mouffe). London, UK: 
Routledge, 1996; Norris, Christopher. “Philosophy as Not Just a ‘Kind of Writing’: Derrida and the Claim of 
Reason” in Redrawing the Lines: Analytic Philosophy, Deconstruction, and Literary Theory (ed. Reed Way 
Dasenbrook). Minneapolis, MI: University of Minnesota Press, 1989. p.199; Norris, Christopher. The Contest of 
Faculties: Philosophy and Theory after Deconstruction. London, UK: Methuen, 1985. pp.162-3; and Dooley, 
Mark. “Private Irony vs. Social Hope: Derrida, Rorty and the Political” in Cultural Values, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1999). 
Caputo, John D. “The Thought of Being and the Conversation of Mankind: The Case of Heidegger and Rorty” in 
Review of Metaphysics. Vol. 36 (March 1983). pp.667-8; Caputo, John D. More Radical Hermeneutics: On Not 
Knowing Who We Are. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2000. 
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THE CRIT ICA L  ROLE OF ONTOLOGY A ND MA STE RY:  QUESTI ONIN G THE FRA ME  
The essential lesson of the critical failure is the necessity of a unified, critical 
perspective on his work. Rorty dissociates his philosophy and politics. For him, the latter 
is not grounded in the former.58 However, the absence of grounding does not mean there is 
no connection or relationship as Rorty implies and his critics accept. Rather, there will 
always be a complex and intuitive connection between these elements that necessitates a 
back and forth reciprocity in their mutual dynamics. Thus, as this thesis argues, a critical 
perspective on Rorty (and politics) requires a totalizing perspective that brings unity to 
his work (or its object of critique). Such a unity could be approached from several angles. 
This study’s approach is ontological; it seeks to expose the hidden dynamics of mastery 
that limit both Rorty’s philosophy and his politics.  
While not rejecting the intellectual frameworks of pragmatism and critical theory,59 
this analysis connects significantly with post-foundationalism. They are linked by a shared 
emphasis on Heidegger and the necessity of an ontological perspective for critical, political 
thought.60Beyond this group, there has been a wider ontological turn in recent political 
philosophy. Stephen K. White has dubbed this turn “Weak Ontology.”61  Here, ontology is 
both fundamental and contestable. Its commitments are both unavoidable and 
ungrounded. As in post-foundationalism, this paradox requires a two-fold approach. 
Political philosophy must think, simultaneously, from two different perspectives. In 
confronting radical contingency and the impossibility of a final ground, it must gesture 
beyond our particular moment in order to think an impossibility and necessity that 
exceeds particular determinations. However, it must also realize that this external 
moment can only occur within a particular historical constellation. It must seek also then 
to engage that constellation; establish its limits and borders.62Unlike Rorty, the situated 
nature of thinking does not necessitate ethnocentrism. Rather, as that thinking gestures 
further, we must think its assumptions and its relation to other forms of thought. ‘The 
fundamental conceptualizations such an ontology provides can, at most, prefigure 
practical insight or judgment, in the sense of providing broad cognitive and affective 
orientation. Practice draws sustenance from an ontology in the sense of both a reflective 
                                                 
58 Rorty, Richard. “Response to Ernesto Laclau” in Deconstruction and Pragmatism. p.73 
59 In fact, some positive future pathways for the perspective developed here and these two clusters of thought 
will be indicated in the conclusion.  
60 This connection does not extend to this cluster’s emphasis on the concept of the political. While not rejected 
here, neither is this concept employed.  
61 White, Sustaining Affirmation. Op.cit. p.4-5 – See also, Vattimo, Gianni. The End of Modernity: Nihilism and 
Hermeneutics in Postmodern Culture (trans. Jon R. Synder). Baltimore, US: John Hopkins University Press, 1991.  
62 Marchart, Post-foundational, op cit. pp.31-2 
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bearing upon possibilities for action and a mobilizing of motivational force.’63 Ontology 
predisposes and limits. It guides and structures. This necessitates a total and historical 
perspective. This analysis attempts to justify this broad approach against Rorty’s 
aforementioned division and his rejection of ontology. As in his politics, Rorty formalizes 
many of the implicit reasons with which Anglo-American philosophy rejects the 
ontological perspective. To expose these, this analysis draws intuitively on some of the 
ideas of Post-foundational thought and explicitly on those of Weak ontology. However, in 
opposing Rorty’s very dissociation of politics from philosophy, it returns to the origin of 
both of these forms of thinking. In his ontological mode of questioning, Heidegger 
inaugurated both of these approaches. This study will return to his articulation of that 
critical framework.  It will examine the consequences of Rorty’s division of labour within 
culture; for these consequences provide the limits within which philosophy operates for 
him. Essentially, they limit critical political thinking in general.  
CONC LUSI ON:  CHA RTI NG THE WAY  
The argument will proceed as follows. Ch. 1 situates Rorty within his critique of 
epistemology and his relation to the philosophy of John Dewey. It argues that this critique 
and Rorty’s reading of Dewey reveal a basic social instrumentalism in his philosophy. This 
analysis is continued, in Chs.2 and 3, through an examination of Rorty’s positive pragmatic 
philosophy. By confronting Rorty with Heidegger’s64 critique of mastery the three main 
elements of his pragmatism (contingency, naturalism, and historicism) are illustrated. 
Further, it is through an analysis of these themes that the veiling mechanism of neutrality 
is revealed in Rorty’s work. Through a purported lack of metaphysics, Rorty assumes the 
pragmatic neutrality of his conceptions and obscures their own partiality. He reduces any 
particularity to culture and ignores their philosophical significance. Finally, in Chs.4 and 5, 
this thesis connects Rorty’s anti-ontological pragmatism to his procedural liberalism. It 
argues that the same mechanism of veiling and resulting claim to pragmatic neutrality is 
operative. After metaphysics, philosophy can only be pragmatic (i.e. concrete, piecemeal 
problem-solving) and politics can only be procedural and liberal (i.e. without substantive 
content). In this, liberalism is the political formalization of the acknowledgement of human 
finitude within pragmatic mastery. It is argued here that this position, and Rorty’s 
resulting public-private divide, serves only to exclude non-pragmatic and non-liberal 
forms of political thinking (Ch.4). Through a confrontation with the work of Herbert 
                                                 
63 White, Sustaining Affirmation, op.cit. p.11 
64 William E. Connolly’s development of this critique is also key to these chapters.  
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Marcuse (in Ch. 5), it is clear that Rorty’s political pragmatism restricts thought to the 
present range of options. Rather than providing a basis for political criticism, it extends 
the present thinking. What Rorty offers in his philosophical pragmatism and political 
liberalism is not a method for cultural change, as he claims, but a self-reinforcing mode of 
thought for contemporary liberalism. His attempt to provide for a political framework 
without philosophical predetermination fails. In his pragmatic elaboration and 
justification of mastery (philosophy) and liberalism (politics) he obscures the deep 
connections between his philosophy and his politics. In opposition, this thesis looks to the 
potential of ontological thought to rethink the role and nature of critical, political 
questioning.  
The premise of this thesis is that Rorty’s division between philosophy and politics 
cannot be made when critically engaging a thinker’s work. The problem with the critical 
field around Rorty is that they take him at his word. They seemingly accept that there is no 
theoretical connection between his philosophy (pragmatism) and politics (liberalism). 
While Rorty is correct that his critics all share an implicit demand to connect these two 
elements, the manner in which these critics actually engage Rorty’s work is restricted to 
the aspect they find particularly problematic. Thus, post-foundationalists take his 
philosophical positions for granted and only engage his problematic politics. Contrariwise, 
pragmatists uncritically accept his overall political position (as a liberal) and focus on his 
problematic philosophy and the equally problematic philosophical aspects of his political 
position. As discussed, the critical field fails to trace the detailed thematic and 
argumentative connections between these two aspects. The argument here is that a 
genuine critical perspective on Rorty’s work requires this linkage. This approach allows us 
to see how Rorty’s philosophy and politics are connected by a common philosophical 
disposition of mastery. It also reveals how Rorty’s mastery and the manner in which he 
frames his project, in terms of this division, obscures these connections. This thesis will 
trace these linkages into Rorty’s philosophy and his politics. 
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CH1:  PHILOSOPHY AND AUTHORITY:  RORTY ,  
THE PRAGMATIC D ISPOSITION AND THE OPENING OF 
THOUGHT  
American pragmatism has, in the course of a hundred years, swung back and forth between 
an attempt to raise the rest of culture to the epistemological level of the natural sciences 
and an attempt to level down the natural sciences to an epistemological par with art, 
religion, and politics.65   
 
INTRODUC TI ON:  THE QU ESTI ON OF PRA GMA TI SM  AND  THE  TASK OF INSTRUMEN TA LI SM  
Rorty begins with the question of epistemology (rather than Being), and thus, 
this enquiry shall begin there. However, as argued below, these two questions are by no 
means separable. The question of what is and the question of how we know it are 
inextricably interwoven. There is not a priority between them and yet the modern impulse 
is to exclude and obscure the ontological question. The epistemological question, perhaps 
by being the sole remaining question, gains precedence. Thus, the priority of the 
epistemological question in Rorty is not free of an explicit position on the use of ontology 
in philosophical reflection. As will be illustrated, Rorty’s early work is characterized by an 
exclusion of ontology that persists in his subsequent philosophy. Further, the 
aforementioned preeminence of epistemology comes with an oft-unarticulated claim to 
neutrality, as if a basic ontological understanding is not already operative in and 
participative with the entire debate on knowledge. Rorty’s uniqueness in this debate is 
found in his anti-metaphysical justification for the exclusion of the question of Being. He 
pairs a particular critique of and answer to the question of epistemology (not necessarily 
an anti-epistemological answer but perhaps one that is anti-traditional-epistemology) 
with this rejection. The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate this critique and answer and 
to establish a preliminary connection between them and the rejection of ontology. By 
connecting this rejection to his social instrumentalism (his epistemology), we can begin to 
                                                 
65 Rorty, Richard. “Pragmatism without Method” in ORT, p.63  
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understand how Rorty justifies and explicitly illustrates the ontology of modernity as 
mastery (See: Chs.2 and 3).   
Pragmatism and the critique of Analytic philosophy set the bounds for this 
initial discussion.66 The latter provides the critique of the foundationalism of epistemology 
and ontology and the reconceptualization of knowledge as social (anti-foundationalism) 
while the former, via the work of John Dewey, provides a new model of enquiry 
(pragmatic instrumentalism). The epigraph above summarizes the central tension within 
pragmatism for Rorty. Should all knowledge be raised to the epistemic standards of the 
natural sciences or levelled down to the human sciences? Is the anti-authoritarian 
emphasis of Rorty and pragmatism (developed throughout Chs.1, 2, and 3) better served 
by the levelling up or down of all forms of enquiry? In order to answer these questions in 
Rorty’s work and clarify the relationship between anti-foundationalism and 
instrumentalism, several tasks must be completed. First, the anti-ontological basis of 
Rorty’s early work must be established. Rorty’s initial concerns in the philosophy of mind 
and epistemology and his conclusion that anti-foundational philosophy can only make 
negative epistemological and ontological arguments are essential here. Second, this 
chapter must critically confront the philosophy and instrumentalism of John Dewey and 
Rorty’s appropriation thereof. Dewey is a major source for Rorty’s pragmatism. This 
argument here is that Dewey’s re-conceptualization of the purpose and disposition of 
enquiry appears in Rorty’s work as a basic ontology (of mastery and modernity). Thus, the 
final section must clarify what enquiry and philosophy become for Rorty in light of these 
two key moments of anti-foundationalism and pragmatism. Rorty combines these two 
elements into a social instrumentalism, a de-ontologized, pragmatized, and anti-
metaphysical “method” for coping with the world. The consequences of this re-
conceptualization, only briefly broached here, are a constriction rather than the freeing of 
thought.  
RORTY ,  ANA LYTIC  PH ILOSOPH Y A ND THE ANTI-ONTOLOGICA L TU RN  
Analytic philosophy, epistemology and the philosophies of language and mind 
are the boundaries of Rorty’s early work. They are the inaugural context of his philosophy 
and thus an understanding of his thought with respect to them is necessary. Further, it is 
                                                 
66 Where Ch. 1 concerns Rorty’s engagement with the pragmatic and analytic, Chs. 2 and 3 address his 
confrontation with the Continental.  
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within them that his rejection of ontology and his critique of epistemology originate.67 
While Rorty seemingly began his career as a rising star within the Analytic world, the 
purpose of this section will be to establish a unity to the progression of this early phase 
that illustrates its logical connection to his critique of that world and his embrace of a 
pragmatic form of enquiry.68 Rorty’s early work in the philosophy of mind, his 
involvement in the mind-body problem, and his work on eliminative materialism illustrate 
the beginnings of his turn against both ontology and epistemology. Thus, it is only in light 
of these that his eventual social instrumentalism can be understood.  
The Early Rorty: Eliminating Ontology 
In this introductory chapter for Rorty’s work, it is appropriate to begin with 
Rorty’s own “Introduction” to linguistic philosophy. Editing an influential volume called 
The Linguistic Turn, this introduction establishes his understanding of the basic dynamics 
of philosophical thought and debate. He begins, ‘The history of philosophy is punctuated 
by revolts against the practices of previous philosophers and by attempts to transform 
philosophy into a science – a discipline in which universally recognized decision-
procedures are available for testing philosophical theses.’69 These revolts, for Rorty, 
typically take the form of a new method which allows philosophy to break out of whatever 
stale set of discussions it has stagnated in. In this way, true knowledge will emerge where 
only mere opinion has been present and philosophy will achieve the secure path of a 
science; that is, it will be in a relation of correspondence with the world. This issue of 
method is central to both this chapter and thesis; while Rorty overtly rejects philosophical 
method, he reintroduces a methodological neutrality within his pragmatism and the 
implicit ontology of mastery in his social instrumentalism. He falls victim to his own 
criticism.70 For Rorty, every such (methodological) revolt has failed because it has claimed 
to be “presuppositionless.” This failure is intuitive as it is difficult to conceive a method 
                                                 
67 This reading of Rorty, which locates the fundamental themes of his work within his reaction to Analytic 
philosophy and the philosophy of mind, does read him against his own self-narrative where he posits 
Platonism as the fundamental target of his philosophy. While I am not denying this, I believe Rorty ignores the 
importance of Analytic philosophy and his rejection of ontology in this account. For his account of his work, 
see; Rorty, Richard. “Trotsky and the Wild Orchids” in PSH – For a dissenting account that resonates with my 
position, see; Habermas, Jürgen “Richard Rorty’s Pragmatic Turn” in Rorty and his Critics (ed. Robert Brandom) 
Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2000. 
68 Habermas notes that the fundamental themes of Rorty’s work can only be understood in the context of the 
latter’s, ‘successful career as a young analytic philosopher.’ – Ibid, p.31 
69 Rorty, Richard. “Introduction” in The Linguistic Turn: Recent Essays in Philosophical Method (ed. Richard 
Rorty). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1967. p.1 
70 Interestingly, this is the dynamic Rorty himself sets up for philosophical history in this text. The claim to 
have a presuppositionless method is matched by his own claim to be without method/ontology. The central 
claim of Chs. 1-3 of this thesis is that this claim fails and a particular set of ontological presuppositions enter 
his philosophy.  
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that has not already made certain metaphysical and epistemological conclusions.71 In spite 
of these reflections, Rorty’s own claim to anti-foundationalism and post-metaphysics (i.e. 
to be ontologically presuppositionless) is based within his explicit rejection of method. 
Thus, while he critiques the history of philosophy generally, and linguistic philosophy 
specifically, for presuming to be presuppositionless through correspondence to the world, 
he repeats their gesture of neutrality through a total rejection of this relation and a 
corresponding assumption of lacking presuppositions. How he fails and what 
presuppositions remain within his work is introduced here but only fully explicated 
throughout this thesis.  
Rorty’s rejection of ontology and critique of representational epistemology is 
rooted in his early work in the philosophy of mind. In a series of essays from the 1960s 
and 70s,72 Rorty offered a striking materialist response to the traditional mind-body 
problem that he called eliminative materialism. To contextualize, with the growth of the 
natural sciences from the seventeenth century, the Western intellectual tradition became 
increasingly reliant on naturalistic and materialistic explanations in enquiry. However, 
one area, especially within philosophy, has consistently opposed this trend: the mind. The 
specifically non-physical aspect of humanity, the part that thinks and has “mental” states, 
has consistently eluded reduction to physical processes (if not in whole at least in part). It 
is indicative of its significance that Descartes’ work, which some would say inaugurated 
modern philosophy, begins entirely with the problem of mind-body relations. The 
problem here is that this leaves philosophy with what Neil Gascoigne calls “a split 
conception of ourselves and the world.” ‘We look to science to explain the latter, and 
regard ourselves as but one more set of objects in that world subject to the same 
fundamental laws. And yet, as possessors or instantiations of minds (and thus as knowers), 
we seem not only set apart from the world, but necessarily so in order that the world 
becomes an object of such scientific knowledge in the first place.’73 The mind, as the source 
of the distinctively human capacities for rationality (in some sense), cognition and agency, 
seems to set us apart from the world while the perspective it develops places us in the 
world as an object of science. This paradox, and the associated problem of how the mental 
and physical worlds (usually our bodies in the first instance) interact, is known as the 
“mind-body problem.” In twentieth century Analytic philosophy, which had undergone the 
                                                 
71 Rorty, “Introduction,” op cit.  pp.1-2 
72 See especially: Rorty, Richard. “Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories” in The Review of Metaphysics. 
Vol. 19 (1), 1965; Rorty, Richard. “Incorrigibility as the Mark of the Mental” in The Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 67 
(12), 1970; and – Rorty, Richard. “In Defense of Eliminative Materialism” in The Review of Metaphysics. Vol. 24 
(1), 1970.  
73 Gascoigne, Neil. Richard Rorty: Liberalism, Irony and the Ends of Philosophy. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 
2008. p.19 – his emphasis 
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linguistic turn, this problem remained within a distinction between sentences that utilized 
“mentalistic” or psychological terms and those that deployed physical terms in 
explanations.  
Rorty enters into this debate within this linguistic context. His concern is with 
the nature of concept change and its relation to the mind-body problem. His theory 
develops the “identity thesis.” This view holds that mental terms do refer to actual states 
that can explain behaviour and that people can report. These states elude the mind-body 
problem because they are physical states. The mind is the brain on this understanding. 
‘Sensations are nothing over and above brain processes.’74 The debate here surrounds the 
status of mental events like sensations (the common example here is “pain”). Are 
sensations, in reality, merely physical processes or are they, in some sense, distinct 
belonging to some category referred to as “the mental”? The conflict here is between 
materialistic (where the physical is the only element) and dualistic (where mind and body 
coexist and are related) descriptions. On the identity thesis, which attempts to reconcile 
the two elements, the identity of sensations and brain processes is both strict and 
contingent; it is strict in that they refer to the same thing (and thus share all properties) 
but contingent in that they mean different things. The failure of this view, which has a 
complex history75, is found in its dependence on the assumption of a neutral translation-
point between these two descriptions. This is the context of Rorty’s entrance into the 
debate.76 His theory of eliminative materialism is, oddly, more a theory of language and its 
status than a materialistic understanding of the mind-body issue. This requires some 
unpacking.  
Eliminative materialism begins with two claims. In order to make these 
plausible, Rorty offers an analogy between sensations in contemporary language and 
demons in a hypothetical “primitive” community. Both terms (sensations and demons) 
serve the functions of explaining reality and allowing individuals to report certain states 
(e.g. I am in pain/possessed by demon). Further, both are, for Rorty, in principle 
eliminable. First, it would do no harm to our understanding of persons if we stopped 
thinking of them as things having sensations (or demons). Sensations are not a necessary 
part of our conceptual scheme. Second, getting rid of mental-talk (or demon-talk) would 
not impair our ability to describe and predict the world. The key point here is that, on this 
                                                 
74 Ibid, p.30; originally from, Smart, J.J.C. “Sensations and Brain Processes” in Materialism and the Mind-Body 
Problem (ed. D.M. Rosenthal). Indianapolis, US: Hackett Publishing Company, 2000. p.56   
75 For an account of this development, see: Gascoigne, op cit. pp.30-5. For an overview of materialism in 
Analytic philosophy, see – Bernstein, Richard J. “The Challenge of Scientific Materialism” in Richard Rorty (ed. 
Alan Malachowski), Vol. 1. London, UK: Sage Publications Ltd, 2002.  
76 My concern here is not with whether Rorty is correct in his assessments of the various positions in mind-
body debate, but the way in which these issues affect his later work.  
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argument, the mental form of description is not reduced to physical states, rather mental 
states really are physical states. Mental-talk is merely eliminated in favour of physical 
description.77 For Rorty, this means that no actual ontological claim or change has been 
made. Language and concept change is a process of using different explanatory 
frameworks through the elimination of a vocabulary, not its reduction. Thus, no 
ontological claim (no claim about the existence of particular objects in the world) is 
actually made. Rather, Rorty is opposing the claim made by some that there are, in 
principle, concepts (e.g. “sensations”) that are an ineliminable part of language. However, 
if sensation-talk is, in principle, eliminable and the future does contain the elimination of 
that vocabulary, as Rorty claims, why are those who speak of sensations now not guilty of 
false beliefs? The answer to this question is found in the status of the claim Rorty is 
making. As David R. Hiley notes, Rorty, in his theory of eliminative materialism, is not 
arguing for the superiority of the materialist position. The only positive claims here are 
the in-principle eliminability of all vocabularies and the necessity of alternative 
vocabularies (materialism being the alternative to dualism).78 Materialism, as a contextual 
add-on, is appended by Rorty only in the situation of the mind-body problem. It is his 
“prediction” that materialism will be the dominant explanatory framework for 
neuropsychology in the future. However, he is emphatic that this prediction carries no 
“philosophically interesting” (i.e. ontological) claim. It is merely an extrapolation from 
current social trends in the discipline. In the absence of a neutral set of criteria, something 
we will see Rorty firmly rejects, this is the limit of what we can claim.79 Instead, what 
emerges is an increasingly social understanding of enquiry and the vocabularies within 
which it occurs.  
For Rorty, the temporal dimension of this argument (i.e. the, in principle, future 
eliminability of sensation-talk) reveals the social origin of our linguistic norms. The idea of 
temporality assumes that in concept change, and specifically in the future, certain 
descriptions can become pragmatically needed in certain situations. Suggesting change 
then involves comparing present language with a hypothetical future. This stands in 
complete opposition to the dominant (modern) desire to judge our understandings against 
the antecedently real. Rorty’s distinct contribution is to naturalize the mental ‘by 
                                                 
77 It may be important to note here that this position rests on a distinction Rorty develops between referring 
and explanatory uses in language. This distinction is unnecessary for our present purposes. For an account of 
it, see; “Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories,” op cit. p.28-41 – and; Gascoigne, op cit. pp.53-9 
78 The notion of alternative vocabularies will be further explained in the coming pages. It depends upon a 
rejection of both the given and the distinction between theoretical and nontheoretical terms; arguments Rorty 
draws from Sellars and Quine respectively.  
79 Hiley, David R. “Is Eliminative Materialism Materialistic?” in Richard Rorty (ed. Alan Malachowski), Vol. 1. 
London, UK: Sage Publications Ltd, 2002. pp.108-9 
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construing the normativity of the reporting of sensations in terms of social practices.’80 
How he achieves this will be illustrated throughout this chapter and the following two. For 
present purposes, it is important to emphasize that this is a distinctly anti-ontological 
move in tension with Rorty’s continued endorsement of materialism. Consequently, he 
came to drop the label of materialism (while still broadly endorsing it) for his position in 
favour of being ontologically non-committal. What should be emphasized here is that this 
“turn” grows out of an understanding of concept change, where explanatory frameworks 
are eliminated rather than reduced, which is already attempting to avoid positive 
ontological significance; for Rorty, while explanatory frameworks may make ontological 
claims about the world, his understanding of concept change does not. Rather, it deflates 
the philosophical and ontological significance of our diverse linguistic practices and of 
changes therein. In PMN, it becomes clear that Rorty’s opposition to ontology is based on 
his reading of it as one more privileged framework philosophy can assume in order to 
raise itself to the level of arbiter of human culture. Ontology is based upon the assumption 
of a neutral level of reality and the idea that the mind, as an entity, is capable of mirroring 
(corresponding to) that reality under proper conditions. However, though he 
acknowledges it privileges the interests (prediction and control) of the natural sciences, 
Rorty continues to endorse a qualified materialism (which he calls “physicalism” (see Ch. 
3)). It is part of his proposed future alternative to the metaphor of the mind as a great 
mirror reflecting reality and ensuring knowledge.81 With this materialism there is a 
reformulation of epistemology as social instrumentalism. With this though, it becomes 
necessary to turn to PMN and its behaviourist critique of epistemology (and ontology).  
Epistemological Behaviourism: A Sociological Critique of Philosophy 
Rorty’s main focus in PMN remains the “mind” as a standard of philosophical 
knowledge. He begins this work with a (much contested) statement about how philosophy 
understands itself and its project. It is useful here to quote it at length.  
Philosophers usually think of their discipline as one which discusses perennial, 
eternal problems -- problems which arise as soon as one reflects. Some of these 
concern the difference between human beings and other beings, and are 
crystallized in questions concerning the relation between the mind and the body. 
Other problems concern the legitimation of claims to know, and are crystallized in 
questions concerning the “foundations” of knowledge. To discover these 
foundations is to discover something about the mind, and conversely… Philosophy 
can be foundational in respect to the rest of culture because culture is the 
assemblage of claims to knowledge, and philosophy adjudicates such claims… To 
know is to represent accurately what is outside the mind; so to understand the 
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81 Ibid. pp.72-7  
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possibility and nature of knowledge is to understand the way in which the mind is 
able to construct such representations.82  
With this statement, Rorty connects his work on the philosophy of mind to a general 
critique of the foundational epistemological project of Analytic and Modern Western 
philosophy. For him, the concept of the mind, and the continued dualism between it and 
the body, have maintained the idea that philosophy, exclusive of other disciplines, has 
unique access to the foundations of knowledge. It is the continued assumption that the 
mind alone allows us to “represent” the external world that supports this claim. On this 
understanding, the mind, and philosophy as our unique access to it, is the (only) Mirror of 
Nature; the only neutral method for judging the accuracy of our various representations. 
For Rorty, this image of the mind containing representations which philosophy alone can 
judge captivates that discipline and incorrectly assumes the possibility of a neutral, 
permanent framework for all enquiry (and culture). This assumption is the main target of 
both this work and (perhaps) Rorty’s philosophy as a whole. In its place he offers a 
behavioural and pragmatic account of epistemology. Initially, it is important to engage his 
critique.  
There is a fundamental undercurrent of anti-authoritarianism in Rorty’s 
critique of epistemology. For him, the demand for a theory of knowledge is, in fact, ‘the 
desire for a constraint—a desire to find “foundations” to which one might cling, 
frameworks beyond which one must not stray, objects which impose themselves, 
representations which cannot be gainsaid.’83 This attempt to oppose the epistemic 
authority of the mind, and of extra-social structures in general, is what unites PMN and 
Rorty’s earlier work on eliminative materialism. In both, he is opposing the Cartesian 
definition of the mind in epistemic terms (and its legacy in Modern philosophy). Here, the 
mind has a unique epistemic status due to a structure Rorty refers to as “incorrigibility;” 
the mind has perfect epistemic accessibility as whatever it thinks is occurring in it, is in 
fact occurring in it. Rorty construed this notion in normative terms as a structure of 
authority. Further, as aforementioned, it is one based on a particular way of speaking, one 
he suggested was optional.84  
In Ch. 3 of PMN, Rorty attempts to narrate the development of this authority 
structure, and the desire for authority in general, in the history of Western philosophy. 
The central argument of this chapter is that philosophy, as a distinct discipline, arose with 
the idea that its main task was a “theory of knowledge.” Such a theory was intended to 
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83 Ibid. p.315 
84 Brandom, Robert B. “Vocabularies of Pragmatism: Synthesizing Naturalism and Historicism” in Rorty and His 
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provide foundations to the sciences and all other forms of enquiry. As such, philosophy is a 
recent, modern invention; one that, nevertheless, is a continuation of the Western world’s 
much older quest for certainty. It is important to note that, for Rorty, this transition in 
philosophy, the creation of it as a Fach, was one of a shift from metaphysics to 
epistemology (as the foundation of philosophical enquiry); a move from a concern with 
what was highest (metaphysics) to what was lowest (epistemology), to the “underlying.” 
This process, only completed with Kant, made philosophy foundational and 
epistemological. It made it about the presence of sure knowledge. Further, Rorty’s claim 
here is that this epistemological view of philosophy depends upon seeing knowledge as a 
problem about which we might have a theory. This, for him, is a product of seeing 
knowledge as an assemblage of representations.85 Importantly, this conception (which 
only culminates in the modern period) is based upon a series of perceptual metaphors 
about knowledge. These metaphors link the Platonic and modern projects of philosophy 
(in the quest for certainty) and are the main critical objects of his attack on epistemology.  
The first move in the modern development of philosophy-as-epistemology was 
the creation of the Cartesian mind. The idea of a mental realm distinct from the physical 
both provided a field of enquiry somehow prior to all previous discourse and created the 
possibility of certainty. This new inner-outer distinction (a version of the appearance-
reality distinction) questioned how we know whether our inner representations match 
outer reality. ‘The idea of a discipline devoted to “the nature, definition, and limits of 
human knowledge” – the textbook definition of “epistemology” – required a field of study 
called “the human mind,” and that field of study was what Descartes had created.’86 The 
Cartesian mind created a problem, the possibility of “veil-of-ideas skepticism,” and its 
solution, a discipline and method for certain knowledge. While subsequent philosophers 
often rejected Descartes’ dualism, they accepted his division between the mental and the 
physical as between something conscious and unconscious. Furthermore, his general 
premise, that knowledge of the external world is based on the accuracy of inner 
representations, dominated subsequent thought. It is one of the main targets of PMN. 
Locke, the second major figure in this modern history, furthered this dynamic through 
assuming that the accuracy of representation depends upon the manner of its causal 
production. For Rorty, this is a fundamental confusion of cause with justification. Locke 
thinks of the justification of knowledge as a relation between a representation and an 
object (causal) whereas justification, for Rorty, is always a social product of a relation 
                                                 
85 Rorty, PMN, pp.131-2, 136 – see also; Gutting, Gary. “Rorty’s Critique of Epistemology” in Richard Rorty 
(Charles Guignon and David R. Hiley). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003. p.43 
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between beliefs/representations. For Locke, sense impressions are “knowing” whereas, 
for Rorty, they are merely the causal antecedent of knowing.87 Importantly, within this 
narrative, Kant’s transcendentalization of philosophy retains these two assumptions, 
though it inverts their form. Kant was motivated by the continuing problem of the “veil of 
ideas,” the skepticism that our representations may not match extra-mental reality. For 
him, our ideas (concepts like space, time, causality, etc.) accurately represent the world 
not because they are causally produced by it but because they are the necessary 
conditions of the mind’s noncausal production of the world. We can access this production 
as well as the concepts that provide for it due to Descartes’ assumption that the mind has 
an unproblematic form of access to itself. This account depends upon a division between 
concepts (ideas) and intuitions (sense data). Philosophy is the unique, foundational 
discipline because it has access to the former, which structure representation, whereas all 
others access only the latter and are solely empirical.88 However, for Rorty, in Kant the 
problems of Descartes and Locke persist. From the former, Kant retains the assumption of 
incorrigibility and fails to see it as a normative structure of authority. From the latter, and 
this is the key part of Rorty’s criticism, Kant retains the confusion of cause with 
justification. In rising above mere mechanism (Locke’s experience of sense data) to the 
transcendental interrogation of the basic concepts of thought, Kant continues to assume, 
‘that the logical space of giving reasons – of justifying our utterances and our actions – 
needs to stand in some sort of special relationship to the logical space of causal 
explanation so as to insure either an accord between the two (Locke) or the inability of the 
one to interfere with the other (Kant).’89 For Kant, the basic categories of thought 
structure our experience of the content of the world. Thus, philosophy-as-epistemology 
has the task of interrogating and understanding those categories in order to understand 
when we have true knowledge as representation. As subsequently discussed, Rorty’s 
epistemology of social instrumentalism strictly separates the vocabularies of cause and 
justification.  
Rorty connects this Descartes-Locke-Kant dynamic to the original Platonic 
project of philosophy and it is here that he indicates the larger object of his criticism. For 
him, Plato is the source of the “Platonic Principle,” the idea that ‘differences in certainty 
must correspond to differences in the objects known.’90 This principle follows from 
modelling knowledge on perception and attempting to ground that knowledge. It assumes 
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88 Gutting, op cit. pp.42-3 
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that we need different faculties to attain certainty with different types of objects (e.g. 
numbers vs. physical reality). For Rorty, this principle seems to culminate in the 
necessary-contingent distinction.91 This distinction assumes that there are foundations to 
knowledge because there are truths that are certain due to their causes rather than their 
justifications. This is the product of an analogy between perceiving and knowing which 
holds that knowing a proposition to be true is the result of being caused to by the object. 
The object somehow imposes the proposition’s truth making it necessary. ‘Such a truth is 
necessary in the sense in which it is sometimes necessary to believe that what is before 
our eyes looks red – there is a power, not ourselves, which compels us.’92 When we think 
knowledge and justification as privileged relations to the objects that propositions are 
about, we inevitably move behind reasons to causes, from argument to compulsion. For 
Rorty, this is to reach down to the foundations of knowledge to certainty. While the 
method for and articulation of this has changed in the Plato-Descartes-Locke dynamic he 
articulates (Kant retains the logic but inverts it), the metaphors of depth and sight remain 
the same throughout these thinkers. Whether the foundations of knowledge are found in 
the “Eye of the Soul,” “Eye of the Mind,” and “seeing singular presentations to sense” 
respectively, the desire for certainty and the mechanism of compulsion persist within 
modern philosophy.93 
It is important to understand the progression here. On Rorty’s understanding, 
the ocular metaphors of Platonic philosophy arose with the appearance-reality distinction. 
A unique form of sight was needed to pierce mere appearance and get down to the reality 
of the Forms. With Descartes, and modernity, that distinction is replaced with a 
functionally identical (though perhaps actually inverted) inner-outer distinction. Now the 
imperative is to get out from behind the veil of our ideas to true outer reality. Importantly 
though, this new distinction served the same use; it ‘satisfied the same need to be gripped, 
grasped, and compelled.’94 This is the desire for certainty and authority in epistemic 
structures that Rorty opposes and was discussed above. The problem which motivates this 
continued desire, the problem of the veil95, continues throughout modern (both Analytic 
and Continental96) philosophy (with the exception of Dewey, Wittgenstein and Heidegger). 
                                                 
91 This distinction is the object of Quine’s famous attack which will be address in relation to Rorty’s work later 
in this chapter. As such, I will only introduce it here. 
92 Rorty, PMN, pp.157-8 
93 Ibid. p.159 
94 Ibid. p.160 
95 The Heideggerian language of veiling and unveiling is a central metaphor of Rorty’s work and is key to both 
his rejection of ontology and my critique thereof. As such, it will persist throughout this chapter and thesis.  
96 It should be noted that, for Rorty, much of recent (post-foundational) Continental (particularly French) 
thought shares this dynamic of veiling. This is the basis of his philosophical critique of their “unmasking” and 
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Further, Heidegger’s work is especially significant here as he critiques Western 
epistemology, and the desire for it, as dependent on the assumption that our relation to 
objects is analogous to visual perception. The logic is as follows. The original dominating 
metaphor is that of having our beliefs determined by being brought face to face with the 
object of that belief. The next step is to assume that to understand how to know better is to 
understand how to improve the activity of this quasi-visual faculty, the Mirror of Nature, 
and thus see knowledge as an assemblage of accurate representations. From here, one can 
assume the presence of a privileged class of representations that serve as the foundation 
of knowledge and culture. ‘The theory of knowledge will be the search for that which 
compels the mind to belief as soon as it is unveiled.’97 For Rorty, there is a continuing neo-
Kantian consensus that philosophy-as-epistemology can only be concerned with these 
immutable structures within which knowledge, life, and culture are contained and which 
are set by the privileged representations it studies. This is the end product of the original 
desire to be constrained by the world rather than engage in conversation with our peers. 
Before addressing his conversational alternative in full, it is important to consider both 
Rorty’s model of epistemological behaviourism and his relationship to the work of John 
Dewey.  
Epistemological behaviourism is the basis of Rorty’s anti-ontological and anti-
epistemological understanding of justification as a social practice. He articulates this 
theory within Ch. 4 of PMN in a discussion of the aforementioned Kantian distinction 
between “intuitions” (sense data) and “concepts” (ideas). For him, this distinction has 
occurred within modern analytic philosophy under several pairs all of which have 
participated in sustaining its foundationalist project. Thus, he utilizes Sellars attack on the 
separation of the “given” and “nongiven” and Quine’s on the distinction between the 
“contingent” and “necessary” respectively. All of these distinctions, while emphasizing 
different aspects, amount to a division between the empirical reality we confront and the 
mental/linguistic (depending on your place in Analytic philosophy) realm through which 
it is filtered, between what is added and what is perennial (in terms of structure).98 In this 
manner, Rorty broadly opposes both the empiricist and rationalist methods for 
establishing the foundations of knowledge. The former begins with everyday experience of 
                                                                                                                                               
political critique of their “radicalism.” – Interestingly, Martin Jay has argued that much of 20th century French 
thought has a similar critique of ocular metaphors within philosophy. See: Jay, Martin. Downcast Eyes: The 
Denigration of Vision in Twentieth century French Thought. London, UK: University of Calfornia Press, 1994.  
97 Rorty, PMN, p.163 
98 These distinctions are not the same. I liken them here only to emphasize that, for Rorty, they all serve the 
same function of legitimating the epistemological (Analytic) project of philosophy; See – Ibid. pp.168-9; A third 
articulation of this critique, Davidson’s attack on the division between “scheme and content,” also forms an 
important part of Rorty’s work. However, it occurs after PMN and is outside of the present scope of discussion. 
See ch. 2. 
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the world (given/contingent) while the latter starts with the universal concepts and 
structures of mind/language.99 Importantly, for him, both Sellars’ and Quine’s critiques are 
behavioural and when combined they invalidate the project of mainstream philosophy in 
general. Rorty’s epistemological behaviourism is intended as a therapeutic counter-theory 
to epistemology rather than an actual positive viewpoint. It is an anti-foundational cure 
for a foundationalist epidemic within Modern philosophy, one that stems from the desires 
for authority and compulsion discussed above.  
Epistemological behaviourism is a behavioural critique of the project of 
epistemology. It is a form of holism that results from the basic assumption that 
‘justification is not a matter of a special relation between ideas (or words) and objects, but 
of conversation, of social practice.’100 The premise of this argument is that human 
knowledge can be entirely understood when we frame it within the social justification of 
belief. Consequently, there is no need to see it as accuracy of representation. For Rorty, in 
the absence of representation (the attempt to mirror nature) and the resulting attempt to 
ground knowledge, the whole premise of a metadiscourse capable of arbitrating the 
knowledge claims of all human practices falls away. Epistemological behaviourism 
destroys the quest for certainty. Rorty begins this discussion by arguing that Quine’s and 
Sellars’ works101 raise behaviourist questions about the epistemic privilege that logical 
empiricism claims for certain “privileged representations.” They both, in different ways, 
suggest that assertions are justified by society rather than by the nature of the inner 
representations they express. For Rorty, this invalidates the whole project of attempting to 
identify such privileged representations and, in turn, explains rationality and epistemic 
authority by reference to the social norms of justification. This holist behaviourism claims, 
‘…that if we understand the rules of a language-game, we understand all that there is to 
understand about why moves in that language-game are made.’102 At this point, Rorty 
acknowledges that there is still a glaring question as to why a behavioural explanation of 
epistemic norms is desirable. Does the study of the nature of human knowledge not 
require an ontological explanation that somehow bridges the gap between subject and 
object? Is “warranted assertability” enough? The real division here is between two 
fundamentally different approaches to truth as, on the one hand, what is good to believe, 
and on the other, as contact with reality. Endorsing the former, Rorty is emphatic here 
about the status of the claim he is making. Epistemological behaviourism is not a claim 
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about the adequacy of behavioural explanations of knowledge-claims or mental states. 
Rather, it is a claim about the limits of philosophy in regards to knowledge and truth and it 
is a refusal to attempt a certain sort of explanation; specifically, one that attempts to judge 
the absolute reliability of human reports about their environment. Causal reports of the 
world and its events and conceptual breakdowns of the structure of the mind, neither of 
which are to be rejected here, are only problematic if they are taken as necessary premises 
for grounded knowledge. ‘Behaviourism in epistemology is a matter not of metaphysical 
parsimony, but of whether authority can attach to assertions by virtue of relations of 
“acquaintance” between persons and, for example, thoughts, impressions, universals, and 
propositions.’103 Rorty’s concern here is mainly with the authority we attach to such 
knowledge claims. He is claiming that a relation of correspondence between people and 
reality, mind and world, mental states and sense impressions, is not the source of 
justification within our social world. In this manner, he extends the claims of eliminative 
materialism. His argument is not meant to make an actual ontological claim about 
knowledge, but only a social claim about where the authority of our practices originates.  
The power of this critique of epistemology is found in its opposition to the 
entire project of grounding knowledge. It, in a sense, steps behind specific claims to or 
about knowledge and correspondence to challenge the very logic of a claim in general. The 
issue behaviourism raises in epistemology is not, ‘the adequacy of explanation of fact, but 
rather whether a practice of justification can be given a “grounding” in fact.’104 The 
pragmatist (i.e. Rorty) does not question whether knowledge has foundations but whether 
the claim that it does is coherent. In response to the kneejerk charge of relativism to this 
position and to the idea of the social basis of all epistemology and knowledge-claims, Rorty 
argues that such a charge only make sense from within the assumption of the existence of 
a permanent neutral matrix for enquiry. For him, this is the key assumption behind the 
project of correspondence and the rejection of coherence as the basis of intellectual and 
practical justification. Without this assumption, the idea of reconciling different 
explanatory frameworks and methodologies dissolves. Thus, it is the basic assumption of 
the quest for certainty and the image of the mirror of nature which sustains that quest. 
Rorty emphasizes that his intent here is not to offer some sort of anti-foundational 
polemic, but to cultivate a, ‘…distrust of the Platonic quest for that special sort of certainty 
associated with visual perception. The image of the Mirror of Nature— a mirror more 
easily and certainly seen than that which it mirrors— suggests, and is suggested by, the 
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image of philosophy as such a quest.’105 It is an attempt to get away from the project of 
such an account of human knowledge; of the attempt to reduce (which, contra elimination, 
is an ontological claim) norms to facts. In this, it is specifically anti- or non-ontological (if 
such a thing is possible).  
The necessary question now is how justification is situated within social 
practice. The language of coherence above betrays the only positive point Rorty has about 
justification. As it is social, as our beliefs and norms (even for knowing) in society are a 
dynamic intersubjective body, they relate to one another and must cohere to some degree. 
Thus, for him, justification must be holistic; ‘…nothing counts as justification unless by 
reference to what we already accept, and that there is no way to get outside our beliefs 
and our language so as to find some test other than coherence.’106 Knowledge-claims are 
about the interaction of a belief with a whole host of other knowledge-claims. The primary 
relation of justification is between assertions rather than between an assertion and the 
world. For Rorty, this coherentist model of justification necessitates a certain model of and 
disposition to enquiry. While this will be addressed in much more detail subsequently, it is 
relevant here to comment that this makes all enquiry reformist and gradual. In the 
absence of a neutral framework, ‘criticism of one’s culture can only ever be piecemeal and 
partial --- never “by reference to eternal standards.”’107 All claims become open to 
criticism and challenge and yet we lack the resources for revolutionary shifts as we can 
only ever judge an assertion against those already accepted. In a sense, we must always 
work from our present network of beliefs. While Rorty is somewhat unclear here, he 
seems to suggest that this basic approach to enquiry is methodologically superior because 
it lacks an assumption about the way the world is or the presence of foundations to 
knowledge. ‘If we are not to have a doctrine of “knowledge by acquaintance” which will 
give us a foundation, and if we do not simply deny that there is such a thing as justification, 
then we will claim with Sellars that “science is rational not because it has a foundation, but 
because it is a self-correcting enterprise which can put any claim in jeopardy, though not 
all at once.”’108 Here, he comes close to articulating a theory of methodological neutrality; 
that if we can match in enquiry the manner in which (social) justification actually occurs 
(i.e. without a preconceived relation to the world, an ontology), we will be guaranteed a 
progressive development. We will return to this in the discussion of Rorty’s use of Dewey.  
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The problem with epistemology is that its aforementioned confusion of cause 
with justification has prevented it from taking this pragmatic turn. Robert Brandom 
rightly points out the centrality of the concept of “vocabulary” for understanding Rorty 
here. For the former, the latter’s work is an attempt to get us to adopt the “vocabulary of 
vocabularies.” The fundamental point here is that there is a strict separation for Rorty 
between causal considerations, which are covered by the basic (Newtonian) vocabulary of 
causation, and all vocabularies of justification, which are non-causally related to the world. 
Brandom calls this a, ‘strict separation between the foreign and domestic affairs of 
vocabularies.’109 All justificatory considerations are internal to a vocabulary. The relations 
between a vocabulary, even an empirical one, and the world of things can only be 
understood in causal (non-normative) terms. The world does constrain us, but only 
causally, never normatively. ‘Normative relations are exclusively intravocabulary. 
Extravocabulary relations are exclusively causal. Representation purports to be both a 
normative relation, supporting assessments of correctness and incorrectness, and a 
relation between representing within a vocabulary and represented outside of that 
vocabulary.’110 Further, the language of causes exists within its own vocabulary. Rorty 
acknowledges that the dominant scientific paradigm of causation is itself a way of 
speaking. In that sense, it exists within his meta-vocabulary of vocabularies, which, 
seemingly, does not assume the causal vocabulary’s understanding of the world. Like all 
others, and this will be discussed later on, it is to be instrumentally assessed and is relative 
to a purpose. Nonetheless, Rorty does assume its sufficiency for philosophy. Thus, he 
comments in PMN that, ‘a simple and relaxed physicalism might be the only sort of 
ontological view needed.’111 While his understanding of justification and critique of 
epistemology are specifically non-ontological, Rorty does seem to hint at the 
contemporary relevance (similar to his support for materialism in the mind-body 
problem) of a basic scientific materialism for our understanding of the world. This casual 
commitment is indicative of a basic ontological disposition of mastery in his work that 
comes to colour much of the rest of his philosophy.  
For Rorty, this reconceptualization of justification as behavioural, holistic, and 
strictly separated from causation leaves epistemology without a project. It invalidates the 
assumption of a permanent neutral framework for enquiry, one that would stand between 
all vocabularies, ensuring correspondence with the world. Further, it destroys the hope of 
a philosophical method of accessing that framework. The issue of whether Rorty actually 
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leaves the assumptions of method behind will be addressed further on. The point of this 
section has been to establish a basic rejection of ontology within Rorty’s early work in the 
philosophy of mind and in his critique of epistemology in PMN. For him, our languages and 
practices move, shift, and are justified amongst us without contact with the external world. 
This makes privileging ontology and epistemology pointless. Both are manifestations of 
our continued desire for authority, compulsion, and certainty. Nonetheless, within this 
argument, two subterranean currents have emerged. First, there is a basic commitment to 
materialism in Rorty in spite of this critique. Second, there is the possibility of a new claim 
of methodological neutrality within his holistic, behavioural understanding of social 
justification; for if we can match our institutions and language to the actual process of 
validating knowledge, progress therein would surely be assured. This gradualism and 
reformism will recur throughout this chapter and its successors as one of the locales of 
Rorty’s implicit mastery. It is now necessary to turn to Rorty’s relationship to John Dewey. 
It is the position of this thesis that it is Rorty’s reading of Dewey and his approach to 
knowing that determines much of the tone and disposition of Rorty’s understanding of 
enquiry and the possibility of ontology. Further, Dewey is the source of the social 
instrumentalist strain within Rorty’s work that opens him up to the charge of mastery. For 
it is in him that Rorty finds a de-ontologized conception of knowledge that erases the 
distinction between knowing the world and coping with it.  
DEWEY A ND IN STRU MEN TA LI SM:  THE METH OD  OF MODE RN ITY  
The oeuvre of John Dewey is of such breadth that sweeping generalizations of 
his thought are suspect. However, for present purposes, his philosophy can be 
characterized as a radical re-visioning of the nature of enquiry in order to overcome a 
series of dualisms that have prevented the intelligent control of both our means and our 
ends. This section will engage one of his key texts, The Quest for Certainty (hereafter: 
QC),112 in order to understand the nature of this re-visioning. It is the ideas that Dewey 
develops here that are key to the development of instrumentalism in Rorty’s 
understanding of enquiry.113 Dewey offers a reading of the history of Western philosophy 
that critiques the fundamental prioritization of thought over action, thinking over doing, 
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therein. Instead, he links these two terms in a unified theory of existential enquiry, where 
our experience of the world is understood as an active enquiry into its concrete relations 
done not to understand the world but to control it and provide for our own security 
therein. Knowing becomes doing here and doing is always a matter of mastering. Dewey, 
in reconceptualizing our basic experience of the world in this way, instrumentalizes the 
world. He converts it into a field to dominate. In spite of this, he does oppose and 
overcome several of the philosophical targets that Rorty (and Heidegger) attack (e.g. the 
appearance-reality distinction, the spectator theory of knowledge, and the foundationalist 
project of epistemology). As such his philosophy is characterized as both anti-
metaphysical and modern (as mastery). It is this dynamic in Dewey’s work that Rorty 
draws upon. While this will be addressed subsequently, this section illustrates this 
instrumentalist and anti-metaphysical (as well as anti-ontological) dynamic in Dewey’s 
work. What he offers here is not so much a philosophical method (in the traditional sense) 
but a philosophical disposition toward experience and enquiry. It is a mode, technique or 
approach rather than a set of procedures or rules. Nonetheless, it harbours a covert set of 
ontological assumptions, attitudes, and desires which limit it. Specifically, it attempts to 
replace the quest for certainty with the quest for control. Rorty, in taking on much of the 
spirit, if not the letter, of Dewey’s work appropriates this basic ontological disposition; this 
particularly modern form of mastery.  
The Quest for Certainty: The Division between Knowledge and Action 
Dewey begins QC with a characterization of the basic existential concern of 
humanity. ‘Man who lives in a world of hazards is compelled to seek for security.’114 
Security is our fundamental concern and from it, a basic prioritization of thought over 
action has occurred. For Dewey, this desire for security could be satisfied in two ways. 
First, humans can manipulate the world through the physical arts in order to secure 
themselves. Second, we can augment our ideas to conform them to the immutable and 
certain.115 These comprise a basic distinction between action and thought (doing and 
thinking, activity and intellect116) respectively. For Dewey, in its original context this 
division led to a prioritization of the latter over the former. Where action always involves 
                                                 
114 Dewey, John. “The Quest for Certainty: A Study of the Relation between Knowledge and Action” in The Later 
Works of John Dewey Vol. 4 (ed. Jo Ann Boydston). Carbondale and Edwardsville, US: Southern Illinois 
University Press, 1984. p.3 --(hereafter: QC) – See also; Hickman, Larry A. John Dewey’s Pragmatic Technology. 
Indianapolis, US: Indiana University Press, 1990. p.37 
115 In Ch.2, Connolly identifies these two strategies within the matrix of contemporary political theory as 
strategies of mastery and attunement respectively.  
116 Interestingly, Rorty attempts to subvert another version of this division within Analytic philosophy: the 
division between making (activity) and finding (something to be contemplated). See Chs.2 and 3. 
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change and is thus uncertain and contingent, thought promises the immutable and the 
certain. ‘Practical activity deals with individualized and unique situations which are never 
entirely duplicable and about which, accordingly, no complete assurance is possible. All 
activity, moreover, involves change. The intellect, however, according to the traditional 
doctrine, may grasp universal Being, and Being which is universal is fixed and 
immutable.’117 QC centres on the effects of this division upon our understanding of and our 
methodology for knowledge in modernity. For Dewey, the division between intellect and 
activity is the source of a quest for certainty (in knowledge). This quest can only be 
satisfied within the realm of knowing (rather than doing). Importantly, the history of 
Western philosophy has inherited rather than created this distinction and prioritization. 
While Dewey is somewhat vague on its precise source, he seems to locate its origin in 
religious or spiritualistic desires for supernatural security. Opposed to these were the 
empirical world of everyday objects and skills. Philosophy inherited this religious realm 
(and shared it temporarily) because of its contrast to the empirical arts and its 
corresponding search for some form of “higher Being.”118 What is fundamental here is that 
the quest for certainty is a response to an (structural) existential desire for security. While 
he opposes that quest, for him (as a naturalist119) security is necessary. It is from this basic 
desire that he theorizes an experimental culture aimed not at certain knowledge but 
maximum control.  
Within Dewey’s narrative, this denigration of doing and glorification of 
knowledge is the source of another problematic dualism for Western philosophy: the 
appearance-reality distinction. When thought alone can access the permanent and action 
can only encounter the contingent and mutable, a distinction between a higher reality of 
such permanence and a conditioned empirical world of the everyday becomes necessary. 
The apparent world of the everyday becomes the domain of practical action while rational 
and immutable thought alone accesses the reality that stands behind, beneath or within 
that appearance. For Dewey, this changes the task of knowledge. ‘It [the appearance-
reality distinction] bequeathed the notion… that the office of knowledge is to uncover the 
antecedently real, rather than, as is the case with our practical judgments, to gain the kind 
of understanding which is necessary to deal with problems as they arise.’120 This language 
of “problems as they arise” is fundamental to Dewey’s understanding of the role of enquiry 
in human life. Presently, it is necessary to emphasize that the appearance-reality 
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distinction made knowledge the search for “the Real in itself, of Being in and of itself.” 
Knowing becomes split between its true form, which contemplates the antecedently real, 
and empirical knowledge, which is mere doing. ‘To these two realms belong two sorts of 
knowledge. One of them alone is knowledge in the full sense, science. This has a rational, 
necessary and unchangeable form. It is certain. The other, dealing with change, is belief or 
opinion; empirical and particular; it is contingent, a matter of probability, not of 
certainty.’121 Further, for Dewey, this rejection of the concrete nature of existence and the 
need to confront its conditions was given an ontological justification. Material reality itself 
was denigrated as the lower of two realms. Everything therein is compromised by the 
conditioned nature of mere appearance. It is changeable and uncertain while “reality” 
(some domain of permanence) is certain and unchangeable. Linked to this, practice 
(action), as occurring within the empirical world of appearance, also loses value compared 
to rational contemplation. The former is subject to the contingency and uncertainty of the 
material world while the latter alone is certainty. In this manner, for Dewey, the quest for 
certainty has determined our basic metaphysics.  
The quest and its necessary theory-practice divide engender two philosophical 
assumptions. First, certain knowledge, as that which is in correspondence reality, becomes 
the sole arbiter of the real. What is true in cognition must be real in Being (in reality rather 
than appearance). Thus, the objects of knowledge become the standards of measure for all 
objects of experience. There is a clear hierarchy (structure of authority) here: only the 
fixed and unchanging can be real. In this manner, the quest and its division between 
thought and action have determined our basic ontological and metaphysical 
understanding of the world. Second, as aforementioned, knowledge is solely concerned 
with the antecedently real, with what precedes knowing. As such, it is assumed that the 
object of knowledge is a fixed and complete reality. We can only know that which is 
unchangeable rather than what we participate in producing. On the traditional 
understanding, action cannot entail knowing because knowing is aimed at what precedes 
rather than succeeds itself. For Dewey, the quest for certainty and the division between 
thought and action are so engrained that we do not perceive how it structures our 
understandings of the mind, consciousness, and enquiry. All theories of knowledge assume 
that the operation of enquiry excludes (or aims to) all elements of practical activity that 
may enter into the construction of the known object. Here, ‘[the] “mind” constructs the 
known object not in any observable way, or by means of practical overt acts having a 
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temporal quality, but by some occult internal operation.’122 Dewey’s argument is highly 
reminiscent of Rorty’s. Their common target is the (traditional) conception of knowledge 
as a process internal to the mind that excludes the external world of objects (and social 
groups). This understanding assumes that what is known must be antecedent to the 
mental act of knowing if it is to be unaffected by these acts; otherwise, it would not be 
certain. Enquiry, must not interact with its object. Again, like Rorty (who implicitly draws 
on Dewey in PMN), for Dewey, knowledge on the traditional understanding is modeled on 
vision. The object of knowledge is received but not affected by the act of seeing. It remains 
aloof from the realm of mere material reality. For Dewey this is the “spectator theory of 
knowledge,” where knowing is an event wholly uninvolved with what it knows. This 
understanding of knowledge results from the quest for certainty and the consequent 
division between thought and action.123 
For Dewey, this spectator theory of knowledge, and its basis in the quest for 
certainty and the knowledge-action divide, affects the Western philosophical tradition’s 
understanding of philosophy. Accepting this knowledge-action division, traditional 
philosophy has aimed at accessing the certainty of the former (though the methodologies 
have varied). Consequently, when discussing and supporting human values, philosophy 
has understood them as separate from practical life. Values can only be investigated, 
understood, and justified, if they are made certain; if we can, ‘give intellectual or cognitive 
certification to the ontological reality of the highest values.’124 The contingency 
surrounding action makes it too insecure for the study of the values that should inform 
our purposes. Once again, Dewey makes an assertion regarding humanity’s basic 
existential condition. We are fundamentally concerned with achieving the greatest 
possible security for our values in concrete existence. While the knowledge-action 
distinction, by promising certainty, has comforted by suggesting that there is a higher 
realm that we can access where values are secure, this illusion has obscured the real task 
of philosophy. ‘The chief consideration in achieving concrete security of values lies in the 
perfecting of methods of action.’125 The division between thought and action, and the 
consequent assumption that only pure thought can secure our values, has not contributed 
to the development of intelligent methods of regulation in our values. However, if the 
division is to be overcome and methods of action made essential to the consideration of 
values what remains for the task of philosophy without the problem of reality and 
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knowledge?126 For Dewey, ‘its function would be to facilitate the fruitful interaction of our 
cognitive beliefs, our beliefs resting upon the most dependable methods of enquiry, with 
our practical beliefs about the values, the ends and purposes, that should control human 
action.’127 This project rejects the traditional hierarchy of the knowledge-action distinction 
and the preference for the certain over the contingent and holds that security through 
active control is to be prized over theoretical certainty. However, Dewey insists that this is 
not about placing action over knowledge. Rather, knowledge and action must interact 
where action, directed by knowledge, is a means, not an end in itself. The goal is a more 
secure and widely shared (social) embodiment of values by means of the active control of 
objects through knowledge. Thus, the task of philosophy now concerns the interaction of 
our judgments about which ends to seek with the knowledge of the means for achieving 
them. The main problem to be addressed in this new conceptualization of philosophy is, 
‘the gap in kind which exists between the fundamental principles of the natural world and 
the reality of the values according to which mankind is to regulate its life.’ This is the 
question, ‘how is science to be accepted and yet the realm of values to be conserved?’128  
Modern philosophy assumes that science and values are fundamentally 
separate (if not opposed).129 For Dewey, this assumption is based upon the quest for 
certainty, its distinction between knowledge and action, and its consequent definition of 
the former as the antecedently real. However, when science is seen as intelligent enquiry 
into the structure of actually existing conditions, why is it useless for considering ends and 
the means for their realization? If the validity of values depends on the consequences of 
action, then the problem of a conflict between science and values disappears.130 Thus, a 
fictitious theoretical tension is replaced with practical problems. ‘How shall we employ 
what we know to direct the formation of our beliefs about value and how shall we direct 
our practical behaviour so as to test these beliefs and make possible better ones?’131 In this 
manner, the questions shift from a concern with fundamental Being and knowledge in 
themselves, and the relation of our values therein, to specific plans that address present 
problems and means. For Dewey, there is a gap in the “humane arts.” These disciplines 
have failed to utilize the anti-metaphysical (and anti-ontological) success science has 
enjoyed (in practice if not totally in theory). Further, science has created the means (a 
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methodological disposition) to better judge our values and the instruments to allow us to 
manifest them. The clash between science and other disciplines is a genuine cultural crisis 
for Dewey and yet it is based on a false distinction and unachievable quest. The task then 
is practical and social. We must change the methods and aims of our institutions to allow 
for this new approach to science and values. This very way of articulating the mission of 
philosophy reinforces this practical social emphasis. The point is to shift the debate away 
from correspondence and Being to our values and their ‘public, objective and shared 
consequences.’132 Presently though, it is necessary to further explore this new disposition 
to enquiry to understand its effects in Rorty’s work.  
Dewey’s Social Instrumentalism: Method and Experience 
The remainder of QC draws on the scientific method to articulate a radical 
methodological disposition (rather than a set of rules) for enquiry. Dewey attempts to 
stand behind the scientific method, utilizing its strengths, to derive a basic approach to the 
world. This experimental instrumentalism focuses not on understanding reality but 
controlling its relations. Rather than searching for a rational foundation to all human 
knowledge, Dewey looks for a critical intelligence for engaging the world and 
understanding it through the production of consequences. In this manner, it is an 
instrumentalization and technologicization of reality. Though meant to be an anti-
metaphysical rejection of an ontological approach (in favour of a pragmatic alternative), 
this methodological disposition harbours a particular attitude toward reality which filters 
into Rorty’s philosophy and politics. This posture is mastery, a dominating approach to the 
world which assumes its coherence and understands it as a passive resource. At present, it 
is important to understand that Dewey attempts here, in light of his critique of the quest 
for certainty and the knowledge-action distinction, to offer a non-essentialist, 
instrumentalist form of enquiry. Here, he shifts the focus away from discovering the real to 
putting it at the service of human purposes. Further, those purposes themselves will not 
be free from this method but will be subject to its critical, pragmatic interrogation. It is in 
this that his method comes to colonize his values.  
Dewey’s resulting project in QC is to offer a new method for philosophy that is 
derived from the actual ‘procedure and results of knowing, as this is exemplified in 
physical enquiry.’133 The latter is assumed to be the paradigm of knowing because it is the 
most successful of all branches of intellectual enquiry. Consequently, Dewey attempts an 
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articulation of the basic principles already contained within that method in order to apply 
them further. In fact, his claim goes beyond this. For Dewey, the scientific, experimental 
method from which he draws his instrumentalist methodological disposition is a 
formalization of our basic mode of encountering experience. Thus, once again, he makes 
an existential claim. In the place of a fundamental reality, whether it is the mind or the 
causal influence of sense data (or one of many other options), he offers “experience” as his 
most basic existential (and epistemic) category.134 
 Dewey offered an “empirical naturalism or naturalistic empiricism” that bases 
its understanding of the world, humans, and enquiry in experience. To avoid the flaws of 
previous empiricisms, he attempted a naturalistic reconstruction of that concept. For him, 
experience is the interaction of organisms with their environment. ‘Original objects of 
experience are produced by the natural interactions of organism and environment, and in 
themselves are neither sensible, conceptual nor a mixture of the two. They are precisely 
the qualitative material of all our ordinary untested experiences.’135 Dewey’s naturalism 
intended to overcome the dualistic division of humanity from the world established by 
Descartes and assumed by subsequent philosophy. His situating of humanity and enquiry 
within experience was fundamental to this. Consequently, experience is not a one-way 
process of the physical world acting on humans, but an interaction between an organism 
and its environment. This,  
interaction may be usefully compared to the activity that results in the ingestion 
and digestion of the food that sustains an animal’s life. A plant passively receives 
energy from a source of radiant energy… An animal must actively seek and 
assimilate stores of energy; to identify stores that it can assimilate the animal has 
behavior routines, which allow it to respond selectively to stimuli in its 
environment. To the extent that the physical interactions that an animal undergoes 
result in the reinforcement or the adaptive modification of its routines, these 
interactions constitute its experience.136 
Thus, organism and environment exist in a reciprocity between the latter, which affects 
organisms, and the former who adapt their behaviour within experience. There crosses 
over with Rorty’s critique of epistemology. Both Rorty and Dewey begin with behavioural 
and naturalistic assumptions. In the case of the former, the social aspect of knowledge was 
emphasized; for the latter, the naturalistic basis of experience. However, this connection is 
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deeper. For Rorty and Dewey, language and experience should be understood both socially 
and naturalistically.  
In experience both the environment and the organism are fundamentally active. 
Further, while it may not always be conscious, even in human situations, it is selective. 
Like Rorty, Dewey wants to avoid the category of the “given” (that which precedes human 
engagement with the world and hence is “given”). For Dewey, we are always already active 
in experience adapting ourselves to objects that structure our activity. ‘The subject of 
experience is not a passive recipient of information; it is an active creature adapting its 
routines, modifying its habits, reconfiguring its dispositions, and it is the effect on its 
routines, habits, or dispositions that determines what parts of the given the animal has 
taken (deliberately or otherwise) to constitute its experience.’137 Dewey’s naturalized 
empiricism understands experience as accumulated modifications to habitual responses. It 
is an active modification of habits that responds to a situation. The “situation” is a key 
piece of terminology. In Dewey’s conception, every situation is a combination of 
determinate and indeterminate elements in experience. ‘Every situation has vagueness 
attending to it, as it shades off from a sharper focus into what is indefinite.’138 Due to this 
vagueness, situations are often experienced as problematic because of the obscurity, 
conflict, confusion and doubt they present. The necessary reaction to this indeterminacy is 
enquiry into a resolution of that situation; indeterminacy initiates enquiry and a situation 
can only be resolved when coherence has been brought to that problematic situation 
through action. Success is determined by whether that situation is no longer experienced 
as a problem. This understanding of experience as interaction and the situation as 
indefinite changes our understanding of knowledge for Dewey. ‘Anything that may be 
called knowledge, or a known object, marks a question answered, a difficulty disposed of, a 
confusion cleared up, an inconsistency reduced to coherence, a perplexity mastered… 
Thinking is objectively discoverable as that mode of serial responsive behaviour to a 
problematic situation in which transition to the relatively settled and clear is effected.’139 
Knowledge becomes about a transition within a problematic situation; one that resolves 
that situation through action. It is about change, rather than permanence, which is 
reflected in Dewey’s understanding of the scientific and experimental method. However, 
before addressing this, it is necessary to further examine experience.  
For Dewey, experience, as interactive and inherently problematic, is 
developmental (and self -corrective). ‘We use our past experiences to construct new and 
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better ones in the future. The very fact of experience thus includes the process by which it 
directs itself in its own betterment.’140 Experience, as a problematic interaction, creates 
the possibility of using the past to better the future. It is the possibility of conscious 
engagement (and control) of experience that makes humanity (and modernity) distinctive. 
In this manner, experience itself yields both the method (for knowledge as the resolution 
of a situation) and the disposition to that method. It contains within it the dynamic of 
interaction between organism and environment which constitutes enquiry. Enquiry (i.e. 
science) flows from experience.141  This necessary relation inserts a covert metaphysical 
unity within Dewey’s work. For Richard M. Gale, this metaphysics follows from Dewey’s 
naturalization of enquiry. For him, we experience everything in terms of how it pertains to 
enquiry. This, ‘can best be understood as a transcendental deduction argument for what 
nature must be like if it is to be possible for enquiry to take place in it, and this results in 
an anthropomorphic metaphysics that ensures the world will be a fit place for our 
Promethean endeavours to control nature through enquiry.’142 This anthropomorphic 
metaphysics implicitly assumes a background unity. This unity, which is the source of and 
method for Dewey’s attack on philosophical dualism (e.g. the organism-environment 
divide), is a relic from Dewey’s earlier flirtation with Hegelian absolute idealism. While it 
changed form, from “universal consciousness” to “experience,” it remained throughout his 
work. In its latter manifestation, it assumes that behind all philosophical dualisms (e.g. 
subject-object, organism-environment, and appearance-reality) there is one experiential 
field of enquiry. Experience, ‘is “double-barrelled” in that it recognizes in its primary 
integrity no division between act and material, subject and object, but contains them both 
in an unanalyzable totality.’143 For Gale, this metaphysics of experience144 in Dewey 
explains the persistent lack of clarity in this term. It is a “mystical doctrine,” a quest for 
unity that assumes that all human activity is enquiry into experience. Further, experience, 
as this unity, contains within itself the dynamic of interaction between organism and 
environment Dewey emphasizes and the need for control he sees in science and enquiry. 
Consequently, this Hegelian view of enquiry sees all experience (and its necessary 
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enquiry) as specifically aimed at resolution and coherence; as a means to ending a 
previously mentioned problematic and indeterminate situation.145 As such, it is 
appropriate to turn now to this method and its consequences.  
Dewey draws his instrumentalism from the scientific method of enquiry. For 
him, it is the highest example of the aforementioned process of directing experience, by 
means of experience, to its own betterment. While he emphasized that different concrete 
methods were necessary for different contexts of enquiry146, he believed that the general 
model of experimental thinking he identified was the only (non-metaphysical) 
understanding of knowing. Once again, Dewey articulates this method from within his 
narrative in Western philosophy. Due to the continued division of knowing from doing, we 
live in a “state of divided allegiance,” both unable to secure our values within the 
immutable realm of true knowledge and unwilling to attempt it in the world of everyday 
experience. Consequently, the ‘conditions and forces that dominate in actual fact the 
modern world have not attained any coherent intellectual expression of themselves.’147 
For Dewey, choosing this field of enquiry (science) for the attempt to secure those values 
is both theoretically and practically justified. If it is established that the actual procedures 
of knowing operative in the world, which yield the most reliable results, have fully 
surrendered the distinction between knowing and doing, then that distinction will have no 
justification. Practically, science is the final “controlling and characteristic fact of modern 
life.” Its method of knowledge, through the medium of technology, has pervaded every 
aspect of our social being. Utilizing this superior and non-metaphysical method for 
knowledge promises to secure our values.148  
The essential difference within the scientific method, the key change from pre-
modern to modern knowing, is the role of observation and experience in knowing. Though 
previously excluded from knowledge, now they are fundamental by both providing 
materials to work on and testing the hypotheses of theory. In science, changing events 
within the empirical world cannot be ignored as they previously were. Rather, those 
changes are explicitly the focus. Specifically, how they are connected to one another sets 
the problems for science. It is essential to understand the relations between those changes 
because this allows enquirers to bring them under directed forms of control. For Dewey, 
‘there is a difference between two kinds of experience; one which is occupied with 
uncontrolled change and one concerned with directed and regulated change… Changes of 
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the first type are something to be brought under control by means of action directed by 
understanding of relationships.’149 Where formerly knowledge turned away from change, 
now it is explicitly concerned with both observing and producing changes. The 
experimental method is explicitly built around the introduction of a change in order to 
measure the results in other factors. Through various operations, correlations in changes 
are established and relationships understood. Thus, in the history of knowledge science 
reverses the previous hierarchical division between knowledge and action by adopting the 
‘instruments and doings of directed practice.’150 Consequently, for Dewey, the very nature 
of knowing changes. Knowledge is established through action and involvement in the 
world. It is no longer something we have but something we do.  
Knowledge and experiment as doing is a formalization of our basic existential 
mode for encountering the world. The previous language of relations is essential here. 
They are the “proper objects of science.” Science is uninterested, for Dewey, in direct 
experience. Rather, it is concerned with the ‘happening of those experienced things. For its 
purpose, therefore, they are happenings, events. Its aim is to discover the conditions and 
consequences of their happening. And this discovery can take place only by modifying the 
given qualities in such ways that relations become manifest.’151 Through the procedures of 
experiment science modifies the world to reveal its relations. Further, the prototype for 
experimental science is found in the everyday world of “ordinary procedures.”  
‘When we are trying to make out the nature of a confused and unfamiliar object, 
we perform various acts with a view to establishing a new relationship to it, such 
as will bring to light qualities which will aid in understanding it. We turn it over, 
bring it into a better light, rattle and shake it, thump, push and press it, and so on… 
the intent of these acts is to make changes which will elicit some previously 
unperceived qualities.’152  
However, these ordinary procedures, while informative, are limited. The key event in the 
history of modern knowing is the formalization and instrumentalization of this process. 
This reinforced these “active doings” by providing instruments devised for the purpose of 
disclosing relations not otherwise apparent. Further, it made possible the introduction of a 
far greater range of systematic variation which allowed the relations produced to have far 
greater detail. Enquiry is still thinking for Dewey, but it is a form of thought that exceeds 
the mind. Thinking as experimental enquiry is directed activity, purposeful action which 
varies the conditions of something in order to establish new arrangements. The obvious 
question arises: what determines which operations we enact? For Dewey, it is explicitly 
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the nature of the problem (and situation) to be dealt with. Objects in the world “suggest” 
responses. These operations have been built upon in human history and the formalization 
of it in modernity is a fundamental step in the development of controlled thinking. They 
are the fundamental mode in which humanity adds relations and understanding to the 
world of gross experience it confronts.153 Thus, in a sense, knowledge becomes about 
solving problems given in experience.  
In Dewey’s account, there is little about the conceptual system within which this 
active knowing occurs. How is our knowledge organized and reflected upon? Fundamental 
to Dewey’s re-conceptualization of knowledge as directed activity is a homogenization of 
reality. The experimental approach, where variations are introduced in order to 
understand relationships, requires the introduction of a ‘permanent register of what is 
observed and instrumentalities of exact measurement by means of which changes are 
correlated with one another.’154 Classification and ordering are necessary. Part of 
identifying the problem of a given situation (of gross experience) is reducing its objects to 
data. Data allows comparison by providing a common field through the elimination of 
qualities. Generalized measurements (e.g. of space, time, quantity, etc) are instruments by 
which relations can be established, measured, and compared. They allow diverse things 
with no qualitative similarity to be brought within the same system. Such a process, for 
Dewey, adds relations to experience; these relations are experienced just as the 
qualitatively diverse and irreducible objects of original experiences. Nonetheless, this 
process involves the removal of some qualities in order to provide for a common field. 
Physical science is paradigmatic as it disregards the qualitative heterogeneity of 
experienced objects to include them in one comprehensive homogeneous scheme. This 
allows for their translation and conversion. It is this forced homogenization which is the 
strength of modern science and technology. The homogeneity of scientific objects… is 
precisely the device which makes this indefinitely broad and flexible scheme of transitions 
possible.155 Such homogeneity recalls the aforementioned metaphysical unity within 
Dewey’s philosophy. It is the formalization of that absolute totality for the purposes of 
enquiry. As illustrated throughout this thesis, this philosophical and pragmatic unity has 
dangerous effects on Rorty’s philosophy. Presently however, it is important to emphasize 
that this homogeneity is essential for the ethic of control in Dewey’s project. He is 
emphatic that the test for any system of measurement (any schematization of 
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homogeneity) is functional; it is about whether it allows us to control elements therein to a 
greater degree.156  
The scientific method is the best approach for providing the needed 
homogeneity for control. At this point it may be useful to allow Dewey to summarize his 
theory.  
If we frame our conception of knowledge on the experimental model, we find that 
it is a way of operating upon and with the things of ordinary experience so that we 
can frame our ideas of them in terms of their interactions with one another, 
instead of in terms of the qualities they directly present, and that thereby our 
control of them, our ability to change them and direct their changes as we desire, is 
indefinitely increased. Knowing is itself a mode of practical action and is the way of 
interaction by which other natural interactions become subject to direction.157 
The experimental method is an instantiation of Dewey’s reformulation of knowledge in 
terms of doing. It replaces the quest for certainty with a new quest for control. As 
previously discussed, this approach, for Dewey, derives from our basic existential 
situation and our necessary desire for security. In this manner, he naturalizes control.158 It 
becomes the basic goal of human enquiry and existence (which are analogous). The 
question now is what this basic approach assumes. What is implicit ontological posture of 
Dewey’s work? It is important to clarify that he understood it, like Rorty, as non-
ontological. For him, his philosophy is rooted in the pragmatic rather than ontological; he 
was interested not it what things are (the Real) but what is to be done with them. 
Ontological considerations only detract from effective control.159  
The quest for control involves a different set of assumptions and demands than 
the quest for certainty. Dewey contrasts these two pursuits through comparing Greek and 
Modern science and their radically different approaches. Whereas Greek science treated 
the world as containing objects, modern science understands it as data. Objects are 
finalities. As complete, finished and discreet, we only need to classify and order them for 
understanding. They are confronted passively. In contrast, modern science, which 
substitutes data for objects, is open. Data requires further interpretation. It serves more as 
indications and evidence than as meaningful in itself. Data is “intermediate, not ultimate; 
means, not finalities.” For modern science, the objects previously taken as knowledge (e.g. 
second-order qualities like temperature) are problems for science. They are something to 
be investigated rather than something given. For Dewey, in this, ancient and modern 
science had fundamentally different approaches to knowledge. ‘Greek and medieval 
science formed an art of accepting things as they are enjoyed and suffered. Modern 
                                                 
156 Ibid. p.104 
157 Ibid. p.86 
158 Hickman, op cit. pp.40-1 
159 Ibid. pp.118,124 
  
56  C H 1 .P H I L O S O P H Y  A N D  A U T H O R I T Y  
 
experimental science is an art of control.’160 For Dewey, this changeover is beyond method. 
It is a ‘revolution in the whole spirit of life, in the entire attitude taken toward whatever is 
found in existence.’161 It is an entire refocusing of humanity’s posture towards existence. 
This difference is between an aesthetic attitude that approaches knowing as a divine art to 
one that approaches knowing as secular control. The former is directed to what is already 
in existence, to what is finished and discreet. Before the experimental method, for Dewey, 
change was viewed as an inevitable evil and the realm of change and mutability was 
always cast as inferior to another “changeless” realm. However, the experimental method 
purposefully introduces changes to alter the course of events. Nature becomes something 
to act on rather than something complete. Introducing such changes becomes an 
“instrument of control.”  
Such a perspective is oriented to problems. New material is always a source of 
new questions, relations and opportunities to direct change. It sets new problems to 
overcome; new material to be interrogated. There is an implicit posture towards existence 
here. 'It is now something to be modified, to be intentionally controlled. It is material to act 
upon so as to transform it into new objects which better answer our needs. Nature as it 
exists at any particular time is a challenge, rather than a completion; it provides possible 
starting points and opportunities rather than final ends.'162 Nature is a challenge (to 
modernity). Previously, goods were a welcome fortune. The insight of modernity, for 
Dewey, is to understand that goods can only be secured in existence through regulating 
processes of change. This regulation is dependent upon knowledge of relations. Further, 
while this involves a “despiritualization” of nature mourned by some, it is a necessary 
feature of intentional action. Only objects without fixed forms and ends can serve as 
“plastic” means for human desires. It is obvious here that in spite of Dewey’s anti-
ontological pretentions, he has a distinct ontological posture towards existence. Rather 
than acceptance, he advocates an attitude of challenge. In contrast to the understanding of 
existence as purposeful, he understands it as plastic. Finally, in contrast to a strict subject-
object divide, he offers a view of interpenetrated relations susceptible to human 
manipulation. For Dewey, this transition frees us from a fundamental orientation to the 
past (in the fixed, the complete, and the given) and orients us to the future, to production 
and creation. Like Rorty, the impetus here is to shift our epistemic authority, or “seat of 
                                                 
160 Dewey, QC,  pp.80 
161 Ibid. p.80 
162 Ibid. pp.80-1 
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authority,” away from attuning ourselves to the Real to a new arrangement more 
conducive to our purposes.163  
The authority of the future changes how Dewey thinks about the conflict 
between science and values.164 In articulating his instrumentalism, he was clear that this 
was a generalizable method he offered to all enquiry. In this manner, he raised the rest of 
culture (as in the epigraph above) up to the level of the natural sciences. To summarize, in 
QC Dewey offered a rereading of the history of philosophy that critiques its quest for 
certainty and its division between knowledge and action. Instead, he offers an 
instrumentalist posture derived from the experimental method (which is derived from 
experience). This posture is an active approach to the world which dominates existence 
through an understanding of its internal relations. The ethic here is a quest for control. 
Existence itself is a challenge for humanity; a passive material to be turned to human 
purposes. Importantly, this posture is matched with a basic ontological assumption (and 
formalization) of a hidden unity behind appearance. Dewey’s anti-metaphysical approach 
ultimately fails due to this homogenization. In spite of Rorty’s emphatic support of 
Dewey’s philosophy, he distanced himself from this element. Nonetheless, this assumption 
of a fundamental unity behind appearance insinuates itself into Rorty’s pragmatic 
philosophy and its appropriation of Dewey’s instrumentalism.  
METHOD A ND D I SP OSI TI ON:  RORTY ’S (M IS)AP P ROP RIATI ON OF DEWEY  
Rorty’s relationship with Dewey is controversial. Is the former’s interpretation 
a radical revisioning that updates Dewey in the pragmatist spirit? Or is he Dewey’s 
“oedipal son,”165 reading his philosophical father to destroy his vision? This section 
clarifies what Rorty takes from Dewey. How, as suggested, he interprets and appropriates 
Dewey’s the dynamic of mastery. Dewey is an enigmatic influence on Rorty’s philosophy, a 
pervasive yet elusive presence that Rorty preferred to ambiguously draw on rather than 
dedicate lengthy works to. Nonetheless, a relationship can be discerned. This section 
proceeds through an account of Rorty’s major essays on Dewey, the critical reaction to 
them, Rorty’s responses and how the theme (and conflict) of method is negotiated by 
Rorty in his appropriation of Dewey. It argues that Rorty is aware of his selective (and 
perhaps violent) reading of Dewey and that, for him, this approach is consistent with 
                                                 
163 Ibid. p.231-2 
164 As discussed in Chs.3 and 5, the normative authority of the future is key to Rorty’s philosophy.  
165 Lavine, op cit. p.42 
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Dewey’s own thought. Finally, it suggests that it is in Rorty’s reformulation of method in 
Dewey’s work that the covert mastery of instrumentalism passes from father to son.  
A Divided Dewey: Rorty’s Two Readings 
Rorty identified two opposing currents within Dewey’s thought, an essential 
tension surrounding his relation to metaphysics. On the one hand, Dewey is an iconoclastic 
critic of the history of Western philosophy. He undermines its oldest dualisms and 
radically re-visions its project. On the other hand, Dewey succumbs to a desire for 
metaphysical grounds in his use of science, method and “experience.” Understanding these 
two sides to Rorty’s interpretation illuminates how he draws on the Dewey’s work. 
Specifically, Rorty largely accepts Dewey’s positive philosophy only rejecting its absolutist 
justification. Due to his myopic obsession with the claim of authority in philosophy rather 
than its substantive claims, Rorty fails to see metaphysical elements built into that 
philosophy and the manner in which they colour Dewey’s (and his own) philosophy and 
politics.  
In “Overcoming the Tradition: Heidegger and Dewey” Rorty provides a reading 
of the first Dewey. There, he (along with Heidegger166) is one of the most insightful critics 
of the history of Western philosophy. He asks the question of whether philosophy, given 
its weaknesses, still has a role in the world; whether there should be a discipline that 
retains its name. Yet, Dewey is no mere “mystic or belletrist” in this task because he pairs 
it with a deep analysis of that history. For Rorty, it is a philosopher’s view of and relation 
to the history of philosophy that defines them. One of Dewey’s readings of that history was 
addressed above in the section on QC. Importantly, this account (and Dewey’s in general) 
shares four key criticisms of the philosophical tradition with Heidegger. Both critically 
assess: 1) the distinction, established in ancient philosophy, between contemplation and 
action; 2) the Cartesian problems regarding epistemological skepticism; 3) the distinction 
between philosophy and science; and 4) the further distinction between these two and 
“the aesthetic.”167 Their essential link is their historicism in approaching these critiques. 
‘Both men are trying to encapsulate the whole sequence which runs from Plato and 
Aristotle to Nietzsche and Carnap, set it aside, and offer something new – or at least the 
hope of something new.’168 Essentially, they are both trying to step outside the Plato to 
Nietzsche progression, to “overcome the tradition.” In this manner, both of these thinkers 
                                                 
166 The following only addresses Rorty’s comparison of Heidegger with Dewey. For a detailed treatment, as 
well as references to criticisms of it, see Ch.2. 
167 For Rorty’s account of their similarities here, see:  Rorty, Richard. “Overcoming the Tradition: Heidegger 
and Dewey” in CP. pp.42-6 
168 Ibid. p.46 
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are descendents of Hegel. However, how they use Hegel and historicism defines their 
difference and it is here that Dewey’s is unique for Rorty. Dewey wants Hegel without 
Spirit.169 He wants history without the grand metaphysics of a teleological movement. 
Heidegger, for Rorty, retains the desire for spirit and lionizes the necessary role of 
philosophy in this quest. The difference can be restated as follows. Both Heidegger and 
Dewey expose the metaphysical assumptions of the history of philosophy, how that 
history has failed to speak Being and only ever spoken beings (i.e. failed to grasp the 
perennial in Rorty’s language). For Dewey, the result of this critique must be an increased 
appreciation of the concrete problems in the relations between beings and with the world. 
Heidegger, in contrast, wants to retain the question of Being and the task of philosophy 
without clearly being able to say what these entail. He leaves us with a ‘vacant place,’ with 
‘facing beings-without-Being, with no hint about what [genuine] Thought might be of.’170 
The difference is between their roles for philosophy following this critical history. Rorty 
sides with this Deweyean hope over Heideggerian nostalgia, democracy over poetry. It is 
Dewey’s willingness to redefine philosophy (in this way) that makes him unique.   
In “Dewey’s Metaphysics” Rorty’s offers his second reading of Dewey. Here, he 
argues that there is a tension in Dewey’s work171 between his critique of the history of 
philosophical dualisms and his search for the “generic traits of existence” in experience 
and the method he derives from this. In another place, Rorty articulates this tension as 
between the images of the philosopher as a social activist and politically neutral 
theoretician. For Rorty, the latter signals a continued commitment to objective truth.172 In 
“Dewey’s Metaphysics” he argues that Dewey was never satisfied with this role of cultural 
critic. This desire for more led to the claim to methodological neutrality in Dewey’s work 
through the category of experience.173 It led to ‘his habit of announcing a bold new positive 
program when all he offers, and all he needs offer, is criticism of the tradition.’174 While 
Dewey moved from a philosophy of “psychology as method” to his concept of experience, 
he never stopped assuming that his description of experience described its reality. In a 
sense, Dewey assumed that a critique of dualisms allowed him to offer a non-dualistic 
account of experience. He assumed that, ‘there must be a standpoint from which 
                                                 
169 A phrasing Rorty continues to use for his own appropriation of Hegel. See Ch.3 
170 Rorty, Richard. “Overcoming the Tradition” in CP, p.49  
171 My concern is with how this reading of Dewey affects Rorty’s use of him and not its accuracy. However, I 
will note that critical commentators on Rorty’s use of Dewey rarely address his argument here. Rather, they 
simply bemoan his use of him and not the analysis that leads to it.  
172 Rorty, Richard. “Introduction” in The Later Works of John Dewey Vol. 8 (ed. Jo Ann Boydston). Carbondale 
and Edwardsville, US: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986. p.x  
173 Rorty, Richard. “Dewey’s Metaphysics” in CP, p.72 
174 Ibid. p.78 – Rorty assumes the possibility of a purely negative position.  Chs.2 and 3 will illustrate how such 
a pure negativity fails.  
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experience can be seen in terms of some “generic traits”’ and that this standpoint, ‘would 
resemble traditional metaphysics in providing a permanent neutral matrix for further 
enquiry.’175 With this matrix, Dewey has rejected the social nature of enquiry and claimed a 
foundational form of knowledge. He has rejected his own historicist critique of philosophy 
and assumed an “integrated unity” behind philosophical thought. Further, he has betrayed 
his own insight that the vocabulary of the causal antecedents of knowledge should not be 
conflated with the (social) justifications of our claims to knowledge. ‘To say, as Dewey 
wants to, that to gain knowledge is to solve problems, one does not need to find 
“continuities” between nervous systems and people, or between “experience” and 
“nature.”’176 For Rorty, Dewey confuses two ways of opposing philosophical dualisms. The 
first is to indicate that the dualism was imposed by a tradition for specific cultural reasons, 
but is now useless.177 The second is to describe the phenomenon in a non-dualistic way 
which emphasizes “continuity between higher and lower processes.” This confuses cause 
with justification by attempting to justify within a causal vocabulary rather than a social 
one. The result is a metaphysical commitment to the reality of concepts. Dewey ‘blew up 
notions like “transaction” and “situation” until they sounded as mysterious as “prime 
matter” or “thing-in-itself.”’178 He mistakenly believed that cultural criticism requires 
metaphysics. For Rorty, it is and can only be a form of purely negative (anti-foundational) 
social critique. 
This tension surrounding the status of cultural criticism and the necessity of 
metaphysics leads to an ambiguity within Dewey’s view of method.179 At times he treated 
his method and its social conclusions as contingent formulations, while at others he 
assumed their neutrality. Dewey struggled to find a, ‘middle ground between a well-
defined procedure— a method in the sense of a set of directions for what to do next, 
something like a recipe— and a mere recommendation to be open-minded, undogmatic, 
critical, and experimental.’180 Is this method universally valid or merely better for modern 
secular cultures? Does it describe or reform? For Rorty, Dewey struggled with this tension 
throughout his philosophy. His comments on method, “critical intelligence,” and “reflective 
                                                 
175 Ibid. p.80 – my emphasis 
176 Ibid. p.82 
177 This is the sociological circumvention of Rorty’s epistemological behaviourism discussed above. 
178 Ibid. p.84 
179 In my own account of Dewey’s work above I have not emphasized this ambiguity in the way Rorty does. 
This is not because I disagree but because I wanted to emphasize the metaphysical aspects in order to 
illustrate how they carry over into Rorty’s work.  
180 Rorty, “Introduction” Later Works, op cit.  p.xiii 
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thinking”181 never achieve the methodological neutrality he sometimes assumed. This led 
Rorty to a very particular use of Dewey’s thought. 
Rorty’s Perversion of Dewey: Critical Readings 
Criticisms of Rorty’s use of Dewey tend to a similar form. Rorty, incorrectly and 
without rigour, subsumes Dewey within his own brand of neo-pragmatism. He ignores key 
elements of Dewey’s philosophy and fails to understand the status of his metaphysics. 
Further, he fails to see how method is central to Dewey’s entire philosophy. His 
philosophy is integrated and holistic; it stands or falls together. James Gouinlock argues 
that Rorty introduces a false division into Dewey’s work between his “good” and “bad” 
(anti-foundational and metaphysical) sides. For him, Dewey’s critiques of philosophy are 
based upon his metaphysics.182 R.W. Sleeper continues this noting that those works that 
Rorty rejects (Logic: The Theory of Enquiry and Experience and Nature) are most central to 
Dewey’s philosophy. Consequently, for Sleeper, he misunderstands the fundamental 
nature of Deweyan (and pragmatist) metaphysics.183 Finally, James Campbell argues that 
Rorty fails to see the centrality of method for Dewey’s project of social reconstruction. For 
Dewey, we can only critique and reformulate our social values with the aid of a critical 
methodology. For Campbell, and all of these critics, Dewey would never leave this task up 
to mere “conversation.”184 
Thelma Z. Lavine represents the polemical side of this reception. For her, Rorty 
undermines ‘the philosophy of John Dewey, even while proclaiming himself a Deweyan.’185 
Rorty re-reads Dewey through the linguistic philosophy that followed his work. In this 
way, ‘he can strike from a source unavailable to Dewey.’186 This is the understanding of 
vocabularies mentioned above. Here, languages are tools for coping. They are contextual, 
                                                 
181 For explanations of these concepts, see: Eldridge, op cit. Ch.2 – Eldridge argues that Dewey’s central project 
is the transformation of  practice through critical intelligence and reflective thinking.  
182 Gouinlock, James. “What is the legacy of Instrumentalism? Rorty’s Interpretation of Dewey” in Richard Rorty 
(ed. Alan Malachowski). Op cit. pp.175-6  
183 Sleeper, R.W. “Rorty’s Pragmatism: Afloat in Neuraths’s Boat, But Why Adrift?” in Transactions of the Charles 
S. Peirce Society. Vol. 21 (1), 1985. pp.15-6 
184 Campbell, James. “Rorty’s Use of Dewey” in Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 22 (2), 1984. pp.182-6 – See 
also: Margolis, Joseph. “Dewey’s and Rorty’s Opposed Pragmatisms” in Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce 
Society. Vol. 38 (1/2), 2002; Brodsky, Garry. “Rorty’s Interpretation of Pragmatism” in Transactions of the 
Charles S. Peirce Society. Vol. 18 (4), 1982. p.317; Edel, Abraham. “A Missing Dimension in Rorty’s Use of 
Pragmatism” in Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society. Vol. 21 (1), 1985; Kolenda, Konstantin. “Rorty’s 
Dewey” in The Journal of Value Inquiry, Vol. 20 (1), 1986. p.58. – For a notable exception, see; Conway, Daniel 
W. “Of Depth and Loss: The Peritropaic Legacy of Dewey’s Pragmatism” in Richard Rorty (ed. Alan 
Malachowski), op cit. p.195. Conway argues that Dewey and Rorty are connected by the common attempt to 
build a new intellectual culture. For him, there is a narrative bridge that connects these two. I am arguing that 
this bridge involves a common ontological disposition.  
185 Lavine, op cit. 42 
186 Ibid. p.43 – this is a noticeably odd point as it seems to invalidate all future criticism.  
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contingent and have normative relations within them rather than representative with the 
world. Importantly, there is no neutral method to decide amongst this plurality. ‘By 
delegitimating, levelling-down scientific method, knowledge, and technology as one of the 
many vocabularies coping with specific contingent situations without representing 
anything other than this contingency, Rorty has now delivered a fatal blow to the 
philosopher-father: scientific method is Dewey’s central concept.’187 In spite of her 
hyperbole, Lavine identifies a key difference between Rorty and Dewey. Dewey levels-up 
all enquiry to the standard of the natural sciences, while Rorty levels it down to our anti-
foundational, social-practices. Fundamental to this difference is the nature and status of 
method.  
The Living and the Dead: Rorty’s Defence  
These critics fail to understand the intention of Rorty’s reading of Dewey. Some 
of these failures are due to opposing philosophies. Others are due to some misplaced 
desire to retain a “true Dewey” and malign any selective reading of him. In response to this 
hostile reception, Rorty, in a series of articles, clarified his treatment of Dewey. In “Dewey 
between Hegel and Darwin” he illustrates the major themes of both pragmatism and 
Dewey and how he seeks to develop their strengths while eliding their faults. Rorty notes 
how both William James and Dewey were influenced by both idealism and panpsychism (a 
view regarding the unity of experience in a mental aspect). In fact, Dewey draws his 
language of experience and the unity it assumes from these two sources. In contrast, Rorty 
situates Dewey between Hegel and Darwin in a way that ignores the idealism and 
panpsychism in each.  
I want to suggest an account of this relation that emphasizes Hegel’s historicism 
rather than his idealism, and Darwin’s affinities with positivism rather than 
vitalism. So I shall be describing what Dewey might have and, in my view, should 
have said, rather than what he did say. I shall be constructing a hypothetical 
Dewey who was a pragmatist without being a radical empiricist, and a naturalist 
without being a panpsychist. The point in constructing such a Dewey is to separate 
what I think is living and what I think is dead in Dewey’s thought, and thereby to 
clarify the difference between the state of philosophical play around 1900 and at 
the present time.188 
This is one of Rorty’s clearest statements on his reading of Dewey. He attempts to isolate 
the elements of Dewey’s philosophy that speak to contemporary problems. He utilizes 
Dewey as a tool for his own “situation.” As Rorty himself notes, he is much more interested 
in the philosophical question than the exegetical one regarding Dewey;189 in the wider 
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188 Rorty, Richard. “Dewey between Hegel and Darwin” in Rorty and Pragmatism, op cit. p.3 
189 Rorty, Richard, “Response to Lavine” in Rorty and Pragmatism, op cit. p.52 
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spirit of Dewey’s work, and its continued relevance. It is for this reason that Rorty often 
seemed confused by the hostile reaction to his use of Dewey. For him, his updating and 
utilizing of Dewey for the contemporary context was utterly Deweyean.190   
The question now is how Rorty appropriates Dewey’s work on method. Is there 
anything living there? What spirit does he discern over/against the flawed letter? Rorty is 
emphatic that, in opposition to both Dewey and his commentators, Dewey did not provide 
a method. This is due to the status of what he offers. By attempting to abstract from the 
scientific method, in a manner applicable to all enquiry, Dewey hit an ambiguous middle 
ground between actual techniques and virtuous habits. For Rorty, there is no generalizable 
method in this liminal space. Consequently, he purposefully (mis)reads Dewey as “beyond 
method.” ‘“Critical intelligence” is as good a name as any for being experimental, 
nondogmatic, inventive, and imaginative, and for ceasing to expect, or try for, certainty.’191 
For Rorty, critical intelligence, Dewey’s name for the mode of thought operative within his 
method, is a set of anti-metaphysical virtues rather than a pathway. Further, QC is not 
elaborating a new method of enquiry, but a critique of anti-metaphysical dualisms 
informed by certain values; imperatives to be, ‘reflective but determined, open yet 
disciplined, tolerant but discriminating, bold but not too bold, imaginative yet not 
wild.’192For Rorty, Dewey could have advocated these virtues193 without the language of 
method. Consequently, Rorty prefers to think of Dewey as offering social practices. The 
dispositions that inform our enquiry and our approach to the world are social and 
behavioural. They stretch beyond specific disciplines, like the physical sciences, and affect 
whole cultures. Further, they are, as Dewey hoped, open to critical confrontation in 
practice. The connection between this reading of Dewey and Rorty’s critique of Analytic 
epistemology is obvious. Rorty utilizes the same behavioural circumvention to de-
ontologize Dewey, to substitute ‘linguistic behaviour for “experience.”’194Rorty’s selective 
reading of Dewey illuminates his understanding of enquiry. What Rorty desires is the right 
ethical disposition (orientation) to enquiry, which he draws from Dewey, backed up with a 
non-metaphysical social-practice understanding of enquiry. This, he argues, will allow a 
progressive and reformist (rather than revolutionary) form of enquiry into human culture. 
Thus, in Rorty’s work, this disposition originates in Dewey. However, it affects his entire 
                                                 
190 Rorty, Richard. “Response to Gouinlock” in Rorty and Pragmatism, op cit. p.99 
191 Ibid. p.92 
192 Rorty, “Response to Gouinlock,” op cit. p.94 
193 For Rorty, these dispositions do not have an implicit ontological position whereas, as I argued previously, 
they are attended by a covert metaphysical disposition of mastery. How this infects Rorty’s view of enquiry is 
addressed subsequently.  
194 Rorty, “Response to Gouinlock,” op cit. p.97 
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reformulation of the project of enquiry and philosophy. Rorty’s view of enquiry does in 
some manner rely upon Dewey’s account of experience.195 As a result, the same unity and 
ontology (of mastery) persists. 
PRA GMA TI SM A ND HERMENEUTIC S:  THE ATTITU DE OF METH OD  
In PMN Rorty elaborates an alternative approach to enquiry he dubs, 
“Hermeneutics.”196 Expanding his epistemological behaviourism, he offers a social and 
anti-essentialist image of philosophy. Drawing on Thomas Kuhn, Rorty utilizes an 
understanding of the dynamics of scientific communities in order to understand language 
and culture in general. Here, he finds confirmation of both his behavioural approach and 
the attitudes toward science and the world that he draws from Dewey. He uses these 
elements to re-conceive the task of philosophy and the nature of enquiry; finally, he 
frames both of these projects within a pragmatized methodological disposition “beyond 
method.” This section argues that Rorty reformulates enquiry to overturn a series of 
dualisms that support the metaphor of the mind (and epistemology) as a mirror of nature. 
This reformulation understands disciplines and paradigms as essentially social-linguistic. 
They are unified behavioural islands where justification is always internal and normative 
rather than representational or ontological. Within this reformulation, which he refers to 
as both “Hermeneutics” and “edifying,” Rorty (implicitly) assumes a basic metaphysical 
unity behind reality and (explicitly) affirms the values of Dewey’s mastery and assume its 
neutrality. Consequently, his hermeneutic freeing of thought only constrains questioning. 
These claims will only be broached here. They will be elaborated upon throughout this 
thesis.  
Rorty situates his re-visioning of enquiry within the aforementioned critiques 
of epistemology as the desire for authority and the requisite assumption of a neutral 
framework for enquiry. Hermeneutics is designed to oppose this desire and assumption. 
He is quick to qualify that it is not a name for another method. It is not another, grounded, 
manner of philosophizing. ‘On the contrary, hermeneutics is an expression of hope that the 
cultural space left by the demise of epistemology will not be filled—that our culture 
                                                 
195 Campbell, op cit. p.185 
196 This section does not attempt to judge the appropriateness of Rorty’s use of this term or the strengths of 
the reading of Gadamer upon which it is based. It is only focuses on what hermeneutics means for Rorty in 
order to critique his wider reformulation of philosophy. For critiques of Rorty’s use of Gadamer and 
hermeneutics, see: Rockmore, Tom. “Gadamer, Rorty, and Epistemology as Hermeneutics” in Laval théologique 
et philosophique, vol. 53 (1), 1997; Guignon, Charles. “Saving the Differences: Gadamer and Rorty” in PSA: 
Proceedings of the Biannual Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. Vol. 2, 1982; Bouma-Prediger, 
Steve. “Rorty’s Pragmatism an Gadamer’s Hermeneutics” in Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Vol. 
57 (2), 1989.  
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should become one in which the demand for constraint and confrontation is no longer 
felt.’197 Hermeneutics is an anti-metaphysical disposition (of hope). Further, it is the 
struggle against the assumption of a neutral framework. For Rorty, this idea depends upon 
the supposition of commensurability, the idea that there is a set of rules for achieving 
rational agreement amongst various discourses and statements. Epistemology (which 
stands opposed to hermeneutics), as grounded philosophy, depends upon a neutral 
framework and such universal commensurability. This is the assumption that, in principle, 
all humans can be brought to agree on something. Though this “common ground” has 
taken different forms throughout the history of philosophy, they all assume a neutral 
framework and the requirement of commensurability. In contrast, hermeneutics ‘sees the 
relations between various discourses as those of strands in a possible conversation, a 
conversation which presupposes no disciplinary matrix which unites the speakers.’198 The 
language of conversation, which has caused much ire among critics, is purposely 
behavioural and sociological. He is suggesting that we see enquiry and claims to 
knowledge from the perspective of one examining the social interactions of a community. 
Enquiry is a social practice that must be interpreted hermeneutically and holistically. We 
must move back and forth in a “hermeneutic circle” encountering as many aspects of the 
community as possible while weaving them into a greater unity.  
Rorty’s appropriation of Thomas Kuhn clarifies this understanding of enquiry. 
The former utilizes the latter to undermine a series of distinctions that divide science from 
the humanities (Natur- and Geisteswissenschaften), and to recast those divisions within 
enquiry as merely the result of different moments therein. Thus, where epistemology and 
hermeneutics are usually distinguished by discipline, Rorty matches them to Kuhn’s 
division between normal and revolutionary science. ‘“Normal” science is the practice of 
solving problems against the background of a consensus about what counts as a good 
explanation of the phenomena and about what it would take for a problem to be solved. 
“Revolutionary” science is the introduction of a new “paradigm” of explanation, and thus 
of a new set of problems.’199 Epistemology and hermeneutics correspond to normal and 
revolutionary discourse respectively. Rorty’s point here to remove the epistemology-
hermeneutics divide from the familiar dualisms linked to it (fact-value, objective-
subjective, nature-spirit, sciences of nature-sciences of man). These dualisms are 
hierarchical distinctions of certainty. The former epistemological term is superior to the 
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198 Ibid, p.318 
199 Ibid, p.320; see also – Kuhn, Thomas. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3rd Ed. London, UK: University 
of Chicago Press, 1962. pp.10-12 
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latter hermeneutic one. In contrast, the normal-abnormal distinction concerns the state of 
enquiry in a given community. In normal (epistemological) periods the standards 
regarding defining and solving problems are established. Revolutionary (hermeneutic) or 
abnormal enquiry does not conform to a normal period. It exists outside the dominant 
rules of a community and can potentially destabilize that matrix. Kuhn’s value, for Rorty, 
was to end the pendulum swing of theories of enquiry between realism and idealism 
through a behavioural approach to the question of knowledge. He did this through a 
historical account of the development of scientific paradigms. By illustrating the dramatic 
shifts in basic science, Kuhn demonstrated the enclosed nature of theoretical paradigms. 
He showed how there were no neutral criteria in these movements and invalidated the 
idea of an algorithm for theory-choice.200 Essentially, his analysis was rejeceted traditional 
epistemology. 
Rorty’s purpose in adopting Kuhn’s distinction and rethinking the nature of 
philosophy is not to destroy scientific values or their place in modern Western culture. 
Rather, like Dewey, he wants to preserve those values without their metaphysical baggage, 
to disconnect them from the mirror of nature.201 For him, the idea that science can only be 
justified if it is not a value-based enterprise, stands upon those aforementioned 
distinctions which divide enquiry into hard and soft varieties. These distinctions only 
function with the grounding assumption of a neutral framework or language that assures 
correspondence with the world. For Rorty, assuming such a neutral language “blocks the 
road of enquiry.” By assuming the neutrality of the present, normal discourse, it prevents 
hermeneutically inspired developments. It blocks new paradigms. Rorty is sanguine about 
the continued rise in the levels of prediction and control of the basic physicalism that 
dominates Western scientific thought. Further, he acknowledges the need of it as a 
formational “background story” or narrative, a posited progressive unity, to the 
development of Modernity in general. His concern is with the attempt to give this basic 
understanding epistemological and metaphysical grounding. For him, it requires none. The 
infinite control promised by physical determinism may tell us much but it cannot 
determine the nature of our communities or how we give meaning to our practices 
(science included). This task is specifically non-ontological (like justification). 
Hermeneutics acknowledges this by eschewing claims to knowledge and offering itself 
only as a means to cope with each other and the world.202  
                                                 
200 Ibid. pp.322-5 
201 Ibid. pp.335-6 
202 Ibid. pp.344-5, 354-6 
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Rorty develops a new task for philosophy in light of this understanding of 
enquiry. Drawing on Hans-Georg Gadamer, he offers a vision of thinking that replaces 
knowledge, as the archetypal human activity, with edification. Edification is the task of 
finding new ways of speaking. Hermeneutics is the disposition best suited to this task. 
Further, it is inherently pragmatic. It is, ‘an attitude interested not so much in what is out 
there in the world, or in what happened in history, as in what we can get out of nature and 
history for our own uses.’203 The task is to find new and “more interesting” ways of 
speaking to cope with the world. With this emphasis, Rorty offers an anti-essentialist 
approach to enquiry which levels down the various vocabularies within which enquiry 
occurs. This is another manifestation of Rorty’s anti-authoritarianism. For him, a hierarchy 
among disciplines and vocabularies is a claim to the possibility of a neutral one. All 
vocabularies have implicit values and thus cannot pretend to neutrality. Further, as 
aforementioned, such a claim closes off enquiry (creating new vocabularies). 
Consequently, Rorty offers a new distinction between systematic and edifying philosophy. 
This distinction corresponds more to the distinction between epistemology and 
hermeneutics and should not be confused with the normal-abnormal distinction, which 
can occur within either type of philosophy. Systematic philosophy, which can be 
periodically abnormal, attempts to establish a new hierarchy. It conforms to the basic 
thesis of correspondence and the presence of a neutral way of approaching the world. It 
seeks to reshape all philosophy on its lines and close off enquiry as a result. Edifying 
philosophy, in contrast, is always destructive and parasitic. It is permanently on the 
periphery and refuses to offer a new standard of authority. It is always pure negativity on 
the “meta-level.” ‘Edifying philosophers have to decry the very notion of having a view… 
We might just be saying something—participating in a conversation rather than 
contributing to an enquiry. Perhaps saying things is not always saying how things are. 
Perhaps saying that is itself not a case of saying how things are.’204 Edifying philosophy is 
specifically anti-ontological. Rorty here seems to equate ontology with representative 
epistemology; that the question of “what is” is always a claim to know it with certainty. As 
a result, edifying philosophy must be negative.205 It must critique and contest but must 
never construct because that act, in itself, closes off enquiry.  
Rorty’s opposition to ontology is rooted in his distinction between cause and 
justification. Within epistemology it is assumed that a philosophy of correspondence is 
                                                 
203 Ibid. p.359 
204 Ibid. p.371 – Rorty notes that to attempt to have an anti-essentialist ontology still falls into the same trap of 
systematic philosophy. Enquiry is still blocked. See: Ibid. p.378 
205 See also: Rorty, Richard. “Solidarity or Objectivity” in ORT.  
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necessary to justify physical enquiry because it literally “shoves us around.” For Rorty, this 
confuses, ‘contact with reality (a causal, non-intentional, non-description-relative relation) 
with dealing with reality (describing, explaining, predicting, and modifying it—all of which 
are things we do under descriptions).’206 Coping with reality is always linguistically 
mediated and socially justified. Confusing these two elements, for Rorty, stands behind 
demands for truth and a single way of describing reality. This is the demand for authority. 
It is the desire to have the world “unveiled.” Drawing on Jean-Paul Sartre, Rorty argues 
that this desire is derivative of the desire for a god (or for humans to be a god in truth). In 
opposition, abandoning the hope for a single way of speaking accepts human finitude. 
Thus, the purpose of Rorty’s edifying philosophy is to suggest the proliferation of this 
conversation, not its restriction. He wants more abnormal discourse, not the static 
dominance of one set of rules in one paradigm.207 Edifying philosophy is intended to have 
a freeing function. For Rorty, the epistemological and ontological projects are inherently 
oppressive. They ‘reduce freedom to nature, choice to knowledge.’208 In turn, he seeks to 
block a series of distinctions (fact-value, objective-subjective, nature-spirit) because they 
divide science and non-science. His way of conceptualizing enquiry, between abnormal 
and normal discourse, allows us to see enquiry as only divided by two moments. This 
allows the perpetual “questioning209” out of which all new enquiry (and thought) emerges. 
Normal epistemology blocks enquiry by universalizing the rules and standards of the 
moment. It ignores that continued conversation is the ultimate context of knowledge. 
If all norms of justification are socially specific, we can only improve them 
through what  Rorty calls “cultural anthropology.” Its “empirical-cum-hermeneutic” 
methods engage with the social practices of justification in a given community, the 
empirical facts about their beliefs, desires and processes. Rorty is noticeably brief on the 
details of this in PMN.210 However, in “Pragmatism Without Method” Rorty elaborates a 
version of pragmatic enquiry drawn from his anti-essentialist reading of Dewey and 
indicative of this intentionally destabilizing form of questioning. To return to the epigraph 
of this chapter, Rorty discerns two sides to pragmatism. While both are anti-metaphysical, 
                                                 
206 Rorty, PMN, p.375 
207 Ibid. p.377 
208 Ibid. p.384 
209 This language of openness and questioning is Rorty at his most Heideggerian. One of the arguments of this 
thesis is that Rorty either misunderstands (or reformulates) Heidegger’s point here. Without specifically 
ontological questioning, Rorty fails to provide for the openness he desires. By privileging the empirical and 
pragmatic level of action-oriented decisions, Rorty circumscribes the debate.  
210 Even Rorty’s most sympathetic critics have noted the contrast in PMN between the power of his critique 
and the impoverishment of his hermeneutic alternative. Bernstein Richard J. “Philosophy in the Conversation 
of Mankind” in Philosophical Profiles: Essays in a Pragmatic Mode. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1986. p.77—For 
more critical account of Rorty’s alternative from the Analytic perspective, see; Pettit, Philip.“Philosophy after 
Rorty” in Richard Rorty (ed. Alan Malachowski), op cit. p.56.  
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they are distinguished by their audiences. When pragmatism has been public, its concern 
has been ‘to break through the crust of convention, to favour receptivity to the new rather 
than attachment to the old.’211 Here, it offered the “experimental attitude” as an alternative 
to custom and offered the natural scientist as its model for human culture (and hence was 
given to scientism). Alternatively, for Rorty, pragmatism has different tendencies within 
philosophical communities. Here, they reject scientism and emphasize the holism, 
behaviouralism, and naturalism addressed above (albeit in different forms). The issue 
between these two approaches is the status of method. Rorty clearly supports the latter 
holist pragmatism that wants naturalism without scientism. It retains materialism (i.e. 
Rorty’s physicalism) while rejecting that this necessitates certain methods. For Rorty, 
rejecting representationalism and thinking of beliefs as “rules for action” only requires an 
experimentalist, fallibalist attitude, not a method. The desire for method in pragmatism is 
one more manifestation of the desire for (argumentative) authority. In lieu of 
correspondence, a method for “rational” decision-making provides another ground to 
establish that authority. The only thing that distinguishes vocabularies is their success 
solving problems. Thus, this position wants naturalism, science, and experimental 
instrumentalism without the claim to a unique method. The only elements that can be 
isolated in such an approach are its attitude. For Rorty, this is a willingness to “muddle 
through,” “be contritely fallibilist,” and reweave one’s ideas with the hope of both 
establishing something new and reaching a consensus. It is a process of piecemeal “useful 
adjustments,” rather than large revolutionary shifts, which would require something like a 
method (or ground). This is a disposition, orientation, or posture rather than a set of 
procedures.212 While this position is characterized by a “means-ends rationality,” it is one 
employed towards the reweaving of our beliefs213 in order to better solve our problems. In 
this focus, the orientation towards the problem, Rorty embraces Dewey’s instrumentalist 
language and attitude.  
This holistic version of pragmatism deflates the traditional (epistemological) 
conception of philosophy. It is anti-metaphysical without replacing the space vacated by 
metaphysics with a new source of authority.214 Rather, in contrast to both scientistic 
                                                 
211 Rorty, “Pragmatism Without Method” op cit. p.63 
212 Ibid. pp.66-8 
213 This process of reweaving networks of beliefs characterizes Rorty’s view of enquiry in general. See: Rorty, 
Richard. “Inquiry as Recontextualization” in ORT.  
214 This is well-represented in Rorty’s claim that his version of enquiry is ethical, in that it is an attitude 
oriented to human purposes, rather than ontological, which is oriented toward representing the Real. See: Ibid. 
p.110 
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pragmatism and Continental claims to “depth,”215 it purposefully leaves the cultural role of 
metaphysics open. It allows enquiry to proceed without hierarchies. ‘We would thus fulfill 
the mission of the syncretic and holistic side of pragmatism—the side that tries to see 
human beings doing much the same sort of problem-solving across the whole spectrum of 
their activities.’216 Thus, Rorty socially naturalizes instrumentalism.217 Through a reading 
of Dewey and a reformulation of enquiry along linguistic lines, Rorty makes all activity 
about the instrumental solving of problems and all standards for this social. To avoid the 
metaphysics of representationalist epistemologies, pragmatist scientism, Continental 
claims to depth, and consequent hierarchies in enquiry, Rorty levels down thought to a 
single epistemological level, the pragmatic. Further, for him, a pragmatic disposition of 
mastery that utilizes this insight is best equipped to tackle our contemporary problems. 
While it is discussed in Chs. 4 and 5, it should be understood that this version of 
pragmatism is the best resource to justify the West’s “anti-ideological liberalism” precisely 
because it lacks a foundational claim to authority. For Rorty, contemporary Western 
political theory demands grounding and certainty. In both the claims to scientific 
grounding of Anglo-American philosophy and the unveiling of reality in Continental claims 
to depth, the hope that sustains democracy has been lost.218 The relationship between 
Rorty’s pragmatic philosophy of mastery and his political liberalism is central to this thesis 
which argues that Rorty’s political liberalism and pragmatic mastery mutually justify each 
other. This pragmatism beyond method, this cautious linguistic reformism, is the only non-
metaphysical justification of liberalism. In turn, liberalism is a political formalization of 
this pragmatic attitude. The pragmatic disposition of mastery that denies ontology is 
linked to a liberalism that denies ideology by a naturalization of social instrumentalism. 
They both deny a set of implicit assumptions and constrain their respective spheres of 
debate in spite of Rorty’s language of hermeneutics and openness.  
There is a deep flaw within Rorty’s reformulation of philosophical enquiry. 
Hermeneutics, as an attitude without method and a philosophy without ontological and 
epistemological assumptions, naturalizes Rorty’s social instrumentalism. A new claim to 
authority, priority and neutrality reflexively re-enters. While Rorty attempts to 
                                                 
215 This critical interpretation of Continental philosophy will be addressed in Ch.2 in a discussion of Rorty’s 
critique of unmasking. This is Rorty’s central critique of Continental thought and is thus central to this thesis.   
216 Rorty, Richard. “Pragmatism Without Method,” op cit, p.76 
217 William E. Connolly claims that Rorty institutes a social foundationalism in place of representational 
epistemology. However, Connolly fails to connect this to Rorty’s instrumentalism. See: ““Mirror of America” in 
Politics and Ambiguity. London, UK: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987. p.122 
218 Rorty, Richard. “Pragmatism Without Method,” op cit. p.76-7 – For a thorough connection of Rorty’s 
hermeneutics to his democratic ethos, see; Warnke, Georgia. “Rorty’s Democratic Hermeneutics” in Richard 
Rorty, op cit. pp.114-22 
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hermeneutically open the field of questioning to perpetual abnormality, his 
circumscription to the pragmatic closes off as much enquiry as it opens. He fails to 
understand that claims to authority and the resulting closure of discourse can occur on 
multiple levels.219 Circumscribing the ontological naturalizes assumptions and structures 
the field of discourse. Further, Rorty’s claim to be successfully anti-ontological fails here. 
Edifying philosophy is clearly a different way of approaching philosophy. Hermeneutics, 
while it may not have specific rules or methods, is a disposition with real consequences. 
The distinction between systematic and edifying philosophy, as two different moments 
within abnormality, fails because there are no purely negative moments. There is no 
attitude without ontology. Rather, there is the ontological disposition of mastery here. 
Though we only get hints, it is clear that this approach is characterized by a piecemeal 
reformism based upon the assumptions of scientific materialism (for the physical world) 
and behavioural sociology (for human communities).220 The resulting instrumentalism 
assumes the plasticity of the physical and the unity of the social worlds. By focusing 
exclusively on the issue of the status of claims of method rather than the ontological 
assumptions or the attitude it carries with it, Rorty ignores the effects of the structures he 
advocates. Consequently, he ends up establishing his social instrumentalism as the 
necessary way of (non-metaphysically) approaching the world. He gives it a pragmatic 
authority instead of an epistemic or ontological one. He reinserts a claim to neutrality and 
closes off the very thought and questioning he seeks to open up. 
CONC LUSI ON:   
Rorty’s early work is characterized by an anti-ontological approach to the 
philosophy of mind that undermined the epistemic authority of that structure. His critique 
of epistemology in PMN expands these themes. There, the desire for certainty and the 
assumptions of a neutral framework for epistemology were opposed through a critical 
reading of the history of Western epistemology and a behavioural view of social 
justification. Dewey’s work, which contains a similar critique of the history of philosophy, 
is a pragmatic instrumentalism explicitly oriented toward mastery of the world instead of 
correspondence to or certain knowledge of it. Moreover, his philosophy is plagued by the 
threat of a covert metaphysical unity (of experience) behind that instrumentalism that 
threatens its assumption of the world’s susceptibility to human control and direction. 
Consequently, Rorty’s reading of Dewey was admittedly selective and focused on utilizing 
                                                 
219 Warnke, “Rorty’s Democratic Hermeneutics” op cit. p.117 
220 These will prove particularly problematic in the discussion of Herbert Marcuse in Ch.5 
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its disposition, rather than its metaphysical justification. This influence is clearly evident 
in the final section of PMN and later essays where Rorty rethought philosophy as a 
community of enquiry. Its linguistic and instrumentalist project is meant to open up 
philosophy, culture and enquiry to an anti-authoritarian attitude of openness to the 
creation of new thought with which to manage our lives and communities. If the 
assumption of a neutral framework for philosophy, philosophical dualisms of rank, and 
claims to (epistemic) authority are the targets of Rorty’s critiques, hermeneutics is the 
alternative ethical attitude, instrumentalism the alternative habit of action and social 
justification the alternative epistemology he offers. The flaws of this portion of Rorty’s 
work are located in his anti-ontological approach to philosophy and his disproportionate 
concern with claims to philosophical authority. He fails to see the impossibility of a purely 
negative philosophy and opens himself to the dangers of the metaphysical unity behind 
Dewey’s work in his appropriation of the latter’s disposition of mastery (developed in 
Chs.2 and 3). Further, he blocks the interrogation of those assumptions in circumscribing 
enquiry to the pragmatic management of vocabularies through the hermeneutic 
confrontation of social and cultural forms of justification. Thus, Rorty assumes and then 
delegitimizes interrogating those assumptions. He inserts mastery and covers it over.221 
He circumvents questioning and gelds philosophy.  
 
                                                 
221 The following chapters will clarify how these two movements are necessarily connected in a common 
mechanism of veiling.  
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CH.  2  MASTERING CONTINGENCY:  LANGUAGE 
AND THE REJECTION OF ONTOLOGY  
The most persistent issue facing critical interpretation today is the ironic relation it 
assumes to its own ontopolitical projections. We must convert this paradoxical condition… 
into spurs to productive thinking. For this condition/limit of reflection is unlikely to be 
eliminated. The sense that this ambiguous condition sets the terms within which thought 
necessarily proceeds today constitutes our reverence and spur simultaneously.222 
INTRODUC TI ON:  
In the absence of a neutral framework for engaging the world that assures one’s 
representations of it, enquiry, indeed the limits of our thought, must be understood as 
social. Humanity can no longer pretend to represent the world in its essence. Further, 
philosophy can no longer claim privileged access to reality and the consequent duty of 
epistemological arbitration of the rest of human culture. With the loss of this project, 
philosophy, for Rorty, must reconceptualize the limits of its practice and the aims of its 
reflections. It must turn away from the essential, the neutral and the timeless and toward 
the contingent, the naturalistic and the historical. This, for Rorty, is fundamentally a turn 
away from reality and toward language (as contingent). As discussed in Ch. 1, the thematic 
unity of Rorty’s early work (his philosophy up to and including PMN) is fundamentally 
anti-ontological. In the place of tradition epistemology and metaphysics it offers a social 
understanding of language paired with an instrumentalist disposition to enquiry. This 
linguistic prioritization of the social argues that our vocabularies, our frameworks for 
conceptualizing of the world, are inevitably cut off from material reality. Consequently, we 
can only approach the latter instrumentally. This separation, between language and 
reality, persists in Rorty’s work and will be explored throughout this chapter and the rest 
of this thesis. The effect is a radical cut between language and the world, culture and 
reality, philosophy and politics. 
                                                 
222 Connolly, William E. The Ethos of Pluralization. London, UK: University of Minnesota Press, 1995. p.38 
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Building on this account, this chapter confronts Rorty’s “mature” philosophy (post-
PMN223). where he continued the theorization of his alternative project for philosophy 
following this negative critique of Analytic philosophy. It continues to argue that Rorty’s 
anti-foundational attack on any connection to reality (essentially, a rejection of ontology) 
is the central thematic of his philosophy, and begins to elaborate and critique the essential 
themes of this positive conception of philosophy. Essentially, to establish what philosophy, 
for him, can achieve in the in the absence of grounds. To accomplish this, three key themes 
will be engaged within Rorty’s work: contingency (and the priority of language), 
naturalism, and historicism.224 These encapsulate both Rorty’s alternative conception of 
the world (a kind of ontology) and his understanding of the limits of philosophy after the 
fall of the foundational project. Further, it is from within these three themes, each of which 
were discussed in some form in Ch 1, that Rorty conceptualizes the relationship between 
philosophy and politics.  
Framed within his opposition to ontology, it is Rorty’s particular formulation of 
contingency, naturalism, and historicism that leads to his central flaw: that in spite of his 
emphasis on contingency there is a reappearance of stability, control, and mastery in his 
thought. In order to critically confront this weakness, this thesis will turn to the work of 
the political theorist William E. Connolly.225 Connolly’s thought has important connections 
with Rorty’s. Both are strong epistemological and methodological critics of their 
respective disciplines. Both criticized the foundationalism of their fields and sought a 
deeper understanding of contingency. Both crossed major academic divides utilizing 
Continental philosophy and work from the humanities. Finally, both affirmed that, in the 
absence of foundations, we must rethink the relation between philosophy and politics. 
Nonetheless, amidst these similarities there are important differences. Where Rorty 
rejects ontology both as a philosophical project and a manner of thinking politics, Connolly 
posits the irreducibility of basic ontological commitments and the interdependency and 
mutual necessity of those commitments and politics. Thus, the latter’s role in this critique 
is to reveal both the manner in which Rorty’s anti-foundational rejection of ontology fails, 
                                                 
223 The division within Rorty’s work established here is merely heuristic for the present analysis. Before, 
during, and after PMN Rorty engages in both negative attacks on Analytic philosophy and positive articulations 
of an alternative path. The present division merely indicates that Rorty’s concern up to PMN was more 
primarily negative attack while following that work it was with an alternative, positive, pathway for 
philosophy.  
224 Williams, Michael. “Introduction to the Thirtieth Anniversary Edition” in PMN. pp.xvi-xvii 
225 Connolly's work is only being drawn upon because of the specific dynamics it illuminates in Rorty. Connolly 
theorizes the necessity of ontology to political thought. Further, he connects this to a reading of contingency, 
an alternative use of Heidegger (from Rorty's) that emphasises the mastery dynamic, and an understanding of 
the instability of language. In this manner, he serves as an ideal introduction to the critical analytic of mastery 
developed in this thesis. However, his later work on pluralism is not drawn as its concerns are beyond the 
scope of the present discussion.  
  
75  C H . 2 :  M A S T E R I N G  C O N T I N G E N C Y  
 
in that ontological assumptions re-enter his philosophy, and the consequences of those 
surreptitious assumptions.  
The argument of Chs. 2 and 3 are as follows. Due to his re-conceptualization of 
enquiry as both social and historical and his understanding of truth as social justification 
(introduced in Ch. 1 and elaborated here), Rorty rejects the ontological project as a 
foundational attempt to recreate an external authority to constrain our thought. 
Pragmatism, within his particular history of philosophy, assumes a revolutionary role 
breaking with the epistemological and ontological projects central to the history of 
Western philosophy. Consequently, Rorty develops three anti-foundational and anti-
essentialist themes within his alternative philosophical model: the pragmatist-historical 
method. First, he theorizes the simultaneous contingency and priority of language. Here he 
offers a utility-based/mastery-oriented approach to language change and social evolution. 
Unfortunately, this understanding results in an assumption of the unity and coherence of 
languages and an uncritical approach to the notion of human control over social and 
linguistic development. Second, while attempting to naturalize this understanding through 
the language of evolution and an account of the material, Rorty, as previously mentioned, 
reinstitutes a firm nature/culture divide. He continues to assume the flat priority of 
language and the social and implicitly assumes the neutrality of naturalism. Finally, as a 
consequence of these two themes, Rorty concludes that philosophy now can only and must 
be historical. This conclusion, in itself, is unproblematic; however, the histories he 
provides and the model of development he theorizes assume a particular model of history 
that proceeds through a linear, albeit contingent, process of alternating revolutions and 
stabilizations. This assumes a fundamental unity of the moment and the ability to master 
human reality before the next contingent historical shift. In contrast, I argue that 
Connolly’s philosophy of ambiguity illustrates how ontological assumptions are 
irreducible and how Rorty’s attempt at ontological minimalism results in flawed 
assumptions about the nature of language and its susceptibility to human control, the 
connection between the material and the linguistic (nature and culture), and the 
movement of history. Furthermore, Connolly’s critique of the ontology mastery and its 
mechanism of veiling reveals that Rorty, in assuming such mastery through the stability 
and priority of language and culture, enacts a “social foundationalism” where an 
epistemological one had reigned. This foundationalism, or  “mastery of the moment”, 
ignores the fundamental ambiguity of being and constricts our intellectual and political 
thought through a mechanism of veiling implicit within the mastery of Rorty's thought. In 
this manner, the rejection of ontology is politicized. This argument will be developed 
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across this chapter and the subsequent one. This chapter will address the approach to 
ontology and the theorization of language. It contrasts Rorty and Connolly’s 
understandings of ontology, the consequences of this for language and their readings of 
Heidegger,226 to argue that Rorty’s rejection of ontology and resulting social 
foundationalism domesticate contingency and enact a mechanism of veiling. This asserts 
the neutrality of his pragmatism while excluding non-pragmatic perspectives.227 Ch. 3 will 
continue these arguments into discussions of naturalism and history.  
THE APP ROA CH (TO ON TOLOGY)  
In Ch. 1 it was clear that an anti-ontological turn occurred early within Rorty’s work 
that formed the basis of his subsequent critique of epistemology and foundationalism. The 
nature of this critique and his subsequent re-working of the project of philosophy in 
general led him to rethink enquiry and the nature of concept change. The purpose of this 
section is to illustrate and critique how this opposition to ontology both persists within his 
work and connects to those re-conceptualizations. In his theorizations of enquiry, social 
justification, and language (the first two of which were introduced in Ch. 1 and the last of 
which will be addressed subsequently) Rorty asserts the ontological priority of the social. 
Essentially, that it is the social practices we have, the languages we speak, and the 
communities that exist determine our ontological reality. In contrast, Connolly posits the 
irreducibility of ontological presuppositions and the necessity of critically engaging with 
ontology in order to assess and understand the implicit assumptions of both one’s own 
and others’ positions. He illustrates that, contra Rorty, it is not possible to eschew a 
discussion of ontology and proceed with an entirely post-metaphysical philosophy. While 
highlighting the importance of the social to our understanding of the world, Rorty goes too 
far in reducing the issue of ontology to social practices and the vicissitudes of cultural 
politics. In this, he assumes you can exclude the issue of ontology in his subsequent 
philosophical and political discussions. In contrast, Connolly, acknowledging both the 
ambiguity of ontology and its necessity, formulates an orientation to philosophy that 
accounts for this fundamental uncertainty. This section will merely establish these 
                                                 
226 If Dewey is the key figure for Ch. 1, Heidegger is the key figure for Chs. 2 and 3. Heidegger is Rorty’s main 
Continental source; the impetus of his engagement with that philosophy. Further, it is in Rorty’s use of 
Heidegger that we can see the real effects of his pragmatism. He reads Heidegger without ontology and 
domesticates the significance of his work to mere emphasis on historicism. Further, Heidegger is central to this 
(continentally-minded) critique. Here, this will be introduced through Connolly’s contrasting use of Heidegger. 
Ch. 3 will turn to his work in detail. 
227 This aspect, as illustrated below, is the return to methodological neutrality discussed in Ch. 1 
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orientations to the idea of ontology with the hope that they will be both clarified and their 
consequences drawn out throughout the rest of this chapter and the thesis as a whole.  
Rorty, the Critique of Epistemology and the Ontological Priority of the Social  
Rorty’s context is of paramount importance to understanding his position on 
ontology. Coming out of Analytic philosophy, his fundamental concerns are with the status 
of enquiry and the role of epistemology in philosophy. He begins PMN explicitly 
contradicting the basic assumption of Analytic philosophy: that philosophy serves a 
foundational role in the search for knowledge by establishing the possibilities, limits and 
nature of accurate representations of the world.228 For him, this “representationalism” is 
based upon a series of mistaken metaphors where the mind (or language) is taken as a 
“mirror of nature.” The purpose of much of Rorty’s subsequent project is to rethink 
enquiry and philosophy along anti-representationalist lines that do not include some 
notion of matching or representing reality.  
The single concern of much of Rorty’s philosophy is to thoroughly debunk the idea of 
a neutral or privileged framework for enquiry. This Archimedean point is the fundamental 
assumption of those positing the commensurability of all discourses. If all discourses are, 
in principle, commensurable, then they are all subject to the same rules of enquiry which 
must, as a result, be stable. This primary concern within Rorty’s work forms the basis of 
his opposition to ontology. Rorty rejects the use of ontology for philosophical and political 
reflection precisely because of his opposition to a neutral framework for enquiry and the 
representationalism of classical epistemology. For him, ontology is inevitably the search 
for the one correct view of reality, the neutral viewpoint against which all assertions are to 
be measured.  
The reason why quarrels among metaphysicians about the nature of Reality seem so 
ludicrous is that each of them feels free to pick a few of her favourite things and to claim 
ontological privilege for them. Ontology remains popular because we are still reluctant to 
yield to the Romantic’s argument that the imagination sets the bounds of thought.’229  
For Rorty, ontology inevitably assumes the existence of a correct view of reality from 
which to build a self-assured moral or epistemological program. However, he emphasizes 
that he is not concerned with providing irrefutable arguments against the sufficiency of 
ontology for doing so would force him into the role of the epistemological sceptic. Rather, 
he is concerned only with providing a way of speaking and thinking that does not assume 
                                                 
228 Rorty, Richard. PMN. p.3 
229 Rorty, Richard. “Pragmatism and Romanticism” in PCP. p.106 
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that reality is the proper subject of theory. This is the crux of Rorty’s anti-foundationalism. 
He attempts only to re-describe our most basic conceptual categories without assuming 
there is anything to ground such descriptions or that they uniquely make contact with the 
world.230 However, Rorty assumes that he can get beyond assumptions about the world is 
in formulating these descriptions.  
This post-metaphysical assumption is based on Rorty’s view of the ontological 
priority of the social. This concept, while nascent in his early work and periodically 
referred to throughout his career,231 had its fullest discussion in one of Rorty’s later 
essays, “Cultural Politics and the Existence of God.” Here, he illustrates both his approach 
to the subject of ontology, specifically in terms of his understanding of social justification, 
and his understanding of its relevance to contemporary ethical-political life. “Cultural 
politics,” a term Rorty initially used pejoratively,232 here refers to discourses within a 
society about what vocabularies, terms, and topics it is useful to employ. The problem, for 
him, within this process, is the argument that some things, because they simply do exist or 
are fundamental to our experience, must be discussed.233 The paradigm example is the 
insistence by religious believers that religion must be part of public discussion because 
God does exist. For Rorty this argument assumes that, ‘ontology precedes cultural 
politics.’234 Essentially, that reality trumps cultural consensus in determining what 
language a community uses and what objects they discuss through this vocabulary.  
Rorty flatly opposes both the necessity of what he calls “God-talk” and the priority of 
the ontological. Instead, he wants ‘to argue that cultural politics should replace ontology, 
and that whether it should or should not is itself a matter of cultural politics.’235 He is 
concerned not with disproving the existence of God but with arguing for the social priority 
of cultural politics over ontology or what he, drawing on the work of Robert Brandom, 
refers to as, ‘the ontological priority of the social.’ When one accepts this primacy, all 
cultural discussions, as cultural politics, become about the use of one vocabulary over 
another. Even discussions that appeal to ontologies and realities are moves within the 
game of cultural politics. By referring to the presence of an authority (e.g. God, empirical 
reality, etc) one attempts to take a privileged stance. However, as long as there is dispute 
                                                 
230 Rorty, Richard. CIS. p.8  
231 See, for example -- Rorty, Richard. “Philosophy as Science, Metaphor, and as Politics” in EHO. p.11--  
232 Rorty, Richard. Truth, Politics, and ‘Post-Modernism’. Assen, The Netherlands: Van Gorcum, 1997. p.35 
233 Rorty understands ontology in the Analytic sense as the study of the existence of particular things in the 
world. This differs from the Heideggerian sense of the general revelation of Being (discussed in Ch. 3). 
However, Rorty does extend this rejection to the Heideggerian usage as well. See, for example; Mouffe, Chantal 
(ed.). Deconstruction and Pragmatism. London, UK: Routledge, 1996.  – In Rorty’s articles here he rejects the 
question of Being as a basis for political thinking.  
234 Rorty, Richard. “Cultural Politics and the Question of the Existence of God” in PCP, pp.3-5 
235 Ibid. p.5 – his prioritization of his own framework is dramatically clear here.  
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about what a purported authority actually holds, the very idea of authority is out of place. 
Rather, it is only through social discourse and the consensus of some community that the 
very notion of authority has any operative value.236 For Rorty, this holds even when 
discussing the existence of specific objects and the reliability of experience.  
Experience gives us no way to drive a wedge between the cultural-political 
question of what we should talk about…and what really exists. For what counts as 
an accurate report of experience is a matter of what a community will let you get 
away with. Empiricism’s appeal to experience is as inefficacious as appeals to the 
Word of God unless backed up with a predisposition on the part of a community to 
take such appeals seriously. So experience cannot, by itself, adjudicate disputes 
between warring cultural politicians.237 
Once again, Rorty’s concern here is the disposition to justification, not its source. This 
argument draws both on his previously discussed views on truth as social justification 
(addressed in Chapter 1) and on his understanding of language as thoroughly contingent 
(next section). The terms and categories we employ do not map onto reality and are only 
ever one of many ways to think about the issue at hand. Cultural politics is exactly the 
socio-political process of justification where we decide which languages to use, categories 
to employ, and objects to speak about. Experience (or existing things within reality) 
cannot determine what we talk about because there is no neutral language through which 
to discuss it. Consequently, and this seems to be Rorty’s point, there are no natural 
questions or concepts; no topics we really must discuss on the field of cultural politics.238   
Instead, cultural politics concerns the utility of any one vocabulary over-against 
another, in the first instance, and the coherence of any particular language in the second. 
Thus, in the sphere of cultural politics, which takes place between and above various 
vocabularies, use is the only (neutral) criterion. This emphasis on use and coherence is 
only reinforced in Rorty’s discussion of “logical spaces.”239 For him, there exists within 
every culture a plurality of logical spaces. All of these have their own criteria, or “canonical 
designators,” for the existence of objects. That is, they have their own rules and lists for 
what objects are treated as in existence and which are treated as nonexistent within the 
given logical space. Accordingly, these worlds, even the physical world of the natural 
                                                 
236 Rorty consistently inveighs against the assumption of a non-human authority which determines the status 
of enquiry and discourse. For him, the imperative is to get out from under such gods and see human agreement 
as the sole determinant of our thought and politics. See; Rorty, Truth, Politics..., op cit., p.36 
237 Rorty, “Cultural Politics” op cit. p.11 
238 Ibid. pp.13-4 – Rorty does acknowledge the presence of limits on cultural politics. However, while these 
limits do exist and are in some sense drawn from the brute facticity of life, they exist within our language 
because it determines our ability to cope through the social practices we have to speak about them. There is no 
necessity that is not drawn from the social. – see, p.15  
239 Rorty derives this concept from Gilbert Ryle. For him, such spaces were normative spaces of meaning. See 
his; Plato’s Progress, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1966. p.24. – For an explanation of Rorty’s 
use of this concept, see; Gascoigne, Neil. Richard Rorty: Liberalism, Irony and the Ends of Philosophy. Cambridge, 
UK: Polity Press, 2008. p.26  
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sciences, are closed off from each other and only have the criteria that have resulted from 
their respective cultural politics to employ in any debates about the existence of a given 
object. They exist with different purposes in mind and can have only contingent, that is 
temporary, lives. Thus, without such a neutral criteria between these spaces, existence is 
not a matter for ontology but cultural politics.240 There is no way to affirm existence 
outside one of these logical spaces and thus no way to affirm existence absolutely. 
Nonetheless, it is not Rorty’s intention to give these logical spaces (or language games) a 
deterministic edge. Changes in what a group discusses and the terms it employs can never 
be made on the basis of agreed-upon criteria. Rather, cultural politics, he emphasizes, is 
‘the site of generational revolt, and thus the growing point of culture – the place where 
traditions and norms are all up for grabs at once.’241 For Rorty, we should be content with 
these limits to philosophical reflection. We can do no more than understand our current 
practices and engage in the act of cultural politics where those practices are contrasted 
critically with alternative past and proposed future ones. Thus, we should stop trying to 
use ontology to ascertain that unique neutral set of canonical designators that could settle 
the question of existence absolutely. ‘ “Ontology” is not the name of an expert culture, and 
we should stop imagining that such a culture would be desirable.’242 Ontology, like 
epistemology for Rorty, is an impoverished pursuit of foundations for knowledge; one that 
is equally pointless in the post-metaphysical context that follows the failure of 
philosophical foundationalism. 
Rorty frames his opposition to ontology here within a claim about the priority of the 
social in determining our linguistic practices. In this, he repeats his strategy outlined in the 
discussion of eliminative materialism in Ch.1. By arguing for the priority of the social over 
particular ontological frameworks, Rorty circumvents the philosophical level of discussion 
in favour of a sociological reduction of the argument. He veils the philosophical level of 
discussion through implicit claim to the neutrality of the social. On his understanding, 
languages are separate from the world and each other, only capable of discussing their use 
and consequences within the social sphere of cultural politics. Why language is so isolated 
will become clear in the subsequent section on contingency. The purpose of this discussion 
has been to highlight that Rorty’s opposition to ontology is framed within his opposition to 
the idea of a neutral framework for encountering reality, that it posits utility243 as the only 
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241 Ibid. p.21 
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243 Rorty’s discussion here implicitly situates utility between vocabularies as a means of arguing amongst 
them. This is another version of his claim to instrumental neutrality. The importance is clarified in the 
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point of discussion between various vocabularies and coherence the only point within 
them, and that it isolates languages from the world and each other. However, by 
establishing the priority of the social and the criterion of utility within the (neutral) sphere 
of cultural politics (which is between vocabularies), Rorty reinserts a foundational claim of 
neutrality; one veiled by a claim to linguistic contingency and ontological minimalism.  
Connolly and the Inevitability of Ontology 
Connolly’s theorization of ontology as fundamental to the nature of philosophical and 
political reflection flows from different concerns. Situated much more centrally within the 
field of political theory, his work attempts to excavate the implicit ontological 
presuppositions of both of these spheres. Beginning with The Terms of Political Discourse 
and continuing throughout much of his work, he has criticized their anti-ontological 
assumptions and attempted to offer a re-invigorated elaboration of methodological, 
philosophical, and political thought. His “New Pluralism,” as Morton Schoolman and David 
Campbell have dubbed it, is primarily an ontological approach to thinking politics.244 
Connolly has attempted to provide a pluralistic ethos of contestation within both of these 
areas of enquiry (and beyond). It is important to understand that for him, ethics, ontology, 
and politics are not categories between which firm lines can be drawn. Rather, each is 
always infiltrated by the others in a manner that colours enquiry within all of them. Thus, 
enquiry into politics is inevitably infused with both ontological presuppositions and 
ethical dispositions which affect its conclusions and its relations with other onto-ethical-
political positions within the field of contestation. For the present study, Connolly 
provides both a similar perspective to Rorty’s, rejecting much of the project of classical 
epistemology, and a radically critical perspective on Rorty’s rejection of ontology. In 
contrast to that rejection, where Rorty holds that the priority of the social makes 
ontological reflection useless for cultural politics, for Connolly, ontological assumptions 
are inevitable and thus a perspective that accounts for and interrogates these assumptions 
is necessary. Further, ignoring this level of analysis risks reinforcing our current 
assumptions and their limitations.  
There is much within Rorty’s attack on the foundationalism of Analytic philosophy 
that Connolly agrees with. Citing PMN as a powerful deconstruction of that tradition’s 
project and the primacy of epistemology therein, he compares Rorty’s attack to Hegel’s 
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articulation of the “dilemma of epistemology.” Connolly articulates this criticism as 
follows:  
…every criterion of knowledge is itself a claim to knowledge and thus must itself 
be proven; but any attempt at validation must appeal either to the criterion itself 
or to a new criterion which is, in turn, in need of validation. The first strategy is 
circular while the second fosters an infinite regress. Each attempt to prove a 
theory of knowledge is doomed to disappear into one of these holes.245 
The primacy of epistemology fosters this dilemma. For Connolly, Rorty’s critique of 
foundationalism has a similar structure. It focuses on the unintelligibility of a neutral 
framework separable from and prior to enquiry. Proceeding internally, this attack 
illustrates how Analytic philosophy’s own epistemic pretensions were ultimately 
undermined by its investigations. There are two key movements here. First, philosophers 
following the work of Wilfrid Sellars246 have dissolved the distinction between the 
necessary and the contingent in favour of the thesis that criteria of rationality are 
established by social authority and not by the nature of some “inner representations.” This 
notion is clearly still present in Rorty’s later work on cultural politics. Second, another line 
of thought, inaugurated by W.V.O. Quine247 dissolved the distinction between language as a 
system of reference and facts recorded within that system. Instead, they hold to a holistic 
view where nature and society are always accessed with linguistic mediation without 
possible appeal to neutral facts against which to test that mediation. Together, these two 
theses dislodge the correspondence model and illustrate how epistemic systems are 
always isolated from a neutral framework and determined by social life. Furthermore, for 
Connolly, Rorty’s social analysis of the continued dominance of the epistemological project 
in Analytic philosophy exposes that discipline’s assumption, shared by wider society, that 
the cultural authority relinquished by religion during the Enlightenment must now be 
vested elsewhere. In the Analytic tradition’s view, philosophy, through the epistemological 
project, assumes this role of master discourse arbitrating over the knowledge claims of 
wider society. In spite of the weakness of this project, the institutional matrix of that 
tradition maintains it.248  
Connolly’s later work bears striking similarities to Rorty’s critique. In his own 
methodological criticisms of the social sciences, Connolly emphasizes the social nature of 
enquiry and the absence of a neutral framework for it. For Connolly, this fact indicates that 
there is no higher court to which social scientists can appeal when clashes between rival 
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methodologies occur.249  Furthermore, he opposes the logic of “representationalism” 
within that same sphere. For Connolly, representation, if such a thing occurs, always takes 
place within a context that fixes the things to be represented and the terms in which that 
occurs. Further, ‘Representation always involves the representation of prior 
representations. This duality, or doubling, eventually confounds representation, not as an 
indispensible social practice, but as a detached, neutral method of accumulating 
knowledge.’250 In spite of these similarities, Rorty and Connolly differ in the alternative 
paths they chart for philosophy. While we have only broached the “positive” side of Rorty’s 
philosophy, we have indicated its anti-ontological focus. In contrast, I will now argue that 
Connolly’s work emphasizes the necessity of ontological reflections and the irreducibility 
of ontological assumptions in all positions. Furthermore, it illustrates that in the absence 
of overt reflection on ontology, Rorty’s philosophy enacts a “social foundationalism” in the 
place of the fallen epistemological one. While Connolly’s argument occurs mainly within 
the context of political interpretation, it is applicable to Rorty and to the inevitability of 
ontology in all sectors of society.  
In contrast to both onta, the study of existing things, and classical ontology, the study 
of a fundamental logic to being apart from appearances, Connolly offers “ontopolitical 
interpretation” or “ontalogy.” This qualified endorsement of ontology acknowledges that it 
is not a fundamental and incontestable understanding of reality that he offers but an 
understanding of the inevitability of ontological presuppositions and thus the need of 
active engagement and affirmative declaration. For him, every political interpretation 
invokes a set of fundaments about the necessities and possibilities of human being, about 
the nature of the world and our relation to it. These assumptions then structure the sphere 
of politics and the nature of political activity therein; they fix the parameters and generate 
the necessarily circumscribed list of possibilities. Ontology establishes boundaries to 
politics. In spite of this, the majority of Anglo-American political theory and science, Rorty 
included, marginalizes ontological reflection as insufficient or irrelevant to politics. For 
Connolly, this occurs through several strategies. For our present purposes, it is his 
identification of the tradition of ontological minimalism that is key. This group, composed 
of a diverse constituency of multiple and contending theoretical and political positions, 
share the assumption with Rorty that ontological reflection into the nature of reality is 
simply unnecessary in the post-metaphysical context. They assume that modernity is 
defined by its ability, in contrast to the premodern, to subsist on the ontologically 
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“minimal” understanding of a pliable world susceptible to technological control. The 
problems and tensions of modern life do not flow from some deep-seated ontological 
differences between groups. They never reach that deep.Thus, even if they exist, they do 
not affect the ethical-political relations and actions of individuals and groups.251 This 
chapter will illustrate how Rorty in fact does belong to this position and how he 
participates in the inevitable ontological assumptions it chooses not to interrogate.  
For Connolly, a question necessarily arises here: by what standard are the ontological 
assumptions of the modern period minimal? What if those standards only appear minimal 
in opposition to the religious and teleological traditions against which modernity 
continually sets itself? For him, it is precisely the ontopolitical matrix of late-modernity 
that needs critical reassessment and positive alternatives. One of the prevalent strategies 
to remove ontological issues is, to return to the above discussion, the primacy of 
epistemology in the social sciences. Connolly’s analysis here is particularly interesting 
because it suggests a manner in which Rorty is still complicit in this project. Epistemology 
claims to circumscribe ontology by either accessing criteria for knowledge that make 
ontology redundant or by providing neutral tests through which to resolve ontological 
issues. Rorty, in order to avoid ontology entirely, attempts to be neither optimistic nor 
pessimistic, neither an epistemologist nor a sceptic, on this issue. Nonetheless, he must 
still connect languages and their changes to humans and their communities. Thus, we see 
the inauguration of the post-metaphysical and pragmatist emphases on use and coherence 
as the only means by which we judge languages and choose to move from one to another. 
While this element of Rorty’s philosophy will be developed and critiqued further 
throughout this chapter and the next, It is important to note here that this reinserts the 
demand that truth, even if only as social justification, be unified and one.252 It thus repeats 
a certain contestable social ontology of neutralism. ‘The primacy of epistemology short-
circuits ontological issues by assuming once the right procedure for attaining truth as 
correspondence or coherence or consensus is reached, any remaining issues will either be 
resolved through that method or shown to be irrelevant.’253  
It is important to emphasize that Connolly is not arguing for the primacy of ontology 
to replace the epistemological project. Rorty would be correct in criticizing that as merely 
replacing one foundation with another. Rather, Connolly is merely indicating that the 
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“dilemma of epistemology” does not equally refute the use of ontology in political 
reflection. He charts another course away from that dilemma that, contra Rorty, does not 
invalidate interrogating our assumptions about the world in order to affirm a particular 
set of ontological dispositions. Fundamental to this disposition, both ontological and 
political, is the conviction that there is no way to decisively arbitrate between contending 
ontological positions. Thus, there is no way for Connolly to prove that the notion of a 
pliable world or that of world with an intrinsic purpose to being, are in fact incorrect. 
Equally, his own position, regarding the irreducibility of ontological assumptions and his 
positive ontology of ambiguity (addressed below), is a valid one that cannot be ruled out 
of the field of contestation. It should be noted that this irreducibility of ontological 
assumptions is, like his ontology of ambiguity, not a reading that Connolly believes is 
capable of definitive proof. However, why they are necessary for a genuine critical position 
for political thought will be addressed in Chs. 3 and 5. For now, it should be understood as 
an axiomatic part of his philosophy from which much of his other work flows; one that he 
acknowledges as contestable.254 
The question for Connolly at this point in his account is whether there is some 
discernable pattern to the contemporary shape of onto-political assumptions in 
contemporary Anglo-American discourse. He suggests that from his perspective, there is. 
This “onto-political matrix” is a relative approximation of the field and should be 
understood mainly as a heuristic principle through which he establishes the position of his 
own perspective and his unique critique of the dominant positions of Anglo-American 
political discourse. The matrix occurs along two axes. The categories across the horizontal 
are mastery and attunement. The former refers to the drive to subject nature to human 
control and the corresponding assumption about the susceptibility of nature to this 
project. The latter, assumes a higher purpose or telos in being and the ability of humans to 
enter into a harmonious relationship with it. The vertical axis oscillates between an 
emphasis on the individual as primary in ethical and political action or the community.255 
While these positions are, in theory, inimical to one another, Connolly notes that most of 
mainstream political discourse occurs within some combination of their precepts. His 
question then is whether they share some similar ontological disposition from which he 
can gain critical access. His answer is that both offer compensatory ontologies. They share 
the implicit demand that there be some compensation in modernity for the loss of 
enchanted understandings of the world following the loss of faith in religion. They insist 
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on the compensation of a world that is predisposed to us in some way, either as a pliable 
medium susceptible to our mastery or a higher order through which we can gain 
communion. For Connolly, one of these assumptions, which it will illustrated in Rorty’s 
position, structures every member of the field; and yet, they are assumptions without 
basis. Why does the world owe us so much that it must be predisposed to us in one of 
these ways? Does it not betray some demand for existential reassurance? Are there, 
perhaps, not dangerous hidden assumptions and positions in such a demand?256 
Thus, we come to the main purpose and method of Connolly’s work. His philosophy 
attempts to destabilize both of these positions by opposing the assumption of a world 
predisposed to humanity and intelligibility. To this purpose, he posits the necessity of 
strategies of both ontological detachment and attachment.257 Critical deconstructive and 
genealogical strategies of detachment are necessarily equally matched by strategies of 
attachment to alternative ontological commitments. The latter, which Connolly refers to as 
“positive onto-political interpretation,” involves projecting explicit presumptions into 
one’s interpretations of actuality while simultaneously acknowledging that one’s 
presumptions exceed both one’s intentions and ability to demonstrate their truth. 
Essentially, one posits them as contestable. This challenges closure in the field by both 
critically assessing other strategies and refusing to set up another theory within an 
absolute space. For Connolly, this dual movement requires a “double-entry orientation” to 
politics. Critical detachments and affirmative attachments are treated as incontestable in 
their first instance, but are then withdrawn in an acknowledgement of contestability. For 
him, enquiry must explicitly take place in the median space between these gestures.258  
Thus, the affirmations are not merely a strategic gesture but comprise ontological 
assumptions built into and constitutive of both the critiques and the alternatives they 
present. Connolly emphasizes this when he refers to these viewpoints as “vague 
essentialisms” and “happy posit-ivisms.” The key point then is that these projections are 
neither merely provisional nor prediscursive realities beyond question.259 Rather, they are 
both affirmative (like prediscursive ontologies) and contestable (like a merely provisional 
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ontology would be). As noted in the epitaph to this chapter, for Connolly, this paradoxical 
pairing of opposites characterizes interpretation in general.260 The double-entry 
orientation to interpretation attempts to do justice to the inadequacy and contestability of 
ontology, the inevitability of ontological presuppositions, and the ambiguous nature of 
human enquiry that results from these conditions. It attempts to provide for critique 
within the situation of the necessity of contingency.  
This difference in the approach to ontology reveals the key difference between Rorty 
and Connolly. For Rorty, the critique of foundationalism and the failure of the 
epistemological model necessitate the abandonment of the idea of a level of reality other 
than the everyday contingent human reality.261 Any notion of unmasking, of getting beyond 
the merely ontic to some deeper level, whether in texts or reality, is necessarily 
metaphysical. It is based upon a continuation of the appearance-reality distinction which 
Rorty, as a Nietzschean (of sorts)262, refuses to endorse. In fact, much of Rorty’s rhetoric 
regarding the weakness of ontology and the Continental tradition in general is that it 
repeats the Platonic logic of a deeper reality which can be unmasked263 by some privileged 
means. The language of unmasking here is especially significant. In contrast to Rorty’s 
understanding of ontology, Connolly’s paradoxical construction of positive onto-political 
interpretation avoids this logic of unmasking while accounting for the irreducibility of 
ontological presuppositions. Consider the following, ‘When an unfamiliar competitor 
[Connolly perhaps?] challenges these terms of discourse, the ensuing debates condense 
some of this fog into a new series of beliefs and counter beliefs. Of course, only one layer of 
fog is lifted by such an intervention, and new layers roll in.’264 New masks/fogs roll in. For 
Connolly, there is no unaccompanied unveiling as every strategy of detachment is, 
simultaneously, an implicit attachment to another set of ontological presuppositions. 
There is no detachment as such, only re-attachments.  
It is useful here to recall a distinction discussed in the introduction to this thesis 
between anti-foundationalism and weak ontology. Anti-foundationalism remains in the 
logic of either/or, either there are firm philosophical foundations or there are not. Its 
purpose is to negatively attack the very notion of foundations and attempt a philosophy 
that does not have recourse to some inevitably metaphysical grounds. Weak ontology, on 
                                                 
260 Connolly, Ethos, op cit. p.38 
261 Rorty, CIS, p 45 
262 For a discussion of Rorty’s work as Nietzschean, see his; “Introduction: Pragmatism and Post-Nietzschean 
Philosophy” in EHO op cit. pp.2-5. There he links Nietzsche to Dewey’s (and his own) pragmatism.  
263 Rorty, Richard. “Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism” in Deconstruction and Pragmatism (ed. 
Chantal Mouffe). London, UK: Routledge, 1996. p.14 
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the other hand, seeks to be both negative and positive. It follows anti-foundationalism in 
negatively deconstructing strong ontologies and purported philosophical foundations. 
However, realizing the inevitability of ontological presuppositions requires the affirmative 
and explicit account of one’s ontological perspective while attempting, in light of the 
negative attack, to weave the limits and contestability of these accounts into their very 
presuppositions.265 It argues that without an ontological analysis of that present to be 
negated, and a correlate analysis of the implicit ontology of the critique itself, the manner 
in which thought is structured and limited will remain obscured.  
Rorty and Connolly illustrate the anti-Foundationalism and weak ontology distinction 
respectively. Rorty, in placing the issue of social justification solely within the realms of 
the use and coherence of languages to human communities, excludes the ontological. For 
him, reality cannot be a criterion for our languages because that merely serves to bring 
one more candidate for a neutral epistemological framework into play. Instead, as 
illustrated below, Rorty attempts to construct a philosophy without epistemological or 
ontological assumptions. For him, the critique of metaphysics has forever destroyed the 
possibility of using reality as a marker against which to judge our philosophical and 
political programs. ‘For without the traditional concepts of metaphysics one cannot make 
sense of the appearance-reality distinction, and without that distinction one cannot make 
sense of the notion of “what is really going on.” No more metaphysics, no more 
unmasking.’266 In contrast, Connolly, illustrating the weak ontological method, asserts the 
simultaneous inadequacy and necessity of ontological presuppositions. For him, claims to 
ontological minimalism or anti-foundationalism, while purporting to be post-metaphysical 
philosophies, in fact repeat and ingrain hidden ontological presuppositions of attunement 
and/or mastery. It is my argument that this basic difference in orientation to ontology 
characterizes the relationship between Rorty and Connolly’s work. Further, in my analysis, 
it is from this basic difference that their subsequent philosophical and political differences 
flow. Rorty, in theorizing a post-metaphysical method, repeats mastery’s assumption of a 
world susceptible to human control. In contrast, Connolly’s double-entry orientation to 
politics creates the possibility of a critical perspective on politics that Rorty obscures. 
Ultimately, as illustrated in the confrontation with Connolly, the assumption of mastery 
and the failure of a critical perspective stem from Rorty’s re-enactment of a social 
foundationalism of isolated human communities whose only means to social change and 
development is in debates about the use and coherence of their vocabularies. Further, this 
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neutralization of the pragmatic indicates a mechanism of ontological veiling within Rorty’s 
work that obscures this assumption of neutrality and claims a critical posture to the 
present. In the end, Connolly, contra Rorty, indicates the use of ontology as a resource that 
functions not as a blueprint but as means for productive, negative and affirmative, critical 
thinking. 
CONTIN GEN CY V S.  CON TESTA BI LI TY:  MASTE RI N G A  TOOL AND THE  AMBIGU ITY OF  
BEIN G  
Central to Rorty’s positive conception of philosophy is a fundamental rethinking of 
the nature of language within the human context. This rethinking both stems from his anti-
ontological premise and is at its root. It both illustrates how language can be understood in 
the post-metaphysical context and is a basis for the idea that ontology is unnecessary to an 
understanding of language. Specifically, through the work of Donald Davidson, Rorty 
approaches language as a social practice without an inherent structure that can be 
discerned. He theorizes it as contingent and as having priority, over reality and the 
ontological, in deciding, though not determining, the social “conversation” of a given 
community. In this analysis, the crux of Rorty’s theorization is his postulation of language 
as a tool, one that can be used and guided for the purposes of human social change. It is 
here that we begin to see the dynamic of mastery entering Rorty’s logic. If language is a 
tool to be controlled, then its effects must be subject to human aims and mastery. Further, 
through an encounter with Rorty’s work on Heidegger, I will illustrate how the former ties 
contingency to mastery and refuses the latter’s critique of technological reasoning and 
anthropocentrism. The presence of mastery and its connection to Rorty’s aforementioned 
social foundationalism will only be introduced in this section as I will shift to Connolly’s 
notion of the contestability of political terms, and I argue, of language in general. For 
Connolly, there is a fundamental ambiguity within language that precludes the type of 
control Rorty desires. Connolly’s identification of this ambiguity will then be further 
elaborated through a brief introduction to his positive social ontology (of ambiguity). 
While contestability and ontology as ambiguity will only be broached here, this will 
nonetheless clarify how Connolly’s contrasting approach to language results in an entirely 
different approach to the question of mastery in contemporary philosophy. Rorty, in 
positing both the priority and contingency of language, and wedding this to a pragmatic 
disposition centered on controlling language for human social development, re-inserts 
ontological assumptions and a veiled claim to neutrality into his philosophy. In attempting 
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to escape the demand for a non-human authority, he subjugates us to a pernicious set of 
assumptions in the mastery dynamic.  
Language as Medium and as Tool: Rorty on Davidson 
Rorty’s positive conception of language stems from his metaphilosophical opposition 
to the basic assumptions of the Analytic philosophy of language. While he praises the 
linguistic turn in that tradition for highlighting the importance of language, he regrets its 
attempt to discover an inherent structure within it through which the “correct” criteria for 
correspondence to reality could be discerned. It is important to note that what Rorty 
opposes is this particular attempt to judge language by the physical world through the 
addition of some neutral framework or medium which would guarantee that our language 
accurately represents reality. Part of what he is opposing, and this will become clearer in 
the discussion of his understanding of intellectual history, is the idea of placing our 
languages and practices under a non-human authority. As discussed in Chapter 1, Rorty 
emphasizes the social nature of enquiry and how such human projects should always 
pursue self-consciously human ends. In opposing this dynamic within the Analytic 
tradition, Rorty assumes that languages are unified and pliable objects subject to total 
human control.  
Rorty frames his discussion of the priority and contingency of language in CIS within a 
distinction between two claims: that the truth is out there and that the world is out there. 
He does this to emphasize that his philosophy is neither an idealism that attributes reality 
to our conceptual schemes nor a positivism that holds that reality determines the veracity 
of our language. Rather, Rorty believes that there is a fundamental division between the 
world causing us to hold a belief and an entire worldview being validated by 
correspondence, or a relationship of “making true,” to reality. The former is obvious and 
intuitive while the latter assumes that the world is designed to confirm or deny language. 
He opposes the very idea that vocabularies/languages, interchangeable terms he uses for 
whole worldviews and frameworks for understanding, are subject to confirmation or 
denial through the application of criteria. As discussed in Ch. 1, this assumes a neutral 
framework for enquiry through which an intrinsic nature or essence of language can be 
discerned. Instead, Rorty wants to drop truth for justification and theorize the latter as 
internal to every vocabulary/language. A belief, for him, can only be overridden by 
another belief, never by reference to something outside of the vocabulary. Consequently, 
  
91  C H . 2 :  M A S T E R I N G  C O N T I N G E N C Y  
 
the world, or a view of it, cannot be the source of either norms or of a method for 
adjudicating between them.267 
Rorty’s elaborates this understanding of language within a detailed engagement with 
the work of Donald Davidson.268 For Rorty, Davidson provides a unique exit from the 
impasse within Analytic philosophy caused by the realism-antirealism debate. This debate, 
which for Rorty seems to be a mere rehashing of the 19th century idealism-realism 
debates, is based upon the representationalist logic that Rorty has opposed throughout his 
work and which has been the subject of Ch. 1 and much of Ch. 2 so far. Davidson’s key 
move is to provide an understanding of language that breaks with the idea that it is 
something that must be proved adequate to either the world or the self. He manages to 
keep the focus on language and its importance (or priority) while dropping it as an 
epistemological standard. Essentially, he theorizes the priority of language and opens the 
door for Rorty to add its contingency.269  
 For Rorty, Davidson achieves this by rejecting the assumption that language exists as 
a representational medium between the self and the world. Language as medium merely 
replaced the earlier emphasis on the mind or consciousness and failed to resolve the 
subject-object issues which plagued idealism-realism and led to epistemological 
scepticism. The shift to language, for Rorty, merely continued this seesaw. Instead of 
language as medium, Rorty interprets Davidson as supporting the Wittgensteinian270 
account of language where vocabularies are conceived of as tools rather than as pieces of a 
representational puzzle. Treating languages as tools rather than pieces within that puzzle 
changes the questions we ask. Rather than asking about the relation or adequacy of 
language to the world, we now focus on its efficiency as a tool. Further, languages on this 
account are now not matters of discovery but invention where new tools are created to 
surpass old ones. The point of these tools is that they allow us to cope with our 
environment and each other. For Davidson, the only possible perspective available to the 
philosophy of language is that of the field linguist. This external position is the simple 
                                                 
267 Brandom, Robert B. “Vocabularies of Pragmatism: Synthesizing Naturalism and Historicism” in Rorty and 
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anthropological one of an observer attempting to link up a “native’s” utterances with their 
surroundings. In this process, the linguist must assume that the native is in touch with 
reality and is mostly correct in their assertions about it.271 The point of this perspective for 
Davidson, and the reason why Rorty endorses it, is to portray language as a largely ad hoc 
and piecemeal process of interpretation. On an individual level, it can be described as a 
process of constructing “passing theories” about the noises/inscriptions of another 
human. Understanding is a process of learning to predict what will come next. These 
theories are passing in the sense that they are constantly revised in order to account for 
things that are not explained by the current theory.272 It is in this sense that vocabularies 
allow us to cope through shared understandings with each other and with our 
environment.  
This understanding of language removes the idea of language as a process of 
achieving more adequate “picturings” of the world. Instead, Rorty emphasizes that 
language be approached behaviourally as a social practice. This repeats his above 
emphasis on the unity, coherence and social nature of languages. Vocabularies must be 
interpreted as closed off spheres that allow people to cope and which can only be 
approached through a piecemeal behavioural method. They do not uniquely link up with 
the world or some other neutral framework that allows for commensurability. Rather, 
such a relation to the world must cease to be assumed. Thus, Rorty follows Davidson in 
rejecting the scheme-content distinction; the distinction between determinate realities 
and conceptual systems that may or may not be adequate to them.273 It must be 
emphasized that Rorty, in adopting Davidson’s position here, is rejecting the relation 
between scheme and content not the ideas of scheme and content. This seems obvious 
since his notion of vocabulary, as a framework for understanding the world, resembles a 
scheme or ontology. It is not that Rorty believes people do not have conceptual systems for 
understanding the world, rather these systems should not be posited as actually 
contacting the world. Unfortunately, he seems to have outstripped his own conclusion 
here by rejecting ontology in general and positing the possibility of an entirely post-
metaphysical philosophy rather than merely holding the anti-epistemological idea that 
ontologies cannot represent or access the fundamental nature of being (which is much 
closer to Connolly).  
It is important to understand that vocabularies are not connected to the world in a 
relationship of confirmation. However, there are causal connections between vocabularies 
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and the world and between successive vocabularies. While the causal relation to the world 
will be addressed in detail in the subsequent chapter on Rorty’s naturalism and 
physicalism, the causal relation between vocabularies is pertinent to this discussion. As 
discussed in Ch. 1, Rorty’s work is fundamentally concerned with the nature of concept 
change in language. Following this re-visioning of language and what can be said about it 
in its philosophical study, Rorty offers a view of intellectual history that accords with this 
account; one that emphases both language’s priority and its contingency. To do this, he 
offers a Nietzschean/Davidsonian understanding of metaphor as the prime agent in 
vocabulary shifts. For Rorty, the purpose of placing metaphor at the centre of the history 
of human languages is to emphasize its necessarily non-teleological and non-purposive 
nature. In contrast, he wants to portray it as a contingent process of tool change. New 
vocabularies are created and either gradually socially accepted or rejected according to 
the needs and values of the time.274 Returning to the philosophy of science, Rorty endorses 
Mary Hesse in thinking of scientific revolutions as “metaphoric redescriptions” of nature. 
As we saw in Chapter 1, science is not a gradual process toward correspondence, but a 
series of descriptive frameworks not wholly separated from more humanistic disciplines 
except by their emphasis and proclivity for prediction and control. ‘We need to see the 
constellations of causal forces which produced talk of DNA or of the Big Bang as of a piece 
with the causal forces which produced talk of “secularism.”’275 Rorty is fairly vague on the 
nature of these causal forces. While they are surely contingent, it is a failing of his theory 
that he leaves them under-theorized. Nonetheless, he does emphasize their causal nature 
in that the question, on this view, is not about the approximation of a new vocabulary to 
some standard but how and why a group changed from one language to another.  
This view of intellectual history feeds into Rorty’s theorization of the priority and 
contingency of language. Shifts in what human communities talk about, shifts that are 
contingent and unpredictable, are due to the production of new languages. Their 
contingency is seen in how these shifts occur: metaphor. Rorty’s Davidsonian account of 
metaphor opposes the usual distinction between the metaphorical and literal as two 
distinct types of meaning or interpretation. Instead, this distinction is merely the 
difference between familiar and unfamiliar (normal and abnormal) noises. Metaphors are 
sentences that have no place within a given language. Essentially, they have no meaning. It 
is in this sense that they are “unparaphraseable.” For Rorty, they are more like pure 
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possibilities.  They are unfamiliar events that must be understood as causes rather than 
attempted representations. They are causes in that they are analogous to new phenomena 
within the natural sciences. All we can do is grapple with them and revise those theories in 
response. It is in this sense that Rorty compares encountering a metaphor to taste. One can 
savour the new experience or reject it. If a metaphor is taken up, if it is used to the point 
where it becomes habitual and regularized, it is killed and only then given a meaning 
within a vocabulary. Language and concept change occurs through this process of the 
literalization and death of metaphors. It is in this sense that it is contingent; metaphors 
have no meaning and thus no necessary place within language. The way a language 
changes depends on which metaphors are taken up, how they are used, and the 
community where they are integrated into regular social practice.276  
Rorty’s point in this model is to emphasize the contingency, priority and isolation of 
language. Languages, as tools, allow us to cope through structuring our world. The history 
of the world is the history of one language replacing another through the adoption of some 
new metaphor or descriptive schema. With each change, our purposes and ends so too 
change. Furthermore, there are no neutral criteria against which to compare alternative 
languages. Rather, languages are irrevocably separated from the world and thus cannot 
draw on it for epistemological criteria or norms. We can only compare one language with 
another in pragmatic terms of their purposes and ends. For Rorty, this realization of 
contingency necessitates that we remove non-human bases for authority in our language. 
Neither reality, god, or the nature of the self, can determine which language we should 
speak, nor can we anticipate that which our descendents might use.277 Yet, Rorty’s account 
of the contingency and stability of language has two effects. First, in making use the only 
criteria between languages, Rorty repeats the above assumption of the neutrality of the 
pragmatic perspective. Second, in emphasizing that nothing external to a language 
validates it, he closes languages off from the world and makes them stable, regular entities 
(outside of metaphorical moments). In utilizing Davidson’s external perspective of the 
field linguist, Rorty commits himself to the view that languages must contain internal 
behavioural regularities for meaning to be possible. Metaphors are specifically the 
moments of breakage within these established systems, which are otherwise stable.278 
While this argument is not yet fully developed, I will comment now that this constitutes an 
assumption of what I call the “mastery of the moment.” This is a social foundationalism 
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within Rorty’s work that assumes that outside of temporal shifts, language is a stable 
entity susceptible to human control. Subsequent sections further demonstrate how this is 
present in Rorty’s philosophy. Later chapters examine its potentially dangerous political 
effects and its limitations on critical, political thought. Presently, it is necessary to further 
indicate Rorty’s connection of contingency and mastery through an account of his reading 
of Heidegger. 
Rorty on Heidegger: Pragmatism and Power 
Rorty engages Heidegger on the specific questions of the place of pragmatism within 
the latter’s history of Being and the connection between a recognition of contingency with 
a pragmatic, mastery-oriented approach to the world. His concern is to vindicate 
Heidegger’s account of contingency while exonerating pragmatism from the latter’s 
criticisms.279 In “Heidegger, Contingency, and Pragmatism” he focuses this account on 
Heidegger’s claim that the Platonic project, when it has run through its process of 
development, necessarily results in the pragmatic approach to the world. Platonism here 
is defined as the view that enquiry must attempt to access something absolute and eternal 
while pragmatism is defined as the view that enquiry must be aimed at improving the 
human condition by, ‘enabling us to cope more successfully with the physical environment 
and with each other.’280 For Heidegger, the connection between these two modes of 
thinking is found in what he calls the “technical interpretation of thinking.” This mode of 
thought stems from the original Platonic “quest for certainty.”281 This cultural demand, 
which Plato inaugurated in the Western tradition, requires that the object of enquiry be 
evident, clear, and distinct to the mind in order to achieve the certainty desired. The 
history of philosophy, under this reading, is a process of continual redescription in order 
to make this possible. Thus, the development from Plato to pragmatism, for Heidegger, is a 
series of failures to achieve this goal. In the end, the only thing we can have clarity 
(certainty) about is our own desires. ‘The only cosmology we can affirm with the certainty 
Plato recommended is our own (communal and individual) world picture, our own way of 
                                                 
279 Rorty is aware of the idiosyncrasy of his reading of Heidegger. See; Rorty, Richard “Heidegger, Contingency, 
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setting things up for manipulation, the way dictated by our desires.’282 Rorty has no 
qualms with the idea that the desire for certainty engendered the skeptical response and 
that the only means out of this impasse is a coherence theory of truth where coherence is 
sought not only among beliefs but beliefs and desires. This point, which should sound 
familiar from Ch. 1, allows us to see the structures in which we think and the nature of our 
enquiries as malleable. They change as the dominant vocabulary changes, ‘whenever such 
a change enables us better to fulfil our desires by making things more readily 
manipulable.’283 Once human desires are admitted in this way, nonhuman authority is 
removed and the pragmatic logic of mastery reigns. It is in this sense that pragmatism, as 
an overt form of means-end logic, is the ultimate form of Platonism. 
For Rorty, Heidegger believes that he has identified the common assumption of this 
Platonism to pragmatism sequence. It assumes that truth is about a unique access that 
gives one the possession of a deep and penetrating power. The West has been on this 
“power trip” since Plato and has found its fullest expression in technocratic pragmatism. 
The desire for truth, on this account, is the desire for an extra-human authority; it is the 
desire to share in a power that overwhelms and yet which you participate in. For 
Heidegger, this assumption that truth is a process of overcoming, that it is a relation of 
power, is fundamental to the onto-theological tradition. Pragmatism is simply the most 
overt and obvious form of this technocratic interpretation of thinking as it places 
instrumental rationality entirely at the service of human desires which are not subject to 
that very rationality. Further, it is, in fact, the only way of thinking in this tradition that 
allows one to address the risk of epistemological scepticism inherent to Plato’s project. It 
is in this sense that Rorty believes Heidegger would find pragmatism to be the most 
acceptable philosophy within this tradition.284 This affinity, for Rorty, stems from 
pragmatism and Heidegger’s mutual embrace of contingency. They both see the history of 
philosophy as the attempt to escape this contingency and achieve certainty.285 The quest 
for certainty is the attempt to escape from time, to divide off Sein from Zeit. For Rorty, 
Heidegger is attempting to recapture contingency and a sense of the fragility of the human 
condition. This fragility has been obscured by the Platonic tradition and its identification 
of the contingent with the apparent. Contrasted with a powerful and enduring reality, that 
which changes has been ignored in this tradition. Rorty’s point here is that while 
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pragmatism embraced contingency on the level of desires, for Heidegger, it is still within 
the assumption of truth as power that is fundamental to the technocratic mode of thought.  
It is for this reason that Heidegger describes this tradition as a downward escalator 
pulling the West further away from the pre-Platonic period where contingency and 
fragility were not ignored. It is a process, once started, that cannot be stopped. It was by 
no means a necessary progression, but one that cannot be interrupted halfway. Heidegger 
is nostalgic for this period before the quest for certainty, which he believes to have been 
more in touch with contingency and fragility and free of the stain of the technocratic 
interpretation of thinking. Thus, Rorty comes to the central question of his treatment of 
Heidegger: does Heidegger have a right to his implicitly anti-pragmatic nostalgia? And, as 
his account seems to be about both the contingency of languages and the impoverishment 
of the modern age, are these two aspects (contingency and belatedness) compatible?286 
Rorty’s answer is a definitive “no.”  In his reading of Heidegger, he posits an essential 
ambiguity within the latter’s work on this question. Heidegger seems to oscillate between 
an understanding of Being as historically contingent and a sense that there is an 
ahistorical reality from which the various epochs in the history of Being, and their 
respective ontological understandings, can be judged.  
‘Heidegger has two quite different things to say about the way the West is now: 
that it is contingent and that it is belated. To say that it is contingent it is enough to 
show how self-deceptive it is to think things had to be as they are, how provincial 
it is to think that the final vocabulary of the present day is “obvious” and 
“inescapable.” But to say that this vocabulary is belated, to contrast it with 
something more primordial, one has to give “primordial” some kind of normative 
sense, so that it means something more that just “earlier.”287 
The only normative sense Rorty can or wants to give to “primordial,” is an awareness of 
contingency. On this conception, an understanding of Being is more authentic and 
primordial if it is aware of its own historical contingency; of the fragility of its condition. 
The modern self-confidence in our ability to manipulate beings in order to satisfy our 
desires stands in pale comparison to the Greek sense of mystery. What is operative here is 
the ability to question one’s social practices, suspend verificationism in encountering the 
world, and attend to the “openedness of beings.” To think of beings as such is to see that 
no language is necessary and thus there is always the possibility of alternative languages 
and beings.288  
The question now for Rorty is whether Heidegger is justified in thinking the Greeks to 
be more in tune with the contingency and openedness of beings. For Rorty, the answer 
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must be “no,” or at least, “not necessarily.” For him, the diversity and complexity of the 
modern world suggests that it is perhaps we who are more apt to recognize contingency 
rather than the insular society of ancient Greece. Beyond this question though, Rorty is 
asking whether Heidegger’s account of the history of Being, of the dialectic necessity of the 
Platonism to pragmatism progression, and the necessity of recognizing contingency, can 
be divorced from his nostalgia. Essentially, is his work on contingency compatible with the 
idea that modernity is in a good position to recognize that very contingency? ‘Can 
pragmatism do justice to poetry [contingency] as well as to inquiry [power]?’289 Rorty’s 
optimistic answer is that it can. He sees no reason why a Deweyan culture, where 
technology is a means to making certain social practices possible, cannot be constructed. 
Here, technocratic manipulation is the servant, not the master, of the community. Yet he 
provides no real discussion of why this might be the case.290 Let us unravel this problem 
further.  
There are several ethical and cultural reasons why Rorty thinks such a relationship 
between contingency and technocratic manipulation possible. However, as political and 
cultural they are properly the subject of the later chapters of this thesis. The pertinent 
point now is to emphasize that Rorty believes that there are no philosophical (or 
ontological) reasons why these two themes are incompatible or problematic. Rather, Rorty 
seems to agree with Heidegger that pragmatism is ultimately an anti-metaphysical291 
version of the technocratic tradition. This allows it to follow its own ends and put the 
technical, instrumental approach to the world at the service of those human ends. Thus, 
contingency and mastery are compatible.292 Contingency, by illustrating that our 
languages and values are not perennial or permanent, allows technocratic thinking to 
pursue not its own ends but those human communities set out for it. There is an obvious 
uncritical optimism in this account. In rejecting ontology and establishing the 
compatibility of mastery and contingency, Rorty assumes that such a mode of thought 
does not carry with it hidden assumptions about the world that could limit the ends we 
hold or the means we prescribe to achieve them. He assumes he can remove the cultural 
demand for certainty from the West without replacing the assumptions about the world of 
that model with an alternative. Yet, new fogs roll in. There is no ontologically minimal 
                                                 
289 Ibid. p.47 
290 As will be illustrated throughout this thesis, Rorty never adequately supports this position.  
291 Rorty means this in his sense of not assuming the presence of foundations or an appearance-reality divide. 
The question of whether Heidegger does assume such a divide and the significance of that for a criticism of 
Rorty will be addressed in Ch. 3.  
292 The account of Heidegger’s critique of technology in Ch. 3 shows the interdependence of metaphysics, 
technology and contingency.  
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viewpoint or anti-foundational perspective. However, before illustrating this in Rorty’s 
constructions of naturalism and historicism, it is necessary now to briefly engage Connolly 
on language for an alternative viewpoint. One that offers a positive ontology of ambiguity 
to counter Rorty’s impoverished assumption of the isolation of language and the 
compatibility of contingency and mastery.  
Connolly and Contestability: Mastery and the Production of Global Contingencies 
While the central operative term of Rorty’s understanding of language, and arguably 
of his implicit ontology as well, is “contingency,” Connolly’s is the related yet distinct 
concept of “contestability.” This concept, like Rorty’s contingency, is one Connolly initially 
articulated within a theory of language and concept change but eventually represented an 
entire ontological-ethical-political orientation. As a theory of concepts, an ethical 
disposition towards others, and a self-consciously partial viewpoint on the nature of the 
political sphere, it is both the most unifying theme of Connolly’s philosophy and the link 
between his pluralistic ontology and his particular brand of ethical-political pluralism.293 
The purpose of this section will be to illustrate Connolly’s understanding of contestability, 
his alternative account of contingency, and (introduce) his positive ontology of ambiguity 
and abundance. For Connolly, language is not only contingent but inherently relational. 
Consequently, languages (and communities) cannot be separated out into the neat 
divisions Rorty offers. Further, contingency, while being a generalized condition, also has a 
particular form (or set of effects) in late modernity. The globalization of contingency, for 
Connolly, is not so much compatible with the logic of mastery as the latter has engendered 
a dangerous form of the former. Finally, in light of this persistent condition, Connolly 
offers an equally contestable positive ontology of ambiguity and abundance as a resource 
for both opposing the logic of mastery and the pernicious effects of Rorty’s social 
foundationalism. Connolly’s thought here will stand in stark contrast to Rorty’s portrayal 
of the isolation of language and the compatibility of contingency and mastery. Hopefully, it 
will begin to illustrate how the critique of mastery will furnish this enquiry with the 
resources to expose the limitations of Rorty’s post-metaphysical pragmatism and 
liberalism.  
                                                 
293 Morton Schoolman also makes this point in his, “A Pluralist Mind: Agonistic Respect and the Problem of 
Violence Toward Difference” in The New Pluralism: William Connolly and the Contemporary Global Condition 
(ed. David Campbell and Morton Schoolman). London, UK: Duke University Press, 2008. p.20. See Also, 
Howarth, “Pluralizing Methods: Contingency, Ethics, and Critical Explanation” op cit. – Also Connolly confirms 
this centrality, see. “An Interview with William Connolly” The New Pluralism, op cit. pp.311-13 
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In The Terms of Political Discourse Connolly argues that the basic concepts of politics 
are “essentially contestable.”294 Like Rorty, Connolly frames his theory as a rejection of the 
understanding of language as a neutral medium through which objective analysis is 
conducted. Rather, those who choose not to reflect on the terms of political discourse are 
inevitably predisposed to established practices.295 As will become apparent, conceptual 
change and agon are essential elements of politics and the only means of political change 
for Connolly. In opposition to the dominant modes of analysis in political science, he offers 
contestability as a means of thinking pluralistically about language and concept-use. 
Furthering an argument made by the philosopher W.B. Gallie, Connolly portrays 
conceptual meaning as multiple and relational.296 Concepts never exist in isolation but in 
complex relations of interdependency he calls “clusters.” A concept can never be defined 
without recourse to other concepts that are themselves related to more concepts. Connolly 
complicates this image by adding that there are very common and wide-ranging concepts 
that most views will refer to in some way (e.g. agency or responsibility). The way people 
understand these concepts, which are of course related to other concepts, and how they 
prioritize and weigh them in the definition of the concept at hand leads to an almost 
infinite level of variation in any one term. ‘Commonly accepted criteria of its [the 
concept’s] application are weighted differently by opposing parties, and certain criteria 
viewed as central by one party are rejected as inappropriate or marginal by others.’297 
Thus, meaning is always underdetermined and multiple in this view of concepts as they 
always exist within complex and differential clusters.  
This understanding leads Connolly to articulate three essential features of concepts. 
First, they are complex. Internally and externally, if such a division can be made, all 
concepts are composed of and refer to a multiplicity of other concepts. Those concepts 
themselves are also related to a multiplicity of other concepts which affect their own 
meanings in often subtle and nuanced ways. Thus, relations both inside and outside of a 
concept are intricate. They exist on multiple levels whose relations cannot be reliably 
tracked. Second, this high level of complexity leads concepts to be essentially open. With 
such complex inner and outer relations, and the fact that a multiplicity of meanings for any 
concept is thus possible, there can be no final definitions. New understandings of even the 
                                                 
294 This emphasis on concepts, and their status as an opposition to mastery, will return in Ch. 5’s discussion of 
Marcuse. There, it is the domestication of concepts which leads to the constriction of political thought within 
the mastery dynamic.  
295 Connolly, William E. The Terms of Political Discourse. 3rd Edition. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers, 1993. 
pp.1-2  
296 Specifically, his paper; “Essentially Contested Concepts” in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 56, 
1956.  
297 Connolly, Terms, op cit. p.10 
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oldest concepts are always possible. Finally, concepts are appraisive. They are never 
simply descriptive but are also normative,  ‘in that to call something “a work of art” or a 
“democracy” is both to describe it and to ascribe a value to it or express a commitment 
with respect to it’298 Thus, to use a concept is to use the associated value-judgment you 
have of that concept based on the particular prioritization of elements, out of the 
aforementioned multiplicity, you have settled on. The way you prioritize those elements 
and consequently define a concept is never free from values.  
These three characteristics lead concepts to be “essentially contestable.” If all 
concepts are highly complex, open, and appraisive, then conceptual debates are always 
normative debates. It is by insisting on the contestability of all concepts at the normative 
level that Connolly pluralizes thinking in general; contested concepts become the locus of 
political interaction. It is not that such debates precede politics but that politics itself is 
contestation over a multiplicity of interdependent and differential concepts that we all 
imperfectly share. ‘Central to politics, as I understand it, is the ambiguous and relatively 
open-ended interaction of persons and groups who share a range of concepts, but share 
them imperfectly and incompletely.’299 This language of imperfectly shared concepts 
allows us to understand Connolly’s view of political development. Political change 
emerges out of competing interpretations of (necessarily) imperfectly shared concepts 
that are themselves rooted in different normative views. As imperfectly shared, they are 
both a common resource for discussion and they remain open to contestation. Thus, 
multiple ways of viewing any situation or concept will always be available as a new set of 
relations among concepts is always possible. In this understanding, unity and stability in 
language, culture and politics becomes impossible. Instead, there is ambiguous open-
ended interaction. This is not meant to suggest that Connolly’s thesis of essentially 
contestable concepts results in a chaotic and relativistic processes of conceptual 
development and change. Rather, as Morton Schoolman points out, the close connection 
between concepts and the culture in which they exist is “axiomatic” for Connolly.300 
Political discourse is rooted in a society’s beliefs; they fill out and imbue the concepts we 
use. Thus, meaning is always culturally configured. However, the consequence of this view 
for culture in general would be an equal level of pluralization. If the concepts through 
which we engage in cultural and political discourse are always open to contestation, then 
culture, in addition to language, is not only contingent (which still allows it to be stable for 
Rorty) but plural and relational. 
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This understanding of concepts and languages posits both the relational nature of 
languages and vocabularies, in that they are always participating in ideas and concepts 
shared with other groups, and the fundamental contestability of each perspective from the 
viewpoint of the other contenders. As normative, conceptual clusters constitute forms of 
life.301 They constitute our actions and practices in the same manner that Rorty believes 
vocabularies determine social practice. Yet, if politics is always a process of normative 
conceptual debates occurring within complex relational networks of imperfectly shared 
concepts, then political debates always involve a wider matrix of our beliefs and 
assumptions. They are thus, already, contra Rorty, ontological. The difference between 
Rorty and Connolly’s accounts is that, while the former ignores the ontological by 
establishing both the priority and isolation of communities and languages, the latter does 
not close off these groups from one another or from the world. As vague clusters, 
languages imperfectly share elements and meanings that allow for conceptual and political 
agon. Communities are not closed off epistemological islands but dynamic and 
interdependent networks of multiple and multi-tiered connections. While it will be 
discussed in Ch. 3, it is pertinent to note now that this difference between Rorty and 
Connolly is the consequence of their contrasting methods. As aforementioned, while 
contestable, Connolly argues for a double-entry orientation to politics that includes both a 
general recognition of contestability and an incontestable critical gesture. This allows him 
to add a spatial dimension to contingency, which contrasts with Rorty’s solely temporal 
conception of contingency. Where Rorty only wants to characterize language (without 
ontological claims), and so separates them from the world and each other, Connolly adds a 
positive ontological moment within his work that asserts the necessity of contingency as a 
condition.302 Thus, the contestability of language means it is both open (temporal) and 
complex (spatial). It is without stability over time and in the relational moment. As 
relational, it can make critical gestures towards other frameworks which, as 
aforementioned, share partial aspects. In this manner, Connolly reconnects our languages 
with the world. He gives them a critical dimension.303 In contrast, Rorty’s pragmatist-
historical method assumes the stability of languages and communities in spite of 
acknowledging contingency. Further, this contingency isolates language from the world. 
His connection of mastery and contingency only exacerbates this by advocating a “mastery 
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302 This necessity divides Weak ontological and post-foundational approaches from anti-foundational ones as 
discussed in the introduction to this thesis.  
303 The importance of a critical dimension and Rorty’s exclusion of it will be discussed throughout this thesis. 
Importantly, Ch. 3 will argue that without an appearance-reality divide, which Rorty rejects, a critical political 
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of the moment” before the next metaphorical shift. The two-dimensional notion of 
contestability in Connolly’s philosophy results in a very different social ontology critical 
methodology. However, before introducing this, it is necessary to briefly divert and 
address Connolly’s treatment of contingency and its possible compatibility with the logic 
of mastery.  
Connolly defines contingency in different terms. Rather than a relationship between 
successive vocabularies, contingency for Connolly is multifaceted.  
‘By contrast to the necessary and the universal, it means that which is changeable 
and particular; by contrast to the certain and the constant, it means that which is 
uncertain and variable; by contrast to the self-subsistent and the causal, it means 
that which is dependent and effect; by contrast to the expected and the regular, it 
means that which is unexpected and irregular; and by contrast to the safe and 
reassuring, it means that which is dangerous, unruly, and obdurate in its 
danger.’304  
It is the latter three descriptions here that highlight the difference. While Connolly would 
agree that contingency precludes neutral frameworks for enquiry and any teleological 
sense for human knowledge and communities (i.e. changeable and uncertain), the 
contingent for him is also necessary relational (dependent), surprising (unexpected), and 
beyond control (unruly). We have already seen how the relational aspect is involved in 
Connolly’s theory of concepts as essentially contestable, the other two themes are related 
to Connolly’s identification of a particular late-modern condition through which he gives 
shape to his thoughts on contingency and its relation to mastery (and implicitly, 
philosophy and its relation to politics).  
While contingency, for Connolly, can be described as a general condition, he also 
focuses on a particular form or manifestation of it he identifies as a “defining mark of late-
modernity:” the globalization of contingency. This condition describes a very different 
relation between mastery and contingency. Rather than being compatible notions, where a 
pragmatic approach of mastery stems from an acknowledgement of the contingent nature 
of human development, for Connolly, mastery exacerbates contingency. ‘The globalization 
of contingency refers to a perverse correlation between the drive of dominant states to 
master contingency in their internal and external environments and the corollary 
production of dangerous global possibilities that outstrip the capacity of any single state 
or the interstate system to control them.’305 As this logic of mastery is extended, as overt 
control is attempted in more areas of human, social, biological, and environmental 
development, contingencies proliferate. For Connolly, mastery is specifically the project of 
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ending contingency; of turning human development to satisfy “human desires and ends” to 
use Rorty’s language. This relationship is obscured by particular developments in late-
modern politics. However, what is important to note here is that, philosophically, Connolly 
postulates that the attempt to master the contingent nature of reality only results in the 
production of new, larger contingency dynamics. Mastery and control, on this view, 
necessarily fail.306 Further, they obscure the very production of contingencies, and their 
involvement therein, through its domestication.  
For Connolly, as discussed above, the mastery assumption of a pliable world 
susceptible to human control is a compensatory ontology. As in the Anglo-American matrix 
of political thought, it theorizes the world as pliable in order to compensate for the loss of 
the enchanted world of religion. These ontologies, the mastery dynamic among them, 
domesticate (veil) contingency through a variety of means, but most occur through a two-
step process. First, they select one or two elements of contingency, as noted above, and 
treat them as the defining nature of contingency. Second, they theorize a social ontology 
that domesticates the selected elements while ignoring the rest.307 It is my contention that 
Rorty’s theorization of contingency perfectly fits this model.308 First, he identifies 
contingency solely as the historically changeable and teleologically uncertain. Second, he 
dismisses contingency as an ontology, refusing to postulate it as a general condition due to 
his anti-ontological philosophy. His concern throughout his work is to, ‘avoid hinting that 
this suggestion [contingency] gets something right, that my sort of philosophy 
corresponds to the way things really are.’309 Instead, he confines contingency to an anti-
metaphysical, behavioural theory of metaphor as the agent of movement in historically 
contingent language shifts. Languages and communities, on this understanding, remain 
stable outside of these moments of change. Further, contingency has no relation to the 
world. Thus, he domesticates contingency by limiting its experience and, as we have seen 
in his discussion of Heidegger, covertly reinserts a demand and presumption of the 
pliability of the world through the mastery dynamic. For Connolly, this demand is a form 
of ontological narcissism. As a compensatory ideology, it is a religious relic demanding 
that the world must be predisposed to us as compensation for the loss of a world that was 
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under religion.310 In this sense, Connolly illustrates how Rorty retains a nonhuman 
authority in the form of a logic and demand of the susceptibility of the world to human 
desires.  
Instead, Connolly offers a very different social ontology. This aspect of his theory will 
only be briefly addressed here to contrast Rorty’s theory as I have presented it thus far. A 
much fuller contrast will be provided throughout the course of this thesis. Connolly 
establishes a distinction between his own social ontology and those of the dominant 
positions of the matrix of Anglo-American political thought. For him, the latter are 
characterized by “ontologies of concord.” Such ontologies assume, ‘that when properly 
constituted and situated the individual or collective subject achieves harmony with itself 
and with the other elements of social life.’311 Such a unity, or demand that truth be one, 
which I have and will continue to identify in Rorty, results in a conversion of difference to 
and excluded otherness; that anything that does not conform to that unity is somehow 
defective.312 While this will be developed further in later chapters, the important point to 
understand now is that Connolly juxtaposes this to an “ontology of discordance.” This view 
holds that some form of otherness, something which does not fit or somehow imperils the 
unity and stability of the entity, is inevitable.313 It is for this reason that the drive to master 
a group or situation will only cause the proliferation of these deviations, not their 
resolution.  
This social ontology extends to Connolly’s understanding of contingency and his view 
of the irreducibility of ontology. Contingencies, which proliferate under the drive for 
mastery, are not merely linguistic. Contingency has a general reality. Consequently, it is 
not only that contingency precludes a neutral framework for enquiry (as uncertain and 
changeable) but that there are necessarily relational, unexpected, and uncontrollable 
elements therein as well.  
Suppose internal and external nature contains, because it is neither designed by a 
god nor neatly susceptible to organization by human design, elements of stubborn 
opacity to human knowledge, recalcitrance to human projects, resistance to any 
model of normal individuality and harmonious community. Suppose these 
elements of dissonance enter into the unities and concordances established 
creating disturbances in the designs we pursue… Each design engenders new 
contingencies while subduing old ones.314 
                                                 
310 Connolly, Identity\Difference, op cit. pp.30, 72-3 
311 Connolly, Politics and Ambiguity, op cit. p.10 
312 This manifests in Rorty’s politics as an exclusion of non-public thought. This is discussed in Chs. 4 and 5.  
313 Ibid. pp.10-11 – Beyond Heidegger, Connolly is clearly drawing on the language of post-structuralism; 
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This ontology of ambiguity acknowledges that our drive to understand and control is 
always matched by the proliferation of the unexpected and uncontrollable. It is not that 
there are no relations within this process but that relations exceed our capacity to control 
them. As in contestability, complex clusters of relational contingencies disrupt every 
established unity or community. As argued Ch. 3, every revelation of Being also conceals. 
There is always a veil. Thus, every view is partial, necessarily capturing some aspects of 
something and obscuring others. Discussing Heidegger’s notion of modern enframing315 
and its opposite, freedom, Connolly notes that he defines the latter as what “lets the veil 
appear as what veils.” For Connolly, freedom, as opposed to the enframing that draws 
things into a pattern of knowledge for the purpose of (pragmatic?) use, does not reveal 
what is beneath this veil. There is no exposure of Being or harmonious relationship with 
nature beneath enframing. Enframing veils the very procedure of veiling; it conceals the 
partiality of its mode of explanation. For Connolly,  
‘Every revealing conceals. And a veil must always be in a world neither designed to 
correspond to our capacities for cognition nor comprised of plastic material 
perfectly susceptible (even in the final instance) to human organization. The 
phrase [“…lets the veil appear as what veils”] then, calls us to appreciate the 
difference between our ideals and the world we draw upon to realize them 
without purporting to elevate that difference itself to a higher standard or 
metaknowledge.’316  
New fogs roll in. The consequence of the irreducibility of ontology due to the partial 
(contingent) nature of our languages and understandings means that contingency, contra 
Rorty, becomes ontologically necessary for Connolly. It is an irreducible part of reality 
which makes all of our understandings partial and the presence of unjustifiable ontological 
assumptions inevitable.  Further, freedom is not the absence of a veil, or its (sociological) 
circumvention as in Rorty, but the revelation of the presence and necessity of that veil. In 
this manner, Connolly illustrates both the connection between mastery and a dynamic of 
veiling (elaborated on in Ch.3) and the capacities of his own ontological method. His work 
does not unveil. Yet, nor does it elide veiling through a sociological and pragmatic 
circumvention. It reveals the necessity of the veil and the contours of the present one.  
Thus, Connolly’s ontology is one of inherent ambiguity. The world never matches our 
conceptual systems nor is it susceptible to a means-ends calculation through which we can 
master it. Rather, contra Rorty, such an approach produces a globalization of contingency: 
the production of contingency on a new level to match such attempts at control. This 
analysis stems from Connolly’s early work on contestability. Terms here are appraisive 
(normative), open (temporal), and complex (spatial). Due to this complexity, languages, 
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which share terms imperfectly, are relational. They are never isolated or restricted to 
internal discussions of use and coherence. Further, as relational, it is not only that our 
languages are never adequate to the world, which Rorty accepts, but that they are never 
adequate to themselves. There is persistent ambiguity in their incompletion. They fill in 
what is not explicitly articulated with assumptions which structure their understandings 
as much as their overt elements. There is no unveiled reality; yet, nor is there a veiless 
post-metaphysical pragmatic disposition. However, at the same time, there is a connection 
with the world. Seeing the veil as what veils asserts the necessity and inevitability of the 
partiality of existence. It asserts the necessity of contingency. 317 Closing his reading of 
Heidegger, Rorty suggests that Heidegger succumbs to the same criticism the latter makes 
of Nietzsche. Metaphysics re-emerges within Heidegger’s philosophy through the nostalgia 
he has for a pure time before the Platonic quest for certainty. This unjustifiable claim to 
the primordial re-inserts what Rorty calls an “unexplained explainer:” a transcendental 
criteria beyond language. It constitutes Heidegger’s attempt to escape from time and 
contingency.318 However, Rorty, repeats the mistake he accuses Heidegger of in his own 
attempt to be free of such transcendence. In his move toward the anti-foundational, the 
non-ontological, Rorty attempts to escape ontological assumptions into the pragmatic; 
albeit, the temporally contingent pragmatism of the modern West.  
CONC LUSI ON:  
This chapter has connected Rorty’s anti-foundational rejection of ontology to his 
understanding of the contingency of language to demonstrate how the implicit claim to 
methodological neutrality (established in Ch. 1) manifests in the first theme of Rorty’s 
pragmatist-historical method. In rejecting ontology and theorizing the priority of the 
social, Rorty focuses discussions of linguistic development on internal debates about the 
use and coherence of vocabularies. Consequently, when he turns to a positive theory of 
language and contingency, he redescribes the former solely within the terms of a 
behavioural (tool) account of social practices and confines the latter to an understanding 
of metaphor as the agent of contingent development. This pragmatic, anti-metaphysical 
view (where language is neither reified nor treated as medium), for Rorty, then 
necessitates a positive revaluation of pragmatism’s mastery logic within the history of 
philosophy. Reading Heidegger, Rorty argues for mastery as the only available post-
metaphysical response to contingency. It is in this sense that I argue that Rorty’s embrace 
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of the logic of mastery ultimately stems from both his opposition to ontology and his 
philosophy of language. Further, this results in an understanding that isolates languages in 
their priority, closing them off from the world and one another. With the mastery dynamic, 
vocabularies are now controllable islands susceptible only to the internal debates about 
use and coherence within the community and to the vicissitudes of metaphorical 
contingency. This amounts to an argument that since languages and thought are entirely 
cut off from the world, the only possible disposition to it is mastery. In contrast, Connolly 
illustrates how languages and concepts are never isolated. Holding to the irreducibility of 
ontological assumptions, Connolly theorizes a double-entry orientation to thought that 
necessitates the explicit articulation of positive ontological commitments. This 
methodology retains its critical standpoint in necessitating, in one moment, the assertion 
of the necessity of contestability before reflexively applying that back onto its own status. 
It thereby gestures toward and at a reality it cannot ultimately grasp. Thus, theorizing 
language and ontology, in opposition to Rorty’s anti-foundationalism, as fundamentally 
contestable, Connolly offers an understanding of concepts that illustrates this moment of 
necessity. Concepts are always complex (relational), open (temporally variant), and 
appraisive (normative). As such, languages always exist in vaguely defined and 
multifaceted networks of interdependent beliefs and every language carries with it 
relations and assumptions not explicitly articulated. Ontology is thus irreducible as it 
stows away, often unarticulated, within every vocabulary. Further, Connolly’s positive 
ontology of ambiguity holds that the world always exceeds our categorizations. 
Contingency is necessary because our languages are never adequate to the world or 
themselves. There is always a veil. Thus, the mastery approach, in seeking to encapsulate 
the world within a means-ends logic, only produces more contingencies as it pushes 
further into the details of reality. The critique of Rorty is twofold. First, in isolating 
language within communities and from the world and each other, Rorty produces a social 
foundationalism and ignores the critical resources of ontological reflection. He veils the 
veil.319 Further, in positing languages as stable and susceptible to control, outside of 
periodic shifts, Rorty enacts a mastery of the moment that ignores the spatial-relational 
dimension of contingency found in Connolly’s contestability. Second, in advocating a post-
metaphysical mastery, Rorty re-inserts the demand for and assumption of a world 
predisposed to human control and conceptualization. He ignores and precludes analysis 
into how such a demand introduces a covert set of ontological assumptions beneath an 
                                                 
319 The mechanism of veiling present in Rorty’s pragmatism-historical method will be introduced in Ch.3. Its 
political consequences will be examined in Chs. 4 and 5.  
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implicit claim to post-metaphysical neutrality because he ignores the possibility of 
ontological criticism. Both of these points will be developed further in Ch. 3 and its 
examination of the questions of naturalism and history.  
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CH3.  MASTERY AND ITS VEIL:  NATURALISM 
AND H ISTORY  
The essence of Enframing is that setting-upon gathered into itself which entraps the truth 
of its own coming to presence with oblivion. This entrapping disguises itself, in that it 
develops into the setting in order of everything that presences as standing-reserve, 
establishes itself in the standing-reserve, and rules as the standing-reserve… This 
disguising is what is most dangerous in the danger.320  
 
Man will know, i.e. carefully safeguard into its truth, that which is incalculable, only in 
creative questioning and shaping out of the power of genuine reflection. Reflection 
transports the man of the future into that “between” in which he belongs to Being and yet 
remains a stranger amid that which is.321 
INTRODUC TI ON:  
This chapter continues the analysis of the dynamic of mastery and mechanism of 
veiling into the two themes of naturalism and historicism. In addition to the contingency 
and priority of language, these themes comprise Rorty’s positive articulation of philosophy 
following his critique of foundationalism; essentially, what Rorty thinks philosophy can 
achieve. With naturalism, he theorizes the extent to which philosophy can contact reality. 
It is clear in this analysis that he radically restricts our ability to theorize the world and 
reduces the theme of naturalism to a way of understanding (the contingency and priority 
of) language as a behavioural and limited causal relationship with the world. This extends 
both his social-practice based understanding of language and his prescription of mastery 
to the physical sphere. Consequently, for Rorty, philosophy is left only with the resources 
of narrative and history for self-understanding. Progressive and linear developments are 
tracked through the past in order to provide an understanding of and prescription for the 
present. Here, Rorty once again returns to mastery as the modern disposition most 
capable of improving the human situation. Through a reading of modernity, he argues for 
its historical necessity and superiority. While in Ch. 2 Connolly’s work provided the main 
                                                 
320 Heidegger, Martin. “The Turning” in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays (trans. William 
Lovitt). London, UK: Garland Publishing Inc, 1977. p.38 – (hereafter: QT) 
321 Heidegger, Martin. ‘The Age of the World Picture” in QT op cit. p.136 
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critical resources to critique the dynamics of mastery in Rorty’s work, this chapter will 
focus on the work of Martin Heidegger. 
While Rorty’s anti-essentialist naturalism remains within the epistemic limits of his 
understanding of the contingency and priority of language, Heidegger gestures beyond 
such constrictions. Though the latter is equally aware of the failure of philosophical 
foundations, his work develops an ontological disposition designed to exceed the 
pragmatic. Through a singular focus on the question of Being, Heidegger offers an analysis 
of modern scientific naturalism and a critique of modernity as technology that reveals 
both the assumptions of modern mastery and the mechanism of neutrality therein. 
Further, he illustrates the necessity of the appearance-reality distinction in his language of 
the veil. Connolly develops Heidegger’s analysis of modernity and veiling through a 
critique of modernity and its implicit dependence on an ontology of plasticity and concord. 
He illustrates how Rorty’s thought (and pragmatism’s) depends upon a demand for truth 
to be one; for a unified viewpoint apparent and susceptible to human mastery. Through 
Heidegger and Connolly’s assessments of modernity and history, Rorty’s understandings 
(and the mastery approach in general) are exposed as impossible desires based on a set of 
unjustifiable ontological presuppositions (thus contradicting his anti-foundationalism). In 
both the themes of naturalism and history, Rorty assumes reality is fundamentally 
mutable which places it at the service of human purposes. The flaws of this 
presupposition, and its negative effects, are exposed here by the further development of 
Heidegger and Connolly’s critical ontological form of questioning. These latter two indicate 
the possibility of an alternative (ontological) approach for the philosophical analysis of 
politics (further developed in Ch. 5). The confrontation here reveals how ontology can be 
philosophical resource for the critical interrogation of our thought and politics in the wake 
of foundations.  
NATU RA LISM A ND TEC H NOLOGY:  NA TURE  AN D I TS  VEI L  
The question of the material world inevitably arises within every positive philosophy. 
Is it a determinative medium that structures our social, economic, and physical lives? Is it 
a pliable free-floating sphere constructed through the categories of thought, language, the 
mind, or some non-corporeal order? Or, is it something in-between? These caricatured 
positions represent the extremes of the positions addressing the nature of materiality, 
what is often referred to as the idealism-materialism divide (or idealism-realism in 
Analytic philosophy). Essentially, whether languages/concepts (either innate or 
constructed) or physical/structural realities (either natural or imposed) have priority in 
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our explanatory frameworks. Following the failure of philosophical correspondence, Rorty 
attempts to enact a version of Spinozan parallelism with respect to nature and culture. 
However, due to the continued priority of language and the social within his account, and a 
consequently simplified understanding of the relational nature of both the linguistic and 
physical spheres, Rorty produces a reductive account of the causal and reinstitutes a firm 
language-reality divide which subordinates the latter to the former in the relationship of 
mastery. All of this is framed within his continued endorsement of a pragmatic, anti-
ontological, and behavioural account of the material that constructs naturalism not as an 
understanding of the material but as a way of viewing language.  
Rorty’s anti-essentialist naturalism is contrasted here with Heidegger’s opposing 
account of ontological questioning and his consequent critiques of modern science and 
technology. By focusing on the question of Being, Heidegger offers a critical disposition for 
philosophical thought that allows him to identify the assumptions, exclusions and limits of 
modern mastery. He thereby illustrates how Rorty’s linguistic and social-practice view of 
naturalism results in a non-critical social foundationalism. Further, Heidegger develops 
the double-entry orientation of ontological thought identified in Ch. 2. Through recourse 
to the language of veiling and an implicit appearance-reality divide, he indicates the 
possibility of a critical perspective that Rorty’s naturalism obscures.  In this manner, he 
exceeds the naturalistic and the pragmatic in a gesture towards the ontological.  
Rorty’s Nod to the Material: Darwin, Naturalism and the Limits of the Causal 
Naturalism, the concept through which Rorty addresses the material, is a concept he 
often has recourse to but rarely defines in any detail. It remains opaque within his thought, 
not so much an account of the physical as a particular way of viewing language that 
accounts for the natural world. Thus, naturalism (and historicism) must be understood as 
occurring within Rorty’s account of the priority of language as social practice. It is part of 
his attempt to offer an anti-metaphysical view of language while simultaneously escaping 
the charge of idealism. However, ultimately it remains open to the flaws of his philosophy 
of language. Stability in the form of a social foundationalism emerges within this account 
where culture (as language) is given priority over and divided from nature.  
As discussed in Ch. 1, Rorty’s early work in the philosophy of mind embraced a form 
of materialism that attempted to address mental (linguistic) categories. Subsequently, he 
became more concerned with adequately accounting for the material in light of his thesis 
of the contingency and priority of language. However, it is important to understand that 
for Rorty, within the history of philosophy, the debate about materialism occurred within 
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the metaphysical context and thus necessarily outside of anti-metaphysical pragmatism. 
This is clear in his description of Spinoza as a turning point in the history of philosophy. In 
Truth, Politics, and Post-Modernism Rorty, as he often does, re-narrates the history of this 
debate from its Greek inception.322 This is the debate between Plato’s gods (anti-
materialists) and giants (materialists) over whether reality is in the end spiritual or 
material. Both of these positions, for Rorty, depend upon the appearance-reality 
distinction and the idea that the veil of appearance can be penetrated to the reality of the 
natural order of things. Blessedness is the anti-materialist sense of having achieved this by 
discovering how reality is in fact predisposed to humanity in some way. This is the main 
distinction between these groups. For materialists, there is no hope of such a relation. The 
natural order can still be accessed but doing so would only give us the utilitarian profit of 
manipulation; no metaphysical comfort323 is offered in this view of “atoms in the void.” For 
Rorty, this opposition between gods and giants continued throughout the history of 
philosophy until Spinoza. He sought to reconcile materialism with the hope of blessedness 
by theorizing the parallelism of matter and mind. Descriptions of reality in terms of 
matter, on the one hand, and mind, on the other, are two equally valid descriptions of the 
universe.324 They are two equally legitimate ways of viewing the same underlying reality. 
For Rorty, contrary to Spinoza’s intentions, this very move destroyed the blessedness. 
The notion of equally valid descriptions of reality, for him, imperils the very idea of a 
natural order that is in principle knowable, upon which the metaphysical view of reality is 
premised. As soon as one admits that there is more than one valid way to describe reality, 
one has to ask why it would be assumed that any description actually approximates it. For 
Rorty, this is due to the inevitable entrance of the notion of utility. As soon as multiple 
descriptions are valid, the idea that they serve different purposes is inevitable. ‘Perhaps 
we have no idea when, if ever, our descriptions of the universe are accurate, as opposed to 
merely being more useful for one or another such purpose than the available alternative 
descriptions.’325 It should be noted that this is the anti-epistemological point that we can 
never know reality, if in fact it has an order to know, rather than the ontological point (that 
Connolly and Heidegger make) that reality exceeds and overflows our descriptions of it. 
                                                 
322 History and narrative are key aspects of Rorty’s thought and method. His own understandings of them are 
addressed below and in Ch.4’s discussion of his methodology for the social sciences. For another discussion of 
the centrality of history to his method, see: Malachowski, Alan. Richard Rorty. Chesham, UK: Acumen 
Publishing Ltd, 2002. pp.41-5; and, Hall, David L. Richard Rorty: Prophet and Poet of the New Pragmatism. 
Albany, US: State University of New York Press, 1994. Ch. 1 
323 Connolly argues that pragmatist mastery is a compensatory ontology that provides metaphysical comfort in 
assuming the world as susceptible to our purposes (see Ch.2).  
324 Rorty, Richard. Truth, Politics, and ‘Post-Modernism’. Assen, The Neatherlands: Van Gorcum, 1997. pp.14-5 
325 Ibid. p.16 
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This slide toward pragmatism, for Rorty, questions the very idea of a natural order. Order, 
instead, is the effect of descriptions, which have no way to connect themselves to reality. 
Consequently, it is reflection on the nature of ontologies as linguistic that leads to the idea 
that they will never approximate the world. As Rorty notes, ‘the more one thinks about 
language, the less there is to think about nature.’326 Thus, Spinoza stands as a fundamental 
turning point in the history of philosophy. By introducing the notion of equally valid 
descriptions, he inaugurated the pragmatist move toward language and away from reality 
and the appearance-reality divide. The question now is, in what sense do materialism and 
naturalism remain for Rorty? What is his nod to the material? It is precisely in the use of 
the physical vocabulary and the naturalization of our understanding of social practice. We 
will take each of these in turn.  
Rorty endorses a version of this pragmatic, Spinozan parallelism regarding the status 
of physical and mental descriptions of reality. His point is to offer a view of the relations 
between humans and the world that, though naturalized, is not reductive or scientistic. 
This “non-reductive physicalism” draws principally on two key theses of Davidson. First, 
there is the idea that reasons can be causes. This amounts to an equivocation between the 
mental and physical vocabularies used to explain action. If reasons (as linguistic) can be 
causes (as physical), then they both impact on reality in a similar manner. What Davidson 
is suggesting with this thesis, for Rorty, is that mental and physical events are just two 
descriptions of the same process, the same event. Reasons and causes are no different than 
macro-structural and micro-structural explanations of the same process. Thus, a non-
reductive physicalist is someone who holds that every event can be explained within 
another set of terms, perhaps micro-structural. The reason why this is not reductive, for 
Rorty, is that this is paired with the idea that such a reduction is merely linguistic and not 
ontological.327 Showing the validity or applicably of another vocabulary is not to reduce 
one to the other. Nothing, for him, could achieve that. Every term gains its meaning 
through its place and relations within a given language game. Thus, as long as there is the 
practice of using a term, it exists. To be a physicalist, on Rorty’s account, is to acknowledge 
the continued use and validity of physical vocabularies. This seemingly paradoxical 
proposition, that language determines reality (and we have seen this before in Ch. 2’s 
discussion of the ontological priority of the social), is resolved by the second Davidsonian 
thesis Rorty employs: that there is no relation of correspondence or representation 
                                                 
326 Ibid. p.17 
327 This argument recalls both Rorty’s “eliminative materialism” and epistemological behaviourism. Here Rorty 
combines these in arguing for the relativity of physical and mental descriptions. Both occur within language. 
For Rorty, this argument is specifically not ontological. It is a repetition of his sociological circumvention of 
philosophy. See Ch. 1.    
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between languages and the world. We should replace the distinction between sentences 
that access reality in some way and those that do not in favour of distinctions between the 
various uses of vocabularies for equally various purposes. In this way the mental and 
physical vocabularies (among others) are acknowledged to have equal validity and Rorty 
can remain a physicalist (i.e. assert the use and value of the natural sciences) without 
falling into reductionism.328 The actual nature of his physicalism will be examined through 
his understanding of the causal. However, initially it is necessary to understand how 
naturalism and naturalization have another use for him beyond the technological 
developments of the physical sciences.  
For Rorty, the key contribution of naturalism to his philosophy is in how it changes 
our understanding of social practice and its development. To recall, Rorty follows 
Brandom and Sellars in holding that “all awareness is a linguistic affair” (see Ch. 2). It is 
this move that makes utility and coherence paramount and which isolates humans from 
the world within their linguistic communities.  
If our awareness of things is always a linguistic affair, if Sellars is right and we 
cannot check our language against our nonlinguistic awareness… There is no 
authority outside of convenience for human purposes that can be appealed to in 
order to legitimize the use of a vocabulary. We have no duties to anything 
nonhuman.329 
For Rorty, in getting out from under nonhuman authority, the only task now is to examine 
our vocabularies and practices in the hope of making their details coherent and explicit. 
We are limited, in this project, only by our present practices and vocabularies (their use 
and purpose) and the alternatives we can create or mine from history. The crux of this 
new pragmatic understanding is a naturalized, behavioural understanding of language as 
social practice that allows Rorty to link cultural and biological evolution.330 This requires 
some unpacking.   
Rorty fundamentally distinguishes his naturalism from the dominant variants in 
Analytic philosophy, referring to his as either “subject” or “pragmatic” naturalism as 
opposed to “object” or “reductive” naturalism. For him, the latter are concerned with the 
identification of perennial philosophical problems of word-world relations and addressing 
these problems through the explanation of non-particles by particles, or language by the 
world. For Rorty, his naturalism opposes the very idea of pictures (ontologies) of these 
relations. Our conceptual systems are better described, for him, as systems of linguistic 
                                                 
328 Rorty, Richard. “Non-Reductive Physicalism” in ORT. pp.113-6 
329 Rorty, Richard. “Robert Brandom on Social Practices and Representations” in TP. p.127 
330 Ibid. p.125 
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behaviour.331 Naturalism starts from the understanding of humans and communities as 
“natural creatures in a natural environment.” As organisms adrift in the flux of reality, we 
are merely attempting to cope with each other and our environments through language. 
Thus, in opposition to discoveries of fundamental word-world relations, all we can hope 
for is narratives about evolutional development; about how our practices and vocabularies 
have changed and grown in complexity in order to better cope amidst our shifting 
purposes. Behavioural explanation is all we have outside these narratives to distinguish 
between organisms. Pragmatism, thus, wants to escape the whole idealism-realism 
argument by eschewing the question of representation/correspondence, ‘in favour of 
descriptions of the interaction of language-using organisms with other such organisms 
and with their environment.’332 Unless particles (as physical) are somehow given an 
ontological status prior to organisms (as language-using), these narratives of cultural 
evolution are as naturalistic as explanation can be.  
Due to this behavioural model of naturalism, Rorty often utilizes the language of 
evolutionary theory in a view he calls, “Darwinian Naturalism.” For him, the evolutionary 
model of contingent and non-teleological responses to changing circumstances and 
developments is a productive non-essentialist way to think about language use and 
change. Consider: ‘Davidson lets us think of the history of language, and thus of culture, as 
Darwin taught us to think of the history of a coral reef. Old metaphors are constantly dying 
off into literalness, and then serving as a platform and foil for new metaphors.’333 And, 
‘Nietzschean history of culture, and Davidsonian philosophy of language, see language as 
we now see evolution, as forms of life constantly killing off old forms – not to accomplish a 
higher purpose, but blindly.’334 This naturalistic account of language-use and worldview 
change emphasizes, for Rorty, the fact that his view of contingent social practice is 
necessarily non-teleological and non-purposive. Changes in our behaviour and practices 
occur neither with a predetermined end in mind nor under the aegis of some determinate 
decision. Rorty’s reason for this may be at least partially explained by briefly referring to 
the work of John Dewey, whose own naturalism and influence on Rorty was discussed in 
Ch. 1. In an essay entitled “The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy” Dewey argues that 
Darwin’s work was a fundamental turning point for philosophy. For him, Darwin initiated 
a revolt against the dominant assumptions of intellectual life at the time. This was the 
                                                 
331 For an account of Rorty’s opposition to such picturing and his argument for the superiority of his social-
practice oriented view of languages, see; Rorty, Richard. “Representation, Social Practice, and Truth” in ORT  
332 Rorty, Richard. “Naturalism and Quietism” in PCP. p.158. The similarity of this language and view with 
Dewey’s (discussed in Ch.1) is obvious. Both neutralize scientific naturalism.  
333 Rorty, Richard. CIS. p.16 
334 Ibid. p.19 – (my emphasis) 
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assumption of the superiority of the fixed and final over the dynamic where change is 
always a perversion that is tolerated only as a means to a predetermined end (telos). 
Darwin destroyed this purposiveness through introducing a mode of thinking that 
removed the idea of a prior intelligent causal force or design. Under his logic of natural 
selection the interest shifts from the essence behind specific changes (the essential or 
metaphysical) to the question of how these specific changes serve concrete and different 
purposes (the pragmatic!). In another sense, this was a shift away from a single 
intelligence or design to particular entities striving in different directions; or a shift away 
from transcendent conditions to the specifics of time and chance.335 Thus, Darwin is a key 
figure in providing the intellectual groundwork for pragmatism specifically and a different, 
anti-essentialist and post-metaphysical, intellectual culture generally. For Rorty, both this 
general disposition and the specific themes of anti-transcendence and contingency are key 
to his naturalism and its role in his philosophy.336 
Rorty’s naturalism offers an understanding of relations that is explicitly framed in 
opposition to a transcendental mode of ontological explanation. Instead, his naturalism 
remains within his account of contingency detailed in Ch. 2. Transcendental explanation, 
or the explanation of actuality by eternal verities or conditions of possibility, is impossible 
here as it is one more attempt to escape from (temporal) contingency. Rorty reads the 
history of philosophy as the history of successive, privileged a priori conditions. Whether 
it is mind/consciousness, experience, logic, or language, all privileged principles can, after 
Darwin, be explained naturalistically as a particular social practice serving a particular 
evolutionary function; a view that Rorty in one instance refers to as, ‘making Spirit 
continuous with Nature.’337 Further, each transcendental condition, or “unexplained 
explainer,” eventually falls victim to the self-referential problem regarding their own 
possibility. This is the problem of how entities used to explain knowledge are themselves 
known. This problem arises because transcendent conditions always function as the 
source of explanation for the rest of reality (including the material). Thus, everything or 
entity must always stand in some sort of relation to these conditions before they are 
accessible to experience, description, etc.  
Call the lower-level entities, those which stand in need of being related in order to 
become available, entities of type B. These are entities which require relations but 
cannot themselves relate, require contextualization and explanation but cannot 
                                                 
335 Dewey, John. “The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy” in The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy: And Other 
Essays in Contemporary Thought. New York, US: Holt Press, 1910. p.15 
336 He also often utilizes Darwinian language and explicit arguments regarding Darwin’s significance in 
naturalizing Western thought. See, for example: Rorty, Richard. “Afterward: Pragmatism, Pluralism and 
Postmodernism.” in PSH.   
337 Rorty, Richard. “Wittgenstein, Heidegger and the Reification of Language” in EHO. p.53 n. 5 
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themselves contextualize or explain. The Platonic Forms, the Kantian categories, 
and the Russellian logical objects are examples of what I shall call type A entities. 
These entities contextualize and explain but cannot, on pain of infinite regress, be 
contextualized or explained.338 
For Rorty, this type of explanation assumes that no entity is available for experience or 
description without being in a relationship which exceeds that between everyday type B 
entities. Type A entities, as conditions of possibility, provide for this necessary 
transcendence. However, this leads to the aforementioned self-referential problem of 
access. If type A entities serve as their own conditions of possibility and we are justified in 
believing in them without relating them to something which conditions them, the problem 
of access to type B entities seems to fall apart. Why are type B entities not available to us 
apart from some condition in the way that type A are? In opposition, Rorty defines his 
naturalism as anti-transcendent. It is the understanding that anything might be otherwise 
(might be put into a new set of relations) and that there are no conditionless conditions 
(nothing that is outside relations). This makes all possible explanation of the actual, causal. 
It is about the present state of relations between entities. Whether language or physical 
reality, the point is to adopt a holistic view which rejects any distinction between available 
and unavailable (privileged and unprivileged, ineffable and effable, masked and unmasked, 
etc.) entities in favour of, ‘a seamless, indefinitely extensible web of relations.’339 Thus, 
Rorty’s naturalism, as anti-transcendent, chooses to exist solely on the level of the actual 
relations of the physical and linguistic worlds. The nature of this relationism and the 
consequences for the causal will be addressed in turn. 
While the previous discussion has introduced a current of relationism in Rorty’s 
philosophy that seems to contradict Ch.2, where Rorty was critiqued for lacking a 
relational view of language, the purpose of deferring the discussion of this aspect till now 
is twofold. First, Ch.2 attempted to illustrate the dominant theorization and function of 
language within Rorty’s philosophy. There, a social-practice tool-oriented view of language 
served to emphasize both the priority and isolation of language. The relational strain 
currently under discussion, it must be emphasized, is a minority report within Rorty’s 
philosophy.340 Second, this relationism, as the last paragraph indicated, flows explicitly 
from his naturalized worldview whereby the impossibility of transcendence necessitates a 
different understanding of the interactions between humans, each other, and the world. 
                                                 
338 Ibid. p.54 
339 Ibid. p.59  
340 Previous to PSH this relationism is only present in Rorty’s characterization of sentences as relational and in 
his view of the self as webs of beliefs and desires. See: Rorty “Wittgenstein” op cit. pp.56-7; and, Rorty, Richard. 
“Inquiry as Recontextualization” in ORT. p.93 – As illustrated below, while language is relational for Rorty, its 
relations are stable and confined to a given language. 
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This should become clear once Rorty’s naturalism, relationism and understanding of 
causality have been addressed. Finally, though this relationism is a departure from Rorty’s 
other reflections on language, it does not fundamentally deviate from that account’s 
central conclusions. There remains a (flawed) focus on the priority and isolation of 
language; one that, in my view, leads to a dangerous assumption of social mastery and the 
reinstitution of a firm and inflexible division between nature and culture, reality and 
language (which Rorty does not seem to intend).  
The continued prioritization of language within this relational viewpoint is clear 
within Rorty’s most detailed exploration of this theme in his late essay, “A World Without 
Substances or Essences.” He frames this discussion within an identification of what he 
feels is the best overlapping area of work between the Analytic and Continental 
philosophical traditions. This is the strain of thought that he broadly refers to as anti-
dualist, antiessentialist and anti-metaphysical where the classic binaries of Western 
metaphysical thought are opposed in favour of a “panrelational” view of the world as a flux 
of continually changing relations. For Rorty, this understanding is best illustrated through 
learning to see everything (objects, languages, social institutions, electrons, individuals, 
etc.) as numbers. Numbers, for him, are not easily assigned intrinsic natures, essential 
cores surrounded by accidental characteristics. Rather, numbers can only be defined by 
their relations to every other number. No relation of a number seems more essential to it 
than another. Excluding the possibility of set theory axiomatics that are capable of 
reducing numbers to sets and generating all relations, such a comprehensive essentialist 
project is generally not possible elsewhere. It is for this reason that Rorty thinks of objects 
as numbers in the following respect,  
there is nothing to be known about them except an initially large, and forever 
expandable, web of relations to other objects. Everything that can serve as the 
term of a relation can be dissolved into another set of relations, and so on forever. 
There are, so to speak, relations all the way down, all the way up, and all the way 
out in every direction: you never reach something which is not just one more 
nexus of relations.341 
Thus, the panrelational view, by opposing the idea that there are essential characteristics 
that are somehow more central to an object, destroys the intrinsic-extrinsic divide. If 
relations go all the way down, then all descriptions are particular constructions of a 
certain set of relations. This observation allows Rorty to return the discussion of relations 
and objects to language and use.   
In Ch.2, it was illustrated that, for Rorty, all language takes place within the confines 
of some vocabulary and all experience takes place within the confines of a language. For 
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this reason, there is no knowledge about something except those sentences which are used 
to describe it. Each such sentence is in fact a description of one relation it has to other 
objects. All sentences attribute some relational property. The only things we can know of 
objects are their relations to various other objects. Thus, Rorty is offering a view of 
language not as a veil that stands between humans and reality, but as a means of relating 
objects to one another. Nonetheless, language remains, for him, our only access to those 
objects. There is no pre- or non-linguistic access that provides a more primordial 
knowledge.342 “All awareness is a linguistic affair.” And “everything is a social 
construction.” These two mantras, the first Analytic and the second Continental, are both 
ways of holding that there is no awareness without linguistic mediation. The first asserts 
that all knowledge is attained through description rather than immediate access; the 
second, that our linguistic and social practices are interwoven to such a high degree that 
those descriptions are always a function of our social needs. The history of philosophy, for 
Rorty, is the history of the attempt to escape the bounds of society and convention (i.e. our 
linguistic practices) in order to make contact with nature. He admits that on his account, 
summed up by these two mantras, the nature-culture divide disappears because, ‘there is 
no such thing as a physis [nature] to be known.’343 Instead, because no description, no 
particular prioritization of elements or relations, is more real than another, there is only 
the distinction between different descriptions (tools) which may be better or worse for 
particular purposes/uses. Importantly, these social purposes, for Rorty, are always on a 
philosophical, rather than practical, par.  
Rorty is aware that this position may earn him charges of reinstituting a linguistic 
idealism, of suggesting that there were no objects to discuss before people began 
discussing them. However, for him, this confuses two quite different questions. ‘How do 
we pick out objects?’ and ‘Do objects antedate being picked out by us?’344 The existence of 
objects before language about objects, which Rorty in no way denies, does not, for him, get 
us any closer to essence. This anti-essentialism is the crux of Rorty’s naturalism. His 
linguistic parallelism, pragmatic naturalism, critique of transcendence, Darwinianism and 
relationism are all designed to remove the question of essence and its dependence on the 
appearance-reality divide. Instead, they offer a naturalized understanding of reality that 
extends Rorty’s social-practice view of human languages and communities. Specifically, as 
discussed below, it extends the instrumentalist mastery-oriented gradualism of Dewey. 
For Rorty, this pragmatic framework and its rejection of essence make any lament about 
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being cut off from reality by a veil a useless tautologous exercise.345 Nonetheless, it is also a 
claim he does not seem to deny either. This issue will reappear in the discussion of 
Heidegger. For now, it should only be understood that Rorty believes his naturalism 
avoids the disposition to essentialism in both idealism and materialism by accounting for 
both language and the physical world. This is most apparent in his reflections on the place 
of language in human evolution and the extent and nature of the causal (a topic we have 
been steadily moving towards).  
The important point to understand in Rorty’s anti-essentialist naturalism is that 
language, as a uniquely human ability, places humans in a fundamentally exceptional 
position with respect to nature. Language use involves the ability to describe. Numbers 
and objects relate to one another but humans alone relate through a relationship of 
description and humans alone are measured by the success of their descriptions in 
allowing us to cope with and utilize the world. Darwin’s work is so significant because he 
replaced the image of humans as having an intrinsic faculty of reason with an evolutionary 
account of our “increased cunning.” The development of symbolizing abilities is then used 
to explain the uniquely complicated interactions humans have with each other and their 
environment. ‘These interactions are marked by the use of strings of noises and marks to 
facilitate group activities, as tools for coordinating the activities of individuals.’346 
Naturalism, on this account, is about viewing language not as a representative medium but 
as a process of relating tools to what they manipulate for a particular purpose. For Rorty, 
this seems to have two distinct effects. First, it allows us to view all human behaviour in 
naturalistic terms and thereby see it as entirely continuous with animal behaviour (thus, 
seemingly effacing a nature-culture divide). Second, importantly, it changes our very 
relation to nature. We are no longer meant to represent or correspond to it, instead, ‘our 
task is to master it [nature], or adapt ourselves to it.’347 Thus, naturalism entails and leads 
to mastery. Without the question of essence, our imperative is only to master nature for 
our purposes. As in the discussion, of contingency and Heidegger in Ch.2, for Rorty, 
mastery is the anti-essentialist response to naturalism (contingency). The extent of this 
orientation only becomes clear through his account of the causal.  
Rorty’s account of the causal is meant to reconcile physical and linguistic (social) 
accounts of the world, to be suitable to both Geistes- and Naturewissenschaften and 
thereby end that problematic distinction. This desire flows from Rorty’s previously 
discussed parallelism and leads to an account of the causal that is meant to apply to both 
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texts (language) and lumps (brute physical reality). Nonetheless, it is fundamental to his 
reinstitution of a division between culture and reality, one that is both philosophically 
flawed and politically harmful. This divide is reinstituted precisely in Rorty’s continued 
prioritization of language. For him, texts and lumps do not have different epistemological 
statuses. The hard facts of science are in no way prior to or privileged over their 
interpretation. Rorty holds this point because, for him, interpretation, as an act, is 
irreducible. No “encounter with reality” occurs outside of some set of socially determined 
rules or structures that determine meaning and significance. He is aware that in making 
this claim he is inviting the charge that he is confusing the causal (physical) force of the 
event with the merely social force of the events’ consequences. In opposition, he insists 
that he is, contra the idealist, not denying the presence of brute physical forces, but that 
this nonlinguistic brutality should not be understood as facts available to humans and 
describable in language. The world acts on us causally, but there are as many facts about 
the world as there are languages for describing any causal interaction. Facts, as described, 
always include both the physical and explanatory aspects and thus are not free of some 
socially derived system of rules and criteria. To explicate this, Rorty refers to the language 
of programming. The world acts on us causally and, in this sense, does cause us to hold 
beliefs. However, it does not suggest this belief to us because such causation always occurs 
within a structured set of social practices with which we have been preprogrammed. An 
object cannot insist, ‘on being described in a certain way, its own way. The object can, given 
a prior agreement on a language game, cause us to hold beliefs, but it cannot suggest 
beliefs for us to hold. It can only do things which our practices will react to with 
preprogrammed changes in beliefs.’348 Thus, causation and justification are two separate 
acts; the former is physical while the latter is social-linguistic.349 Differences in explanation 
then are institutional, in the sense of social, rather than epistemological, in the sense of 
being privileged. Once again, Rorty reconciles language and reality by giving language (and 
his anti-essentialist naturalism) priority.  
Within this account of a physical-cultural parallelism, Rorty continues to oppose the 
image of language as a veil or medium between humans and reality. He does this in spite of 
reinstituting a theory in which reality is very much mediated through language. His 
purpose, in this, is pragmatic rather than philosophical. Rorty wishes to remove the desire 
to find a manner of making the veil match what it veils (i.e. in a analysis aimed at 
correspondence or representation). To do so, he offers an alternative image of languages 
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as tools for engaging with this brute reality. The question then becomes what these tools 
are for, what do they allow us to do on this conception for Rorty? Is this a better image; 
one that, in its purported absence of philosophical assumptions, avoids the problems of 
the veil? His answer is very much about control. For Rorty, conceiving of languages as 
tools allows us to see them as ways to master our environment and ourselves. They are 
alternative means of “grabbing hold” of the causal forces that surround us and altering 
them and ourselves to our purposes. It is for this reason that languages should not be 
viewed as, ‘veils between us and objects, but as ways of putting the causal forces of the 
universe to work for us.’350 He emphasizes that the justification of this metaphor (mastery 
of a tool) over the veil is not a matter of philosophical argument but of narrative. All he can 
do is tell stories about the development of Western culture that emphasize the negative 
consequences of the veil metaphor and the positive possibilities of the tool. The substance 
of this narrative, however, will be deferred until the analysis of Rorty’s relation to history. 
Now, it is necessary to discuss Heidegger’s contrasting account of essence, naturalism, the 
veil and their consequences. 
Heidegger: Ontology, Technology and the Veil 
Heidegger’s philosophy provides the resources to challenge both anti-foundational 
thought in general and Rorty’s particular brand thereof. Where Rorty premises his 
understanding of philosophy (and its relation to politics) after foundations with a rejection 
of ontology, Heidegger makes ontological thought (and a consideration of “metaphysical” 
questions) a necessary prelude to both a critique of metaphysics and any consideration of 
the subsequent nature of philosophy and politics. Specifically, in conceiving of 
metaphysics as a wider dynamic (beyond the issue of foundations) of the forgetting of 
Being and historicizing that problematic into an epochal history of Being, Heidegger 
provides a critical capacity to engage with the present. He inaugurates a critical posture on 
modernity and new conception of freedom.351 Essentially, through the theorization of a 
distinct mode of ontological questioning, Heidegger creates the possibility of critically 
engaging the dominant assumptions of an age. Further, through an analysis of modernity, 
he reveals the limitations of Rorty’s naturalism and mastery in the mechanism of veiling 
introduced in Ch.2. Thus, he both provides this analysis with a furthering of the critical 
posture introduced by Connolly, and undermines Rorty’s naturalism and historicism. He 
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illustrates that, rather than freeing thought from external non-human authorities, Rorty’s 
pragmatic naturalism circumscribes our critical capacities and confines us to the present 
thinking.352  
The question of Being is the frame of Heidegger’s thought. It is the centre his entire 
philosophy circles around; its constant point of orientation. Being and Time is solely 
concerned with re-awakening and understanding the meaning of this question. His project 
is to address this question of the meaning of the being of all beings and to discern its 
formal structure.353 He sharply distinguishes this fundamental ontology from regional 
ontologies that only investigate a specific type of beings. For him, such ontologies operate 
within a pre-given perspective that assumes a set of worldviews, metaphysical 
constructions, and anthropological considerations. They presuppose a particular 
understanding of being (e.g. being as life, being as nature, being as politics). His purpose is 
to think the common frame of all such inquiries. This is the proper task of philosophy. It is 
not meant to make evaluations and prescriptions, but to understand the formal structure 
of being in general (and the specific determinations of regional ontologies). This makes 
Heidegger’s project in Being and Time a- or pre-political. His ontological analysis intends 
to understand the conditions for the political; to establish the frame within which politics 
is thought.354   
For Heidegger, the question of Being is historical. He is clear that this question has 
been forgotten and neglected. His analysis is prompted by a particular relation to the 
question, ‘… a dogma has developed which not only declares the question about the 
meaning of Being to be superfluous, but sanctions its complete neglect.’355 It is this 
position, which greatly resembles Rorty’s, that Heidegger opposes. In this manner, he 
understands the present historically. Its relation to the question of being (to ontology) 
defines it in terms of a deficiency, a forgetting of the question. It is thus defined by its 
relation to the ontological. Contrary to Rorty’s reading, his desire is not merely to return to 
some previous relation or understanding of Being, but to grapple with the forgetting. ‘It is 
                                                 
352 The following argument makes use of very particular aspects of Heidegger’s work. Rather than attempting 
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a matter of acknowledging the question as that question to which belongs the very 
covering up of that question, that question which is characterized by a peculiar self-
effacement. The history of that self-effacement is the history of metaphysics, ontology 
proper.’356 However, this investigation is not only a negative critique but also a positive 
exploration of the value of that tradition in order to enact a fundamental ontology of the 
conditions of the question of Being. The difficulty, illusiveness and indistinctness of the 
question and its object do not allow us to avoid them. Rather, they necessitate confronting 
them in enquiry. Enquiry, for Heidegger, is a seeking and an interrogation. Further, the 
disposition and orientation of the questioner is fundamental. ‘Inquiry itself is the 
behaviour of a questioner, and therefore of an entity, and as such has its own character of 
Being.’ And, ‘Being, as that which is asked about, must be exhibited in a way of its own, 
essentially different from the way in which entities are discovered.’357 The question of 
Being requires an ontological mode or disposition of questioning. It is in pursuing this that 
Heidegger makes his contribution to critical thought.   
While he shares with Rorty a critique of the foundationalism of the Western 
epistemological tradition, for Heidegger, foundationalism is only one form of a larger 
dynamic of metaphysics within Western thought. Metaphysics is this forgetting, eclipse, 
and abandonment of Being and its question. It is the concealment of humanity’s necessary 
relation to the revealing of Being. Further, it is the concealment of the necessarily 
inadequate nature of all revelations of Being. As discussed in Ch.2 with Connolly, every 
revealing conceals. Every determination of Being is inadequate in a world that is not 
predisposed to humanity.358 Defining it in this way, rather than as solely an issue of 
foundations, makes ontology necessary rather than metaphysical (in Heidegger’s sense). 
Further, beyond necessity the question of Being is also primary. As the primordial 
question for philosophy,359 it structures what real philosophy consists of and is thus a 
normative benchmark for philosophical enquiry. All real philosophical questioning is 
ontological; it approaches, without actually answering (as this would be a covering-over), 
and circles around the question of Being. In the Introduction to Metaphysics Heidegger 
argues that the ability to stand back and question the entirety of Being is the unique 
capacity (and role) of humanity. It is a historical possibility that must be reactualized and 
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repeated continually. It is in this way that he gives this question and questioning priority. 
‘Our question is the question of all true questions--that is, of those that pose themselves to 
themselves—and it is necessarily asked, knowingly or not, along with every question. No 
questioning, and consequently no single scientific “problem” either, understands itself if it 
does not grasp the question of all questions, that is, if it does not ask it.’360 The issue then 
becomes: what is the capacity of this questioning? For Heidegger, as outside the everyday 
practical realm of use, it cannot be judged by usefulness or “everydayness.” Rather, 
ontological questioning is untimely. It allows us to confront that world and to disrupt it. 
Questioning shatters the unity of the everyday and pulls us out of the established order of 
beings. What this provides is a different perspective on that realm; for Heidegger, a more 
true and essential perspective.361  
We can only ask the question of Being from within what Heidegger calls, ‘the 
questioning attitude.’ He describes this attitude as ‘open resoluteness.’ The point is to open 
us up to the truth of Being and to allow us to stand back from particular determinations or 
organizations of Being. This attitude opens up a space for the question and thus provides 
us with the proper orientation to Being. As discussed throughout this thesis, Rorty’s 
pragmatism includes a fundamental orientation of instrumentalism. The world is 
confronted not as a thing to be known, with certainty, but to be controlled. For Heidegger, 
we must set aside both the epistemological and instrumental approaches to beings. 
Instead we must orient ourselves to the essence of Being. Essence denotes the ontological 
dimension to something. The essential is the aspect of a thing that covers its relation to 
Being in general. Thus, to question something, or Being in general, is to question it apart 
from its mode of revealing within a specific determination of Being (e.g. the natural, 
common-sense, or anthropological attitudes).362 Philosophical and ontological questioning 
is explicitly concerned with essence. Consequently, Heidegger often makes use of a 
distinction between ‘the true’ and ‘the correct.’ True here is not to be understood on the 
correspondence model of knowledge that Rorty rejects, but as the essence of a thing, its 
ontological dimension and how it participates in the current revelation of Being. In 
contrast, the correct relates to the revealed nature of a thing within the dominant 
interpretation of Being. Thus, within modernity, science, technology and the 
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anthropological perspective may be correct in their various interpretations of things, but 
they are never true.363  
This theorization of ontology leads to a distinct approach to politics. Rather than 
addressing specific political issues, Heidegger is concerned with the site of politics and its 
ontological determination, the polis. For him, the polis (or the political) is the site of 
history, of the collective determination of Being. It is the place where epochs emerge; 
where humanity, in its unique role, unconceals and conceals Being. To translate polis as 
state, or to name the state (or the interstate system), as the primary site of politics is to 
understand politics from within a specific determination of Being (the modern). In 
contrast, the polis is the site of humanity’s historico-ontological dwelling. It is the site 
where our collective relation to Being arises. It is in this sense that the essence of the polis 
is in an essential relation with the unconcealment of beings. It presents the frame in which 
we understand beings as a whole.364 What Heidegger indicates here is the social aspect to 
our determination of Being. What ontology offers is the ability to think the extent of this 
universe, its limitations and tendencies. In this manner, he offers us a much-needed 
counterweight to the dominance of pragmatic social categories in our thinking that Rorty 
(“correctly”) theorizes. For Heidegger, thinking the social requires, before an examination 
of its practices, an understanding of the limits and exclusions of that perspective. This 
results in a unique critical position for ontological thought.  
As in Connolly’s discussion of the double-entry orientation to political thought, 
Heidegger asserts the necessity of an ontological approach in order to critically address 
the present universe of thought. The orientation we take is essential. ‘When we first ask 
the fundamental question, everything depends on our taking up the decisive fundamental 
position in asking its prior question, and winning and securing the bearing that is essential 
here.’365 For Connolly, rather than merely rejecting truth as Rorty does, Heidegger’s 
ontological mode of questioning and understanding of truth draws that concept out of the 
epistemological framework of modernity in order to undermine its truth/falsity pairing. 
This pairing conceals the “untruth” that exceeds it.  
Modern "truth" is a mode of revealing that enables judgments of correctness and 
incorrectness within its frame. But every historical regime of revealing also 
conceals. It conceals possibilities of being that cannot be brought into a particular 
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way of life without confounding its basic principles of organization. "Untruth" is 
deeper than truth and falsity, then: untruth is that which cannot achieve sufficient 
standing within the terms of discourse of a time without stretching contemporary 
standards of plausibility and coherence to their limits of tolerance.366 
This dynamic requires engaging thinking what is not commensurate with the current 
historical determination of thought. Truth is not epistemology but the attempt to 
understand how truth was reduced to epistemology. Rorty, in rejecting truth entirely (in 
an anti-foundational gesture), assumes the sufficiency of the epistemological tradition’s 
definition. What Heidegger offers us is a truly critical perspective on the present and its 
universe of thought. He offers us the ability to understand its borders and assumptions; to 
reveal how it excludes other frameworks for thinking politics and the world. This is 
particularly useful in the present analysis because Rorty, through Dewey, attempts to 
formalize the actual manner in which social justification occurs and changes in language. 
He attempts to take the present naturalism and pragmatically neutralize it through a 
disposition of mastery. For Rorty, such a disposition is the only non-foundational response 
to contingency. In this, he attempts to explicitly exclude ontological (and epistemological) 
perspectives. Heidegger, in contrast, shows how genuine and total critique requires us to 
stand back to the ontological level and question totally. This does not mean everything is 
questioned at once but only that we understand our present as a unity and totality when 
we question it. Contra Rorty, true critical thought is not only piecemeal. Rather, it requires 
the ontological perspective of totality and the appearance-reality distinction he rejects.  
The present study is arguing that in spite of humanity’s inability to access a reality 
beneath appearance, we must retain the critical posture of this divide. There is an 
ontological rationale for this. We cannot pierce the veil down to reality. But at the same 
time, we cannot simply exist on the level of appearance. We do not have such access. Our 
languages, as imperfectly related to that reality, are always partial, always inadequate. 
Thus, we need that posture to gain critical purchase on the present. The veil allows us to 
assert the necessary inadequacy of the present; to assert that there is something it 
obscures and excludes, something relevant to our current thought. It asserts that there are 
dynamics, structures and limits we cannot yet see but that are politically relevant to our 
present world. If we think only in terms of the present universe, if we reject the presence 
of a veil, we cannot make that critical assertion of inadequacy and hidden dynamics. We 
lose the ability to say that beneath and in current situations, there is something as yet 
unseen that we should oppose. Essentially, we become subsumed under the current public 
logic. ‘We usually lose ourselves among beings in a certain way. The more we turn toward 
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beings in our preoccupations the less we let beings as a whole slip away as such and the 
more we turn away from the nothing. Just as surely do we hasten into the public 
superficies of our existence.’367 For the present study, this perspective, and its resulting 
critiques of science, technology and modernity, is what is living in Heidegger’s thought.  
In his later work, Heidegger turned toward an explicit critique of science and 
technology within modernity.368 For him, the problem with both scientific naturalism and 
modern technology is that they exclude the ontological and obscure their exclusion under 
a claim to neutrality. They are limiting perspectives. However, while the former is 
dangerous for its effect on ontological questioning, the latter is dangerous in terms of the 
alternative ontology it offers and the mechanism of veiling contained therein. Each of 
these will be discussed in turn.  
The essence of modern scientific naturalism is research. In research, knowing consists 
of a procedure enacted in some realm. Heidegger emphasizes that procedure here does 
not merely refer to method or methodology but the manner in which its sphere is revealed 
and the accompanying orientation we take to it. ‘Every procedure already requires an 
open sphere in which it moves. And it is precisely the opening up of such a sphere that is 
the fundamental event in research.’369 The unconcealing of Being in science is 
mathematical370 and it is only within this “groundplan” of nature that an event appears 
and is meaningful. Methodology and the experimental features of research only follow this. 
They both assume conditions of research and knowledge that entail a particular revelation 
of Being. Further, every science, by virtue of its circumscribed object-sphere and 
methodology of experimentalism, must particularize itself into specific, institutionalized, 
fields. As an on-going activity, one Rorty lauded in PMN as self-corrective, it adapts itself, 
its knowledge, and its procedure to its past results. ‘In the course of these processes, the 
methodology of the science becomes circumscribed by means of its results. More and more 
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the methodology adapts itself to the possibilities of procedure opened up through itself.’371 
Further, though circumscribed, it also dominates over the object world, becoming the sole 
arbiter of whatever is for Heidegger.  
These dynamics change the role of the intellectual. In the place of the scholar there is 
the researcher who has specific projects for specific problems.372 No total understanding 
or new thinking is intended. Essentially, the disposition to the world in science changes to 
a procedural objectification of whatever is.373 For Heidegger, the consequence of this 
disposition is a relocation of the authoritative centre. Just as in Rorty and his discussion of 
anti-authoritarianism, in scientific modernity man frees himself to himself; i.e. ‘Man 
becomes that being upon which all that is, is grounded as regards the manner of its Being 
and its truth. Man becomes the relational centre of that which is as such.’374 As the 
determinant of all value, all thought must be oriented toward humanity and its 
improvement. Thus, the essence of science is to serve the public375 and its current 
priorities.  
While in his analysis of science Heidegger demonstrates how its naturalism excludes 
ontological thinking and limits our universe of thought, it is only in his analysis of modern 
technology that he fully reveals the ontological frame of our present and its systematic 
limitation of thought.376 In “The Question Concerning Technology” Heidegger enquires into 
the essence of technology, which is, famously, nothing technological. In opposition to the 
instrumental and anthropological views, technology is not about contrivance or 
instruments. Rather, the essence of technology, its ontological dimension, is that it is the 
archetypal form of revealing in modernity. As the very mode of disclosure within 
modernity, technology stands behind specific forms of knowledge as the basic relation to 
Being. Further, there are two main aspects to this relation, an attitude and a mode of 
disclosure, challenging-forth and standing-reserve respectively.377 The posture modern 
technology adopts with respect to the world is challenging-forth. This orientation 
demands that nature supply energy to be extracted and stored. The earth is thus set upon 
                                                 
371 Heidegger, ‘World Picture” op cit. p.124 
372 As will be discussed in Ch. 4, Rorty lauds this image of philosophy.  
373 Ibid. p.126 
374 Ibid. p.128 
375 This term should not be interpreted to mean a collectivity. Rather, in Heidegger’s (and Marcuse’s) language 
it indicates the current determination of being and universe of thought. It is the bounds of the present. It is 
discussed at length in Ch.5. See, for example: Heidegger, Martin. “Letter on Humanism” in Pathmarks op cit. 
p.242.  
376 For Heidegger, science too is part of technological enframing. See; Heidegger, “World Picture” op cit. p.116.  
377 While this division within Technology may be a bit forced with respect to Heidegger’s work, it is a useful 
device for understanding the manner in which Heidegger’s ontological enquiry is corrective of Rorty’s 
rejection of ontology. Further, it recalls two aspects of Dewey’s instrumentalism: his challenging quest for 
control and his instrumental homogenization of reality.  
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in a ‘setting-to-order’ intended to unlock, expose and transform through the regulation 
and organization of its elements. Thus, this challenging revealing, for Heidegger, reveals 
the world as standing-reserve, as everywhere ordered to stand-by. Being as a whole 
appears to us as a ready resource to be organized and utilized. ‘Thus when man, 
investigating, observing, ensnares nature as an area of his own conceiving, he has already 
been claimed by a way of revealing that challenges him to approach nature as an object of 
research, until even the object disappears into the objectlessness of standing-reserve.’378 
Technology is thus a demand and a revealing. It is a ‘challenging claim which gathers man 
thither to order the self-revealing as standing-reserve.’379 Heidegger names this form of 
revealing, Enframing.  
The essential danger of Enframing is not its specific determination of Being, though 
that is dangerous, but its relation to the question of Being in general. Enframing conceals 
its own particularity. It denies that it is a specific determination of Being. As a result, it not 
only drives out every other possibility of revealing, ‘but it conceals revealing itself and 
with it That wherein unconcealment, i.e., truth, comes to pass.’380 Enframing denies and 
obscures the ontological question. Like Rorty, it rejects the necessity of this question and 
cloaks its own determination in a neutrality that excludes all others. Thus, opposed to 
Enframing, Heidegger offers a redefinition of freedom, one that contradicts Rorty’s 
specifically anti-ontological and anti-authoritative hermeneutic of freedom. For Heidegger, 
freedom is unconnected to the idea of will or choice. Rather, freedom, in its essence, is 
related to the dynamic of revealing necessary to Being. It is a happening of revealing, a 
moment for the true. ‘Man becomes free only insofar as he belongs to the realm of 
destining and so becomes one who listens and hears, and not one who is simply 
constrained to obey.’381 But what does freedom allow us to hear? For Heidegger, we are 
constrained to obey when we are forced to forget the question of Being in general and the 
manner in which it allows us to break out of our current mode of thought and adopt a 
questioning attitude to it. As such, ‘Freedom is that which conceals in a way that opens to 
light, in whose clearing there shimmers that veil that covers what comes to presence of all 
truth and lets the veil appear as what veils.’382 Freedom allows us the experience of and 
chance to critique the dominant determination of Being and its circumscription of the 
                                                 
378 Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology” op cit. p.19 
379 Ibid. p.19 
380 Ibid. p.27 
381 Ibid. p.25 
382 Ibid. p.25 – my emphasis 
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universe of thought. In this manner, Heidegger ties freedom to critique; the former is 
achieved only when we have the genuine possibility of the latter.383 
Thus, contra Rorty, for Heidegger, true (and essential) freedom requires the question 
of Being. Pragmatism, instrumentalism and hermeneutics, cannot provide for this freedom 
and perspective. Their humanism, their understanding of humanity as the only source of 
authority (epistemic or political), rejects the question of being and limits us to the 
technological universe. For Heidegger,  
‘In ek-sistence [the ontological perspective] the region of homo animalis, of 
metaphysics, is abandoned. The dominance of that region is the mediate and 
deeply rooted basis for the blindness and arbitrariness of what is called 
“biologism,” but also of what is known under the heading “pragmatism.” To think 
the truth of being at the same time means to think humanity of homo humanus. 
What counts is humanitas in the service of the truth of being, but without 
humanism in the metaphysical sense.’384  
Scientific naturalism cannot take a critical perspective on the present. Its reduction of 
thought to social instrumentalism, to a series of problems and responses by the human 
animal and its social structures, makes it incapable of conceiving its relation to the 
question of being. It is incapable of asking how it has determined being before research 
and mastery. It is important to note here that Rorty does not reject science so much as its 
status. It basic revelation of being and orientation to reality remains in his work. In fact, it 
goes unchecked in a subterranean current of mastery that hides beneath an explicit 
assumption of the neutrality of technology within his naturalism. 385 His anti-essentialism 
and critique of unmasking justify this exclusion through an anti-foundational and 
reductive reading of the appearance-reality divide.386 Here he divides language, and our 
critical thought, from reality and reduces us to our social practices. Where Rorty saw 
ontology as one more limitation on the free expression of human desires, Heidegger saw it 
as a necessary medium one must pass through for freedom, both ontological and political; 
an imperfectly accessible opportunity to expand our thought and our present. One that we 
must continually gesture towards without ever grasping.  
                                                 
383 See also for this; Heidegger, “What is Metaphysics?” op cit. p.93 
384 Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism” op cit. p.268 
385 Thomson, Iain. (2010). “Rorty, Heidegger, and the Danger and Promise of the Technological Archive”. Time 
Will Tell, But Epistemology Won't: In Memory of Richard Rorty A Symposium to Celebrate Richard Rorty's 
Archive. UC Irvine, Retrieved from: 
http://escholarship.org/uc/item/4b09r4st  
386 Heidegger in contrast, like post-foundational thought and weak ontology, rejects the anti-foundational logic 
as remaining within the metaphysical universe. See; Heidegger, Martin. “The word of Nietzsche: ‘God is Dead’” 
in QT op cit. p.61 
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H I STORY  AN D MODE RN I TY:  HUMA NI TY  AT  THE  CENTRE  
From within the contingency and priority of language, and the social (i.e. anti-
essentialist) understanding of naturalism, Rorty turns to history as his positive method for 
social and political progress.  He is a self-declared “historicist” and historicism is the final 
major theme of Rorty’s positive articulation of philosophy. With it, we encounter his turn 
to politics; it is with history and narrative, for him, that philosophy can be utilized for 
positive social change. Through a confrontation with Connolly and Heidegger, this section 
illustrates how Rorty’s utilization of history and narrative, understood from within his 
work on the contingency of language, leads to his readings of Hegel and modernity and an 
explicit human-centred form of mastery. It is in Rorty’s understanding of history and 
modernity that we see his fullest theorization of the stability of the historical period 
(outside of contingent shifts). Much like his treatment of languages, he isolates eras from 
one another in their vocabularies and reinserts a demand for a unity and stability to be 
mastered. This “mastery of the moment,” will be illustrated through a confrontation with 
Connolly and his critique of modernity. It is within his writings on history and modernity 
that Rorty reveals both the demand for unity in his thinking and how it is involved with his 
theorization of pragmatism as mastery. Further, this section will also return to Heidegger 
to identify the dangerous “humanism” at the basis of Rorty’s pragmatist-historical method. 
By making human social groups the sole epistemic and political authority, Rorty 
compromises critical thinking. He destroys our ability to exceed the public present. Thus, 
his social foundationalism, through the three themes of contingency (of language), 
naturalism, and historicism, will be exposed. Finally, this will indicate how philosophy and 
ontology, in spite of their reformulated capacities for thought after foundations, can 
gesture towards a more critical orientation to the given.  
History, Hegel, and Modernity: Rorty and the Pragmatic Self-Assertion of Reason 
Like naturalism, historicism is a concept that Rorty often had recourse to but which 
he rarely defined in any detail.  As vaguely defined, it is not so much a theory of history as 
a way of understanding the status of the present (and its languages), and the capacity to 
change that present in a directed manner. Thus, like naturalism, it must be understood 
from within Rorty’s social-practice account of language. Like his theorization of language 
and naturalism, his historicism is an attempt to articulate the project (and the limits 
thereof) of philosophy in the post-metaphysical context. Ultimately, as in both of those 
areas, it is open to charges of reinstituting a stability in mastery that assumes that our 
world, languages, and groups are plastic forms mutable to human wills.  
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As discussed, for Rorty, language is a social practice (tool) that allows us to cope with 
our environment and each other through an understanding of the world and its relations. 
Its development is contingent and characterized by the movement from one language to 
another through the process of the literalization of new metaphors. Here, languages are 
both given priority and isolated from each other and the world. For Rorty, this account has 
specific consequences for any discipline attempting to understand human behaviour.387 
Simply put, rather than attempting to explain the macrostructural (behaviour at the 
individual and social levels) by the microstructural (particles, e.g. nature of mind-brain 
functions), we must engage in the creation of narratives of our development. To 
understand our cultural practices, we must see them as distinct from the biological states 
that make them possible.388 For Rorty, philosophy can only articulate what makes humans 
distinctive (exceptional) through the creation of narratives, rather than the search for 
perennial features. This narrative focus again brings philosophy and enquiry back to the 
category of use. Philosophy must approach humanity not with the aim of discovering the 
immutable but of understanding the past uses of various conceptualizations in order to 
understand how they led to the present conceptual landscape. In this way, philosophy 
should not be understood as a puzzle to be solved, but a continual process of 
‘reinterpreting and recontextualizing the past.’389 For Rorty, this model of enquiry 
redirects our focus from the “methodologico-ontological” to the “ethical-political.” It ends 
the idea that certain objects and topics demand to be studied in a certain way and instead 
redirects enquiry to the purposes it hopes to achieve and the alternatives available. For 
him, these are always on a philosophical par.390  
This view changes the nature of enquiry. Rather than being a process of accumulating 
knowledge about the world, redescription becomes central. It is this aspect of Rorty’s 
theory that necessitates history. When enquiry is redescription, philosophical debate 
becomes about the use of any given practice or vocabulary. For Rorty, use is debated 
through the descriptive comparison of a given practice or vocabulary with a past or 
proposed future one. Thus, pragmatically, philosophy must become historical.391 It must 
offer understandings of the past, not to be understood as “true,” but as contingently useful. 
                                                 
387 Throughout his career, Rorty never clarified his position on the difference between the physical and human 
sciences. While he opposed any prioritization of Naturwissenschaften (science) over Geisteswissenschaften 
(humanities), he retained a difference between the two. This was often articulated through a comparison of the 
relative capacities for consensus between the two with the former often achieving high levels and the latter 
necessarily not. However, he failed to delineate the consequences of this. See; “Method, Social Science, and 
Social Hope” in CP.  
388 Rorty, Richard. ‘Holism and Historicism’ in PCP.pp.177-8 
389 Ibid. p.182 
390 Rorty, Richard. “Inquiry as Recontextualization: An Anti-Dualist Account of Interpretation” in ORT. p.110 
391 Rorty, Richard. “Introduction” in CP, p.xxix 
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Here, the importance of narrative to Rorty becomes obvious. Albeit contingent, narratives 
can provide a line of historical progression. These narratives are the only tools available to 
the pragmatist to recontextualize the practice or vocabulary they are offering. In a sense, it 
is the only anti-essentialist, argumentative means to change the way we think about a 
given topic.392 While in naturalism, mastery is the only disposition available to the anti-
essentialist, Rorty argues here that history is the only tool of change.  
History has several distinct functions in this view of narrative. For our purposes, 
Rorty identifies four beneficial types. The first two, which he contrasts, are historical and 
rational reconstructions. The former situates a thinker and attempts to understand them 
from within their historical context. This provides what Rorty calls “self-awareness;” the 
awareness of the difference (and hence contingency) of forms of intellectual life. In 
contrast, rational reconstructions are singular interpretations that integrate thinkers into 
the present philosophical context. This provides what Rorty calls “self-justification.” Here, 
past thinkers are incorporated into the present debate in an attempt to provide continuity 
and a rational line of progression through the temporal development of philosophy. While 
anachronistic, this allows us to conceive of philosophy as a “long conversational 
interchange.” It assures us of rational progress and, for Rorty, is consequently an 
important project. ‘We need to think that, in philosophy as in science, the mighty mistaken 
dead look down from heaven at our recent successes and are happy to find that their 
mistakes have been corrected.’393  
The third and fourth types of history are similarly connected. Intellectual history, for 
Rorty, provides the raw material. Philosophy always occurs within a wider intellectual and 
cultural context. As an honorific title, what counts as philosophical is often contentious. 
Intellectual history provides the material for canon reformation, a process that must, for 
Rorty, be continual. But what decides the canon? For Rorty, it is specifically the fourth 
type, Geistesgeschichte. These “spirit-histories” draw on both historical and rational 
reconstructions (as well as the raw material of intellectual history). From the former, they 
derive the awareness of the relativity of philosophical vocabularies and problems. From 
the latter, they draw the project of justification. Yet, theirs differ in scale. Where rational 
reconstructions focused on specific problems and thinkers, Geistesgeschichte engages 
problematics and asks the meta-questions of what philosophy is and should be.394 For 
Rorty, these meta-histories fulfil several purposes. First, they illustrate the contingency of 
                                                 
392 Rorty, “Inquiry” in ORT. p.110 
393 Rorty, Richard. “The Historiography of Philosophy: Four Genres” in TP.pp.249-50. Rational reconstructions 
are always judgments/interpretations of past thinkers by present standards. They do not discern the truth of 
those philosophies but only their present applicability. 
394 Ibid. p.260 
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our own time. Second, they simultaneously provide us with an understanding of 
philosophical development that assures us that progress has been made, that we are 
“better off” than those before us. These upward narratives provide us with the hope to 
continue on with the project of a community. Finally, these narratives point us to the 
future, to the ways in which that time will be better than our own.395 There are several 
unclear issues here. For the present, these will be deferred as a discussion Rorty’s reading 
of Hegel and his narrative of Western civilization and modernity will help bring them into 
focus.  
As both Rorty and his critics have observed, 396 he employs only a very particular 
aspect of Hegel’s thought, his historicism. For Rorty, Hegel’s “temporalization” of 
rationality in his history of varying rationalities dialectically progressing through 
European civilization was the most important step toward pragmatism. This historicism 
made the criteria for rationality dependent on the language and epoch within which it 
operates. However, it is necessary to remove this historicist emphasis from the 
overwhelming discourse of the Absolute in Hegel, a process Rorty refers to as “de-
absolutizing” or “de-ontologizing” Hegel. What remains is the admittedly minimal part of 
Hegel’s philosophy where philosophy itself is understood as ‘its time apprehended in 
thought.’397 For Rorty, Hegel first posits the pragmatist notion that justification and 
philosophical problems are internal to an epoch and shift with the general movement of 
temporal contingency. Thus, he is instrumental in the development toward Rorty’s own 
characterization of languages and truth as temporal, contingent developments (Ch.2). In 
“Nineteenth-Century Idealism and Twentieth-Century Textualism” Rorty posits Hegel’s 
“romanticism” (i.e. his sense of the temporal relativity of vocabularies) as his chief 
contribution to toppling nineteenth century scientism. He exposed,  
the relativity of significance to choice of vocabulary, the bewildering variety of 
vocabularies from which we can choose, and the intrinsic instability of each. Hegel 
made unforgettably clear the deep self-certainty given by each achievement of a 
new vocabulary… He also made unforgettably clear why such certainty lasts but a 
moment. He showed how the passion which sweeps through each generation 
serves the cunning of reason, providing the impulse which drives that generation 
to self-immolation and transformation.398  
The stability each generation achieves with the creation of a new vocabulary is inevitably 
lost in the intrinsic temporal instability of all such vocabularies. Thus, in Rorty’s view of 
                                                 
395 Ibid. pp.270-3 
396 See: Rotenstreich, Nathan. “Rorty’s Interpretation of Hegel” in The Review of Metaphysics, vol. 39 (2), 1985; 
Redding, Paul. “ History as Celebration or Justification? Rorty versus the Non-Metaphysical Hegelians” in Clio, 
vol. 31 (4), 2002; Matarrese, Craig B. “ Satisfaction or Supersession? Expression, Rationality, and Irony in Hegel 
and Rorty.” In Clio, vol. 36 (1), 2006.   
397 Rorty, “Dewey Between” in TP. p.302 
398 Rorty, Richard. “Nineteenth-Century Idealism and Twentieth-Century Textualism” in CP.  p.148 
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history and his use of Hegel, there is a certain model of development. Change is 
progressive and developmental. It moves in one consistent direction from each period of 
normal discourse to the next through the necessary revolutionary period of vocabulary 
change brought on by the inevitable effects of the temporal instability of our worldviews. 
Furthermore, Hegel also contributed to this shift from the eternal to the future, from 
searching for the universal foundation of things to positive hope for change. ‘With Hegel, 
intellectuals began to switch over from fantasies of contacting eternity to fantasies of 
constructing a better future. Hegel helped us to start substituting hope for knowledge.’399 
This language of the future, which we have encountered previously, will return in Chs. 
4&5.  
Like Hegel, Rorty provides such linear, upward narratives throughout his works. The 
common thread that runs through them is a view of the development of Western thought 
and culture as a process of de-divinization and secularization.400 For Rorty, from the 
religiosity of the medieval period, through the love of reason in the Enlightenment, and 
finally the romantic love of the inner truth of man in the 19th century, we have looked to 
idealizations and external absolutes to define human ends. The imperative now is to reject 
all such static conceptions and divinations. It is to have history and narrative, ‘replace God, 
Reason and Nature as the source of human hope.’401 It is this upward narrative and the 
theorization of the self-sufficiency and self-enclosed nature of each historical ‘epoch’ that 
motivates his dismissal of modernity as a “philosophical problem.”402 For him, modernity 
is merely the result of a multiplicity of social, economic, and historical contingencies. Due 
to his progressive and periodized model of time, where each period is taken to be isolated 
in language and enquiry from those preceding and following it, and movements between 
these moments are only the products of contingent shifts, Rorty assumes that no deeper 
explanation of a period is possible. No criteria is available that can transcend the epoch in 
which something is explained. Further, no deeper logic is present behind it.403 Rather, 
when we understand our time, we can only hold it in thought; we can only offer those 
progressive narratives of justification.  
                                                 
399 Rorty, Richard. “The End of Leninism, Havel, and Social Hope” in TP.p.233 
400 CIS is both a justification of this upward narrative approach and an example of Rorty’s own particular 
version. Through narrative this work justifies the development of Western civilization towards Rorty’s own 
vision of pragmatic liberalism.   
401 Rorty, Richard. “Afterward: Pragmatism, Pluralism, and Postmodernism” in PSH. p.265 
402 This is a reference to Robert B. Pippin’s seminal work: See; Modernism as a Philosophical Problem. Oxford, 
UK: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1991.  
403 Rorty, Richard. “Comment on Robert Pippen’s ‘Naturalness and Mindedness: Hegel’s Compatibalism” in 
European Journal of Philosophy. 7 (2), 1999. pp.213-16 
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Rorty connects these themes of narrative, history, and modernity to his ethic of 
mastery and critique of Continental philosophy in his review of Hans Blumenberg’s The 
Legitimacy of the Modern Age, “Against Belatedness.” For Rorty, the power of 
Blumenberg’s work is that it offers an understanding of modernity that defends the 
Enlightenment without recourse to the foundational nature of reason; essentially, it offers 
an anti-foundational justification. Rorty frames this review in terms of a critique of 
Continental philosophy (Nietzscheans, Heideggerians, and Marxists especially) and its 
recourse to the logic of “unmasking”404 in its critique of the “belatedness” of the modern 
age. Both of these terms require unpacking. As discussed in Ch.2, Rorty critiques 
Continental philosophy (and Heidegger) for employing the logic of unmasking in 
philosophical critique. Here, the appearance-reality distinction is maintained in the 
attempt to penetrate through some distorting veil to a hidden reality within. “Belatedness” 
is the associated view that modernity, for some reason, is fundamentally impoverished in 
comparison to some idealized past (Nietzsche and Heidegger are particular examples for 
Rorty). It is a distinction between some “pristine old and nasty new” that smuggles the 
appearance-reality distinction back in. In contrast, the virtue of Blumenberg’s work is that 
he offers a justificatory narrative of the Enlightenment, an “old-fashioned 
Geistesgeschichte,” without a totalizing metaphysics. Essentially, he combines a recognition 
of historical contingency with a reinvigorated defence of modernity; two things Rorty 
believes rarely go together but need to be combined.  
What we want, on this view, is acknowledgement of discontinuity and open-
endedness and contingency, rather than either nostalgia or exuberance… Those of 
us who agree with Nietzsche and Heidegger that the philosophical tradition is 
pretty well played out, with Carlyle and Foucault that the arts and sciences have 
not been unmixed blessings, and with the Marxists that we should not believe what 
the lying capitalist press tells us about the modern world, but whose highest hopes 
are still those of Mill, now have a champion.405 
For Rorty, this is a contest of narratives. Is modernity where humanity has become freer in 
its projects of disenchantment and democracy? Or is it merely a secularized form of the 
same ancient and Christian eschatology as various Continentals have charged? 
Blumenberg both refutes this reading and offers a justificatory narrative of modernity 
within the mastery dynamic. Regarding the former, for Rorty, he undercuts the 
“alternative forms” thesis of modernity as secularized theology by highlighting the intense 
differences between modernity and earlier periods. For Blumenberg, the very project of 
picking a sufficiently abstract description able to encompass ancient, medieval, and 
                                                 
404 See; Rorty, Richard. “Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism” in Deconstruction and Pragmatism (ed. 
Chantal Mouffe). London, UK: Routledge, 1996. p.14 
405 Rorty, Richard. “Against Belatedness” in London Review of Books. Vol.5 (11), June 1983. p.3 
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modern, and thus see them as alternative forms of the same thinking, is facile and 
misleading. He justifies this with an alternative reading that highlights the distinctiveness 
of modernity. For him, medieval theology created its own destruction within its 
articulation of the total omnipotence of God. With Ockham and medieval nominalism, 
God’s omnipotence and transcendence were so absolute that his purposes became utterly 
unknowable. The only path left to humanity, was what Rorty calls the “Baconian 
pragmatism” of modernity. Blumenberg makes a key distinction in his work between two 
Enlightenment projects: self-foundation and self-assertion. For him, critiques of modernity 
confuse the two. Self-foundation is the project of discovering an ahistorical framework for 
human knowledge and existence. It can be eschewed without rejecting the “mode of life” 
(self-assertion) that came with it. The fact that it lacks these foundations is not a point 
against it. Rather, for Rorty as for Blumenberg, ‘the legitimacy of the modern 
consciousness is simply that it is the best way we have so far found to give sense to our 
lives.’406 In contrast to Heidegger’s account of the history of Western philosophy as 
successive movements away from a primordial relationship to Being, Blumenberg 
understands that history as a series of rational rejections of alternatives. These were not 
rational in some ahistorical sense, but only in the sufficient sense of being a pragmatic 
choice among tools.  
Baconian pragmatism is the expression of self-assertion, the orientation or 
disposition407 of technical mastery towards the world. The demands of knowledge are not 
fixed by some absolute but only by the “requirements of domination over natural reality.” 
Thus, self-assertion is the priority of human aims, desires, and happiness and their 
fulfilment through a post-metaphysical (i.e. without self-foundation) pragmatic practice. It 
is a replacement of the future for the historical or primordial; for it involves the, 
‘substitution of an infinitely long time in which progress can occur for a pre-existent 
infinite.’408 For Rorty, this substitution, and the pragmatic mastery-oriented approach of 
modernity, involves replacing metaphysics with “historical self-consciousness.” These are 
narratives that provide a distinct understanding of our past that allows us to understand 
our superiority over it in terms of sufficient rationality. While this is a “Whiggish” 
approach, it is self-consciously so and thus aware of its own status. Its value lies in its 
perception of the difference between the two projects of Enlightenment, self-foundation 
and self-assertion, its critique of the former and justification of the latter, and its ability to 
                                                 
406 Ibid. p.3 
407 Like in Ch. 1, Rorty argues for a instrumental disposition to the world.  
408 Rorty, “Against Belatedness,” op cit.  p.3 
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eclipse metaphysical thought while preserving human purposes and progress.409 
Blumenberg, ‘helps us see that the demand to unmask completely, to make all things new, 
to start from nowhere, to substitute new true consciousness for old false consciousness, is 
itself an echo of the Enlightenment. It is precisely that part of the Enlightenment which 
really is ‘bankrupt.’410 No more metaphysics, no more unmasking. Through Blumenberg, 
Rorty draws together the various themes of his historicism to offer an understanding of 
modernity as a period where human purposes are liberated from previous ideals, and 
human means are liberated from metaphysical requirements. It is the unique time where 
we can approach the future as a resource to be mastered and a tool for human 
development. It is in this analysis that Rorty fully illustrates what was referred to in Ch.2 
as his “pragmatist-historical method.”411 This is the project whereby the pragmatic self-
assertion of man and his purposes is enacted through the construction of historical 
narratives of upward progress. It combines an emphasis on the use of contingent historical 
events in narrative construction with the self-assertion of humanity. It is thus pragmatic 
(masterful) and historical. For Rorty, as anti-foundational and post-metaphysical, it 
replaces ontology and philosophy as the means for social hope and progress.  
This discussion has illustrated the importance of history and narratives in Rorty’s 
philosophy. Like his theorizations of contingency and naturalism, his account of 
historicism occurs within his social-practice view of language. Here, narrative is the only 
means of connecting past practices to the present and providing an understanding of their 
progression; for it is through narratives of historical development that a people 
understand their past and decide their future. Hence, the importance of history. History 
emphasizes both the contingency and progress (the two aspects of Geistesgeschichte) of 
human development. Hegel’s work is a particular exemplar of this type of reflection; one 
that, as will become clearer subsequently, comes with a flawed model of change. Finally, 
Rorty’s work on modernity, his justification of modern mastery and the upward path of 
Western civilization, clarifies his historical method as part of his pragmatic response to the 
post-metaphysical situation. For him, after the fall of foundations and the resulting 
naturalization of our relation to the world, our philosophy must be historical while our 
disposition to the world must be pragmatic and masterful. The dangers of Rorty’s use of 
history and his understanding of modernity are exposed in the subsequent comparison 
                                                 
409 For an insightful critical account of Blumenberg and hisclaims that the self-assertion of reason is free from 
ontological assumptions, see – Widder, Nathan. “On Abuses in the Uses of History: Blumenberg on Nietzsche; 
Nietzsche on Genealogy” in History of Political Thought. Vol. XXI (2), 2000.  
410 Rorty, “Against Belatedness,” op cit.  p.3 
411 Calling this a method is not to suggest that Rorty believes his philosophy leads to some determinate 
conclusion that achieves something true, but to say that it structures one’s understanding of the world through 
a limiting set of ontological presumptions.  
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with Connolly’s critique of modernity and Heidegger’s identification of the human at the 
basis of mastery.  
Truth and Ice: Connolly, Modernity and Mastery 
What is the status of modernity? Is it the necessary eclipse of the ancient and the 
medieval (as Rorty and Blumenberg theorize)? Or a wayward fall from a more primary 
relation to community and/or Being? In his analysis, Connolly manages to avoid these two 
hackneyed approaches to the question of modernity. Instead, he offers a detailed 
interrogation of its dominant positions; one that is explicitly informed by his ontology of 
ambiguity and contestability. This section will utilize his critique of the mastery dynamic 
within modernity in order to contest Rorty’s reading and further the critique of modernity 
initiated through Heidegger. Specifically, Connolly’s analysis will expose the hidden 
ontological assumptions and demands that accompany the self-assertion of human reason. 
It will illustrate that beneath Rorty’s use of history there is the unifying demand for a truth 
to be grasped and dominated. This demand excludes the partiality of all of our 
understandings fundamental to both Connolly and Heidegger’s frameworks. To this end, 
Rorty stabilizes the historical moment, ignoring its instability, in order to make it 
susceptible to human mastery and places our purposes as the only critical standard. 
Heidegger’s work will briefly return to expose this dangerous reduction of critical thought 
and to indicate (with Connolly) the possibility of a more rigorous critical, ontological 
disposition.  
In Political Theory and Modernity (hereafter: PTM), Connolly, building on Heidegger, 
thinks the modern frame. Eschewing the question of whether it is intrinsically unique, 
Connolly believes that modernity is a distinctive period with its own constellation of 
perspectives on the world. Whether laudatory or critical, these viewpoints assume its 
fundamental separation from earlier periods. Together this matrix constitutes a 
‘distinctively modern mode of consciousness’412 that is available for interrogation. Its unity 
is found not in its prescriptions but in its common set of concerns, including, but not 
restricted to: the question of meaning, the relation of human life to nature, the relation of 
the present to the past and future, and the form of a well-grounded order. Thus, in 
                                                 
412 Connolly, William E. Political Theory and Modernity. London, UK: Cornell University Press, 1993. p.2. 
Connolly, and Heidegger, are aware of the diversity of modernity. Nonetheless, they think it necessary to 
discern an ontological unity behind this plurality to critically confront the assumptions that govern 
contemporary life. Importantly, this unity, unlike Dewey and Rorty’s, does not homogenize either material 
reality or a time period as an object to be mastered. The difference is in the disposition. Heidegger and 
Connolly acknowledge the contestability of their own readings. Every revealing conceals. Further, they do no 
analyze modernity to use it but to expose its circumscriptions.  
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opposition to those who deny the existence of modernity,413 Connolly asserts its presence 
while not assuming that it has in fact fulfilled its self-given criteria. It is useful here to refer 
back to a discussion in Ch.2 regarding the contemporary matrix of Anglo-American 
political thought. For Connolly, this matrix roughly covers the major positions of modern 
thought. Along its horizontal axis are mastery and attunement (to intrinsic purpose or 
Being), and along its vertical, the individual and society. Every position uniquely combines 
these elements and their hidden assumptions. Specifically, mastery and attunement both 
demand that the world be for us; that is, be predisposed to the fulfilment of our purposes 
in some manner. Connolly critiques this demand as an ontological narcissism for its 
tendency to mask ‘the conversion of a world of microcontingencies into a world of global 
contingency by its insistence that the world itself must be predisposed to us in one way or 
the other.’414 It obscures the very contingencies that escape both projects and indicate the 
failure of modernity to control the world. Rorty, in spite of theorizing contingency, also 
obscures contingency in his use of the mastery dynamic.  
In PTM, Connolly targets the assumption of a world predisposed to humans within the 
mastery dynamic specifically (attunement being more of a reactionary response). In 
modernity, control of the world becomes the ultimate concern. Elements therein, whether 
natural, individual, or social are all approached as at the disposal of humanity. This can 
still lead to several approaches (all within the mastery dynamic). ‘Nature becomes a set of 
laws susceptible to human knowledge, a deposit of resources for potential use or a set of 
vistas for aesthetic appreciation.’415 The world loses its enchanted nature where divine 
will and realities were inscribed upon it and order was obvious through some great 
hierarchy of Being. Instead, with modernity, it becomes resources to mine and material to 
augment. In PTM, Connolly largely agrees with Rorty and Blumenberg’s account of the 
internal tensions of medieval thought that led to the emergence of modernity as mastery. 
Nominalism, by asserting simultaneously the complete transcendence of God and God’s 
freedom from any external determination, made the world thoroughly contingent and 
without an order discernable to humans. It opened up the desire for humans to assert 
more effective control over the world.416 Thus, all modern approaches are governed by the 
desire to form and reform, to perfect control over change and hence assure progress. In 
such a world, modernity becomes a continual process of critique, absorption and reform 
                                                 
413 See, for example, Latour, Bruno. We Have Never Been Modern (trans. Catherine Porter). London, UK: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993. 
414 Connolly, William E. Identity\Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox. London, UK: Cornell 
University Press, 1991. pp.29-30 
415 Connolly, Political Theory, op cit. p.2 
416 Ibid. p.20 
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(or what in Rorty becomes matching political institutions to the manner in which social 
change actually occurs – see Ch.4), a way to guarantee its notion of continual temporal 
progress.  
Yet, for Connolly, modernity may not be as free from ontological assumptions as Rorty 
and Blumenberg think. Drawing on Nietzsche, Connolly attempts to explore the 
(nonmodern) consequences of the disenchanted world. In a world without the assurance 
of God, truth is jeopardized. Without design it is unlikely that human capacities for 
cognition will correspond to the world’s nature, or that the human ability to know will 
measure up to its complexity. Thus, the entire correspondence theory of truth breaks 
down as symmetrical relations between humans and the world disappear. ‘In a world 
without a divine designer knowing is not a correspondence but an imposition of form 
upon the objects of knowledge.’417 Knowing forces its subject-matter into a set of discrete 
categories that do not correspond to but shape it. Rorty would seemingly have no problem 
with this opposition to the correspondence theory of truth so far. As addressed in Chs. 1 
and 2, much of his philosophy is directed against the attempt to synthesize language and 
reality.418 However, for Connolly, coherence, consensus, and pragmatist theories of truth 
are also imperilled. These theories continue to presume and demand that, ‘…truth be one, 
that a doctrine or theory not be treated as true unless it is the only one that meets the 
established standard of truth.’419 Truth is exceptional, there can be only one and it must be, 
at least for the moment, stable. Thus, while Rorty may contest the correspondence theory 
of truth, he shares its insistence, that it itself shares with the world of religion, that truth 
(even as pragmatic instrumentalism) be one (as the only legitimate post-metaphysical 
response). While this formulation may presently be opaque, the fog will clear.  
Connolly clarifies this charge in a reading of Nietzsche’s “How the Real World at Last 
Became a Myth”420 and a critique of the pragmatic use of Hegel. In the former, Nietzsche 
provides a succinct, six-stage history of truth within Western thought that roughly 
narrates the death of the appearance-reality distinction. For Connolly, each stage in this 
process preserves something of the previous. Here, it is stage five that is important. ‘The 
“real world” – an idea no longer of any use, not even a duty any longer – an idea grown 
useless, superfluous, consequently a refuted idea: let us abolish it!’421 For Connolly, this is 
the moment of pragmatism and utilitarianism when human use and organization exhaust 
                                                 
417 Ibid. p.10 
418 See, for example; “The World Well Lost” in CP 
419 Connolly, Political Theory, op cit. p.10 – My emphasis 
420 Nietzsche, Friedrich. Twilight of the Idols and The Anti-Christ (trans. R.J. Hollingdale). London, UK: Penguin 
Books, 2003. pp.50-1 – Interestingly, Rorty cites this as a pragmatic text. See; “Introduction” in EHO. p.2 
421 Ibid. p.50 
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the true. Citing Rorty as an example of this “naturalized Hegelianism,” he notes that this 
view is still to “cheerful.” It fails to understand or interrogate how its own assumptions are 
determined by the metaphysical tradition. It seeks the ontological minimalism of truth as 
pragmatic action and ignores the possibility of alternative (and resistant) ontologies. It 
thus, ‘lives in a house of rotting foundations and plants flowers in the backyard.’422 
Connolly critiques Marx in a manner that furthers this assessment of pragmatism and its 
use of Hegel. For Connolly, Marx pairs an explicit critique of Hegel’s ontology of Spirit with 
an implicit assumption of a counter-ontology of plasticity in nature. If the world is not 
being progressively realized in Spirit through the dialectical march of history, it is 
becoming progressively more susceptible to human mastery. This converts nature from a 
world standing against and perhaps over humanity, to a deposit of resources utilizable for 
human ends. Thus, for Connolly, Hegel and Marx (and Rorty) still share a fundamental 
“pattern of insistence.” All three insist that the world be for us in its fundamental structure. 
Rorty’s version is simply a Hegel without Spirit. It, ‘is Hegelianism by other means. It is the 
conversion of Hegelianism into a set of presumptions more credible and amenable to 
modern sensibilities.’423 The question now becomes, what is the further step that 
Nietzsche takes beyond the pragmatist gesture of stage five, what is stage six of the history 
of truth? 
The final stage of truth is the abolition of the apparent world. For Connolly, this is not 
the idealism it may appear to be, but a statement on the nature of knowledge without the 
appearance-reality distinction. ‘We must stop comparing belief to the pure model it seeks 
to copy and start appraising beliefs according to standards of living. We might even begin 
to discern that knowledge – an authoritative organization of experience – is both a support 
and danger to life.’424 With pragmatism, Nietzsche assumes that knowledge bears utility. 
Knowledge is a mode of power,425 a way of imposing form on the world in order to make it 
comprehensible and utilizable. Here, knowledge is not simply power but a form or “tool” 
of power. Like Rorty, Connolly compares knowledge (language) to a tool in that it shapes 
and refines. It does not merely reveal the world but acts on it and organizes it. It “wills it” 
in Nietzsche’s language. The will to knowledge is the will to change the world to bring it in-
line with human capacities and purposes. Yet Nietzsche goes further than this pragmatism. 
                                                 
422 Connolly, Political Theory, op cit. p.145 
423 Ibid. p.132 – a claim that Rorty made above.  
424 Ibid. p.144 
425 Pragmatism is not usually thought of as sharing this insistence with Nietzsche. However, as briefly 
discussed above, Rorty embraced Bacon’s version of pragmatism where knowledge is the power to shape the 
world for humans. While he was often brief on this point, it is persistently referred to throughout his works. 
E.g. see – Rorty, “A World” in PSH. p.50 
  
145  C H . 3 :  M A S T E R Y  A N D  I T S  V E I L  
 
Knowledge is both a support (like a tool) and a danger (like a mask?). Nietzsche does not 
assume, with the pragmatist, that the world is susceptible to the forms we impose. ‘Thus a 
residue of the providential view of the world clings to the categories through which the 
pragmatist seeks to organize it. The pragmatist naturalizes Hegel and forgets that a 
naturalized world may not be as responsive to human capacities as one filled with Spirit. 
The ghost of Hegel’s Spirit still roams the world of pragmatism.’426 Rather, for Connolly, via 
Nietzsche, the world resists our interpretations of it. Instead of merely rejecting truth and 
the real world (the “let us abolish it!” of stage five pragmatism), Connolly supports the 
explicit alternative ontology of resistance.  
‘Suppose human bodies… and external nature… contain elements stubbornly 
opaque to human knowledge, resistant to incorporation into human projects… 
Under these conditions, each worthy design we enact will subjugate some 
characteristics while releasing others, create new resistances while dissolving 
previous ones, and engender new contingencies while taming old ones.’427 
This ontology of resistance develops the ontology of ambiguity discussed in Ch.2. On this 
understanding, all views of the world are partial as they all both reveal and conceal 
elements therein.428 Due to this, for Connolly, “Truth is Ice.”429 It is the attempt to fix what 
cannot be fixed. He utilizes this image of the stabilizing effects of truth to expose its 
pernicious effects and the way in which modernity still participates in a faith. This is the 
faith that truth is one. Pragmatic instrumentalism assumes that it is done with truth in its 
anti-foundational and post-metaphysical self-assertion of humanity. Yet, it still demands 
that reality be one in its plasticity and susceptibility to human purpose and assumes the 
neutrality of its pragmatic method. It is still an ontology of coherence and concord 
(discussed in Ch.2) and thus, is ‘a demand for external guarantees inside a culture that has 
erased the ontological preconditions for them.’430 This is the paradox of modernity and its 
faith.  
For Heidegger, this demand is inherent to modernity’s understanding, use of and 
disposition to history. For him, part of the effect of modernity’s enframing and its 
revelation of the world as a standing-reserve to be challenged-forth, is the understanding 
of the world as picture. The scientific objectification of nature addressed above requires a 
“picture” in order to establish the world as an object subject to humanity. On this 
understanding, the world as picture indicates a particular revelation of Being.  
                                                 
426 Connolly. Political Theory, op cit. p.145 
427 Ibid. p.132 
428 Here, Connolly makes the connections between Heidegger and his own ontology of ambiguity obvious.  
429 This is not the truth of Heidegger’s critical ontology. There truth represents that which exceeds the present 
demand for stability and uniformity. This is the truth of the implicit demand (of Rorty and pragmatism) that 
truth be one.  
430 Ibid. p.11 
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‘Hence world picture, when understood essentially, does not mean a picture of the 
world but the world conceived and grasped as picture. What is, in its entirety, is 
now taken in such a way that it first is in being and only is in being to the extent 
that it is set up by man, who represents and sets forth. Wherever we have the 
world picture, an essential decision takes place regarding what is, in its 
entirety.’431  
The world as picture denotes, for Heidegger, that within modern enframing, the world is 
established before humanity as an object (it is “pictured”) to be grasped. Further, this 
grasping of the world as picture is fundamentally part of establishing the aforementioned 
normative and epistemological primacy of humanity.432 This is, as discussed above, a 
particular relation to Being; it is an anthropocentrism where all things are judged relative 
to the human as relational centre and all values are oriented to the self-assertion of 
humanity in general. 
‘the more extensively and the more effectually the world stands at man’s disposal 
as conquered, and the more objectively the object appears, all the more 
subjectively, i.e., the more importunely, does the subiectum rise up, and all the 
more impetuously, too, do observation of and teaching about the world change 
into a doctrine of man, into anthropology.’433 
Heidegger’s analysis of the world as picture illustrates that Rorty, in focusing on the use of 
historical narratives justifying our present, establishes history as an object to be 
dominated. While he does not repeat the representationalist logic that Heidegger critiques 
here, his instrumentalism establishes the same relation between language and the world 
(only with a different status). This is the relation whereby the former grasps the latter as a 
tool to be put to some end; the world as a picture for humanity and its purposes. The 
consequence of this relation and disposition to our social narrative is a, ‘peculiar 
dictatorship of the public realm.’434 For Heidegger, when humanity is the source of 
authority, its current, public determination of Being dominates and excludes. It maintains 
the objectification of everything that is particular to modernity. ‘But because it stems from 
the dominance of subjectivity the public realm itself is the metaphysically conditioned 
establishment and authorization of the openness of beings in the unconditional 
objectification of everything.’435 Importantly, for him, language, as the house of Being, and 
contingency are domesticated in this determination. They are incapable of undermining 
the present.  
For Heidegger, this subterranean relation to being affects the use of history. Under 
humanistic mastery, history stabilizes. History, like science above, can only explain within 
                                                 
431 Heidegger, ‘World Picture” op cit. p.130 
432 Zimmerman, Heidegger’s Confrontation, op cit. p.87 
433 Heidegger, ‘World Picture” op cit. p.133 
434 Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism” op cit. p.242 
435 Ibid. p.242 
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its given determination. Thus, it represents what is fixed and reduces the past to the 
intelligible. As an object to be controlled, whatever does not fit within the pre-established 
dynamic, or use and purpose, is excluded.436 History also grasps the world as picture and 
does so within an assumption of the ontological primacy of man. This dictatorship of the 
public (and our present social universe) obscures the partiality of the present as a 
necessary condition. While recognizing the contingency of human history, the disposition 
to mastery within Rorty’s thought ignores its inevitable stabilization of the present and 
exclusion of critical perspectives. It can only understand history as a tool for that present; 
a narrative justification of what is.  
‘As a good antiessentialist, I have no deep premises to draw on from which to infer 
that it is, in fact, better…. All I can do is recontextualize various developments in 
philosophy and elsewhere so as to make them look like stages in a story of 
poeticizing and progress.’437  
Heidegger, in contrast, rejected this project. For him, holding our time in thought (i.e. 
developing a philosophy for our time) reduces philosophy to worldviews. Instead, 
philosophy should be an untimely intervention of a question; one that disrupts the present 
rather than reinforcing it.438  
In approaching the world as an object to be grasped, Rorty’s pragmatist-historical 
method assumes the unity of the world. It assumes it is one; that it is susceptible to our 
grasping and that this approach is neutral (i.e. without philosophical and ontological 
presuppositions). For Rorty, the only antiessentialist and anti-foundational disposition in 
response to contingency is to master the world. Consequently, history and narratives of 
hope, are tools to effect change in that world. However, it is clear from Rorty’s reading of 
Hegel and his narrative of modernity that history is a tool rooted entirely within the 
mastery dynamic. It is to be utilized in the justification of our present and the self-
assertion of humanity in general. In mandating narratives of progress, Rorty circumscribes 
us to the assertion of the present and its (public) values. His model of historical change 
only exacerbates this dynamic. Drawing on Hegel, he asserts the self-enclosed, unified and 
stable nature of historical periods. This is re-enforced in his reading of Blumenberg that 
assumes that modernity is a discrete, unified epoch. He stabilizes them as human contexts 
to be mastered through his method. He “masters the moment” to be used in a narrative 
toward some human purpose. Further, that reading of Blumenberg illustrates the most 
bare and obvious basis of mastery in Rorty’s thought and his reading of history and 
modernity. Beyond establishing history as a tool of present mastery, he makes humanity, 
                                                 
436 Heidegger, ‘World Picture” op cit. p.123 
437 Rorty, Richard. “Inquiry as Recontextualization” in ORT. p.110 
438 Pattinson, op cit. p.188 
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and its current universe, the ultimate source of value. It is in the priority of the self- 
assertion of humanity that we become the relational centre of Being.  
For Connolly and Heidegger, historical sense must become more than just awareness 
of past events and their contingency.439 It must be about the refusal of familiar 
representations that merely domesticate history according to some pre-given frame. The 
historical approach, even in an anti-foundational mode, smuggles in metaphysical 
assumptions about the unity of the moment (the historical period), its susceptibility to our 
purposes and humanity as the source of value.440 What then is the status of Rorty’s 
understanding of modernity and the pragmatist-historical method? Heidegger and 
Connolly’s analyses of modernity as mastery expose the underlying assumption of Rorty 
and pragmatism that truth be one. This involves two assumptions. First, Rorty both 
assumes the triumph of modern mastery and its anti-foundational nature and ignores the 
implicit ontology of plasticity it harbours. Second, he assumes the fundamental unity, or 
mastery of the moment, of the modern period and historical epochs in general. Rorty fails 
to see that, when knowledge is understood as imposed, it is not only fallible, but 
incomplete. It encounters a world that will resist its attempts at control because that 
knowledge fails to match it. This is Connolly’s positive ontology of ambiguity.  
Through the work of Heidegger and Connolly, it is clear that Rorty’s mastery 
domesticates history and its contingency. For Heidegger, beneath modern history there is 
the same ontological disposition of mastery and technology. The world is approached as 
an object to be grasped and is defined in relation to humanity and its present purposes. 
Connolly extends this analysis of modernity. For him, the modern frame contains the 
covert demand that truth be one; the world must be susceptible to our purposes. 
Pragmatism shares in this demand in assuming that in the absence of correspondence, the 
world is susceptible to its disposition of instrumental action. It denies the inevitable 
ontology within its disposition; one that the world will resist. Heidegger and Connolly’s 
critiques amount to the claim that our determinations of the world are always insufficient. 
Every revealing conceals and thus, there is always a veil. Rorty’s mastery approach, in 
rejecting the veil and offering an ontology of social instrumentalism coupled with a 
pragmatist-historical method, domesticates this contestability (as the contingency of 
language). Thus, the pragmatist-historical method is revealed. It is a project whereby the 
pragmatic self-assertion of man and his purposes is enacted through the construction of 
                                                 
439 Cornel West also notes that Rorty’s historicism is reductive and simplistic. His aversion to theory prevents 
any deeper understanding of history’s movements. See his; The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of 
Pragmatism. London, UK: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989. pp.207-209 
440 Widder, “On Abuses in the Uses of History,” 2000. p.320 
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historical narratives of upward progress. However, fundamental to this method is the 
circumscription (and veiling) of the world to humanity, and the reduction of history to our 
present desires. These exclusions, as will be discussed in Chs. 4 and 5, reduce our capacity 
to critically engage that present and its universe of thought. They turn our thought to ice.   
CONC LUSI ON:  
Through this chapter and the last, this thesis has offered a detailed reading of Rorty as 
a philosopher of mastery. The purpose has been to situate his pragmatism; to understand, 
following Ch.1’s analysis of his relationship to Analytic philosophy and pragmatism, how 
he shapes his positive role for philosophy in the world. He does this, fundamentally, 
through restricting its scope and drawing its limits in the three above themes of the 
contingency and priority of language, naturalism, and historicism. Through these, he 
constricts understanding while fundamentally extending the possibility of control. For 
Rorty, our languages (and ontologies) cannot make contact with the world, they can only 
provide useful descriptions and narratives which either increase or decrease the capacity 
for control. However, the rhetoric surrounding this latter project is one of limitless 
upward progress; a sort of cornucopian technocratism that sees the manipulation of 
nature and society as unproblematic. This constitutes Rorty’s philosophical answer to the 
problem of philosophy after foundations. The value of his work is that he develops an 
original and insightful answer to this fundamental contemporary question. The weakness 
is that his answer fails to account for its own presuppositions and eschews critical self-
reflection. Through Connolly and Heidegger, this chapter has exposed this approach as a 
form of unconcealed optimism, as one based upon the assumption that in the absence of 
correspondence, metaphysical assumptions can be avoided altogether. In his work, Rorty 
rejects ontological enquiry, in fact all philosophical enquiry that offers an overt position on 
the nature of the world, as a project of unmasking, as fundamentally still under the 
assumption of a hidden reality beneath the apparent. His concern with this project is 
political. Like all metaphysics, for him, the reference to reality is an authoritarian gesture, 
one that removes the discussion from humanity and its purposes by setting up an external 
standard. Rorty wants our purposes to be the only significant ones and so he theorizes a 
means (mastery) that is singularly capable of attaining them. However, as stated in Ch.2 
and illustrated here, while there is no unmasked reality, this is also no maskless post-
metaphysical pragmatic disposition. The project of mastery (and modernity) comes with 
its own assumptions.  
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Ontology is inevitable. Thus, a different approach to the question of philosophy after 
foundations must emerge. Throughout these two chapters, to draw out a criticism of Rorty 
and establish an understanding of his work, I have attempted to offer an understanding of 
Heidegger and Connolly that centres on their construction of a critical disposition and a 
resulting critique of modernity. Both emphasize the necessity of the ontological 
perspective for critically engaging the present as a totality. Both emphasize the dynamic of 
mastery that dominates that present and which is clearly evident in Rorty’s philosophy. 
The strength of Rorty’s work is found in the problematic he addresses and reveals. After 
philosophical foundations and given the situatedness of our thought, are human purposes 
the only lens through which to critically address thought and politics? For Rorty the 
answer is yes and the pragmatic disposition of mastery uniquely operates from within the 
finitude of humanity while still providing for the possibility of human progress. When 
confronting this problem of authority Rorty articulates, Heidegger and Connolly’s 
approaches both imperil and address Rorty’s concerns. Heidegger’s theorization of 
ontological questioning and his analysis of modernity and its dynamic of veiling reveal the 
partial nature of all determinations of being. This adds instability to his conception of 
history. Every determination conceals as it reveals. None are unified and self-enclosed as 
all can be disrupted by the ontological perspective. Rorty, rejecting this orientation, unifies 
historical epochs. In his ontology of ambiguity, Connolly furthers this illustrating the 
underlying assumptions of pragmatic mastery and contrasting this with a world that is 
fundamentally unknowable, unavoidable, and resistant to those purposes. With veiling 
and contestability, these two thinkers offer a perspective that incorporates that ambiguity, 
that contestability, into the very structure of its assertions. Nonetheless, they both retain 
the critical gesture toward reality that Rorty lacks. The latter isolates humanity within the 
social practices of the linguistic community. The formers, in spite of using truth in 
opposing senses, gesture toward that reality through the critical identification of the 
necessity of a veil and its current limitations. Thus, both Heidegger and Connolly retain 
some relation to the appearance-reality divide.  This argument will be returned to in Ch.5’s 
discussion of Marcuse. At this point it should be clear that while philosophy after 
metaphysics cannot provide blueprints, it can offer indicative, critical and constructive 
resources. What those resources will amount to, their scope, nature and limits, will 
become clearer subsequently where the analysis of the project of pragmatism as mastery 
in Rorty’s work will be brought to his prescriptions for pragmatic and liberal, political 
universe. 
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CH.4.  RORTY’S POLITICAL L IBERALISM:  
PRAGMATIC PROCEDURES AND ROMANTIC NARRATIVES  
Today, any liberalism which is not also a radicalism is irrelevant and 
doomed.441 
 
INTRODUC TI ON:  
The connection between Rorty’s philosophy and politics has stood behind this 
analysis so far. Presently, however, it is necessary to ask: how is Rorty’s liberalism also a 
pragmatism? How does the pragmatist-historical (non) method, as the philosophical unity 
of Rorty’s thought, affect and shape his politics? This chapter, and the following one, will 
critically analyze both this connection and the manner in which Rorty understands it. 
While he is often inconsistent on the subject of the relationship between his philosophy 
and politics, his pragmatism and liberalism, he does firmly reject the idea of a necessary 
relation between the two. In contrast, it is argued here that there is a clear philosophical 
connection between Rorty’s pragmatist-historical method and his ‘minimalist liberalism.’ 
Both, as argued in earlier chapters, are rooted in the ontological disposition of mastery 
and the behaviourism and anthropocentrism thereof. To recap; Rorty derives his mastery 
from both an early critique of analytic philosophy and an appropriation of the 
fundamental philosophical disposition of John Dewey and the latter’s instrumentalism. 
This disposition understands enquiry, not as correspondence, but as a self-correcting 
process of adaptation and control of one’s environment. Here, human communities are 
treated (existentially) as organisms in environments; beings thrown into social existence 
whose only response is to control their surroundings through piecemeal and experimental 
movements (akin to proto-forms of the scientific method) within their environment. 
Rorty’s philosophical project was, like that of Dewey, to overturn a history of philosophic 
activity that, in opposition, saw philosophy as the quest for certain knowledge (rather than 
                                                 
441 Dewey, John. “Liberalism and Social Action” in The Later Works of John Dewey, Vol. 11(Jo Ann Boydston) 
Carbondale, US: Southern Illinois Press, 1987. p.41 
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control). Consequently, Rorty offered a philosophy of pragmatism that attempted to wed 
this understanding to new developments in the philosophy of language. Thus, he 
articulated his philosophy through three themes: contingency (of language), naturalism, 
and historicism. Through these, Rorty offers an understanding of, and method for, social 
change; one that emphasizes the gradual nature of developments, the unity of 
vocabularies, the central role of narratives and the priority of the social.  
This chapter illustrates these themes within Rorty’s overt philosophical justification 
of liberalism. It demonstrates how Rorty’s liberalism is the political formalization of his 
social-practice oriented understanding of human behaviour and culture. Essentially, it 
claims that Rorty’s understanding (and justification) of liberalism attempts to provide for 
a form of political organization that gives precedence to humanity and its external control 
of the world. This particularly liberal form of mastery entails the same anti-metaphysical 
and minimalist set of assumptions that were addressed in Chs.1,2, and 3 of this thesis. This 
view asserts the priority of the human in the pursuit of control. In his politics, Rorty is 
attempting to demonstrate the compatibility of post-metaphysical culture and liberalism 
with this very modern project of self-assertion. In so doing, Rorty enacts the same veiling 
addressed in Chs.2 and 3. By positing the post-metaphysical potentiality of liberalism, he 
obscures its own partiality. In implicitly claiming liberalism’s neutrality and privatizing 
theoretical thinking, he furthers gelds critical political thinking within liberalism with the 
same logic as in his hermeneutics of enquiry (see Ch. 1). In this manner, liberal mastery 
comes to be a deep conservatism.  
This chapter argues that, as with his hermeneutic form of enquiry and pragmatist-
historical method, Rorty’s articulation and justification of liberalism is situated within the 
problematic of foundational philosophy. Specifically, it is situated within two divisions 
Rorty makes: a public-private divide, and a division of the public into procedural and 
hermeneutic logics. Importantly, both of these are gradualist, piecemeal methods 
conforming to his pragmatic mastery. Further, Rorty’s procedural logic, drawn from 
Rawls, is based in an anti-foundational attempt to reground liberalism solely within the 
practices of present democratic communities. It pragmatizes and de-philosophizes politics 
by making the practices and traditions of the given community the bounds of political 
discussion. This chapter argues that through an implicit, pragmatic claim to neutrality, 
Rorty locks us within our present languages in this. Further, he circumscribes criticism 
through a critique of radical thought that circumvents, rather than addresses, its ideas. 
Rather, through this argument Rorty scales back social criticism and political activity to a 
maintenance of the status quo. Finally, this chapter argues that Rorty’s romantic culture of 
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liberalism, the aspect of his politics meant to provide for social progress, reduces all 
political progress to ethical and cultural change. Thereby, Rorty completes his restriction 
of politics to his social-practice view. He insulates the liberal mastery of proceduralism 
from critique and creates the political framework to re-enforce his pragmatic ontology. In 
providing a pragmatic articulation and justification of liberalism (mastery) Rorty furthers 
and deepens liberalism. He denies us the critical capacity to exceed this ideology by 
compromising the potentiality of critical thought. In this movement, his liberalism veils the 
status of his own thought. His pragmatic disposition of mastery and social 
instrumentalism provide a basis for his pragmatic liberalism to obscure its own partiality. 
In this manner, his philosophy comes to once again re-enforce his politics of liberal 
mastery. 
FOU NDA TI ONS AN D METHOD:  RORTY ’S POLIT ICA L PROBLEM ATIC  
It is important to understand the framework within which Rorty’s theorizes and 
justifies liberalism. As in his philosophy, Rorty’s politics must be understood from within 
his critique of philosophical foundationalism. The rejection of foundations sets the 
boundaries of his political theory. When Rorty theorizes liberalism, it is to answer two 
implicit questions related to this issue. First, how can liberalism as a political culture and 
democracy as a political method be justified without reference to philosophical 
foundations (i.e. pragmatically and historically)? Second, what would such a post-
metaphysical liberal culture and democratic method look like? In a sense, how should 
liberalism be understood as inherently post-metaphysical and how does this make it a 
superior form of politics? This concern to simultaneously justify and redescribe liberalism 
in terms of post-metaphysical, pragmatic thought frames Rorty’s theorization of 
liberalism. Specifically, the problem of foundationalism in politics leads him both to a 
defence of (a form of) political liberalism and to a public-private divide that dominates his 
political philosophy. Consequently, he concludes that an understanding of the world and 
our knowledge of it cannot participate in a public, political discussion. For Rorty, this 
necessitates a division between these two spheres and changes the role of philosophy in 
politics and culture. Foundationalism and metaphysics in politics become the products of 
misunderstanding the possible role of philosophy in politics. Further, this role is itself 
qualified by a second division between two approaches politics: on the one hand, an 
established logic within which politics occurs, and on the other, a normative language 
around the ends that logic should pursue. This second division, and its ultimate piecemeal 
logic, only further insulate Rorty’s politics from critique. This section will establish the 
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problematic within which Rorty theorizes liberalism. Further sections will both articulate 
that understanding and draw out its consequences.  
Two Divisions: Philosophy and Methodology 
Two divisions structure Rorty’s political thought.442 The first was discussed in detail 
in the introduction to this thesis. This is the division between the philosophical and 
political projects. For Rorty, the attempt to formulate a common framework, to hold 
reality and justice in a single vision, is the unifying flaw of the Western philosophical 
tradition. It represents another iteration of the quest for certainty. In contrast, for Rorty, 
these two projects are fundamentally distinct. There is no way to philosophically ground 
or unmask our politics. There are only the contingent justifications of language speaking 
communities at a given moment.443 These are public and political, shared languages. 
Philosophy, in contrast, is private. It is about an integrated vision that can subsume all 
things. For Rorty, philosophy and politics are separated by a division between private and 
public.   
The second division operates around a difference in two approaches to politics. As 
discussed in Ch. 1, Rorty rejects the overt language of method as an attempt to ground 
knowledge. However, he retains a sense of method in the notion, appropriated from 
Dewey, that there is a set of dispositions that are conducive to open and productive 
enquiry. This attitude has broadly been characterized as an ontological disposition of 
mastery, a philosophy of social instrumentalism. The argument here is that this same set of 
ontological dispositions (this divided unity of an instrumentalism within an understanding 
of the primacy of the social) is present in Rorty’s political thinking. There is a method to 
his liberalism; one that limits and constrains his thinking. In order to access this implicit 
structure of thought within Rorty’s politics, it is useful to turn to a relatively early essay in 
his work, “Method, Social Science and Social Hope.” Here, Rorty attempts to unify his 
opposition to the rhetoric of scientific method in order to resituate the role and limits of 
the social sciences. As such, it illustrates how and to what extent politics can be thought. 
The scientific method has usually been understood as our unique access to the real; it is 
the means to understand how nature is in-itself. For Rorty, this understanding is based on 
two, related mistakes. First, that connection to the real is dependent on a framework that 
                                                 
442 Neither Rorty nor the available critical literature discusses Rorty’s liberalism in terms of these two 
divisions. While they are always aware of the first division between philosophy and politics, the second is 
ignored. Like his mastery, it remains a hidden dynamic.  
443 See; “Trotsky and the Wild Orchids” in PSH. For accounts of this essay, see: Habermas, Jürgen. “Richard 
Rorty’s Pragmatic Turn” in Rorty and his Critics (ed. Robert Brandom). Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers, 2000; 
Voparil, Christopher. Richard Rorty: Politics and Vision. Oxford, UK: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006.  
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should offer no metaphysical comfort. Second, that such a method should yield 
predicatively useful generalizations. In opposition, for him, while we should value the 
discoveries of modern technological civilization, they do not tell us ‘anything about the 
nature of science or rationality. In particular, they do not result from the use of, nor do 
they exemplify, something called the “scientific method.”’444 As discussed in Ch. 1, enquiry 
is a social product. It is the product of a community and so must take place (whether in 
conformity with or in opposition to) within a group and its current vocabulary. Further, 
the only sense in which method can be understood is as a certain disposition; one directed 
at control. For Rorty, this is the original Baconian sense of method, which is solely focused 
on ordering our thinking for control. This understanding of method,  
means merely being rational in some given area of enquiry… it means obeying the 
normal conventions of your discipline, not fudging the data too much, not letting 
your hopes and fears influence your conclusions unless those hopes and fears are 
shared by all those who are in the same line of work, being open to refutation by 
experience, not blocking the road of enquiry. In this sense, “method” and 
“rationality” are the names for a suitable balance between respect for the opinions 
of one’s fellows and respect for the stubbornness of sensation.445 
Such an approach is not epistemologically distinct. It has no unique access to reality. It is 
merely a formalization and standardization of ‘the same banal and obvious methods all of 
us use in every human activity.’446 Echoing Dewey, for Rorty, the scientific method is only a 
methodological codification of a much wider (pragmatic) way of experiencing the world, 
one characterized by openness, experimentalism, and constant revision through trial and 
error.  
This conception of method has important consequences for Rorty’s understanding of 
the nature of the social sciences and their role in political life. Echoing his rejection of the 
distinction between Geistes- and NaturWissenschaften in PMN, Rorty attempts to 
circumvent the methodological divide (fundamental to the social sciences) between 
“value-free” and hermeneutic social science. For him, the whole debate between these two 
“methods” is misguided. Rather, these are merely two different forms of enquiry which 
fulfil two different purposes: explanation and understanding. Rorty’s point must be 
understood from within his understanding of the primacy, unity, and contingency of 
vocabularies (Ch 2). Explanation and understanding are two different types of 
descriptions (vocabularies) that fulfil different purposes. Explanation, which refers to the 
types of descriptions you get in the (value-neutral) hard sciences, is only the sort of 
understanding one wants when the priority is prediction and control (what Rorty calls 
                                                 
444  Rorty, Richard. “Method, Social Science and Social Hope.” in  CP.p.191  
445  Ibid. p.194-5 
446  Ibid. p.193 
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“technical interest”). Understanding, in contrast, is enquiry into what we should do, the 
normative question of the purposes of our social and political forms. For Rorty, once again, 
the confusion in this debate is in the conflation of these two projects. ‘It is a mistake to 
think that when we know how to deal justly and honourably with a person or a society we 
thereby know how to predict and control him or her or it, and a mistake to think that 
ability to predict and control is necessarily an aid to such dealing… narratives as well as 
laws, redescriptions as well as predictions, serve a useful purpose in helping us deal with 
the problems of society.’447 For Rorty, both of these forms of enquiry are merely ways of 
knowing within a vocabulary. They are oriented towards different purposes and should 
not be judged by each other’s criteria. Implicitly connecting his analysis here to PMN, for 
Rorty, being hermeneutical is enquiry in the same sense as value objective science. It is 
merely enquiry when the larger purposes of that project are as yet undecided. It employs 
the same methodological attitude of mastery described above. It is still a trial and error 
process without larger preconceived objectives. It is experimentation with new ways of 
thinking and speaking focusing on the consequences of these changes. Further, it is this 
aspect of enquiry which reveals the aforementioned social aspect of knowledge. The 
necessity of a discussion of larger purposes, of the path of enquiry itself, reveals our 
implicit awareness that we are members of a community. This division of labour, between 
the hard sciences of prediction and control and the hermeneutical discussion of the larger 
purposes of our enquiry and our community, is thus within the social (public) aspect of 
our existence (rather than the private or individual). It is subject to the constraints of a 
linguistic, social community. It repeats Rorty’s imperative, discussed above, to divide 
certain human projects from one another. We should, following the same logic, eschew the 
urge to reconcile such projects and live with difference between them.448 
For Rorty, this understanding of the social sciences as “beyond method” can engender 
two opposed responses. First, the narratives and unities created within the vocabularies of 
enquiry (or any form of reflection on our communities) can be understood as the only 
mechanism for directing the future development of these communities. For him, this is the 
Deweyean conception of communal life as unimpeded possibility; a form of living together 
as enquiry into how to live better than we do now. It is a view based only on an 
“unjustifiable hope” in the possibilities of human solidarity. Against this, Rorty describes 
the Foucaultian path. Importantly, for Rorty, Dewey and Foucault broadly share the shame 
critique of method in the social sciences. They,  
                                                 
447 Ibid. p.198 
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‘make exactly the same criticism of the tradition. They agree, right down the line, 
about the need to abandon traditional notions of rationality, objectivity, method 
and truth. They are both, so to speak, “beyond method.”… But Dewey emphasizes 
that his move “beyond method” gives mankind an opportunity to grow up, to be 
free to make itself, rather than seeking direction from some imagined outside 
source…  His experimentalism asks us to see knowledge claims as proposals about 
what actions to try out next… Foucault also moves beyond the traditional ideas of 
method and rationality as antecedent constraints upon enquiry, but he views this 
move as the Nietzschean realization that all knowledge-claims are moves in a 
power-game.’449  
What Dewey offers, that Foucault does not, is a sense of hope, and a way to think many 
traditional concepts (democracy, truth, progress, etc.) without an epistemic ground. For 
Rorty, the problem with Foucault is that the possibility of human solidarity and 
community disappears as a consequence of the critique of epistemology. All knowledge is 
understood only as domination. In contrast, for Dewey, ‘the will to truth is not the urge to 
dominate but the urge to create, to “attain working harmony among diverse desires.”’450 
Dewey’s democratic hope allows for a positive politics of creation. It provides for the 
possibility of ‘unjustifiable hope, and an ungroundable but vital sense of human 
solidarity.’451 
This discussion has revealed two divisions in Rorty’s political thinking. The first, 
referred to above and discussed in detail in the introduction to this thesis in Rorty’s 
autobiographical essay, is a division between two forms of thinking: one public and shared 
and the other necessarily private and unshared. For Rorty, the great failure of his critics, 
who criticise him either for refusing to philosophically justify his liberal politics (the 
Right) or for failing to further his philosophy to a critique of the bourgeois rhetoric  of 
liberalism (the Left), is their inability to understand this fundamental separation. The 
division between these two projects changes the role of philosophy in public life. Here, we 
come to the second division. In Rorty’s reflections on method, he formulates a division 
within public thinking, introduced in PMN (addressed in Ch. 1) and elaborated in the essay 
discussed above, between two types of enquiry. Rather than engaging in a perpetual back 
and forth between value-neutral and hermeneutic methods, Rorty encourages us to 
understand these two approaches, not as opposed but as two different forms of thought. 
The former is normal and stable. It is enquiry which works out the consequences of an 
established vocabulary and seeks prediction and control within those terms. The latter, is 
revolutionary (in Rorty’s limited sense). It questions the larger directions of enquiry. 
                                                 
449 Ibid. p.204-5 
450 Ibid. p.207 
451 Ibid. p.208 - This critique of Foucault will be elaborated on below in the discussion of Rorty’s rejection of 
radical thought. His justification of a politics of hope will be addressed in detail in Ch. 5. For an account of 
Rorty’s relationship to Foucault’s work, see; Malecki, Wojciech. “If Happiness is not the aim of politics, then 
what is?: Rorty versus Foucault” in Foucault Studies, no. 11, 2011.  
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Occurring at this meta-level, it is fundamental to the change of vocabularies. As discussed 
in Chs.2 and 3, this occurs gradually and historically through the piecemeal shifting of 
language and the use of new metaphors. Importantly, both of these forms of enquiry occur 
through the same pragmatist disposition to experimental, piecemeal practices.452 
Hermeneutic enquiry is the experimental and pragmatic testing of new ways of speaking. 
Thus, Rorty performs a strategic, philosophical circumvention. As in his critique of 
epistemology and theorization of epistemological behaviourism (Ch.1), rather than 
philosophically disproving correspondence, he uses a sociological explanation to argue 
that the implicit “method” of actual enquiry (whether in the hard or hermeneutic modes) 
is already pragmatic and social. The whole issue of correspondence and value-neutrality is 
elided through recourse to a meta-level of sociological enquiry into vocabularies. The 
consequence of this argument is another division within thinking. However, this divide, 
between two forms of enquiry, resides within the public realm. It is a division within 
politics between an established and normal set of stable procedures, on the one hand, and 
a hermeneutic, narrative method of cultural change, on the other. As will be discussed, for 
Rorty, it is only within the hermeneutic form of enquiry into politics that philosophy 
participates. Nonetheless, politics in general is subject to the common disposition of 
pragmatic mastery. Both methods employ the pragmatic logic of piecemeal experimental 
reform. The former (procedural) is a formalization of it while the latter (hermeneutic) 
employs it in the creation of new vocabularies. Presently, it is necessary to turn to Rorty’s 
elaboration of liberalism in order to understand how he constructs it as an explicit 
formalization of this basic disposition.453 He understands liberalism as the only available 
political method of a post-metaphysical community because it is the political 
manifestation of communal, pragmatic enquiry. As a stable set of procedures and a method 
for cultural reform it is a piecemeal and experimental liberal mastery.  
THE PRI ORI TY  OF DEM OCRA CY AND  THE  M IN IM A LI SM OF  L IBE RALI SM  
This set of concerns, about the method and role of enquiry into human society and the 
relation between philosophy and politics, structures Rorty’s liberalism. His central 
political work, CIS, offers a post-metaphysical description and justification of liberal, 
political methods and culture. There are two key aspects of this liberalism. First, Rorty 
attempts to detach the language of and case for liberalism from its foundationalist past 
through a re-justification of liberalism along anti-foundationalist, pragmatic lines. This is 
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related to the aforementioned issue of method. For Rorty, liberalism can and must be 
justified from within an acknowledgement of contingency and without a claim to 
neutrality. Given the centrality of the human community, the contingency of language and 
vocabularies, the historical context of all phenomena, and the consequent limitations on 
enquiry and human claims, how can a pragmatic argument for liberalism be made? For 
him, the answer is in how liberalism can politically match pragmatic culture. Rooted in the 
community and its language, minimalist and procedural liberalism is the political 
formalization of pragmatic enquiry, and the most compatible political structure with a 
post-metaphysical culture.454 Second, continuing this re-theorization of the connection 
between philosophy and politics along the lines of his separation of the two (central) 
aforementioned projects (reality and justice), Rorty offers a different understanding of the 
role of philosophy in political life. Rather than establishing universal principles or 
exposing the reality of social relations beneath some ideological veil (the Anglo-American 
and Continental approaches to philosophy and politics respectively), philosophy’s role is 
humbled. As a form of narrative, a participant in our wider cultural conversation, it cannot 
offer theoretical analyses. Rather, philosophy can only, in the piecemeal and gradual 
manner of hermeneutics, shift our public vocabulary. It can, over long periods and through 
many increments, offer communities new ways of speaking. Consequently, it cannot 
participate in or critically analyse the actual procedures of liberal democracy. It can only 
offer new descriptions. It is important to emphasize that both of these political projects, 
the justification of liberalism as pragmatism and the redescription of liberalism as a 
hermeneutic, cultural project, recast the relationship between philosophy and politics 
through the central mechanism of Rorty’s political thinking: his public-private divide. 
While he portrays this as a necessary division within a post-metaphysical context and an 
acknowledgement of the diversity of human projects and desires, it will be argued here 
that this division functions as a restriction on critical thinking and a naturalization of 
liberalism. This section concerns the first project of Rorty’s detachment of liberalism from 
philosophy; subsequent sections will address the new roles he articulates for it.  
                                                 
454 This analysis reads Rorty’s liberalism as explicitly connected to his pragmatism. For strong critical readings 
of Rorty that also do this, see: Bacon, Michael. Richard Rorty: Pragmatism and Political Liberalism. Plymouth, 
UK: Lexington Books, 2007; Voparil, Richard Rorty op cit; Bernstein, Richard E. “One Step Forward, Two Steps 
Backward: Rorty on Liberal Democracy and Philosophy” in The New Constellation: The Ethical-Political 
Horizons of Modernity/Postmodernity. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992; Shapiro, Ian. Political Criticism. 
London, UK: University of California Press, 1990. – However, even these exceptions limit their questioning to 
the tradition of the thought (pragmatism) Rorty emerges from. The nature of Rorty’s limiting of thought calls 
for a wider confrontation of his work; one from outside the conversation he himself remained loyal to.  
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Public and Private as the Confines of Thinking 
In CIS, Rorty unites his theoretical distinction between the projects of reality and 
justice with an articulation of political liberalism. He opens, true to his pragmatist-
historical method, with a broad narrative of Western thinking focused on the relation 
between public and private. Similar to his critique of the persistence of visual metaphors 
and the image of the mind as the mirror of nature in philosophy, for Rorty, political 
philosophy has been similarly plagued by a project to fuse public and private. The Platonic 
(philosophical) quest for certainty is matched by a Platonic (political) quest for unity. This 
project requires the assumption of a common human nature. It assumes that what is 
private, for each of us, is somehow connected to what we have in common with others, 
‘that the springs of private fulfilment and of human solidarity are the same.’455 CIS is 
Rorty’s attempt to provide space for both public and private thinkers through a 
fundamental division between them. For him, the purpose is to see them, not as opposed, 
but as oriented to different, exclusive projects, which cannot be integrated into a single 
vision. These are the projects of self-creation and justice. The former is the quest for 
private perfection, the desire to create oneself apart from the community and achieve 
autonomy. The latter is the quest for human solidarity, the desire to provide for collective 
identity and action in the pursuit of greater justice. Importantly, for Rorty, this is the 
difference between two vocabularies, two ways of speaking. ‘The vocabulary of self-
creation is necessarily private, unshared, unsuited to argument. The vocabulary of justice 
is necessarily public and shared, a medium for argumentative exchange.’456 The difference 
between public and private emerges as two distinct ways of speaking and thinking. The 
private is thought outside of the framework of one’s society. It exceeds that framework in 
some manner. In contrast, public thinking, as shared, necessarily occurs within the 
common vocabulary. Rorty’s project in CIS is to provide space for both of these types of 
vocabularies. He wants to illustrate that in the absence of metaphysics a liberal society is 
still possible. Further, he wants to argue that a liberal politics is, in a sense, the most 
compatible form of political organization and culture for such a postmetaphysical society. 
Finally, that such a culture must reject both philosophical foundationalism and the quest 
for the unity of public and private. This division allows for the compatibility of liberalism 
and anti-foundationalism. In fact, a historicist, nominalist and postmetaphysical culture, 
for Rorty, is possible only with a public-private divide. It allows for the two goals, 
individual development and communal solidarity, to co-exist. It allows us to fully replace 
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Truth with Freedom.457 In Rorty’s language, this is replacing the desire to ground our 
politics in universal principles or human nature with the desire to provide the cultural and 
institutional resources to pursue both greater individual diversity and collective solidarity.   
It is important to re-emphasize Rorty’s method here. Falling within that second 
(hermeneutic) form of enquiry, he is not arguing for his articulation of liberalism. Rather, 
he is merely offering a different understanding and narrative of liberalism and the relation 
between philosophy and politics. One that rejects two alternative approaches to this 
question: metaphysics and radical critique. While not strictly separate for Rorty, as the 
latter is really just a particular political manifestation of the former, it is useful to 
distinguish them. Metaphysics, as discussed above, still assumes the appearance-reality 
distinction Rorty rejects; it still assumes, ‘a single permanent reality to be found behind 
many temporary appearances.’458 When dealing with politics, this assumption manifests 
itself in the notion that philosophy’s role is to establish the principles that ground 
institutions and behaviour. Radical critique also assumes the appearance-reality 
distinction. However, this assumption is found not in a project of grounding present 
institutions but in the attempt to radically critique them by piercing their ideological veils 
and unmasking their essential natures. Marxism, and its pretentions to science, and post-
Heideggerian Continental thought, with its philosophical unveilings, are Rorty’s usual 
examples. However, rather than argue against their methods, he only wants to present a 
coherent and desirable image of a culture without that demand.459 On his own terms, 
Rorty redescribes. He does not argue.460 However, as discussed, he does have a broad 
critique of radical theory as dependent on some form of philosophical essentialism. The 
broad argument of this thesis is that Rorty both mis-describes this group and fails to 
counter their implicit criticisms of his pragmatic approach. Thus, it focuses much more on 
his treatment of this body of thought rather than his critiques of “metaphysical” (i.e. 
broadly Kantian) philosophies. In seeking to avoid foundationalism through a rejection of 
the appearance reality-divide and the language of unmasking, Rorty compromises the 
critical potential of his thinking. He fails to see that a genuine methodological pluralism 
can acknowledge the critical validity of different theoretical frameworks. It can assert that 
they expose different dynamics in the world that are all operative though they may differ. 
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459  Rorty, Richard. “The End of Leninism, Havel and Social Hope” in TP, 323 
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liberal society he offers. It is in this sense that this claim must be understood. See; Bernstein, Richard. “Rorty’s 
Liberal Utopia” in The New Constellation op cit.  p.261 
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Without such a position, we lack the critical resources to exceed the current framework of 
thinking (liberal mastery) and remain locked within our current political horizon. 
Presently, it is necessary to engage Rorty’s liberalism more deeply in order to understand 
how it is involved with his philosophical disposition of mastery.  
For Rorty, much of the impetus behind CIS was to counter his critics who had claimed 
that his philosophical views, where he opposed classical distinctions in moral and political 
philosophy (e.g. the morality-prudence distinction), would fail to establish the necessary 
philosophical preconditions for a just (and liberal) society. As such, the basis of his 
argument is the position that the continued success and progress of liberalism is better 
served by a post-metaphysical vocabulary.461 For Rorty, his own vocabulary, which 
revolves around the centrality of language and metaphor, the primacy of the community 
and its social practices and the historical nature of all phenomena, is much better suited to 
this purpose. However, he is emphatic that his framework does not provide philosophical 
foundations for liberal democracy. Rather, it only permits it to be redescribed as a project 
of collective solidarity and individual self-creation.462 Such a description better serves its 
purposes of increasing human freedom. Thus, this is a project of political vision, not 
foundation.463 The desire for the latter simply disappears in this redescription. What Rorty 
is offering here is a different culture for liberalism; a different way to understand its status 
and virtues and a different vocabulary in which to describe its practices and goals. He 
claims that the postmetaphysical language of redescription is more coherent with 
liberalism than the language of foundation.  
‘The difference between a search for foundations and an attempt at redescription 
is emblematic of the difference between the culture of liberalism and older forms 
of cultural life. From its ideal form, the culture of liberalism would be one which 
was enlightened, secular, through and through. It would be one in which no trace 
of divinity remained, either in the form of a divinized world or a divinized self. 
Such a culture would have no room for the notion that there are nonhuman forces 
to which humans should be responsible.464 
As discussed previously, there is a philosophical anti-authoritarianism at the basis of 
Rorty’s political thinking.465 What Rorty opposes is the idea that there could be a 
nonhuman element (God, Reason, History, etc.) in the justification of our knowledge and 
                                                 
461  Rorty, CIS. p.44 
462 Redescriptions are the only justifications Rorty overtly offers. Thompson, Simon. “Rorty on Truth, 
Justification and Justice” in Richard Rorty: Critical Dialogues (eds. Matthew Festenstein and Simon Thompson). 
Cambridge, UK: Politiy Press, 2001. p.34 – However, this chapter argues that there is a covert claim to 
pragmatic neutrality here. 
463 Voparil, Richard Rorty op cit. p. 20.  
464 Rorty, CIS. p.45 
465 Bacon, Michael. “Rorty and Pragmatic Social Criticism” in Philosophy and Social Criticism vol. 32 (7), 2006. 
p.865 – Bacon argues this is the central theme of Rorty’s pragmatism and liberalism. Further, it makes Rorty a 
pragmatist. 
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political institutions. For him, the process of de-divinization, so central to his thought and 
narrative of modernity, culminates in the pragmatic notion that it is only to other humans 
that we must justify ourselves and our political practices. Appeals to extra-human 
standards are opposed to the culture of liberalism which understands freedom as, ‘the 
recognition of contingency.’ In framing liberalism and freedom in this way, Rorty is 
attempting to elide the entire debate around the foundations of liberalism and the charge 
of relativism. For him, the virtue of liberalism is the ability to understand our values and 
their vocabulary as contingent and yet remain committed to them. The manner in which 
he articulates his liberalism, and the relation between philosophy and politics in general, is 
structured by this philosophical anti-authoritarianism and the attempt to rebut the charge 
of relativism in the absence of foundations. Thus, Rorty’s liberalism is articulated within a 
context of a concern for its justification, and hence the stability of its values, given his 
rejection of foundations. The suggestion here will be that he may go too far with this 
concern; that his attempt to situate liberalism in the absence of philosophical foundations 
leads to a constriction of critical (non-liberal) thinking.  
Rorty situates his account of liberalism in CIS in an advocation of plurality466 through 
Isaiah Berlin’s argument in “Two Concepts of Liberty.” Here, Berlin argues that to 
understand freedom, we must acknowledge the necessary incompatibility of our diverse 
human desires and ends.467 Rorty reads this as the impossibility of a single framework or 
overall conception for political life. The virtue of liberalism is the ability to recognize the 
contingency of our political framework and yet remain committed to it. It is important to 
recall Rorty’s philosophy here. As discussed in Ch.2, the absolute validity of a belief is 
impossible for Rorty as those beliefs always occur within a vocabulary (a linguistic system 
whose coherence is internal and separate from other vocabularies). Absolute, or intra-
vocabulary, validity is dependent on some foundational distinction which would allow one 
to differentiate between something peripheral and illusory and something which allows 
access to that absolute (such as: a distinction between two sorts of selves, reason and 
passion; or a distinction between two sorts of persuasion, rational and irrational). For 
Rorty, justification is always internal to a language (social) and there is no such standpoint 
between them. ‘This amounts to giving up the idea that intellectual or political progress is 
rational, in any sense of “rational” which is neutral between vocabularies... progress, for 
                                                 
466 For Robert Brandom, this advocation of plurality is a result of Rorty’s understanding of vocabularies and 
their normative isolation. See; “Vocabularies of Pragmatism: Synthesizing Naturalism and Historicism” in Rorty 
and his Critics op cit. p.168. – This chapter follows Brandom’s argument in placing Rorty’s naturalism and 
historicism at the base of his political theory, p.172.  
467 Berlin, Isaiah. “Two Concepts of Liberty” in Four Essays on Liberty. London, UK: Oxford University Press, 
1969. – Like Berlin, Rorty argues that plurality is best protected through the negative liberty of a public-
private divide.   
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the community as for the individual, is a matter of using new words as well as of arguing 
from premises phrased in old words.’468 For Rorty, the vocabulary of foundations and 
critique cannot explain the relation between old and new. It cannot explain change. This is 
due to its proclivity to seek reasons rather than causes. There is no (context independent) 
reason for a change in vocabulary. Reasons are always internal to vocabularies and hence 
we will always use one vocabulary to judge another. Thus, in the case of a change in 
vocabularies, a vocabulary will always be judged by criteria foreign to it. New ways of 
speaking are only causes for a change in the same sense in the same way as physical 
realities may cause new beliefs but never determine the actual belief (see Ch. 2). 
Consequently, we are confined to the languages, practices and cultures of our 
communities.469 There is a priority of the social and the linguistic here.  
This priority is matched with a historicist emphasis. All phenomena are historical; 
they occur within history, they have changed throughout history, and they are 
interconnected with other aspects of their epoch. As discussed in Ch. 3, Rorty has an 
epochal conception of history where each period is integrated in a dominant vocabulary 
that shifts through piecemeal linguistic change. Further, understand a process of change is 
retrospective. The role of philosophy in history is to provide narratives and 
understandings of the unity of these moments by, as Rorty notes, “holding our time in 
thought.”470 For him, this quasi-Hegelianism means, ‘finding a description of all the things 
characteristic of your time of which you most approve, with which you unflinchingly 
identify, a description which will serve as a description of the end toward which the 
historical developments which led up to your time were means.’471 Philosophy celebrates 
history. It finds a way to rationalize the present as the positive result of past developments 
and encourages us to identify with that process and result. For Rorty, while the language 
of the natural sciences (Truth, correspondence with the world, method, etc) was 
fundamental to the development of political liberalism, it is no longer suitable. Rather than 
philosophical foundations, liberal culture needs a new self-description to shift its focus 
away from the natural sciences and towards literature and utopian politics. Instead of 
searching for philosophical foundations, it should aim at creating the conditions for 
infinite, poetic redescription. Culture must be poeticized and opened up to the 
hermeneutics of change discussed above.472  
                                                 
468 Rorty, CIS. p.48-9 
469 Ibid. p. 50 
470 See; Hegel, G.F.W. Elements of the Philosophy of Right (trans. H.B. Nisbet) Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991. p.21 
471 Rorty, CIS. p.55 
472 Ibid. p. 53-5 
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In addition to a culture of redescription, and akin to the normal method of mastery 
outlined above, for Rorty, the absence of foundations requires a justification of liberal 
institutions that avoids the logic of grounding. Through Rorty’s readings of Rawls and 
Habermas it is clear that this justification is based on an understanding of liberal 
procedures as the institutionalization of pragmatic mastery. They are the self-assertion of 
humanity in that they are a political form without reference to non-human authority. In 
contrast to the charges of his radical critics, the absence of philosophical foundations does 
not imperil liberal institutions and culture. The latter are justified as the political 
formalization of the pragmatic, social model of enquiry.  
Pragmatic Democracy and The Community as Ground 
As Rorty’s pragmatic, social justification of liberalism is implicitly a response to those 
radical critics,473 it is useful to briefly introduce Rorty’s critical reading of them. His brief 
critique of Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment is a particularly 
illustrative example.474 He concedes to these two critical theorists that the 
Enlightenment’s own spirit of critique eventually consumed the alternative foundations 
(in “rationality” and “human nature”) it constructed; that the scepticism of the 
Enlightenment critically undermined the tools which it itself utilized in criticism. However, 
they wrongly assumed that this leaves contemporary society in a state of moral and 
philosophical bankruptcy. They presume that the absence of philosophical foundations 
compromises political liberalism. For Rorty, in this position, they misunderstand the 
nature of intellectual and cultural progress. A culture is not bound by the terms with 
which it initially frames a new vocabulary; ‘the terms used by the founders of a new form 
of cultural life will consist largely in borrowing from the vocabulary of the culture they are 
hoping to replace. Only when the new form has grown old, has itself become the target of 
attacks from the avant-garde, will the terminology of that culture begin to take form.’475 
The critique of Enlightenment foundationalism is a development within modern (liberal) 
culture. It is not a move away from it.  
For Rorty, Horkheimer and Adorno’s fundamental mistake is in their understanding of 
the consequences of modernity’s critique of itself, its rejection of its own purported 
                                                 
473 Rorty’s critique of radical criticism is addressed below. Presently, it is only important that they represent a 
form of philosophical critique that depends upon the logic of unmasking and the appearance-reality 
distinction. Rorty rejects their analyses of the consequences of the failure of Enlightenment rationalism. For 
him, this failure does not compromise liberalism. See; Rorty, Richard. “Philosophy as Science, as Metaphor, and 
as Politics” in EHO. pp.24-5 
474 I am not addressing the accuracy of Rorty’s reading of Dialectic here. Such a task is beyond this project. It is 
only discussed as an example of his critique.  
475 Rorty, CIS. p.56 
  
166  C H . 4 :  R O R T Y ' S  P O L I T I C A L  L I B E R A L I S M  
 
foundations.476 For them, as Rorty quotes, ‘every specific theoretic view succumbs to the 
destructive criticism that it is only a belief – until even the very notions of spirit, of truth 
and, indeed, enlightenment itself have become animistic magic.’477 For them, the 
consequence of this is the loss of critical and foundational grounds for society. Modernity, 
in the absence of foundations, is incapable of thinking beyond the status quo. “Blindly 
pragmatized” thought (i.e. thought without a foundation) lacks the ability to critically 
transcend the present and so establish a relation to truth. For Rorty, this analysis goes too 
far. The failure of Enlightenment rationalism does signal the failure of foundationalism in 
general. However, as discussed earlier, truth and justification are separate. The lack of 
foundations merely means that all theoretical frameworks are one more description. Their 
justification always has been social. Thus, another justification of our present institutions 
and values is possible; one that is rooted in our present practices.  
In “The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy” Rorty attempts to argue for a form of 
social theory that, splitting the difference between liberal foundationalists and 
communitarian historicists (as well as some post-Marxist “radicals”), manages to retain 
the political benefits of the legacy of the Enlightenment while acknowledging the centrality 
of the community as the only source of our political and moral justification.478 For Rorty, 
this is the Jeffersonian compromise; the ability to create a common political heritage and 
identity while differing about its ultimate source (i.e. religion). Jefferson privatizes 
religion. He views it as irrelevant to the social order of liberalism. For Rorty, John Rawls,479 
who is the focus of his essay, illustrates how liberal democracy can function without 
philosophical presuppositions in a similar manner.480 For the former, the latter privatizes 
philosophy by applying the principle of toleration (through exclusion) to it. This principle, 
on Rawls’s own understanding, was the precondition for allowing a plurality of doctrines 
and conceptions of the good to be affirmed within a single (democratic) society. It also 
serves as the basis of Rorty’s argument that philosophy is not necessary to public life. ‘We 
can think of Rawls as saying that just as the principle of religious toleration and the social 
                                                 
476 For another reading of these authors by Rorty, see; “The Overphilosophication of Politics” in Constellations, 
Vol. 7 (1), 2000.  
477 Horkheimer, Max and Theodor W. Adorno. Dialectic of Enlightenment (trans. John Cumming). New York, NY: 
Seabury Press, 1972. p.23 – quoted in; Rorty, CIS. p.57 
478 As argued in Ch.3, Rorty’s attempt to wed the self-assertion to a social-practice oriented linguistic 
naturalism defines his positive philosophy.  
479 The accuracy of Rorty’s reading of Rawls is not discussed here. Rather, only how his reading of Rawls 
illustrates his understanding of the relationship between philosophy and politics is at issue.  
480 Rawls does this mainly in, “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical” in Philosophy and Public Affairs, 
Vol. 14, 1985. Elsewhere, Rawls argues that liberalism’s nonphilosophical nature makes it uniquely capable of 
addressing issues around multiculturalism and tolerance. For him, it is uniquely capable of providing ‘a shared 
public basis for the justification of social and political institutions.’ “The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus” in 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 7 (1), 1987. p.1 
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thought of the Enlightenment proposed to bracket many standard theological topics when 
deliberating about public policy and constructing political institutions, so we need to 
bracket many standard topics of philosophical inquiry.’481 For Rorty, in the wake of the 
critique of Enlightenment reason and metaphysics, the imperative is not to rethink the 
philosophical foundations of liberal political institutions and values that arose with them. 
Rather, we can “benignly neglect these topics” (for the purposes of political theory).  For 
Rorty, this neglect is exactly what makes Rawls’ theory political rather than philosophical. 
Rawls notes, ‘since justice as fairness is intended as a political conception of justice for a 
democratic society, it tries to draw solely upon basic intuitive ideas that are embedded in 
the political institutions of a democratic society and the public traditions of their 
interpretation. Justice as fairness is a political conception in part because it starts from 
within a certain political tradition.’482 Justice as fairness is rooted only within the present 
community. It is a systematization of the values and principles already held within the 
American community and is thus internal to its standards. Without an external standard it 
is a reflection rather than a critical analysis.  
For Rorty, rooted in the community and its practices in this manner, Rawls’ analysis 
avoids philosophical presuppositions. It is “thoroughly historicist and antiuniversalist,” 
avoiding philosophical issues in the manner that Jefferson avoided religious ones. In this 
reading, the only background assumptions a society needs are the types of “common-
sense” understandings offered by history and sociology. It is important to note that 
“common-sense” is not a better or more grounded form of reasoning. Rather, it is the 
shared understandings of a community; the meanings and associations generally assumed 
by their public discourse. For Rorty, philosophical questions about such topics are not 
public. This shared language does not go that deep and hence philosophy can be ignored in 
political questions. For him, politics does not require the authority philosophical 
foundations attempt to provide. Rather, when  
‘justice becomes the first virtue of society, the need for such legitimation may 
gradually cease to be felt. Such a society will become accustomed to the thought 
that social policy needs no more authority than successful accommodation among 
individuals, individuals who find themselves heir to the same historical traditions 
and faced with the same problems. It will be a society that encourages the “end of 
ideology,” that takes reflective equilibrium as the only method needed in 
discussing social policy.’483  
It is important to clarify exactly what Rorty means by justice (via Rawls) and how central 
it is to his anti-metaphysical, liberal culture. For him, the emphasis on justice is indicative 
                                                 
481 Rorty, Richard. “The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy” in ORT. p.179-80 – such bracketing reflects 
Rorty’s own marginalization of philosophy in his public-private divide discussed above. 
482 Rawls, “Justice as Fairness,” op cit. p.225-6 
483 Rorty “The Priority of Democracy” op cit. p.184 
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of the shift from metaphysical to political thinking. It is the end of the appeal to authority. 
When justice, rather than an antecedent order, is the focus we are free from non-human 
(non-social) authority. This is his “freedom as the recognition of contingency.” While Rorty 
often assumes freedom in its negative sense, he refers to it more often in this manner; 
freedom as social and historical autonomy (i.e. a community free from self-imposed and 
external forms of authority). This is freedom as the recognition that we are finite, 
linguistic, historical communities with no ultimate basis for our social practices and 
vocabularies. It is freedom as the recognition that only we create and justify those 
languages and habits. Liberalism, and Rawls (who only formalizes its principles), in their 
emphasis on justice as accommodation amongst individuals in a community, 
institutionalizes this freedom. It grounds public discussion, not within an antecedent 
order, but within the history and traditions embedded within public life.484 It is non-
ideological in its method of seeking reflective equilibrium in an existing linguistic, social, 
and historical community.  
Rorty’s definition of philosophy lurks behind this discussion. For him, both 
philosophy and religion can be defined in a manner broad enough for everyone to share 
philosophical presuppositions or a religious faith. However, he chooses to understand the 
former in the narrow sense of questions concerned with the nature of human beings and 
reality. Rawls, in Rorty’s view, argues that such questions be excluded from politics; that 
they should be a private concern unconnected to public discussions of social policy. The 
point is that beliefs about these topics are not necessarily wrong but that they threaten 
freedom by referring to an authority outside of the human community.485 It is in this 
concern that the real effects of Rorty’s argument are revealed. While he narrows his 
definition of philosophy, his alternative excludes much more than the contents of that 
description. It excludes thinking and vocabularies that are not the language of the public. 
Discussing the limits of that sphere, he notes, ‘We have to insist that not every argument 
need to be met in the terms in which it is presented. Accommodation and tolerance must 
stop short of a willingness to work within any vocabulary that one’s interlocutor wishes to 
use, to take seriously any topic that he puts forward for discussion.’486 When the practices 
and languages of a community are the sole ground of its politics, alternative theoretical 
and explanatory frameworks are immediately excluded from political discussion. 
Furthermore, our ability to question the institutions that reinforce those practices is 
                                                 
484 Ibid. p.185 
485 Ibid. p.182-3 – this argument recalls William E. Connolly’s description of ontological minimalism discussed 
in Ch. 2. The critique of this element of Rorty’s work here, that his minimalism contains a liberal form of 
mastery, relies on Connolly’s analysis.  
486 Ibid. p.190 
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compromised. ‘It is not evident that they [democratic institutions] are to be measured by 
anything more specific than the moral intuitions of the particular historical community 
that has created those institutions.’487 For Rorty, this situates politics solely within the 
democratic community. It gives priority to democracy over philosophy by placing political 
right over philosophical good. Importantly, and uniquely, for Rorty, this justification is 
solely political. Whatever its flaws, this conception is not plagued by philosophical 
presuppositions (and seemingly neither is his liberalism).  
It should be evident that Rorty rejects non-human authority and attempts to ground 
our practices solely within the community (as a shifting and contingent entity). This 
position has distinct effects on his understanding of politics and the manner in which he 
redescribes modern liberalism. His “Postmodern Bourgeois Liberalism” is an attempt to 
illustrate a politics situated in this simultaneous rejection of philosophical foundations and 
celebration of the community. Once again, he situates this (pragmatic) justification of 
liberalism as a third-way alternative to Kantian liberals and their post-
Marxist/communitarian critics. While Rorty finds common ground with the latter in a 
Hegelian historicism, he distinguishes himself by the political (rather than philosophical) 
demand to preserve liberal institutions without their traditional justification. Postmodern 
bourgeois liberalism is a non-philosophical form of liberalism. For it, the only justification 
for institutions is the community that creates, shapes, and maintains them. For Rorty, 
those who take this position can justify their practices solely within solidarity (i.e. within 
the views of the contingent historical community.)488 Postmodern bourgeois liberalism is a 
contingent justification of a set of institutions and practices rooted only in the community 
it emerges from. It is self-consciously partial and contextual. It is justification without 
foundation. Rorty emphasizes that he uses this label to highlight these two aspects. He 
calls it “bourgeois” to acknowledge it is a set of institutions and practices only ‘possible 
and justifiable in certain historical, and especially economic, conditions.’489 Further, he 
calls it “postmodern,” recalling the work of Jean François Lyotard, to indicate that it rejects 
“metanarratives” which describe abstract transhistorical entities (e.g. Absolute Spirit, the 
Proletariat, etc). These contrast with historical narratives, which are the only source of 
such justification. Philosophy can only help us summarize those views after the fact, rather 
than justify them.490 
                                                 
487 Ibid. p.190 
488 Rorty, Richard. “Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism” in ORT. p.200 
489 Ibid. p.198 
490  Ibid. p.200 
  
170  C H . 4 :  R O R T Y ' S  P O L I T I C A L  L I B E R A L I S M  
 
This self-confessed methodological parochialism491 where political discussion is 
confined to competing narratives of a society’s practices, places progressivism at the 
centre of Rorty’s politics. When vocabularies are understood as tools, tools that emerge in 
a gradual and piecemeal fashion where their function and effects are only understood 
retrospectively, stories of progress that explain the positive in the present become the only 
form of politics for philosophy (and culture in general). In this manner, we hold our time 
in thought by understanding how all the small developments that preceded the present 
were particularizations and contributions to the general good of the present moment. In 
its hermeneutic (public) function, philosophy does provide macro-analysis, but only 
retrospectively and only for the purposes of justifying the present.  
‘But we now know these things, for we latecomers can tell the kind of story of 
progress which those who are actually making progress cannot. We can view these 
people as toolmakers rather than discoverers because we have a clear sense of the 
product which the use of those tools produced. The product is us – our conscience, 
our culture, our form of life.’492  
Philosophy looks backward in order to understand the present. The centrality of narrative 
to politics in Rorty’s thought is due both to his methodological dualism, between 
pragmatic method and hermeneutic reform, and to his understanding of the centrality of 
identity. Despite his invocations against the politics of identity, his liberalism, as should be 
evident, is situated within his understanding of Western liberal culture.493 Identity is 
central because it is a manifestation of those social practices which have epistemological 
and political primacy. Politics and morality is primarily a matter of what Rorty, drawing on 
Wilfred Sellars, calls “we-intentions.” An implicit understanding of the community we are 
a part of and the range of acceptable behaviour therein dominate our public life. Anything 
that exceeds that range is what “we” would not do. Further, identity is the product of a 
narrative. It is the product of understanding our development, not general principles.494 To 
have any significance identity must be inherently contrastive. It must, for Rorty, denote 
some group smaller than humanity in order to have something with which to differentiate 
itself. It is an understanding, rooted in narrative, about who we are, how we got here, what 
we do, and how we are different from others.  
This understanding of identity and politics makes social practices central. For Rorty, 
general principles of morality and politics only have sense, ‘insofar as they incorporate 
tacit reference to a whole range of institutions, practices, and vocabularies of moral and 
                                                 
491 Rorty positively describes this trait as an “ethnocentrism.” It will be addressed in Ch.5.  
492 Rorty, CIS, p.57 
493 Voparil, Richard Rorty op cit. 64 
494 Rorty, CIS, p.60 – See also, Ibid. pp.190-1 and Rorty, “Postmodernist” op cit. p.200 
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political deliberation.’495 They are a result of those practices rather than causes of them. 
Such an understanding emphasizes the community as the contingent and experimental site 
of political conversation about those practices. This is the primacy of the social. It is 
important to emphasize here that Rorty’s conception of politics and resulting advocation 
of liberalism is the result of the linguistic (in terms of contingency), social, and historical 
aspects of his philosophy. Politics, for him, is situated in a community, articulated in the 
language of that community, and speaks to the present through an understanding of the 
past. Liberalism, consequently, must be based in a community and its vocabularies. 
Further, it must be able to cope with the presence of different vocabularies within it and it 
must be open (in some way) to the gradual movement of progressive, piecemeal historical 
change. In spite of this theorization of contingency, where freedom becomes recognizing it 
as a condition, by limiting politics Rorty locks us within the present community. Criticism 
changes under these intellectual (epistemic, ontological, etc.) conditions. All we can 
achieve is, ‘a circular justification of our practices, a justification which makes one feature 
of our culture look good by citing still another, or comparing our culture invidiously with 
others by reference to our standards.’496 Criticism becomes empirical and comparative. It 
becomes about protesting against aspects of society that do not conform to its current self-
image497 (hermeneutic) and suggesting concrete alternative practices (pragmatic). For 
Rorty, this turns politics away from revolution, toward reform.  
‘A liberal society is one whose ideals can be fulfilled by persuasion rather than 
force, by reform rather than revolution, by the free and open encounters of present 
linguistic and other practices with suggestions for new practices. But this is to say 
that an ideal liberal society is one which has no purpose except freedom, no goal 
except a willingness to see how such encounters go and abide by the outcome.’498 
Situating politics within the community necessitates such an approach. If no total 
perspectives are possible, and change (in history, language, and actual 
cultures/communities) is piecemeal and experimental (i.e. reformist), then politics must 
be liberal. In one telling moment Rorty, connecting his social naturalism to politics, argues 
that, ‘rational behaviour is just adaptive behaviour of a sort which roughly parallels the 
                                                 
495 Rorty, CIS, p.59 
496 Ibid. p.57 
497 Rorty nearly approximates Michael Walzer’s notion of the “connected critic” in situating social criticism 
primarily within the standards of the community. However, the difference is that Rorty makes the critic 
ultimately loyal to those standards as well. For Walzer’s account of social criticism, see; Interpretation and 
Social Criticism. Cambridge, US: Harvard University Press, 1987. For accounts of the differences between 
Walzer and Rorty, see; Allen, Jonathan. “The situated critic or the loyal critic? Rorty and Walzer on Social 
Criticism” in Philosophy and Social Criticism, vol. 24 (6), 1998; and, Shapiro, Political Criticism. Op cit. Chs.2&3. 
For defences of Rorty in this area, see; Horton, John. “Irony and Commitment: An Irreconcilable Dualism of 
Modernity,” in Richard Rorty: Critical Dialogues op cit; Bacon, “Rorty and Pragmatic Social Criticism” op cit; 
Bacon, Richard Rorty, op cit. pp.38-42.  
498 Rorty, CIS, p.60 
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behaviour, in similar circumstances, of the other members of some relevant 
community.’499 There is a claim to truth here. Rorty has a distinct understanding of society, 
language, and the nature of historical movement. In this sense, liberalism is the 
formalization of social pragmatism. It is the politicization of this non-foundational, 
piecemeal, communicative, social-practice oriented philosophy. Further, it is the anti-
metaphysical and pragmatic culmination of the achievements of modernity.500 Presently, it 
is necessary to connect this conception of politics and justification of liberalism to Rorty’s 
rejection of radical thought. To do this, it is necessary to examine his reading of another 
“anti-radical;” it is in his qualified endorsement of the work of Jürgen Habermas that 
Rorty’s connection of philosophical pragmatism and political liberalism is revealed.  
THE BEAUTI FUL AN D THE SU BLIME :  HA BE RM AS,  RAD ICA L THOU GH T AND SOCI A L  
CRIT ICI SM  
If pragmatic philosophy’s (overt) public role is to participate in the hermeneutic, 
cultural conversation of modernity, its concealed function is to justify the superiority (and 
hegemony) of liberal proceduralism (as mastery). This repeats the aforementioned 
division between hermeneutics (narrative) and method (liberal procedures) within 
Rorty’s politics. It is to his defence of the latter that we now turn. This consists of a two-
part reading of Habermas. First, Rorty defends the latter’s politics while critiquing the 
manner in which he supports it. For him, Habermas is a “liberal without being an ironist.” 
He asserts the superiority of liberal mechanisms and gestures towards their pragmatic 
justification. However, he also goes too far and slips back into foundationalism.501 Second, 
in a series of essays, books, and discussions, Rorty clarified his critique of “radical thought” 
through a comparison with Habermas’ philosophy.502 Selectively drawing on the latter’s 
critique of postmodernity Rorty identifies in both radical thinkers and Habermas (though 
in different forms) a common demand for a philosophical validation of politics. They 
continue to assume that philosophy represents the ultimate judgement for our social and 
                                                 
499 Rorty, “Postmodernist” op cit. p.199 
500 Rorty, CIS, p.57 
501 Rorty and Habermas are remarkably close in many of their ideas. The key distinction is in the status they 
accord to their philosophies and politics. Rorty focuses on this status and so often distinguishes himself from 
Habermas in the arguments referred to below. For a account of their similarities and common "non-
foundational pragmatic humanism," see; Bernstein, Richard J. “What is the Difference that Makes a Difference: 
Gadamer, Habermas and Rorty” in PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science 
Association, Vol. 2, 1982.   
502 Rorty, Richard. “Habermas and Lyotard On Postmodernity” in EHO; Rorty, Richard. “Cosmopolitanism 
Without Emancipation: A Response to Jean-François Lyotard” in ORT; and, Rorty, Richard. “Habermas, Derrida 
and the Functions of Philosophy” in TP. 
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political lives. Thus, while Habermas, for Rorty, represents the archetypal public (liberal) 
philosopher, he (unlike Rawls) shares the universalizing demand to unite philosophy and 
politics that Rorty diagnoses in postmodern radicals. His approach is still foundational. 
Habermas, like those he critiques, fails to realize that the only justification of liberal 
institutions is pragmatic. Piecemeal, empirical comparison and social decision-making 
procedures are the only validation liberalism asks for and allows. Through this analysis, it 
is obvious that the virtue of liberal proceduralism, for Rorty, is the purported lack of a 
philosophical veil. It is collective life without philosophical presuppositions, without 
external authority. It is the political manifestation of pragmatic (anti-metaphysical) 
thought. It is freedom as the recognition of contingency.  
Habermas: Reconstructing Foundations 
The basis of Rorty’s readings of  Habermas and radical thought is the aforementioned 
distinction between the two projects of public solidarity and private self-creation. This 
division leads Rorty to separate thinkers and ideas into those conducive to either project. 
It is important to reiterate that this divide is not between two spaces within society503 but 
is an intellectual division within individuals and between different types of intellectual 
activity and thinking. For Rorty, a thinker’s work can be judged public or private even 
while every individual has public and private aspects to themselves. Further, while these 
aspects are not incompatible in a person or society, both of which can have multiple and 
contending drives, they cannot be reconciled within a single theoretical framework.504 
They are two different types of vocabularies. Public is that which occurs within the 
vocabulary one shares with a community. Contrariwise, private are those attempts to 
speak outside or to transcend that vocabulary in some manner. Thus, Rorty describes it as 
parasitic on the public, as it is always an attempt, implicit or explicit, to overcome public 
thinking and speaking.505   
Within his philosophy, Rorty’s readings of Habermas and radical thinking serve to 
reinforce this division.506 Both, for Rorty, misunderstand the public-private divide. The 
result is twofold; Habermas rejects “postmodern507” thinking in general, when he should 
                                                 
503 Rorty notes this in response to Nancy Fraser’s accusation that his public-private divide repeats the classic 
distinction between private home and public forum. “Habermas, Derrida” op cit. pp.307-8 note 2. For Fraser’s 
critique, see; Fraser, Nancy. “Solidarity or Singularity: Richard Rorty between Romanticism and Technocracy.” 
in Reading Rorty (ed. Alan Malachowski). Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell Inc, 1990. pp.314-5 
504 Rorty, CIS, p.120 
505 Rorty, CIS, p.9 
506 The accounts of both Habermas and Radical thinking below are Rorty’s. While selective criticisms of these 
readings are made, the focus is on how these readings illustrate Rorty’s liberal philosophy as mastery.  
507 There is a terminological difficulty in Rorty’s work. In these discussions he tends use the terms 
“postmodern,” “radical,” and “ironist” with little clear differentiation. All three clearly share a general 
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merely understand its utility more specifically, and radical thought miscalculates the 
consequences of their own critique. Rorty frames his discussions of Habermas and radicals 
as a conflict between two extremes;508 one that he will cut a middle way between. The 
difference between these two is in the necessary philosophical conditions for social 
criticism. For Habermas, radical thinkers, or philosophers roughly in one of the two 
philosophical heritages engendered by Nietzsche,509 lose their emancipatory potential in 
their unmasking of all universals. For him, it is necessary to retain at least one (universal) 
standard for the explanation of domination or all distinctions (free and oppressed, theory 
and ideology) lose their critical force. Without such a standard, we cannot have a 
“theoretical approach” to politics. We will be left only with a context-dependent (socio-
historical) form of social criticism; one which ignores the elements of reason contained 
within “modernity’s ideals.” For Habermas, the question must be, ‘How can an intrinsic 
ideal form be constructed from the spirit of modernity, that neither just imitates the 
historical forms of modernity nor is imposed upon them from the outside?’510 
Consequently, his own “communicative rationality” attempts to locate a structure of 
universal validity claims within communication (irrespective of context) itself. For Rorty, 
Habermas does not think the type of parochial, social narratives he offers is enough of a 
basis for political life and action.511 They do not provide a basis for critique.  
For Habermas, postmodern and radical thought leads to a political cul-de-sac. He 
admits that Nietzsche correctly diagnosed the “philosophy of subjectivity” (the attempt to 
locate an extra-social foundation for our political and moral obligation within the human 
subject) as unable to provide for human emancipation. However, in entirely rejecting all 
grounds, Nietzsche radically divorced the emancipatory project from philosophy. This 
refusal is Nietzsche’s legacy to twentieth-century thought; ‘a disastrous legacy, one which 
has made philosophical reflection as best irrelevant, and at worst antagonistic, to liberal 
hope.’512 Habermas’s response is his own philosophy of intersubjectivity which replaces a 
                                                                                                                                               
philosophical disposition that eschews the classical foundationalist projects.  All three are generally historicist, 
anti-metaphysical and critical of traditional epistemology. While the term “Postmodern” has a complicated 
history in Rorty’s work, he has embraced and rejected it at various times, it generally refers to this 
philosophical disposition; one that Rorty claims to share. The real difference depends then on politics. Radical 
tends to denote those in this disposition who reject liberalism and advocate philosophical analyses of 
contemporary society. Ironists are those who understand Rorty’s public-private divide and confine their anti-
foundationalism to the private.  
508 In particular, see: Rorty, “Habermas and Lyotard” op cit.  
509 Habermas, Jürgen. The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (trans. Frederick Lawrence). Cambridge, UK: 
Polity Press, 1987. Ch. 4 – Here, Habermas argues that Nietzsche produces two pathways in Postmodernity. 
One, Heideggerian and Derridean, and the other Foucaultian. Both overemphasize the world-disclosive aspects 
of language and mythicize the other of reason.  
510 Ibid. p.20 
511 Rorty, “Habermas and Lyotard” op cit. p.164-7 
512 Rorty, CIS, p.62 
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subject-centred conception of reason with the aforementioned communicative version. 
Here, reason is understood as the internalization of social norms and democratic 
institutions are grounded only in “domination-free communication.” However, while Rorty 
lauds these moves, his appropriation of them will be addressed below, for him, Habermas 
goes too far. First, while the latter acknowledge the inevitability of metaphor within the 
“hard disciplines” (law, science, politics, economics, etc.), he maintains the presence of 
universal validity structures behind, and unaffected by, these world-disclosive functions of 
language. These structures provide for grounded argumentation and for the possibility of 
theoretically identifying domination within communication. Essentially, Habermas wants 
to reconstruct, rather than reject, rationality along communicative lines. Rorty, in contrast, 
does not seek a replacement for rationality. His understanding of the contingency of 
language (Ch.2) and his anti-authoritarianism require this space to remain unoccupied. 
Second, this resurrected foundation within Habermas’ thinking leads him to 
misunderstand postmodernism. Habermas rejects ironism, Rorty’s term for his particular 
liberal form of postmodern/radical thinking (addressed below), with the same incorrect 
assumption radicals hold. This is, ‘the assumption that the real meaning of a philosophical 
view consists in its political implications, and that the ultimate frame of reference within 
which to judge a philosophical, as opposed to a merely “literary,” writer, is a political 
one.’513 Habermas retains the quest for the unity of the philosophical with the political. 
This error leads him to reject radical thought as a “symptom of exhaustion.” Its lack of any 
critical standards against which to study politics means that it is a tradition without 
continued use. For Rorty, Habermas misunderstands postmodern philosophy and its 
function. He has confused public and private forms of thinking. He has judged private 
thinkers by public standards and repeated the quest for unity. ‘Where Habermas sees a 
contrast between a socially useless, exhausted philosophy of subjectivity and a socially 
unifying philosophy of rationality-as-intersubjectivity, I see a contrast between the private 
need for autonomy and the public need for a synoptic view of the goals of a democratic 
society.’514 For Rorty, the proper way to understand this form of thinking is as a private 
attempt at autonomy. For him, speaking outside language of the public makes that thought 
non-political.  
Like Habermas, radical thought repeats the demand for the unity of the philosophical 
and the political. However, while Habermas overestimates the need for a philosophical 
foundation for liberalism, radical thinkers overestimate the consequences of that 
                                                 
513 Rorty, CIS, p.83 – see also: Rorty, “Habermas and Lyotard” op cit. p.171 and Rorty, “Habermas, Derrida” op 
cit. p.310 
514 Rorty, “Habermas, Derrida” op cit. p.316 
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foundation’s lack. Thus, while his critique of Habermas focuses on the latter’s attempts to 
reconstruct rationality, Rorty’s critique of this group focuses on their attempt to draw 
political conclusions from postmodernism. For Rorty, there is still both a social and 
pragmatic justification of liberalism after foundations. Radical thought misses this 
possibility in its own quest for unity. Fundamental to Rorty’s critique of this group is his 
own much commented-on distinction between ironism and metaphysics in CIS.  These two 
are opposing philosophical dispositions. The former is defined by “radical and continuing” 
self-doubt with respect to the vocabulary one uses. It holds to Rorty’s general proposition 
that there are only vocabularies and that there is no way to neutrally chose amongst them. 
Irony is anti-essentialist and holds to the contingency of language, society and history. 
Metaphysicians, in contrast, are essentialists. They continue to search for a comprehensive 
framework for reality, one which provides certain knowledge and is not subject to time 
and place. The difference can be illustrated through their respective methods. Ironists 
redescribe, Metaphysicians argue. The former attempt to “play off,” in Rorty’s language, 
various descriptions against each other in order to gradually enact a metaphoric 
redescription (see Ch.2) of something. Metaphysicians attempt to argue in terms that are 
universalizable and certain. For Rorty, as metaphysics is deeply woven into the public 
rhetoric of Western liberal democracies, the imperative is to shift that language to the 
ironist disposition (while not in whole, at least in part).515 This requires acknowledging 
the contingency of language, the isolation and unity of vocabularies, and the ubiquity of 
redescription. This changes the function of philosophy and thought in relation to politics. 
The former can no longer ground the latter but can only engage in context-specific (i.e. 
concrete) appraisals of the existing situation. For Rorty, this is the difference between 
asking, “how are we currently humiliating [oppressing] people?” rather than, “Why should 
we not humiliate?” It is the difference between a contingent question and a foundational 
one. Further, the former, which is the question that should dominate public language and 
the redescriptive efforts of Rorty’s liberal ironists, is a redescriptive question.  It is 
necessary to distinguish here between redescription for public and private purposes. The 
former creates connections between different descriptions for the purpose of 
understanding amongst groups. It redescribes in order to help us understand the situation 
and vocabularies of other people. Private, idiosyncratic description is specifically 
                                                 
515 Rorty, CIS, p.87 – Rorty has been critiqued from several angles for this total rejection of metaphysics. See: 
Conway, Daniel. “Irony, State and Utopia” in Richard Rorty: Critical Dialogues, op cit. p.56; Critchley, Simon. 
“Metaphysics in the Dark: A Response to Richard Rorty and Ernesto Laclau” in Political Theory. Vol. 26 (6), 
1998. p.813 
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unrelated to this project and in fact structurally separated in Rorty’s liberalism. It is an 
exercise in autonomy.516 
It is important to clarify the series of moves Rorty has made here and their 
consequences for the role of philosophy.  The distinction between irony and metaphysics 
is a distinction between the linguistic, social, and historicist brand of pragmatism Rorty 
theorizes and the traditional foundational project of philosophy. This distinction, and 
Rorty’s advocation of a public culture of liberal irony where we do not ask foundational 
questions in politics but only specific and contingent ones, allows Rorty to propose a 
public-private division between vocabularies oriented toward expanding that public 
sphere, and those that do not. Further, it allows him to distinguish between types of 
thinking that are conducive to this project and those, subsequent to the failure of 
philosophical foundationalism, that we know are not. Metaphysics is privatized.517 The 
question now is: why and how is philosophy a form of private perfection as opposed to a 
critical framework for the interrogation of the public? 
Radical Thought and Autonomy: Rorty’s Claim to Procedural Neutrality 
In the absence of foundations for philosophical thought, philosophy (theory) becomes 
a means to private perfection rather than human solidarity. Theory is broad; it is 
specifically about standing back from an entire tradition or body of thinking in order to get 
a new perspective on it. However, as with the previous distinction, theory in this situation 
is specifically opposed to metaphysical philosophy, which searches for a unity behind the 
plurality of appearances. Ironist theory, in contrast, is critical of this tradition. Its goal is, in 
fact, to free itself from it and its metaphysical urge. In CIS Rorty reads ironist thinkers (e.g. 
Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida) as seeking autonomy rather than enacting a new method, 
platform or rationale,. They are attempting to free themselves from the vocabulary they 
inherited and think anew. Consequently, the standards within their thinking change.518 
Further, this desire to speak and think outside the confines of an existing vocabulary 
extends beyond themselves. Ironist theorists have an implicit demand for their autonomy 
to exceed themselves; for the act of their autonomy to rupture the given stasis. For Rorty, 
this is the difference between the merely beautiful and the gloriously sublime.  
‘They want the sublime and ineffable, not just the beautiful and novel – something 
incommensurable with the past, not simply the past recaptured through 
rearrangement and redescription. They want not just the effable and relative 
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beauty of rearrangement but the ineffable and absolute sublimity of the Wholly 
Other; they want Total Revolution.’519 
There is a temptation here to relapse into metaphysics. For Rorty, because theory 
abstracts, because it stands back and attempts to develop a general understanding of a 
tradition all at once, it often assumes that its redescriptions achieve some sort of 
permanence. In this manner, it repeats the philosophical quest for unity. In contrast, 
ironist theory has equally failed (even in the method of narrative) to unite public and 
private, to synthesize self-creation (in the above sense of thinking anew) with  social 
responsibility. Consequently, it is necessary to divide these two projects as separate logics. 
For Rorty, no new way of speaking and acting, even one that abstracts away from the 
present to some large entity (his examples are “Europe” or “History”), has public 
relevance.  
Rorty’s account of ironist theory and his critique of radical thought are dependent on 
Bernard Yack’s The Longing for Total Revolution. This work is a historical critique of a 
covert demand within European philosophy for radical, social transformation. This is the 
desire to exceed the social, to overcome an oppressive set of conditions often understood 
as inherent to modernity and our current social universe. These conditions somehow 
pervert our humanity. Through readings of Rousseau, Hegel, Nietzsche and Marx, Yack 
diagnoses this longing as dependent on two assumptions. First, that modern humanity is 
somehow lacking and unable to achieve itself. Second, that the cause of this limitation is 
fundamental to the nature of modern social conditions. The longing for total revolution 
develops out of an analysis of these obstacles within modernity. Importantly, this tradition 
identifies these obstacles in some fundamental sub-political sphere of social interaction 
which shapes humanity and society. Removing this condition requires a total revolution, 
‘which transforms the whole of human character by attacking the fundamental sub-
political roots of social interaction.’520 For Yack, the two assumptions above are 
problematic. The first assumes it is possible not to be fully human; that is, it assumes a 
human essence which we can fail to achieve. The second assumes the underlying unity of 
the social. It assumes that when institutions do not provide for the full realization of our 
humanity, they dehumanize us. It demands that institutions match our humanity and that 
we should realize our humanity within social conditions. For Yack, this is the ultimate 
source of the longing and the reason why it will never be fulfilled. The desire for total 
revolution falls into a self-contradiction. By defining human freedom in terms of the 
individual’s ability to resist external conditioning, it immediately invalidates the entire 
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project of realizing our humanity in the social world. With such a definition of freedom, all 
social conditions will be dehumanizing.521 The error of this thinking is in positing the unity 
of the social in a single spirit that characterizes social interaction. For Yack, this is what 
necessitates a revolution from the present. Once it is understood that these analyses are 
constructions, that they are particular vocabularies in Rorty’s parlance, there is no 
obstacle to social change. Thus, ‘partial reform and, indeed, partial revolution regain 
meaning and importance.’522 Rather than rejecting it outright, Rorty’s solution is to 
privatise this revolutionary impulse. Through his public-private divide he takes a desire to 
overhaul the existing conditions of human society and converts it into an intellectual 
desire to overcome one’s intellectual predecessors. The argument here is that this 
domestication is fundamental to his overt rejection of radical thought and his articulation 
of procedural and minimal liberalism as the only framework for thinking publically.  
Rorty diagnoses in radical thinking the same assumption of an inner human core free 
from socialization. For him, the conditions of possibility of social action are set by (and 
continually changing because of) semantic world-disclosure. There is no access to, and 
thus no such thing as, an essential humanity to be emancipated. There is no set of social 
relations more distorted or obscured than another. For him,  
‘every form of social life is likely, sooner or later, to freeze over into something the 
more imaginative and restless spirits of the time will see as “repressive” and 
“distorting.” What is wrong with these forms of life is not that they are 
“ideological,” but just that they have been used to justify the systematic 
administration of pain and humiliation.’523  
For Rorty, the problem with radical thought is that it cannot accept that all discourse is 
coerced insofar as it is limited to the terms and practices of a given community at a given 
moment. It rebels against this condition and, through a series of concepts (ideology, 
dehumanization, etc.), assumes the possibility of a non-socialized human essence.524 For 
Rorty, as soon as emancipation is dissociated from a particular instance of oppression, as 
soon as it is thought in an abstract and general sense, it relies upon some understanding of 
the un-oppressed human and its nature. Yack illustrates that to reject such a core requires 
a public-private division. Efforts at autonomy, where the entire field of thought is 
overcome through some new description, should not be seen as the “actualization of a 
common human potentiality” but only as an effort in self-creation. Radical thought 
attempts to take something private and apply it to the public.525 For Rorty, the fallacy in 
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radical thought is their desire to speak anew, outside of the public vocabulary of the 
present; outside of terms meaningful to it. In this, it takes a system of meaning that is only 
significant for it and subsumes the contemporary world underneath its conceptualization. 
This is a powerful desire that promises affiliation with a higher power, disclosure of a 
hidden reality and the possibility of total autonomy.526 The desire for autonomy (freedom 
from all social limitations) becomes a claim to external (nonhuman) authority. In its 
reliance upon an appearance-reality distinction and its use of philosophical abstraction, 
radical theory becomes metaphysical and misunderstands the connection between 
philosophy and politics. It understands contemporary society and “ideology” the same way 
ironists understand metaphysics, as an insidious temptation that must be overcome. This 
produces the notion that criticizing metaphysics is political and that theory has political 
consequences. For Rorty, this assumption stands behind a diverse range (both politically 
and philosophically) of Continental thinkers all of whom repeat the quest to unify the 
political and the philosophical.  
The final question remains, what is social critique after philosophical 
foundationalism? Where radical thought (and Habermas) seek emancipation, Rorty 
emphasises tolerance as the virtue of pragmatic liberalism. In contrast to the ability to 
penetrate appearances down into reality, the strength of liberalism is its reformism, its 
ability to alter itself from within. It does not oppose incommensurable frameworks of 
analysis to each other (e.g. in some overt model of contestation), but, in Lyotard’s 
parlance, converts différends into litigation. Its logic creates the possibility of gradual 
reform both between different frameworks in the moment and between different periods. 
For Rorty, in this disposition, pragmatism is inherently inclusive. It ‘constantly changes to 
accommodate the lessons learned from new experiences... [This is a] program of constant 
experimental reformulation.’527 Rorty encourages us to see ourselves as part of this 
“pageant of historical progress.” In such a reformism there is tolerance. There is the 
gradual accommodation of new experiences and situations. This is tolerance, not so much 
as a political virtue (though Rorty would not exclude this), but as a philosophical 
disposition for cultural change. With this “anglo-saxon utilitarian-reformist brand of social 
thought” the aforementioned distinctions between ideology-nonideology, humanizing-
dehunamizing, and emancipation-oppression fall away. They are replaced with a single 
political distinction between force and persuasion. For Rorty, this distinction is non-
theoretical. It is merely the difference between communication that is systematically 
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distorted and that which embraces the reformist cosmopolitan brand of tolerance. 
Obstacles to the latter are not in need of deep theoretical disclosure or ideology-critique. 
Rather, they are obvious, such as a lack of democratic institutions or a free press.528 
Freedom is empirical. It is the lack of constrictions on democratic institutions and 
pragmatic communication. Further, such freedoms require no foundation but the 
consensus of a community. For Rorty, the social is given priority in politics. Consequently, 
the freedom of social communication is the only sense in which truth has meaning. Truth 
is merely a product of the decisions of a community and its unrestricted communication. 
'When you take care of freedom, truth will take care of itself.'529  
It is only in this sense of a lack of constrictions on communication that “rationality” 
can have any sense after philosophical foundationalism. Within Rorty’s thought, if we 
think publically, ‘we shall identify the rational with the procedures, and the true with the 
results, of “undistorted communication” – the sort of communication characteristic of an 
ideally democratic society.’530 Liberal procedures are not rational because they tend 
toward universal validity but because they provide for pragmatic, piecemeal (adaptive) 
change. They allow us to have no other authorities than the public. Due to this anti-
authoritarian pragmatism, social criticism becomes empirical and contextual. It is about 
the suggestion of concrete, alternative situations or organizations, not the analytical 
exposure of a hidden dynamic. Pragmatic anti-metaphysical liberal ‘culture is one in which 
doubts about the public rhetoric of the culture are met not by Socratic requests for 
definitions and principles, but by Deweyan requests for concrete alternatives and 
programs.’531 For Rorty, disclosing an alternative social world is the only (pragmatic) 
social criticism that can occur. Further this process of suggesting concrete alternatives is 
explicitly piecemeal. It is about gradually confronting established habits and institutions 
with new dynamics and situations. Thus, the imperative is once again Rawlsian reflective 
equilibrium,  
between our old moral principles (the generalities we invoke to justify old 
institutions) and our reactions to new developments, our sense of the desirability 
of various recently disclosed possibilities. … So there would be continual social 
criticism, but no radical social theory, if “radical” means appealing to something 
beyond inherited principles and reactions to new developments.532  
Criticism must be gradualist. It must explicitly work from the present universe of meaning 
(vocabulary) and reform upon that base. It must not attempt to radically shift that base. 
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For Rorty, the problem with radical thought is it does not speak to the present. ‘...adopting 
a new vocabulary only makes sense if you can move back and forth, dialectically, between 
the old and the new vocabulary.’533 Radical thought tries to shift too much too fast. It 
wants to dramatically change the language of the present, to revaluate the existing 
conditions with no positive use of the present understanding. In this, for Rorty, it ignores 
the social basis of the political. It ignores how culture and society actually change.  
Rorty’s strategy here is familiar. He does not argue against the substantive analyses of 
radical theorists. Rather, he sociologically circumvents those critiques. Much like his 
treatment of Analytic thought and the philosophy of mind addressed in Ch.1, Rorty treats 
radical thinkers as a social group who share a cultural demand for total revolution. He 
circumvents actually addressing their ideas by viewing them primarily as a linguistic 
community. In this approach, Rorty assumes the neutrality and priority of his own 
perspective without actually establishing that priority. Rather, he obscures the partiality of 
his perspective under a therapeutic pragmatism. However, there is a circular logic at work 
here. Assuming the neutrality of his own perspective, Rorty critiques radical thought as 
based on a demand that exceeds the actual possibilities of human social life and its 
capacity for change. However, still having never clearly asserted the truth of this 
perspective, he then uses his critique of radical thought to argue for the necessity of those 
limits on political reflection. In this manner, he walks us into a self-reinforcing circle of 
thinking that operates solely on the basis of an implied claim to neutrality.534 This 
mechanism, or Rortian Circle, will recur in this thesis. Presently, it is necessary to briefly 
address the consequences of Rorty’s critique of radical thought and reformulation of social 
criticism.  
When freedom is the recognition of contingency liberalism’s greatest virtue becomes 
its minimalism: its rejection of philosophical questions, its consequent lack of substantive 
claims and its capacity for continual reform. The arguments for it, over alternative forms 
of political organization, are only empirical. ‘Preferring what Sandel calls “procedural 
republics” to other regimes is merely historical, not philosophical. Procedural republics 
are those in which as few answers to substantive moral questions... are built into the 
political institutions as possible. Such republics have the best track record among the 
regimes which we have tried so far.’535 Liberalism brackets the true (in the substantive 
                                                 
533 Rorty, “Cosmopolitanism” op cit. p.221 
534 For Rorty, this type of circular justification which remains internal to a given language, is extent of possible 
argument. See; Rorty, CIS, p.57 
535 Rorty “A Defence of Minimalist Liberalism” in Debating Democracy’s Discontent: Essays on American Politics, 
Law, and Public Philosophy (ed. Anita L. Allen and Milton C. Regan). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1998. 
p.119 
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sense) in favour of the “priority of the practical.” In this it encourages a pragmatic public 
disposition, one that emphasizes the tolerance and reformism that characterizes it. 
Further, in political criticism, this disposition specifically resists abstraction. As 
aforementioned, the role of philosophy, for Rorty and his particular form of minimalist 
liberalism, comes after rather than before political decisions. The public, through its 
common vocabulary and piecemeal political reformism, decides. Only then do 
philosophers celebrate and explain.536  
The consequence of Rorty’s philosophical anti-authoritarianism is the advocation of 
both a de-divinized pragmatic form of politics and the creation of socially centred 
hermeneutics of politics that emphasize the central role of the community in political 
thinking and justification. This priority places the human community at the centre of his 
conception of politics. Its only ground is a pragmatic understanding of how change 
actually occurs within human groups (i.e. piecemeal and gradual). The consequence of this 
is a firm rejection of the use of philosophy, and specifically radical forms thereof, in the 
public. Instead, such expressions are privatized and the public becomes solely the domain 
of the pragmatic form of political enquiry. However, in spite of Rorty’s Kuhnian image of 
enquiry whereby decisive (i.e. revolutionary) shifts are possible through a change of 
vocabulary, his theorization of liberalism restricts thinking to the present, liberal universe. 
When change can only work from the present, and it must occur within the vocabulary of 
the present, thought and critique are restricted. While Rorty was adept at refuting such 
criticisms, he did admit this. For him, his position does assume that ‘the instruments of 
perfectibility are already, in the rich North Atlantic constitutional democracies, in place – 
that the principle institutions of contemporary democratic societies do not require 
“unmasking” but rather strenuous utilization, supplemented by luck.’537 Functionally and 
structurally, Rorty’s thought constricts social organization to the liberal model. Social 
change is redefined, not as the possibility of continuing change (of both the radical and 
reformist sort) but solely as the perfecting of the liberal model. 
THE CULTU RE OF THE L I BE RA L PRE SE NT:   PRA GMATI SM AS  ROMAN TI C UTIL ITA RIA NI SM  
While it has been peripherally discussed, it is necessary to illustrate Rorty’s liberal 
culture and the hermeneutic task therein. As aforementioned, for him, hermeneutics is the 
cultural counterpart to public proceduralism. The latter is the non-philosophical logic of 
liberal methods and institutions. It is the justification of those structures and the formula 
                                                 
536 Ibid. pp.120-1 
537 Rorty, “Habermas, Derrida” op cit. p.326 – my emphasis. See also; Rorty, CIS, p.63 
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for its politics rooted only in the communicative practices of a community.  It is the force 
for stability. The former, in contrast, is the method for change. Where proceduralism 
stabilizes, hermeneutics reforms. It offers new descriptions and understandings in order 
to change our language and our practices. In his work Rorty often situates this project in 
the romantic culture of pragmatism. This cultural is plural and diverse. It attempts to open 
up rather than close down. This is Rorty’s political (cultural) adaptation of his 
hermeneutics of enquiry (see Ch.1). However, similarly, this form of thought is 
fundamentally limiting. By defining plurality solely in terms of individuality, Rorty 
ethicizes politics. Political change becomes a process of self-creation, rather than collective 
action. Further this ethicization makes politics, and specifically political change, an 
entirely cultural project. It focuses solely on adapting our narratives and descriptions 
rather than critically engaging our assumptions or altering our institutions. Political 
progress becomes about loosening and expanding our groups rather than systematically 
changing the relations within that group. This limitation is due to the disposition of 
mastery at the basis of Rorty’s philosophy and politics. Hermeneutic (ethical and cultural) 
change is solely piecemeal and reformist. It works out from the present stasis making 
cautious, experimentalist gestures. At the basis of Rorty’s pragmatic culture of liberalism, 
there is a demand for coherence with the (dominant) present; to must speak in, and to, the 
old vocabulary. As a result, Rorty’s philosophy ends up divorced from any critical project. 
It obscures this dynamic beneath a language of hermeneutic openness and change. It veils 
its exclusion. 
 Romantic Pragmatism: Revolutionary Change at a Piecemeal Pace 
For Rorty, in the absence of non-human authority structures, the political shift to 
liberalism requires a corresponding movement from unity to plurality. Without a 
universal framework for thought neither enquiry nor politics can integrate our diverse 
ends and desires. This assertion of necessary plurality is the challenge of romanticism. For 
Rorty, this movement, like pragmatism, is a disposition in thought; one specifically 
oriented against the universalist desire to reconcile all questions within a single 
intellectual framework. Once again drawing on Berlin, he asserts the necessary diversity of 
our desires and purposes. This is the “collision of the good with the good.” ‘For 
pragmatists intellectual and moral conflict is typically a matter of beliefs that have been 
acquired in the attempt to serve one good purpose getting in way of beliefs that were 
developed in the course of serving another good purpose.’538 This conflict is inevitable and 
                                                 
538 Rorty, Richard. “Grandeur, Profundity, and Finitude” in PCP.p.81 
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can only be addressed through compromise and redescription. For Rorty, romanticism had 
a fundamental role in criticising the Platonic model of enquiry and its quest for certainty. 
In its assertion of plurality it made politics as piecemeal problem-solving the only 
possibility.539 However, romanticism is not without its proclivity to demand unity. As in 
the discussion of radical thought above, for Rorty, romanticism has a tendency to desire 
the infinite. Rather than the inclusive framework of universalism, romantic unity desires 
the removal of all limitations on thought (i.e. completely unrestricted plurality). This is the 
desire for perfect or absolute freedom through philosophical depth. For Rorty, we need to 
reject all metaphors of height, both the ascendance to truth in universalism and the access 
into our deepest self of romanticism. We must be suspicious of both universalist grandeur 
and romantic depth. Pragmatism cuts a middle path between these two alternatives, 
universalism and romanticism, by reconciling their two needs: the need for intersubjective 
agreement (stability) and the desire for novelty (change). Thus, while Rorty emphasizes a 
plurality of purposes and desires, in actual discussion he seems to focus mainly on the 
need to reconcile or provide space for these two specific needs.540 The source of this 
ambiguity, discussed below, is a conflation between the project of private self-creation and 
the hermeneutic task of politics.  
Pragmatism is the philosophical disposition that provides for these two, separate 
tasks: stable proceduralism and dynamic hermeneutics. Pragmatism is romantic 
utilitarianism. For Rorty, pragmatism’s affinity with romanticism is found in both their 
mutual rejection of non-human standards and their emphasis on the imagination. The 
latter, rather than ontology, determines the universe of thought. ‘Ontology remains 
popular because we are still reluctant to yield to the Romantic’s argument that the 
imagination sets the bounds of thought.’541 As the source of language (See Ch. 2 and its 
discussion of metaphoric redescription) imagination defines the range of human thinking. 
For Rorty, part of accepting this limitation and rejecting the quests for certainty (in 
philosophy) and unity (in politics) is to think of reason only as a social practice, ‘the 
practice of enforcing social norms on the use of marks and noises, thereby making it 
possible to use words rather than blows as a way of getting things done. To be rational is 
simply to conform to those norms.’542 Standardization through agreement within our 
linguistic communities allows us to act collectively. It is in this sense, for Rorty, that 
speaking in the terms of the community is rational. Imagination is the ability to shift these 
                                                 
539 Ibid. p.83 
540 Ibid. p.85 
541 Rorty, “Pragmatism and Romanticism” in PCP.p.106 
542 Ibid. p.107 
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terms and thereby change our practices. Intellectual and political progress, on this 
understanding, is not a deeper understanding of the Real but a new use of language that 
increases our ability to “do things;” one that allows us to have richer and fuller 
experiences. It is specifically the imaginative ability to reflect on those terms, the terms 
which structure our discourse, and consider alternative sets of terms that allows for 
human freedom beyond mindless impulse-response. Imagination differentiates humans 
from animals who are only mechanistic in their response to environmental stimuli. 
‘Mechanism stops, and freedom begins, at the point where we go metalinguistic – the point 
at which we can discuss which words best describe a given situation. Knowledge and 
freedom are coeval.’543 Imagination, as the source of new descriptions, is the basis of 
freedom.  It is the only manner in which we can critically appraise the vocabulary within 
which we currently operate. ‘Rationality is a matter of making allowed moves within 
language games. Imagination creates the games that reason proceeds to play. Then... it 
keeps modifying those games so that playing them is more interesting and profitable. 
Reason cannot get outside the latest circle that imagination has drawn.’544 Imagination 
sets the bounds of thought. Rorty emphasizes that even his reduced, social, and 
communicative form of rationality is subject to the imagination. “Imagination has priority 
over reason.” This understanding repeats his reading of hermeneutics as the destabilizing 
and freeing form of enquiry (Ch. 1). Freedom is, once again, here cast as the ultimate value 
of Rorty’s liberal culture.   
Ethics and Culture: The Limits of Reform in Rorty’s Liberalism 
The limitation of this hermeneutic of freedom is revealed in a fundamental ambiguity 
in Rorty’s account of pragmatism and romanticism. In his thought, the necessary plurality 
of desires may contribute to gradual reform over time, but in the moment it leads to a 
crass individualism and the privatization of critical thinking. In the absence of a universal 
framework for integrating that plurality, Rorty advocates a poetic polytheism for liberal 
culture.  
‘Polytheism… is pretty much coextensive with romantic utilitarianism. For once 
one sees no way of ranking human needs other than playing them off against one 
another, human happiness becomes all that matters… human perfection becomes a 
private concern, and our responsibility to others becomes a matter of permitting 
them as much space to pursue these private concerns – to worship their own gods, 
so to speak – as is compatible with granting an equal amount of space to all. The 
tradition of religious toleration is extended to moral toleration.’545  
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The privatization of religion within liberalism is extended to all substantive moral and 
political views. Thus, the consequence of the romantic aspect of pragmatism is not only a 
hermeneutics of reform as freedom, but a public-private divide; one that separates off 
non-public language from the sphere of liberalism. It is in this sense that Rorty can claim 
that, while his pragmatism may not necessitate democratic politics, democratic politics is 
inferentially connected to (and encourages) the pragmatic disposition. For him, one’s 
devotion to democratic politics and its desire for agreement will not be sincere if one is a 
monist. The latter position will still be authoritarian in the sense that some external 
authority will condition the validity of human politics.546 However, liberalism, as political 
anti-authoritarianism matches pragmatism’s similar emphasis on the human community 
as the only authority in public life. The aforementioned ambiguity emerges in 
corresponding notion that the individual is the only authority in private life.  
This ambiguity is between the two projects of the romantic aspect of pragmatism 
(rather than the utilitarian aspect which roughly conforms to the proceduralism address 
in the previous section): (private) self-creation and (public) hermeneutic reform. As both 
are based within our capacity for imaginative redescription, they are fed by a common 
source. Thus, the ambiguity here is regarding self-creation and its relevance to the public. 
While Rorty usually strictly separates self-creation off as private, he periodically conflates 
it with the hermeneutic task of politics. He seems to see some individual self-creation as 
public. This confusion within Rorty’s romantic culture of liberalism further reveals the 
unintelligibility of the public-private divide. It also reveals that it functions to separate off 
non-liberal thinking from the public. In this role, it repeats the dynamic of the veil. It masks 
its exclusion of “non-public thought” through a hermeneutic of freedom claiming to open 
up critical reflection.  
This circumscription of non-pragmatic critical thinking involves two related and 
interwoven movements in Rorty’s redescription of politics: an ethicization of politics and a 
“making cultural” (or social) of the political. Both of these build on this individualist 
interpretation of plurality discussed earlier.547 In “Ethics Without Principles” Rorty offered 
a pragmatic understanding of the scope of ethical thinking. While he generally denies the 
public relevance of private development548, here, through an opposition to both the 
prudence-morality and reason-sentiment distinctions, he connects ethical development to 
the hermeneutic project. For him, both of these distinctions are based within a desire to 
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ground moral and political obligation through some essential human core or element 
which we share with others. The former distinction, between morality and prudence, is a 
differentiation between unconditional or categorical obligations and 
conditional/hypothetical ones. He rejects it for the same reasons he rejects universalism 
and the quest for certainty and attempts to reconstruct it along pragmatic lines. The latter 
distinction, between reason and sentiment, is a differentiation between two forms of 
moral reasoning, one grounded in a universally available framework, and one that is not. 
For Rorty, both of these distinctions should be recast as distinctions of degree, rather than 
kind, and understood within a relational, social perspective. The result is that morality-
prudence becomes the difference between established and controversial moral 
relationships and claims. The latter are those that are settled and “common-sense” within 
our communities. The former are novel claims which do not have that status. The result of 
this move is to understand moral and political progress in terms of a “progress of 
sentiments.” This Humeanism549 emphasizes that the only sources of moral and political 
obligation are ‘tradition, habit and custom.’550 Progress is the introduction of new claims 
that are eventually accepted. Sentiment is the means by which these new claims are 
acknowledged.  
For Rorty, in contrast to earlier works denying its relevance551, it is a 
misunderstanding of the self as non-relational that is the cause of these errors. For Rorty, 
the self, as in his naturalism in general (see Ch. 3), is constituted by its relations. It is in 
this sense that Rorty, throughout his philosophy, has referred to the self as a “network of 
beliefs and desires.” Such a network is not coherent or centred by any one aspect of itself. 
Rather it is composed of the same multiplicity of competing drives as romantic plurality.  
Consequently, the self should be understood as an unharmonized entity, a dynamic 
process with no telos. For Rorty, this changes the nature of moral development and 
political action. ‘Moral development in the individual, and moral progress in the human 
species as a whole, is a matter of re-making human selves so as to enlarge the variety of 
relationships which constitute those selves.’552 Changing our obligations requires changing 
ourselves. Recalling the above discussion of the difference between humans and animals 
in romanticism, Rorty emphasizes that this difference, in this discussion, becomes one of 
flexibility. Humans are more flexible in the boundaries of the self and the quantity of 
                                                 
549 For an account of the role of Hume’s work in Rorty’s thought, see; Williams, Michael. “Rorty on Knowledge 
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relations that can go into our constitution. Importantly, this is a difference only of degree, 
not of kind. The resulting imperative is to widen that sensitivity and responsiveness to 
include more people and needs. For Rorty, we cannot ground obligation within a universal, 
however we, ‘can aim at ever more sensitivity to pain, and ever greater satisfaction of ever 
more various needs. Pragmatists think that the idea of something nonhuman luring us 
human beings on should be replaced with the idea of getting more and more human beings 
into our community – of taking the needs and interests and views of more and more 
diverse human beings into account.’553 Moral progress is about widening sympathy. 
Importantly, for Rorty, this is a piecemeal and gradual process. Such a project requires 
rejecting metaphors of depth and height in favour of metaphors of breadth. The latter 
denotes the “thousand little commonalities” that could be used to stitch groups together 
into a wider community. The means to do this is once again imaginative redescription. It is 
the only means for this cultural aspect of the project of liberalism. In this manner, Rorty 
ethicizes politics. He understands the hermeneutic side of political progress solely as a 
process of ethically recreating ourselves to widen our range of sympathetic connections.  
This ethicization leads to the priority of the cultural within Rorty. The political task of 
liberalism, which Rorty largely seems to restrict to the question of relations between 
various communities and his own Western liberal “we,” is to spread our community.554 
Thus, the ultimate chapter of CIS, entitled “Solidarity,” argues that expanding solidarity is 
the political task of post-metaphysical liberalism. Building on the priority of identity and 
community in his pragmatic framework, he emphasizes that this is a continual project of 
expansion; one that utilizes philosophy’s ability to hermeneutically reweave our 
vocabularies to suit this purpose.555 Fundamental to this process is the development of 
inclusive narratives which seek to include more groups. The apotheosis of this, and the 
only concrete narrative Rorty explores, is the myth of American democracy he focuses on 
in his later work.556 The power of this narrative is its individualism. For Rorty, its 
inclusiveness (key to his post-metaphysical liberalism) is its ability to draw individuals 
from any vocabulary into its individualism. It levels and unifies. It creates one public 
speaking one language against the plural background of individuality. It thus satisfies both 
aspects of pragmatism: common intersubjective unity and individual plurality.557 For 
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Rorty, creating such narratives is the public (and hermeneutic) role of philosophy. 
Philosophy does not ground or unmask, it re-imagines our communities and others in 
order to expand our liberal community. It extends the present.  
In Rorty’s romantic culture of liberalism, he attempts to provide space for novelty and 
change. Romanticism and hermeneutics are the necessary counterpart to the need for 
intersubjective agreement in procedural liberalism. Where the latter unifies through the 
epistemological and political dominance of the community and its common language, the 
former moves our communities forward. Through emphases on the necessary plurality 
(and incompatibility) of our individual and collective purposes and the imagination as a 
means for reimagining ourselves and others, Rorty theorizes how the community can 
progress within the structure of procedural liberalism. For Rorty, such meta-reflection 
about the languages we use and the purposes we have is the fullest sense of (pragmatic) 
freedom. However, an ambiguity emerges in Rorty’s account of this culture; one that is 
indicative of a larger dynamic within his work. His emphasis on individual plurality and 
his admission that some forms of self-reflection are part of this hermeneutic project 
violates his public-private divide. It raises the question of why some imaginative 
redescriptions, some new conceptualizations of the world, are public and others are not. 
The only answer within Rorty’s work repeats the mechanism revealed in the last section. 
For Rorty, a language is private when it differs too much from the dominant (liberal) 
language of the present. Thus, hermeneutic thought must be piecemeal. It must be close to 
the current public. It must still speak (mostly) within its terms.558 Thus, in spite of his 
public-private divide, this ambiguity illustrates how the private does find a public role in 
Rorty’s liberalism. However, it is a domesticated role; one made subject to the logic of the 
public (mastery) and its veiling (of hermeneutic freedom). Thus, the private too is 
colonized and subsumed under the logic of the public. This is a concealed dynamic within 
his thought, a veiled hegemony of the liberal logic. Beyond this mechanism, this self-
reinforcing logic is only doubled in Rorty’s focus on ethics and our collective disposition. 
This emphasis is Rorty’s culturalism, his attempt to replace political with cultural change. 
It is only in the hermeneutic sphere where change occurs in his framework. Institutions 
and their procedural logic remain. 
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CONC LUSI ON:   
This chapter has critically investigated Rorty’s liberalism and the manner in which he 
justifies it through an analysis of the connection between philosophy and politics. Rorty 
divorces the two. Through a reading of the philosophical tradition, he diagnoses a deep 
metaphysical trend to combine the public and private projects, one that he assumes fails. 
Further, through a methodological discussion, he distinguishes between two types of 
political enquiry: one, scientistic and technical (stable); and the other, hermeneutic 
(developmental). Through these two divisions, the public-private divide and the division 
of the former into hermeneutic and procedural forms, he restricts critical philosophy from 
politics. This chapter has argued that this construction, and Rorty’s liberalism in general, is 
the political formalization of his pragmatism as a social-practice oriented understanding of 
human culture. Essentially, that Rorty’s understanding (and justification) of liberalism is 
the attempt to provide for a form of political organization that gives precedence to 
humanity and its external control of the world. The mastery of proceduralism is, for him, 
the only alternative to the metaphysics of the Kantian and radical forms of political 
thinking. Proceduralism, on this understanding, is superior because it is collective control 
without philosophical preconceptions (without a veil).  
In contrast, this chapter has illustrated the manner in which this proceduralism limits 
thought. When the political is defined by the present public and restricted to the dominant 
mode of thinking through a rejection of abstract critique, the non-liberal comes to be 
defined as the non-public. Rorty’s thought ends up privatizing theory that attempts to 
expose new, unseen dynamics. These are interpreted as private fantasies because they do 
not fit into the overall framework of the present public. He thus incapacitates his own 
model of enquiry that is supposed to allow for revolutionary (i.e. paradigm shifting) forms 
of thought. Instead, we can only get piecemeal changes. Rorty locks us in liberalism in 
these two movements. Politics must be firmly separated from both the quest for certainty 
and foundations (which is a defunct philosophic project) and from the new role he accords 
to philosophy. Thus, philosophy’s only political role becomes cultural and linguistic. It is 
concerned solely with changing the language within which we understand ourselves, our 
identity and our purposes. In this, Rorty’s thought has the implicit claim that we should 
match social criticism to the actual way in which change occurs. Change is limited, and so 
our social theory should be too. He repeats this circular argument in a critique of radical 
thought which assumes the neutrality of its own perspective in order sociologically 
circumvent the arguments of these thinkers and reduce their thought to a social pathology. 
For Rorty, the failure of this group only re-enforces the pragmatic limits he sets on 
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thinking. As a result, philosophy cannot engage in the critical analysis of politics. It can 
only participate in a society’s conversation on the macro world-disclosing level. It cannot 
and should not be involved with actual political prescriptions or analysis. In this manner 
he prevents the wholesale critique of our political structures and institutions. The 
argument of the next chapter is that this mechanism repeats the logic of the veil described 
in earlier chapters. Rorty’s proceduralization of politics veils his circumscription of 
thought. His justification of liberalism then becomes, in function, a form of conservatism 
for the liberal (modern) epoch. It serves as a political and intellectual method for 
preventing significant change. It is the self-reinforcing logic of liberal mastery.  
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CH.  5.  THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL HOPE:  RORTY’S 
POLITICAL UNIVERSE  
 
Another sign of our times… is the new importance given to the single person. 
Everything that tends to insulate the individual – to surround him with barriers 
of natural respect, so that each man shall feel the world is as his, and man shall 
treat with man as a sovereign state with a sovereign state – tends to true union 
as well as greatness… The world is nothing, the man is all.559  
 
The publicity of self-actualization promotes the removal of the one and the 
other, it promotes existence in that immediacy which, in a repressive society, is 
(to use another Hegelian term) bad immediacy (schlechte Unmittelbarkeit). It 
isolates the individual from the one dimension where he could “find himself”: 
from his political existence, which is at the core of his entire existence. Instead, 
it encourages non-conformity and letting-go in ways which leave the real 
engines of repression in the society entirely intact, which even strengthen these 
engines by substituting the satisfactions of private and personal rebellion for a 
more than private and personal, and therefore more authentic, opposition.560 
INTRODUC TI ON:  
When the world is partitioned into public and private and the former is further 
segregated into an established procedural logic for institutions and a restricted 
hermeneutic of cultural development, there seems little left for political philosophy to 
engage with. Instrumentalism has taken over questions of means and culturalism 
questions of ends. This final chapter addresses the remaining task for philosophical 
thinking in Rorty's work. It critically engages his theorization and concrete articulation of, 
what he terms, the politics of social hope. As discussed in Ch. 4, Rorty circumscribes the 
political role of philosophy to the role of participant in the cultural conversation of a 
community. Philosophy can provide theorizations and justifications of developments after 
they occur, but it cannot function as a critical arbiter on social and political changes. It can 
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neither ground nor unmask. The question naturally follows, in what way can philosophy 
look forward? How can it be involved in actual social and political change? Rorty's answer 
is social hope. Philosophy can provide inspiring alternative visions of its community. It can 
re-describe these concrete alternatives in terms of their differences to the present. And it 
can hope that these visions convince the democratic public sphere of discussion. In this 
manner, philosophy can be utopian.  
This thesis has not often emphasized the strong aspects of Rorty's work. His attempt 
to reorient politics away from eternal standards and towards a utopian politics of the 
future does provide political thought with an important base following the failure of 
philosophical foundations. However, this disposition is fundamentally limited by his 
rejection, and structural circumscription, of criticism of the present. Without such 
criticisms, how can a future be understood? Without explorations of what is wrong now, 
how are alternatives to be judged? This chapter will proceed by illustrating this politics of 
social hope and how Rorty roots it within the social practices of the community. If, as 
addressed throughout Chs.3 and 4, the practices of one’s social and linguistic group set the 
pragmatic bounds of possibility, then only the imagination can carry human thinking 
forward in social changes. Further, as in Ch. 4, such changes, after metaphysics, can only be 
justified within a democratic framework where procedures are based only on persuasion. 
Such procedures are the political formalization of the pragmatic way in which justification 
actually occurs. The result of these points is that, for Rorty, the hoped-for future should 
serve as an ontological ground or hypergood for social change. Alternative visions offered 
on the democratic marketplace of ideas are the only basis for such change.  
After illustrating the ontology of social hope in Rorty’s work, this chapter will turn to 
the work of Herbert Marcuse in order to establish a critical framework that exposes the 
limits of the former’s philosophy and politics. Marcuse continues the ontological critique 
of modernity and technology Heidegger began. However, unlike Heidegger, Marcuse 
focuses on a particular material situation: the advanced technological capitalism of the 
West. He identifies how a particular framing of the political field, one that matches Rorty’s 
pragmatic restriction of politics, circumscribes political thought and prevents genuine 
criticism and alternatives. Marcuse’s analysis of the universe of thought within liberal 
democracy and the manner in which a set of intellectual conditions are interrelated with 
and reinforce a particular disposition toward social criticism clarify the internal dynamics 
and consequences of Rorty’s liberalism (introduced in Ch. 4). Further, this analysis extends 
the critical framework of mastery developed in Chs.2 and 3. There, Heidegger’s (and 
Connolly’s) mode of philosophical questioning revealed the possibility of a general critique 
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of an ontological framework and the identification of specific dynamics within that 
framework which limit our understanding of Being. Specifically, the assumptions that 
inform both that dynamic and the mechanism of veiling therein. For Marcuse, modern 
technological rationality veils its own partiality within a language of operationalism and 
behaviourism that claims to work within the actual possibilities of knowledge. Similarly, 
contemporary political discourse veils its circumscription of thought within a pragmatic 
language of problem-solving and a claim to non-ideological neutrality. In opposition, 
Marcuse argues for the necessity of critical, philosophical methods that exceed these 
limitations on thought and politics.  
Applying this critical framework, this chapter offers a critical reading of Rorty’s 
interpretation of the “New Left” and the radical political movements of the 1960s. For 
Rorty, this group represents a turn away from genuine Leftism and the accomplishments 
of the social democratic Left of the first half of the 20th century. He diagnoses several 
fallacies within that movement that follow on from his general critique of radical thinking 
(see Ch.4) and argues for the necessity of patriotism and positivity in an American politics 
of hope. In contrast, for Marcuse, this movement represented a new source of liberation in 
an increasingly effective, repressive political context. Rather than a futile rejection of 
effective reformism to a cultural politics of identity, the New Left is the negative 
manifestation of the forces of liberation within advanced technological capitalism. Further, 
these forces, irrespective of the success or failure of their campaigns, are uniquely 
illustrative of the limits, and the mechanisms by which they are maintained, of the liberal 
present. Through a comparison of these two accounts this section will illustrate that 
Rorty’s politics of hope lacks any genuine transformative potential; that Rorty’s 
circumscription of thought impoverishes his politics of hope. The result is that, 
functionally, his pragmatism and liberalism result in the very conservatism he opposes.  
PRA GMA TI C SOCIA L CHA NGE :  RORTY A ND THE FUTURE  OF HOPE  
In a series of later writings, Rorty articulated a politics of social hope designed to 
develop the constructive role of his culture of liberalism (see Ch. 4). Such a politics is an 
attempt to provide for the possibility of collective political action in spite of the 
impossibility of grounding or unmasking in politics. It is meant to serve as an alternative 
“ground” for social change; one that inspires without falling into the fallacies of 
metaphysical politics. Instead of basing its alternative visions on immutable principles or 
disclosing analyses, it looks to hope for the motivation for social and political change. 
Undefined hope functions as a “hypergood” in this part of Rorty’s philosophy.  Importantly, 
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following his justification of liberalism, he both grounds this project within the languages 
and practices of the community and structures it within his account of pragmatic 
toleration. In this, he intends an inclusive political project of communal hope meant to 
provide the resources for an active reformism. The limits of this project will be addressed 
in subsequent sections. 
The Social Foundation of Hope 
Rorty’s theory of social hope is rooted within his earlier examinations of the role of 
the community in shaping epistemic standards, and his theorization of a pragmatic form of 
liberal democracy as the formalization of the virtues of tolerance and diversity. As 
discussed in Ch. 1, Rorty argues that the language of a community sets the parameters of 
knowledge. Importantly, this is not a metaphysical argument about the nature of truth but 
a sociological point about the manner in which justification actually occurs. Similarly, the 
same constraints operate within politics which is not a process of grounding or disclosing, 
but one of reaching consensus within a community. For Rorty, our socially situated nature 
requires a pragmatic disposition. This entails embracing what he, drawing on Rawls, terms 
the principle of tolerance. Here, tolerance is “benignly neglecting” substantive notions of 
the good and philosophical issues when thinking politically. This position makes liberalism 
political (and pragmatic) rather than metaphysical. It is based solely within the traditions 
of a community rather than in a set of principles or a metaphysic. Those traditions set the 
limits of political thinking and action. As such, they are the necessary context of any 
constructive politics of hope. For Rorty, this is fundamentally liberating. By being rooted 
solely within the history of a community, politics is understood as freedom from external 
(non-human) standards. The consequence of this is Rorty’s acknowledgement that any 
justification of political and social organization is contingent; it is restricted to a particular 
community at a particular time.561  However, there is another result here. By resituating 
liberal tolerance as the disposition of a contingent community, Rorty places that 
community’s ability to make positive moral and political statements in question. The basis 
of his response to this problem forms the logical frame for his politics of hope. 
In “On Ethnocentrism: A Reply to Clifford Geertz,” Rorty denies this risk arguing that 
his pragmatism is not a relativism. It does have the ability to make positive commitments. 
In this article, he discusses the problem of relativism in relation to ethnocentrism. While 
he never defines the latter term, it seems to denote the assumption that the values of one’s 
community are superior to the alternatives. For him, this position is no longer acceptable 
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within liberalism. However, refusing such a claim risks descending into relativism. Thus, 
Rorty argues, contra Geertz and “wet liberals,” for his own inelegantly named disposition 
of “anti-anti-ethnocentrism.” This temperament is rooted in two aspects. First, he claims 
that bourgeois liberal culture is opposed to ethnocentrism. It is defined by its continuing 
project to widen its sympathies and “we,” by its ‘tolerance of diversity.’562  This comprises 
its first “anti.” The second represents its rejection of relativism. For Rorty, this problem is 
a product of the desire to philosophically ground our politics and practices. However, they 
need no such bases. They are justified (which as discussed in Ch.1 is different from 
founding) by being central to the community in question. The problems of relativism and 
ethnocentrism are the product of assuming a distinction between rational judgement and 
cultural bias. Liberal rationalists want to simultaneously rationally justify their beliefs and 
acknowledge their particularity. This bind, for Rorty, has led to what he calls a 
“psychological problem” in this group, as they are pulled between these two incompatible 
positions.563  
The desire to distinguish between rational judgement and cultural bias is a product of 
the Enlightenment’s attempt to justify liberal ideas and specify the transcultural limits to 
tolerance. Effectively, to know when tolerance is no longer due. For Rorty, those limits can 
only be decided pragmatically, ‘case by case, by hunch or by conversational compromise, 
rather than by reference to stable criteria.’564 Further, procedural logic is ideal for setting 
those limits outside of substantive values.  
One does not have to accept much else from Western culture to find the Western 
liberal ideal of procedural justice attractive. The advantage of postmodernist 
liberalism is that it recognizes that in recommending that ideal one is not 
recommending a philosophical outlook, a conception of human nature or of the 
meaning of life, to representatives of other cultures. All we should do is point out 
the practical advantages of liberal institutions in allowing individuals and cultures 
to get along together without intruding on each other’s privacy, without meddling 
with each other’s conception of the good.565  
The pragmatic justification of the procedural logic is neutral. While Rorty never explicitly 
claims this, if proceduralism is capable of arbitrating between every other substantive 
viewpoint, it must hold some superiority or neutrality amongst them. Thus, in the very 
least, the pragmatic logic is exceptional. Further, it allows communities to make positive 
political decisions.  
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In his later volume on social hope, Rorty develops this argument in order to 
pragmatically justify his ethnocentric liberalism.566 He begins “Pragmatism, Pluralism and 
Postmodernism,” with a historical argument about the development of philosophical 
thinking over the past century. Briefly, he argues that Darwin, utilitarianism and 
pragmatism have all contributed to the growing acceptance of philosophical pluralism in 
the West. ‘I shall use the term “philosophical pluralism” to mean the doctrine that there is 
a potentially infinity of equally valuable ways to lead a human life, and that these ways 
cannot be ranked in terms of degrees of excellence, but only in terms of their contribution 
to the happiness of the persons who lead them and of the communities to which these 
persons belong.’567 These various intellectual developments all contributed to a general 
shift from unity to plurality and the sense that, ‘a perfected society would make possible 
ever-proliferating human diversity.’568 For Rorty, the liberalism of J.S. Mill is designed 
specifically around this aim. He is quick to qualify that while pragmatism does not 
necessitate liberalism, liberalism does necessitate such pragmatic pluralism. He wants to 
understand this pragmatism only as the view of knowledge most compatible with the 
advocation of liberalism as the best sociopolitical alternative.569 Political theory in general, 
Rorty emphasizes, should be understood in this sense; as suggestions for future action 
emerging out of historical experience. The advocacy of liberalism is not, contra post-
colonial critics, susceptible to the charge of ethnocentrism. Rorty is not arguing that the 
West has a superior rationality. Rather, the claim for liberalism is only its experimental 
success. Criticism, for Rorty, must come by the way of concrete alternatives. A 
commitment to pluralism does not entail an inability to identify irrational positions. 
Rather, the concept can still be used to denote, ‘a readiness to ignore the results of past 
experience, rather than to signify a departure from the commands of an ahistorical 
authority called Reason.’570 Irrationality has a pragmatic sense. It refers to intellectual 
standpoints that do not give experience and experimental reasoning priority. It is in this 
sense that tolerance, for Rorty, is pragmatically justified. Historical experience teaches that 
it is significantly more successful at allowing different groups to live together. In light of 
such experience, it cannot be considered a relativistic position. ‘The difference between 
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pluralism and cultural relativism is the difference between pragmatically justified 
tolerance and mindless irresponsibility.’571  
These two essays reveal how Rorty believes liberals can argue for the superiority of 
their institutions and values. Further, they also reveal the constraints within which any 
political change must occur. Consequently, they clarify the implicit framework of 
pragmatic neutrality within which Rorty’s politics of social hope operates. To recapitulate, 
for him, politics is situated within the social practices and history of a community. This 
necessitates a liberal approach to political change because liberalism (as pragmatism) is a 
formalization of how social and political change actually occurs. In the articles discussed 
above, Rorty makes two arguments to this effect. First, he argues that the Western value of 
tolerance and the procedural institutions and logic meant to provide for it are 
pragmatically justified. Their validity is thus implicitly neutral. It exists between 
substantive cultures and modes of thinking. Second, the pragmatic logic of change, 
whereby concrete alternatives to the present are judged through the lens of history and 
experience, is the product of the development of a series of philosophical themes around 
pluralism and diversity throughout the 20th century. The self-acknowledged particularity 
of this logic to the West does not make it a relativism. Rather, it is the only manner of 
judging between social and political developments. Contra Rorty, I will argue that this 
implicit neutrality violates his commitment to anti-authoritarianism by marginalizing 
other critical frameworks and functionally constraining change. However, presently, it is 
necessary to shift to his actual articulation of social hope to understand how the priority of 
the social and the implicit claim to pragmatic neutrality affect Rorty’s understanding of 
political change. 
Philosophy and the Future: Ontological Foundations Re-emerge 
The concept of social hope in Rorty’s work is his explicit attempt to offer a progressive 
politics of change. For him, such an approach is necessitated by the contemporary 
situation. It is the only possible positive and post-metaphysical (pragmatic) method for 
political development. Building on the romantic culture of liberalism addressed in Ch.4, it 
focuses solely on shifting the community through narratives and a language of hope. The 
undefined and imaginative future can then function as a hypergood or ontological 
foundation for political action. In a sense, it can bridge the theory (or in this case, 
narrative)/action divide that is of fundamental concern to pragmatism. Further, without 
the ability to critique political reality, it remains Rorty’s only positive move to affect the 
                                                 
571 Ibid. p.276 
  
200  CH.5:  T H E  F U T U R E  O F  S O C I A L  H O P E  
 
concrete realm of politics. However, as politics and justification for him are both rooted in 
the community and the previously discussed claim to pragmatic neutrality, this politics of 
social hope is limited by two constraints: the standards of the present community, which 
may exclude many forms of thought, and the necessity of dreaming concrete alternatives 
to the present which (as in Ch. 4) only build on and reform that present. Rorty’s positive 
politics is ultimately compromised by an inability to critically engage the present. 
Consequently, his future hope lacks a present against which to attempt change. Without 
such a critical understanding, political action is both capricious and unmotivated. 
The politics of social hope is Rorty’s solution to a particular problem in contemporary 
Western politics; one which particularly afflicts the Left. Rorty’s Achieving Our Country 
(hereafter: AOC), which will be addressed below, is his detailed diagnosis and response. 
This problem is the loss of political hope in contemporary Leftist politics. This lack of hope 
is caused by the perception of failure in the 20th century of the two main methods of 
achieving a classless, cosmopolitan society: revolution and reform. Importantly, it has had 
a distinct intellectual effect upon Leftist academics. For Rorty, ‘The appropriate 
intellectual background to political deliberation is historical narrative rather than 
philosophical or quasi-philosophical theory.’572 Such narratives provide an understanding 
of the past up to the present, a situation for politics to engage with or problems to solve. 
For Rorty, the most insightful political philosophy (his examples being Marx, Dewey and 
Rawls) is always parasitic on narratives of recent history. They designed their conceptual 
systems for critically engaging existing institutions with reference to a narrative of what 
has happened and where we might reasonably hope society will go in the future. In 
contrast, recent political thought, on his interpretation, is dominated by a turn away from 
such historical narratives toward theory and the philosophy of language. ‘This seems to 
me the result of a loss of hope – or, more specifically, of an inability to construct a 
plausible narrative of progress. A turn away from narration and utopian dreams toward 
philosophy seems to me a gesture of despair.’573 The intellectual turn to theory is a 
symptom of the loss of hope and its replacement with fear and resentment. Rorty’s specific 
concern here is with the role of theory in political action. Theory should not dictate action. 
It should only aid in formulating redescriptions of social phenomena once one “already 
knows what one wants.” Theory should not dictate or affect the direction of our politics. It 
should only help with a predefined path. It is a good servant but a bad master.  
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The key problem here is the role of philosophy. Rather than constructing large 
theoretical frameworks that undermine social and political organization on the whole and 
offer some new defining principle,574 Rorty emphasizes that philosophy’s task is 
experimental. While he commented on this notion frequently, his most focused treatment 
of this humbled role is found in a later essay focused on the role of the “future” in his 
politics of social hope. While consistently elusive, this concept is fundamental to his 
alternative basis for political change. In “Philosophy and the Future,”575 he argues that the 
future has replaced the eternal as the normative base of political thought. Philosophy 
began as an attempt to escape flux and access something permanent.576 This replacement 
is one of the dominant trends of modern philosophy which, unlike previous forms, “takes 
time seriously.” While Rorty fails to significantly clarify what this means, it seems to 
indicate a general acknowledgment of temporality and contingency. This dynamic has led 
philosophy to gradually replace the desire for knowledge of another world with hopes for 
the future of this world.577 This shift has led to a new task for philosophy. The shift to the 
future compromises the priority of contemplation over action. The loss of the eternal does 
not entail the death of philosophy; rather, only the contemplative image. Philosophy must 
turn to the world instead of away from it. It must engage in the contextual and contingent 
present situation. Thus, its agenda must be set by the present, not by the eternal.578  
The important issue when assessing Rorty’s mandate that philosophy turn to the 
present is the manner in which he situates philosophical thinking in relation to that 
present. Philosophy responds to social and cultural changes. It addresses, ‘the need to 
replace a human self-image which had been made obsolete by social and cultural change 
with a new self-image, a self-image better adapted to the results of those changes.’579 For 
Rorty, such changes necessitate new descriptions and new languages within which to 
understand ourselves. In a telling line Rorty comments, ‘Only a society without politics—
that is to say, a society run by tyrants who prevent social and cultural change from 
occurring—would no longer require philosophers.’580 Politics is social and cultural change 
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and philosophy is reinterpreting ourselves in light of those changes. Drawing on Dewey, 
Rorty emphasizes that this role is prompted by conflict between inherited institutions and 
contemporary tendencies. This Hegelian role for philosophy makes it a reaction, and hence 
parasitic on, contemporary developments. Rather than a vanguard, it should ‘mediate 
between the past and the future.’ Philosophy must, ‘weave together old beliefs and new 
beliefs, so that these can cooperate rather than interfere with one another.’581 This 
imperative particularizes philosophy. It deploys it against particular problems that arise in 
particular situations; specifically, in contexts where past understandings and the present 
situation are in conflict.   
Importantly, there are several consequences of this understanding of philosophy’s 
relation to social and political change. First, philosophy loses the avant-garde and becomes 
an under-labourer, ‘clearing away the rubbish of the past in order to make room for the 
constructions of the future.’582 However, Rorty does note, in addition to this, philosophy 
can also be prophetic. It can offer visions of the future. Despite the title of this essay, he is 
noticeable reticent about what this entails; what function the future and such visions have. 
Here, philosophy seems to be mostly reactive to what has already occurred while still also 
dreaming into the future. This ambiguity will be clarified subsequently. Presently, it is 
important to emphasize the other effects of this role for philosophy. For Rorty, it (which 
takes philosophy away from the eternal) invalidates the distinction between science and 
ideology.583 Such a distinction, along with the distinction between a posterori and a priori, 
is an attempt to make philosophy autonomous; to accord it a distinct and clear area of 
culture within which it has a unique task. For Rorty, these distinctions assume for it a 
method or unique access it cannot justify.584 They are symptoms of two temptations in 
philosophy that should be avoided: Analytic professionalism and non-Anglophone 
radicalism. The latter, which is our concern here, is based on the premises Rorty criticizes 
in his account of “radical thought” addressed in Ch. 4. Instead of repeating this, he argues 
that philosophy should be oriented towards a liberal and democratic cosmopolitanism. 
This utopian tradition, as discussed above, ignores cultural traditions in political decisions. 
Forming such a society for Rorty requires the “gradual and gentle and piecemeal” 
persuasion of other groups to similarly ignore the distinctions between them and others. 
Philosophers can provide the contingent and contextual languages to do this in each 
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specific case. ‘In a thoroughly temporalized intellectual world, one in which hopes for 
certainty and changelessness have disappeared altogether, we philosophers would define 
ourselves as servants of that sort of freedom, as servants of democracy.’585 The philosophy 
of the future is still pragmatic. It is a piecemeal project of the expansion of pragmatic 
democracy. The question now is what is at the basis of this conception. Why be pragmatic 
and future-oriented? 
In a review symposium on Charles’s Taylor’s Sources of the Self, Rorty argues for a 
central political role for his notion of social hope. In that book Taylor both identifies a 
tension within modernity between moral universalism and romance, specifically between 
the social demands of equality within the former and the desire to differentiate oneself in 
the latter, and argues that this tension indicates the insufficiency of moral motivation in 
modernity and its eschewal of substantive goods. Responding to these claims, Rorty 
argues that Taylor fails to see a possible reconciliation between these two aspects; one 
that addresses the problem of motivation and grounding. He fails to see the possibility of a 
non-reductive naturalism and a socially oriented liberalism. For Rorty, this reconciliation 
(achieved in pragmatic liberalism) can provide the political grounding (or “hypergood”) 
Taylor desires.  
‘This is to say that human beings are, indeed, self-interpreting beings, and 
consequently not Cartesianly apparent, while insisting that their self-
interpretations are at their best when they are social... Why should not the social 
creative imagination be a hypergood? ... [Why cannot] The Glorious Social Future, 
the one in which the procedural morality of the Enlightenment has made possible 
the spiritual flourishing of everyone rather than just the happy few, do the work 
that God, or some other version of The Objectively Existent Good, used to do?586’ 
In spite of the tensions Taylor identifies in modernity, politics can be grounded in our 
capacity to hope and imagine. For Rorty, centring our politics on our ability to imagine 
visions of our society different and better than the present reconciles moral universalism 
and romantic differentiation. It allows us to dream a collective and glorious social future 
which acts as a normative and critical standard against the present.587 Further, it resolves 
the motivational deficit within Modernity and liberalism and the eschewal of substantive 
goods that Rorty supports. It is important to note that, for him, pragmatic proceduralism is 
the frame and condition of possibility of imagining that glorious social future. Rorty’s 
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reconciliation takes the shape of a pragmatic procedural universalism providing for the 
possibility of romantic and creative individual expression.588  
The strength of Rorty’s account here is the novelty of its response to a genuine 
philosophical problem. Given the lack of foundations for political thought, how do we 
justify social criticism and political change? Rorty identifies within the philosophical 
tradition a shift from knowledge to hope; from an analysis of what must be to what could 
be. The weakness is in the results. As illustrated below, Rorty formalizes the existing 
liberal method of change. Further, rather than providing for free development, this mode 
of thought circumscribes thinking to its own categories and the limited world they reveal. 
Marcuse provides the theoretical framework to expose this. Rorty’s concrete reading of 
the New Left and consequent reformist politics illustrates this circumscription.  
THE UN IVE RSE OF  TH OU GH T:  MA RCU SE A ND THE  C I RCU MSC RIP TI ON OF THIN KI N G  
In what way might Rorty’s philosophy and politics constrain thought? How does the 
relation he draws between the two prevent genuine critical thinking in either? Up to this 
point, the Heideggerian critique of Modernity and technology as mastery has offered the 
resources for immanent critiques of Rorty’s pragmatism and liberalism. Within the former, 
a hidden dynamic of mastery has been identified. In the latter, a series of distinctions and 
exclusions have been revealed. However, such criticisms have not connected in detail, 
other than suggestively, the exclusions in Rorty’s philosophy and those in his politics. In 
order to expose these connections, which as aforementioned contradict Rorty’s own 
account of the relation between his pragmatism and liberalism,589 this thesis will now turn 
to the work of Herbert Marcuse. Marcuse provides a unique opportunity to critically 
assess Rorty’s liberalism. While illustrating the former’s critical framework, this section 
will highlight how it exposes the connections between Rorty’s mastery and its limitation of 
thought, and his liberalism and its limitation of critical political thinking. While Marcuse’s 
work has suffered from both a harsh critical reception and eventual dismissal,590 I argue 
that its value is in its extension of the Heideggerian critique of technology (and modernity) 
as mastery by identifying how the mechanism of veiling functions within the intellectual, 
social and political practices of advanced technological society. In revealing these 
procedures, he provides a (implicit) holistic criticism of Rorty’s philosophy and politics 
                                                 
588 Rorty, “On Ethnocentrism” op cit. p.206-7 
589 See Ch.2 and; Rorty, Richard. “Response to Ernesto Laclau” in Deconstruction and Pragmatism (ed. Chantal 
Mouffe). London, UK: Routledge, 1996. p.73 
590 My use of Marcuse’s work will be clarified below. This section is not a wholesale endorsement of his theory, 
but a qualified usage of a dynamic within his work.  
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and its circumscription of thought. Further, Marcuse’s critical framework takes precisely 
the perspective that Rorty rejects. Thus, the former’s work becomes both an ideal critical 
voice on Rorty’s philosophy and a contradiction of Rorty’s critique of radical thought591. 
Through an ontological critique of mastery Marcuse illustrates how a set of intellectual 
and material conditions can serve to constrain political thinking and action. This section 
identifies the intellectual conditions he outlines and how they are connected to both 
Rorty’s liberalism and his politics of future hope.  
Reading Marcuse: Heidegger and The Question of Essence 
While there may be several elements to focus on in any reading of Marcuse, including: 
Hegel, Marx, Freud, and Critical Theory,592 this thesis will only focus on the Heideggerian 
dimension to his theory. Correspondingly, while Marcuse’s work can by no means be 
reduced to the ontological (having complex empirical, material and psychoanalytic 
elements), that aspect will also be emphasized here. This section will argue that there is a 
lasting connection between Heidegger and Marcuse’s philosophies. Specifically, that 
beyond the usual connection made between the Heidegger of Being and Time and 
Marcuse’s early attempt at a phenomenological Marxism, there is a common philosophical 
analysis between Heidegger’s critique of modernity as technological enframing and 
Marcuse’s critique of advanced technological society.593 They both reveal an ontological 
circumscription of thought in technology and a corresponding mechanism of veiling that 
obscures the partiality of the technological perspective. Marcuse, importantly, extends this 
analysis to a concrete critique of how this veiling prevents critical political thinking.   
There is a tendency among commentators on Marcuse to situate his work entirely in 
its social-historical context. Beginning his academic career in inter-war Germany during 
epistemological crises in both Marxist theory and German philosophy594 and an unstable 
political and economic climate, his work is often interpreted as reflective of these 
pressures.595 Specifically, it is understood as an attempt to epistemologically justify Marx’s 
                                                 
591 This critique is fundamental to his limitation of critical thinking in liberalism. See Ch.4, 
592 The range of Marcuse’s work is a significant obstacle to understanding his thought as a whole. See; 
“Introduction” in Marcuse, Critical Theory and the Promise of Utopia (eds. Robert Pippin, Andrew Feenberg, 
Charles Webel). London, UK: Macmillan Education Ltd, 1988. p.xi 
593 While some of Marcuse’s early work is discussed to frame his relation to Heidegger, this chapter focuses on 
One-Dimensional Man, The Essay on Liberation and “Repressive Tolerance”. These works only span five out of 
Marcuse’s forty-year career. Thus, should not be interpreted as representing his whole thought.  
594 For an account of these crises and Marcuse, see; Wolin, Richard and John Abromeit. “Introduction: What is 
Heideggerian Marxism?” in Heideggerian Marxism (eds. Richard Wolin and John Abromeit). London, UK: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2005.  
595 See Douglas Kellner’s Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism. London, UK: Macmillan, 1984. Kellner 
argues for reading Marcuse’s work as a response to the crisis within. For a condensed version, see; Kellner, 
Douglas. “Herbert Marcuse’s Reconstruction of Marxism” in Marcuse, Critical Theory and the Promise of Utopia 
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analyses of the dynamics of capitalism by connecting it to the phenomenological ontology 
of Heidegger’s Being and Time. In this project, Marcuse attempted to link Marxism 
(specifically The 1844 Manuscripts596) to Heidegger, through their mutual emphasis on 
historicity, in a common critique of objectification (or reification in Marxist terms). Most of 
these analyses conclude that the Marxist side of Marcuse’s work was the dominant 
intellectual base of his philosophy.597 Further, they conclude that Marcuse correctly saw 
the failures of this project, especially after Heidegger’s turn to National Socialism (another 
historical explanation), and turned instead to Hegel.598   
This approach is explained by the legacy of Marcuse in subsequent philosophical 
debates. To be blunt, there is a common perception that his philosophy has not aged well; 
that it has fallen below the level of current philosophical debate.599 Ironically, this 
dismissal is similar to criticisms Rorty has received. Marcuse is criticized from ‘the right as 
a wholly negative or destructive critic, merely tearing down the achievements of modern 
culture, technology and economy, and by critics from the left as so full of positive promises 
of happiness as to be characterizable as “utopian,” nonprogrammatic, even romantic.’600 
Rejected by both, his work has fallen between the dominant schools of thought; 
specifically, critical theory and post-structuralism. In the former, there was a turn away 
from the critique of modern rationality (epitomized by Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse) 
and towards a reformulation of that rationality under Habermas.601 Marcuse never 
reversed his critique of pragmatism while Habermas drew on that movement in both his 
dialogical conception of reason and his justification of democracy. Regarding the latter, 
post-structuralism, the key difference is the linguistic turn. Marcuse consistently 
maintained a materialist understanding of subjectivity and never turned to language as a 
                                                                                                                                               
(eds. Robert Pippin, Andrew Feenberg, Charles Webel). London, UK: Macmillan Education Ltd, 1988. For 
another of this type of reading, see; Wolin, Richard. Heidegger’s Children. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2001. Ch.6.  
596 György Lukács’ attempt to revitalize the Marxist tradition was also fundamental to this project. See his, 
History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics (trans. Rodney Livingstone). London, UK: Merlin 
Press, 1971. For an account of Lukács and Marcuse’s, see; Feenberg, Andrew. Heidegger and Marcuse: The 
Catastrophe and Redemption of History. Oxon, OX: Routledge, 2005. Ch.4. See also; Goldmann, Lucien. Lukács 
and Heidegger: Towards a New Philosophy (trans. William Q. Boelhower). London, UK: Routledge, 1977.  
597 Wolin, Heidegger’s Children, op cit. p.135 
598 Abromeit, John. “Herbert Marcuse’s Critical Encounter with Martin Heidegger” in Herbert Marcuse: A 
Critical Reader (ed. John Abromeit and W. Mark Cobb). London, UK: Routledge, 2004. See also; Marcuse, 
Herbert. “Heidgger’s Politics: An Inteview” in Heideggerian Marxism, op cit. pp.165-6 
599 Feenberg, Heidegger and Marcuse, op cit. p.132 
600 Pippin, Robert Andrew Feenberg, Charles Webel. “Introduction” in Marcuse, Critical Theory and the Promise 
of Utopia, op cit. p.xiii 
601 Key to this Habermas’ “Technology and Science as “Ideology” in Toward a Rational Society (trans. J..J. 
Shapiro). Boston, Mass: Beacon Press, 1970. See also; Gandesha, S. “Marcuse, Habermas and the Critique of 
Technology” ” in Herbert Marcuse: A Critical Reader, op cit. For a general account of the Habermasian turn in 
Critical Theory, see; Kompridis, Nikolas. Critique and Disclosure: Critical Theory Between Past and Future. 
London, UK: MIT Press, 2006. Ch.1 
  
207  CH.5:  T H E  F U T U R E  O F  S O C I A L  H O P E  
 
basis for philosophy. Further, connected to this project, he continued his attempt to 
rethink Marxism in light of the changing conditions of the 20th century while post-
structuralism generally turned away from social theory and emancipatory politics.602  
The result of this situation is a lack of attention to Marcuse’s work outside of 
understanding it as a reflection of his various social-political contexts. While this historical 
approach has validity, clarifying Marcuse’s questions, it remains descriptive and uncritical. 
It contradicts his imperatives and philosophical method to focus on the current material 
context and dialectically update our concepts as the changing circumstances require. 
Instead, this chapter approaches his work philosophically. It examines it in terms of its 
relevance to contemporary philosophical questions (particularly as they relate to Rorty) 
and its use therein. In both this approach and the emphasis on the ontological dimension 
of Marcuse’s thought, the work of Andrew Feenberg is significant. Feenberg attempts to 
formulate a critical theory capable of responding to what, for him, is the fundamental 
problem of contemporary democracy, ‘the survival of agency in this increasingly 
technocratic universe.’603 In order to achieve this, he develops the critiques of technology 
initiated by Heidegger and others (primarily: Marcuse and Foucault604) in order to 
democratize technology. With this aim, in Heidegger and Marcuse: The Catastrophe and 
Redemption of History,605 he establishes the fundamental philosophical connections 
between these two figures. 
Against convention, Feenberg argues for deep philosophical connections between 
Heidegger and Marcuse beyond the latter’s early attempt to formulate a Heideggerian 
Marxism.606 He argues that, in spite of his self-declared rejection of Heidegger, Marcuse 
continues to address questions drawn from the former’s ontological problematic. It is 
these basic questions that structure both of their projects and create the potential for a 
critical stance on the present. I argue here, extending an analysis Feenberg begins, that it is 
in this sense that Marcuse continues the analysis of technology and modernity as veiling 
addressed in Heidegger’s work (see Chs.2 and 3). Marcuse reveals how the contemporary 
universe of thought circumscribes critical perspectives on itself while obscuring this very 
                                                 
602 Abromeit, John and W. Mark Cobb. “Introduction” in Herbert Marcuse: A Critical Reader, (ed. John Abromeit 
and W. Mark Cobb) London, UK: Routledge, 2004.  pp.15-6 
603 Feenberg, Andrew. Questioning Technology. London, UK: Routledge, 1999. p.101 
604 This may raises questions as to why Marcuse, whose work is problematic at times, has been employed in 
this context instead of Foucault. While this issue is addressed below, I will say that Marcuse’s analysis has been 
chosen because of the specific dynamic of veiling that he develops from Heidegger and its relevance to a 
critique of Rorty.   
605 See also Feenberg’s; “Heidegger and Marcuse: The Catastrophe and Redemption of History” in Herbert 
Marcuse: A Critical Reader, op cit. And; “The Bias of Technology” in Marcuse, Critical Theory and the Promise of 
Utopia op cit. 
606 An exhaustive account of these early essays is beyond the scope of this section. For an introduction and 
collection of these works, see; Marcuse, Heideggerian Marxism op cit.  
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process through a particular revealing of social being. In order to illustrate this, it is 
necessary to both follow some of Feenberg’s argument and move well beyond the, 
admittedly problematic, relationship he establishes between these two thinkers.607 
For Feenberg, in spite of Marcuse’s break with Heidegger,608 they share a project to 
recover the notion of techné for the modern world; they have a utopian demand, in light of 
similar critiques of technology, to redeem modern technology through recovering 
something from the ancient understanding of production. Neither desires a simple return 
to the Greek model, rather, only the incorporation of something lost to overcome the 
domination inherent within the modern technological horizon. To this end, Feenberg gives 
a reading of the basic question of Greek philosophy. The Greeks posed the question of 
being from the perspective that humans are primarily labouring beings engaged in 
transforming their environment. This assumption structures the entire history of Western 
philosophy and its core distinctions. First, there is the distinction between nature (physis) 
and practical activity (poiésis). The former is that which creates itself while the latter 
covers all things that are the product of human activity. Techné refers to the knowledge 
that governs a particular form of poiésis (e.g. medicine is a techné aimed at the human 
practice, poiésis, of healing the sick). Importantly, for the Greeks, techné is objective. It is 
the correct way to achieve the end it is put to (poiésis). Second, there is the distinction 
between essence and existence. The latter refers to whether a thing is or not. The former 
refers to what the thing is. The problem, especially in the modern conception that 
Heidegger and Marcuse criticize and Rorty lauds, arises in the relation between these two 
distinctions; specifically, in the concept of techné. As aforementioned, techné has an 
objective sense. Each techné contains the essence of the thing to be created which is 
independent of its actual existence. This essence already contains a purpose. Thus, when 
humans create, they act according to a plan and for a purpose which is independent of 
them. However, for the Greeks, this dynamic of essence and existence also occurs in 
nature. Physis contains essential forms which are independent of and determine existence. 
In this manner, Greek thought understood both physis and poiésis (i.e. all being) according 
to this dynamic between essence and existence in techné.609  
The obvious problems with understanding nature in terms of essence and existence 
led to the Modern rejection of this distinction. Modernity, represented by Descartes and 
Bacon for Feenberg, correctly criticizes the Greeks for treating their own social 
                                                 
607 Feenberg is aware that in bringing them together, he does violence to each of these thinkers. See; 
“Heidegger and Marcuse: The Catastrophe and Redemption of History,” op cit. p.70 
608 See, Wolin and Abromeit. “Introduction: What is Heideggerian Marxism?” op cit. p.xxvi 
609 Feenberg, Heidegger and Marcuse, op cit. pp.6-7 
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conventions as essences (i.e. for treating their particular understandings of the purpose of 
human and natural creations as immutable). However, like Rorty, they move from this to a 
rejection of the language of essence in general. They are not concerned with what 
something is but how it works. Importantly, there is still continuity in this shift. Modernity, 
like Greek philosophy, understands being in terms of technology (production). The latter 
has just shifted.610 Modernity is defined by the rejection of the essence-existence 
distinction. This culminates in the anti-essentialism that has been discussed throughout 
this thesis in both Rorty’s philosophy and politics.  
The rejection of essence leads to the assumption of the neutrality, or lack of values, 
within modern technology. Modern technology does not realize objective essences within 
nature; it is merely instrumental. As a means toward purely subjective ends, it is 
mechanistic rather than teleological. This view alters the understanding of reason. Reason 
is only about means, not ends. It is not about discovering something’s intrinsic purpose, 
but controlling it for human purposes. Similarly, in Rorty’s anti-authoritarian pragmatism, 
we are only subject to human ends. Rationality can only have a procedural sense. After 
philosophical foundations, ‘we shall identify the rational with the procedures.’611 For 
Modernity in general, means and ends are radically separated. The neutrality of 
technology with respect to ends implies that it is also neutral in terms of culture. In 
serving whatever ends it may be applied to, technology is the most effective means 
irrespective of one’s other substantive values.612 It is thus universal in the same manner 
Rorty argues liberal institutions are. It is the source of the hidden claim to pragmatic 
(philosophical) and liberal (political) neutrality revealed in Ch.4.  
Heidegger and Marcuse’s critiques of modern technological civilization are prompted 
by this claim to neutrality. While they agree that the Greek understanding of essential 
forms within nature was deeply problematic, they dispute the value-neutrality of 
technology. Further, they both reveal an obscured dynamic of veiling within this claim: 
Heidegger in the basic ontological determination of the modern West, and Marcuse within 
the circumscribed universe of thought in advanced liberalism.  
As discussed in Chs.2 and 3, Heidegger critiques the circumscription of thinking in 
modernity. This account, which revealed the modern determination of Being in terms of a 
standing-reserve and the modern disposition as a challenging-forth, identified the central 
mechanism of technology, veiling. Enframing (the ontological determination of modernity 
as technology) obscures its own partiality. It veils the veil in a claim to instrumental 
                                                 
610 Ibid. p.12 
611 Rorty, Richard. “Habermas, Derrida, and the Functions of Philosophy” in TP, p.309 
612 Feenberg, “The Bias of Technology”, op cit. p.229 
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neutrality.613 For Feenberg, this analysis presumes the aforementioned distinction 
between Greek techné and modern technology. Heidegger’s critique of technology rethinks 
the Greek conception of essence. The Greeks understood essence as what endures through 
change. Instead, Heidegger thinks essence as revealing. Revealing, which grants an entire 
world to humanity, is the ultimate essence from which we can think a particular 
determination of Being (in this case, Modernity). This is the distinctness of the ontological 
perspective. It creates the capacity to view the bounds and presumptions of our own 
thinking. It allows us to see that we always know things as something because of a prior 
revealing; that before knowledge, even social and contingent knowledge, there is 
limitation in a revealing.614 Rorty emphasizes similar limitations in the contingency of 
language and the priority of the social. However, he falls into the modern determination by 
focusing solely on the human relation and its role in the production of knowledge. He does 
not see how a set of presumptions always limit any ontological determination, even one 
premised on the finitude, contingency, and socially situated nature of humanity. Feenberg 
offers an insightful reconstruction of Heidegger’s argument, one that exceeds its source, 
which clarifies this issue. In his interpretation, for Heidegger, the Greeks correctly 
identified the importance of being as the source of meaning. The moderns ignored this but 
correctly saw the importance of the human being in its essential activity. Neither saw 
both.615 Heidegger seeks to correct this by developing a perspective, necessarily outside 
the language of the present, that reveals Being. It reveals the inevitability of an essential 
dimension and the necessary shifting ground of essence. 
It is in this sense that Heidegger reaffirms a distinction between the “True” and the 
“correct.”616 As discussed in Ch. 3, Truth for Heidegger is the recognition of revealing as 
the essential dimension. The ontological perspective asks the question of Being (essence). 
The essential is the aspect of a thing that covers its relation to Being in general. Thus, to 
question something, or Being in general, is to question it apart from its mode of revealing 
within a specific determination of Being (e.g. the natural, common-sense, or 
anthropological attitudes).617 Thus, the distinction between true and correct is not about 
factuality. It is the difference between two manners of revealing. The ontological 
perspective is aimed at truth. Truth is the revealing of revealing, it does not lift the veil but 
                                                 
613 Heidegger, Martin. “The Question Concerning Technology” in The Question Concerning Technology and Other 
Essays (trans. William Lovitt). London, UK: Garland Publishing Inc, 1977. p.25  
614 Feenberg, Heidegger and Marcuse, op cit. p.37 
615 Ibid. p.44 
616 This distinction is similar to the distinction between Being and beings for Heidegger. It is the forgetting of 
this distinction in philosophy that is the central object of Heidegger’s critique of that entire tradition. See; 
Pattinson, George. The Later Heidegger. London, UK: Routledge, 2000. pp.35-6 
617 De Beistegui, Miguel Heidegger and the Political. London, UK: Routledge, 1998. pp.9, 37 
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only reveals its operation. Thus, truth, contra Rorty, is not about correspondence. Truth is 
the inevitability of determination. It is freeing awareness of the limitation of present 
thinking, ‘seeing the veil as what veils.’618 This perspective’s relevance to politics is 
specific. Neither Heidegger nor Marcuse suggested that all political thinking must be 
ontological. Rather, the claim is merely that it is a necessary dimension of critical political 
thought. Marcuse, notably, blends several other critical frameworks with it. Thus, neither 
of these thinkers entirely rejects the correct, instrumental thinking of modernity. Its 
weakness is that it is entirely internal to modernity. It is limited by that intellectual 
horizon and does not, like Heidegger’s ontological account, gesture beyond that 
framework. In this sense, the instrumental account is uncritical. It does not attempt to 
exceed the terms of the determination in which it occurs.619 While Rorty seems to 
acknowledge this need in his understanding of vocabularies, he does not provide for its 
realization. In rejecting the concept of truth and the appearance-reality distinction, he 
obscures the veil and compromises critical thought.  
When thought is oriented to Truth, it can critically gesture beyond the current, 
historical determination. Further, a mere consciousness of essence is not sufficient. Unlike 
modernity, the Greeks had an understanding of essence. However, they did not question 
the essences they attributed to things; their revealing and its limitations. As Feenberg 
notes, ‘That question, the question of being, can only occur where the very concept of 
essence is in question.’620 Modernity did overcome the Greeks and their lack of an 
understanding of the human involvement in revealing. However, it does this by entirely 
rejecting the question of being and essence and assuming the total determination of the 
“is” by human thought. Heidegger reveals that the modern rejection of the distinction 
between essence and existence (true and correct) constitutes its veil. This mechanism is 
its veiling of the critical (ontological) dimension of thought. Marcuse extends this by 
illustrating how the distinction between true essence and merely correct, or reality and 
appearance, provides the philosophical resources for radical political criticism at its 
widest. Unlike Marcuse, Heidegger never gives the concept of essence truly critical, 
political force.621 Freedom for him is only seeing the veil as what veils. For Marcuse, it is 
thinking a politics beyond that veil. Thus, to reveal the limitations of Rorty’s liberalism, it 
is necessary to turn to Marcuse’s work and his critique of the universe of liberal thought. 
                                                 
618 As discussed in Ch.3, the ontological perspective’s revelation of the present is fundamentally freeing for 
Heidegger. As discussed below, Marcuse too construes freedom in this critical, ontological manner.  
619 Feenberg, Heidegger and Marcuse, 2005. p.25  
620 Ibid. p.39 
621 Ibid. p.17 
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From Heidegger to Marcuse: Politicizing Essence 
By establishing ontological questioning on a distinction between reality and 
appearance (essence and existence), Heidegger initiates a critical intellectual framework. 
By identifying the lack of this distinction in modernity, he reveals the mechanism of the 
veil and the manner in which mastery occurs in modernity. Marcuse extends this analysis 
in the critique of advanced technological society. He identifies the common assumptions of 
mastery in both the intellectual framework and the socio-political structures of modern 
liberalism.622 Further, he reveals the contemporary universe of thought and how the 
modern mechanism of veiling limits forms of thinking that transcend that universe. In One-
Dimensional Man (hereafter: ODM) and other works, he illustrates this liberal universe of 
thought and the manner in which it excludes non-liberal forms of thinking. This section 
will illustrate this analysis in relation to the Heideggerian problematic of modernity as 
technology and the mechanism of veiling discussed above. This will establish a framework 
within which to understand the limitations of Rorty’s philosophy and politics. Marcuse 
illustrates how real political change requires the conditions for transcending the current 
universe of thinking. Further, he reveals how Rorty’s pragmatic limitation of politics gelds 
critical thought and prevents substantial change.    
Before addressing this analysis in detail, it is necessary to illustrate the connection 
between Heidegger and Marcuse’s critiques of technology.623 For Feenberg, Marcuse, like 
Heidegger, is responding to the claim for the neutrality of technology in modernity. This is 
the understanding that technology is neutral with respect to both ends and its context (i.e. 
its cultural-historical-political environment).624 Instead, both claim: first, that technology 
contains hidden values and assumptions; second, that it offers a circumscribed revelation 
of existence; and finally, the claim to neutrality therein is particular to modernity. 
However, Marcuse goes well beyond Heidegger. For him, the problem with the claim to the 
neutrality of technology is not only that it is a particular determination of reality that veils 
the nature of being as concealment/unconcealment. It has more concrete socio-political 
effects. In both its intellectual and material aspects, technology and the claim to neutrality 
tend toward domination. As discussed above and in Ch. 3, Heidegger does argue that in 
                                                 
622 Two caveats are necessary. First, due to the need for brevity, only the former of these two will be focused 
upon. Nonetheless, it should be understood that Marcuse’s critique has material, as well as psychological, 
dimensions. For accounts of these, see: Schmidt, Alfred. “Existential Ontology and Historical Materialism in the 
Work of Herbert Marcuse” and Hyman, Edward J. “Eros and Freedom: The Critical Psychology of Herbert 
Marcuse” in Marcuse, Critical Theory and the Promise of Utopia (eds. Robert Pippin, Andrew Feenberg, Charles 
Webel). London, UK: Macmillan Education Ltd, 1988. Second, Marcuse’s analysis of advanced technological 
society is not confined to liberalism. He identifies the same mechanisms in Soviet communism. However, the 
focus here is on the former as this is s applicable to Rorty.  
623 While many have taken this for granted, few critics have explored these connections in any depth.  
624 Feenberg, “The Bias of Technology”, op cit. pp.229-30 
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technology all of being, including humanity, is drawn into standing-reserve; that all things 
become a means. However, his concern is solely ontological. It is with the forgetting of 
being, an inauthentic existence. This is another form of the separation of philosophy and 
politics. While acknowledging they are interwoven, Heidegger separates the two in 
making politics subordinate to philosophy. Rorty merely reverses this in the priority of 
democracy to philosophy. Comparatively, Marcuse understands the interrelation of the 
political and the philosophical. For him, modern technological liberalism is characterized 
by a simultaneous intellectual and political circumscription of critical thought.  
It is important to emphasize Heidegger’s contribution to Marcuse’s analysis. These 
two thinkers share a common understanding of the contrast between Greek and modern 
technology and common critique of the latter’s lack of a notion of essence. In fact, the 
specifically Heideggerian aspect of Marcuse’s work is his notion of the two dimensions of 
society which politicizes the ontological difference between essence and existence. 
However, while the concept of essence for Heidegger is about ontological revealing, in 
Marcuse it is about the capacity for critical truth in general. It gains a normative 
dimension. What is lost in modernity for Marcuse is the difference between two 
dimensions of being, the ideal and the real. This is, ‘the notion that what is is fraught with 
tension between its empirical reality and it potentialities.’625 This is the basic ontological 
point that within the present, there is direction, tendencies and limitation. Like Rorty, 
modernity rejects this idea of tension and the language of essence and potentiality. It aims 
only at quantifying, classifying, and controlling. For it, there is no tension between true 
and false being and thus no difference between a preference and a potentiality inherent to 
the thing. The empirically observed thing becomes the extent of the real. This limitation is 
why technology is neutral. In the perspective of bare empirical reality, technology can be 
put to any ends. The telos of ancient technology is replaced with subjective choice. 
Essential potentialities and subjective choice are collapsed in modernity.626 In its anti-
essentialism, modernity limits the range of questioning and thought.    
Despite the strengths of Feenberg’s work, there is a lacking in his connection of 
Marcuse and Heidegger.627 For him, the former exceeds the latter’s contribution in the 
                                                 
625 Feenberg, Heidegger and Marcuse, op cit. pp.86-7 
626 Rorty goes further in this limitation by making all access to that real entirely social and linguistic. He 
exacerbates this tendency within modernity.  
627 Feenberg’s work is not without its own critics. While his project of rethinking the conditions of modern 
technology has met with enthusiasm, his attempt to read Heidegger and Marcuse together has been received 
more harshly. Iain Thompson accuses him of misreading Heidegger’s project in criticizing the latter for 
technological essentialism. In a very perceptive review essay, Ian Angus argues that Feenberg’s attempt to 
reconcile the Heideggerian and Marxist projects of Marcuse’s work through recourse to a Hegelian notion of 
revolutionary reversal ultimately fails. For him, in spite of the persistence of phenomenological themes within 
Marcuse’s work, these two projects cannot stand together. See: Thomson, Iain. “From the Question Concerning 
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theorization of a utopian alternative to modern technological society.628 While he is 
correct, Marcuse develops this much further, Feenberg fails to explore how Marcuse’s 
analysis of technology and its dynamic of veiling exceed and extend Heidegger’s account. 
He ignores how Marcuse’s analysis of advanced technological liberalism reveals that 
frame’s restricted political thinking.629 Marcuse politicizes Heidegger’s identification of the 
mechanism of veiling. This addition is partially explained by the former’s context. As a 
member of the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory Marcuse was concerned with the failure 
of 20th century Leftist movements. In his words, this school confronted the following 
question. ‘What, however, if the development outlined by that theory [Marxism] does not 
occur? What if the forces that were to bring about the transformation are suppressed and 
appear to be defeated?’630 This is the problem of Critical Theory. Its resulting task is to 
make social relations appear in a new light; to expose new aspects of its critical object. 
While Marcuse’s focus and sources shifted throughout his career, this question and task 
are the unity of his work.631 However, whatever the cause, the result is that his thought 
consistently focuses on the material, political situation. As Habermas observed, the 
essential difference between Heidegger and Marcuse is that while Heidegger remains on 
the level of ontological abstraction, concerned mainly with the revelation of being, 
Marcuse links ontological structures to concrete processes.632 With this turn, he develops 
the normative centre of freedom around which the critique of technology is premised. He 
offers a detailed description of how an ontological mechanism of veiling circumscribes our 
universe of thought and action in contemporary liberalism; how the manner in which we 
                                                                                                                                               
Technology to the Quest for a Democratic Technology: Heidegger, Marcuse, Feenberg” in Inquiry, 43, 2000. 
And; Angus, Ian. “Walking on Two Legs: On the Very Possibility of a Heideggerian Marxism” in Human Studies, 
28 (3), 2005. It is important to note that my own use of Marcuse and connection of him to Heidegger is 
unaffected by this criticism. The present chapter does not utilize Marcuse’s re-grounding of the (Marxist) 
emancipatory project within a logic of negation. Rather, it only illustrates how his critical perspective reveals 
the limitations and the internal mechanism of veiling within Rorty’s thinking.  
628 This alternative and the problematic manner in which Marcuse identifies the conditions for its realization 
are not the focus here. While some of this material will be briefly addressed below, Marcuse’s work is utilized 
here for his critical ontological analysis of the circumscription of thinking with contemporary liberalism. While 
these two aspects cannot be absolutely divorced, it is the premise of this chapter that they can be dissociated 
for the purposes of this argument.  
629 In spite of Feenberg’s rigorous examination of the relationship between Heidegger and Marcuse, he never 
exposes the political implications of “The Question Concerning Technology,” nor the explicit dynamic of 
veiling, identified in Chs.2&3 and elaborated on here. He hints at the importance of essence in both but fails to 
draw out the consequences.  
630 Marcuse, Herbert. “Philosophy and Critical Theory” in Negations: Essays in Critical Theory. London, UK: 
Mayfly Books, 2009. p.142 . 
631 Pippin et al. “Introduction” in Marcuse, Critical Theory and the Promise of Utopia, op cit. pp.xi-xii 
632 Habermas, Jürgen. “Psychic Thermidor and the Rebirth of Rebellious Subjectivity” in Marcuse, Critical 
Theory and the Promise of Utopia op cit. p.7 – This argument is particularly illustrated by both Marcuse’s early 
essays republished in the Heideggerian Marxism volume and the introduction to One-Dimensional Man where 
he indicates the empirical studies central to his ideas. See especially: Marcuse, Herbert. One-Dimensional Man. 
London, UK: Sphere Books Ltd, 1968. p.14 – (hereafter: ODM); Marcuse, Herbert. “On Concrete Philosophy” in 
Heideggerian Marxism op cit.  
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conceive politics is determined by a prior structuring of thinking in general. This occurs 
through several procedures: the loss of the distinction between appearance (given) and 
reality (possible), the dominance of a “total empiricism” and the generalization and 
homogenization of science, and the unification of opposites. These mechanisms, which are 
discussed below, result in the circumscription of the intellectual universe to the liberal 
present.  
Marcuse’s Dimensions of Thought 
In ODM, Marcuse reveals how a set of intellectual and material conditions can serve to 
constrain political thinking and action.633 As discussed above, his work is intended as a 
critical confrontation with contemporary society’s tendency to contain social change that 
would produce new institutions, productive processes and modes of human existence. 
This containment is the unique achievement of contemporary technological liberalism. It 
is important to note, since some critics seem determined to ignore it,634 that Marcuse is 
very clear that he is only identifying a tendency within contemporary society. For him, his 
account vacillates, ‘throughout between two contradictory hypotheses: (1) that advanced 
industrial society is capable of containing qualitative change for the foreseeable future; (2) 
that forces and tendencies exist which may break this containment and explode the 
society.’635 He emphasizes that while the first tendency is dominant both are present. Such 
an ambiguous dynamic can be identified precisely because the explicit orientation of this 
analysis is on the level of totality. Technology is not treated as the sum-total of 
instruments but, ‘as a system which determines a priori the product of the apparatus as 
well as the operations of servicing and extending it.’636 It is a framing universe and a 
project which anticipates certain modes of conditioning humans and nature. Modern 
technological enframing constitutes only one of multiple historical alternatives. 
Nonetheless, it tends to exclusivity (to the marginalization of other approaches). 
Consequently, this technological universe of thought is a political universe where all things 
are approached as something to be transformed and organized. ‘As the project unfolds, it 
                                                 
633 Due to Feenberg’s weaknesses, I am not continuing his phenomenological reading of Marcuse. Rather, I 
connect between the later Heidegger and Marcuse’s through the world-disclosive aspects in understandings of 
totality.  
634 Alasdair MacIntyre’s critique of Marcuse is the most notable example. For him, in identifying the one-
dimensional nature of contemporary thinking, ODM fails to provide the possibility of its own critical stance on 
the present. Jeffrey Stout raises the obvious point that this criticism easily applies to both MacIntyre and all 
other social and political theory in general. See: MacIntyre, Alasdair, Herbert Marcuse: An Exposition and 
Polemic. New York, NY: Viking Press, 1970. p.70 -- and; Stout, Jeffrey. Democracy and Tradition. Woodstock, UK: 
Princeton University Press, 2004. p.121.   
635 Marcuse, ODM, p.13 
636 Ibid. p.13 
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shapes the entire universe of discourse and action, intellectual and material culture. In the 
medium of technology, culture, politics, and the economy merge into an omnipresent 
system which swallows up or repulses all alternatives… technological rationality has 
become political rationality.’637 For Marcuse, such an approach is inherently given to 
domination.  
In such a situation, for Marcuse, even democracy can constrain freedom and exclude 
alternative forms of political thinking. Assuming the contestability of all political concepts, 
he notes that in the contemporary period, the concept of liberty has lost its emancipatory 
function and become a force for the status quo. Freedom is not simply choice, the presence 
of a range of alternatives. Rather, it is defined by what can be chosen and what is chosen. 
The presence of choice loses its quality of freedom when the options are covertly 
circumscribed and presented as necessary. The ability to set this range, to determine the 
universe of options, is (one of) the dominant modes of control within technological 
liberalism. Further, this is an ontological operation. For example, the media does not 
simply control thought with particular messages and coverage. Rather, ‘The people enter 
this stage as preconditioned receptacles of longstanding; the decisive difference is in the 
flattening out of the contrast (or conflict) between the given and the possible.’638 This is 
the aforementioned tension necessary to critical thought; the ability to critique the 
present from outside the boundaries that it itself sets to thought. The distinction between 
appearance and reality is rethought in Marcuse as a distinction between the given 
(present) and the possible (future). Yet, this futurity is essentially different from Rorty’s. It 
is not a romantic imagination constrained by pragmatic procedures. The possible is a 
potentiality. It has a genuine aspect of reality. As such, it gains normative and critical force. 
Without it, the present is the only horizon of thought. Marcuse describes this as the power 
of modern technology, the ‘rational character of its irrationality.’639 Given the present 
universe of thinking, modern pragmatic liberalism is “correct.” Consequently, critical 
thought is pre-emptively disempowered.  
Critical political thought is eclipsed through the loss of a particular dimension of 
thinking; one explicitly opposed to the established, public, realm of thinking. Additionally, 
drawing on Freudian psychoanalytic theory, this “inner” dimension must be conceived as 
individual and opposed to the social. There is an unfortunate and problematic assumption 
in this otherwise insightful aspect of Marcuse’s thinking. He, like Rorty, assumes that all 
non-public thought is only individual. By also politicizing it, by making it the basis of 
                                                 
637 Marcuse, ODM, p.13 
638 Marcuse, ODM, p.24 
639 Ibid. p.24 
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critical social thought, he falls into the flaw that Yack and Rorty identified in Ch. 4 where 
socialization itself is understood as the limitation to be overcome and the social is 
conflated with conformism. In contrast, this thesis emphasizes that non-public thought is 
not necessarily individual but often collective. In fact, it is the marginalization of collective 
and systemic ways of conceiving our situation that is problematic in contemporary (and 
Rortian) liberalism.640 The result of the loss of the non-public, the mechanisms for which 
will be addressed subsequently, is the absorption of all thought into that dominant 
framework. Thought is homogenized and opposites unified. ‘In this process, the “inner” 
dimension of the mind in which opposition to the status quo can take root is whittled 
down. The loss of this dimension, in which the power of negative thinking –  the critical 
power of Reason – is at home is the ideological counterpart to the very material process in 
which advanced industrial society silences and reconciles the opposition.’641 For Marcuse, 
through the destruction of this faculty, ideology, the set of beliefs which reinforce the 
present universe, becomes objective. In contemporary liberalism, ideology comes to 
entirely coincide with its object. It is the circular reinforcement of the present horizon of 
conception. The consequence of this is a mode of life that explicitly militates against 
qualitative change; it is a pattern of “one-dimensional thought and behaviour” in which 
non-public ideas are rejected or reduced to the terms of this universe.  
The dominance of a one-dimensional manner of thinking arises with particular 
developments in the sciences. Operationalism in the physical and behaviourism in the 
social sciences are the two parts of a ‘total empiricism’ that governs thought. Concepts, 
ideas and forms of critique which cannot be represented within these modes are 
eliminated642 in favour of empirical accounts. All forms of thought which ‘transcend’ these 
terms, merely in the sense of employing criteria and notions outside of their universe of 
discourse, are rigorously excluded as ‘metaphysical.’ Operationalism here comes to serve 
as a process of containment. All events and ideas are reduced or translated into the given 
universe of facts and thought. It is important to note that the causation amongst various 
levels (e.g. intellectual, material, psychological and historical) is not strict or efficient in 
Marcuse’s thought. Instead, many factors arise together, which bear obvious relation 
without having a clear priority of causes. While the language of this section will often seem 
to imply that certain philosophical and intellectual developments have caused one-
                                                 
640 As a result, the following use of Marcuse elides this aspect. For an additional critique of this aspect of 
Marcuse’s work, see: Toscano, Alberto. “Liberation Technology: Marcuse’s Communist Individualism” in 
Situations: Project of the Radical Imagination, Vol. 3(1), 2009.   
641 Marcuse, ODM, p.26 – The role of the negative in Marcuse’s thought will be addressed below. See; Bernstein, 
Richard J. “Negativity: Theme and Variations” in Marcuse, Critical Theory and the Promise of Utopia, op cit. 
642 Recall Rorty’s strategy of eliminative materialism discussed in Ch.1.  
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dimensional thinking, it should be emphasized that on the level of a totality they can only 
be understood as concurrent and related conditions. They coexist within a larger and 
opaque dialectical totality. Marcuse himself notes this integration.  
‘With the gradual closing of this [critical] dimension by the society, the self-
limitation of thought assumes a larger significance. The interrelation between 
scientific-philosophical and societal processes, between theoretical and practical 
Reason, asserts itself “behind the back” of the scientists and philosophers. The 
society bars a whole type of oppositional operations and behaviour; consequently 
the concepts pertaining to them are rendered illusory or meaningless. Historical 
transcendence appears as metaphysical transcendence.’643  
A whole range of thought and modes of organization are blocked by the technological 
universe. Before addressing the underlying philosophical assumptions of this 
circumscription, this section will illustrate some of the effects of the loss of the critical 
dimension of thought.  
Much of ODM tracks the aforementioned dynamics into various aspects of existence 
(e.g. material/social reality, consciousness, and language). While these aspects are 
important to his analysis, it is the movement towards one-dimensionality in language that 
is specifically significant here. Fundamental to this aspect of Marcuse’s work is his notion 
of the universe of thought and discourse644 and it is the narrowing of language that most 
clearly illustrates the restriction of thought within the pragmatic liberal universe.645 The 
operationalism and behaviourism of pragmatic technological liberalism reveals a 
circumscribed universe. As a result, political questions can only be thought in particular, 
limited manners. Once again, Marcuse contrasts the language of one-dimensionality with 
genuine, critical thinking. For him, the language of total administration ‘testifies to 
identification and unification, to the systematic promotion of positive thinking and doing, 
to the concerted attack on transcendent, critical notions. In the prevailing modes of 
speech, the contrast appears between two-dimensional, dialectical modes of thought and 
technological behaviours and social “habits of thought.”’646 These habits of thought erase 
the tension between appearance and reality. What is lost in the operational and 
behaviouristic perspectives are the processes of mediation whereby facts are known; the 
understanding that concepts are involved in understanding facts and, in that sense, 
transcend them. Without such mediations, language identifies reason with fact, essence 
with existence, and the thing with its current use. Essentially, the future is bound by the 
                                                 
643 Marcuse, ODM, p.29 
644 These three areas of analysis (material/social, the psychological, and the linguistic) resonate with the 
positive avenues Rorty explores after metaphysics. Chs.2 and 3 were structured around language, naturalism 
and social practice, and historicism. For Marcuse, each of these spheres is constricted by one-dimensional 
thinking.  
645 Recall Connolly on political concepts in Ch.2 
646 Marcuse, ODM, pp.77-8 
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present. These identifications link the methodology of operationalism and the politics of 
social conformism. For Marcuse, what is lost is the space within language for the creation 
of new meaning. Operationalism defines the thing by its function and thereby identifies a 
concept entirely with a set of operations. Outside the explicit worlds of science and 
technology, and in politics, this logic leads to the concept being absorbed by the word. As a 
result, the former has no non-public and standardized meaning. While many things in our 
lives can be treated in this pragmatic manner, for Marcuse, politics should not be.  
‘The functionalization of language expresses an abridgement of meaning which has 
a political connotation. The names of things are not only “indicative of their 
manner of functioning,” but their (actual) manner of functioning also defines and 
“closes” the meaning of the thing, excluding other manners of functioning… it 
repels demonstration, qualification, negation of its codified meaning. At the nodal 
points of the universe of public discourse, self-validating, analytical propositions 
appear which function like magic-ritual formulas… they produce the effect of 
closing it within the circle of the conditions prescribed by the formula.’647 
By restricting language to the functional, political concepts are confined to a particular 
(current) interpretation. Thus, political language repeats the unification of opposites. The 
forces and meanings opposed to the present are domesticated and excluded. Further, the 
functionalization of language obscures the neutralization of other meanings. Concepts like 
freedom and equality, which are by their nature contested, are unified under one meaning 
from within the concept. Antagonism never appears and they are made immune from 
contradiction. 
The strength of the operational approach is its claim to concreteness and lack of 
metaphysical presuppositions. This focus contains the implicit claim to supersede the 
linguistic interpretation of the thing and achieve some more primal relation to it. For 
Marcuse, the very vocabulary and syntax of this language blocks differentiation. It blocks 
conceptual thinking which does not identify the thing and its function. There is nothing in 
principle illegitimate about this perspective. It may even be the correct way of proceeding 
in certain contexts. However, it also dissolves concepts into operations and excludes the 
intent behind such conceptual thinking. This intent is specifically to exceed the operational 
perspective; to see another dimension of being. For Marcuse, conceptual thinking, 
‘distinguishes that which the thing is from the contingent functions of the thing in the 
established reality.’648 This is the ontological perspective. In opposition, Rorty (and 
operational thinking) only wants to see that contingent, current function of a thing. The 
key distinction related to these features is the one between “is” and “ought” (essence and 
appearance, potentiality and actuality, negative and positive). In some form, this tension is 
                                                 
647 Ibid. p.79 
648 Marcuse, ODM, p.85 
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a necessary presupposition for critical political thinking; thinking that does not merely 
reinforce present dynamics. For Marcuse, these are genuine antagonistic categories, 
‘reality partakes of both of them.’649 Accordingly, these antagonisms are also historical. 
Operational rationality suppresses history. It suppresses the understanding of the future 
as the negation of the present.  It is important to note that genuine historical 
consciousness for Marcuse is not about understanding the contingency of the past up to 
the present but seeing that the future necessarily involves the negation of that present. 
Reality operates under the condition of history. Everything has a history and is subject to 
it.  
It is important to understand Marcuse’s view of concepts here. For him, concepts 
always exceed the immediate experience of their object. They are the result of a reflection 
which has understood the thing in the context of other things not present in the immediate 
experience of the concept and which explain it in some way. There is an excess of meaning 
in concepts due to their generality, to their attempt to exceed particular objects. This is a 
move towards universality. Concepts attempt to recast the particular thing in its universal 
condition and relation. They attempt to transcend its immediate appearance in favour of 
its reality.650 It is in this abstractness that the potential for a critical enquiry resides. At this 
point, Marcuse makes a distinction between cognitive and operational concepts. The 
former go beyond description of particular facts. In terms of society, they go beyond the 
particular context of facts and into the conditions that structure that society. ‘By virtue of 
their reference to this historical totality, cognitive concepts transcend all operational 
context, but their transcendence is empirical because it renders the facts recognizable as 
that which they really are.’651 This dimension of thought reveals the limitations of the 
operational description of experience. Operational thought has a false concreteness 
because it isolates thought from thinking the conditions of limitation which constitute the 
present reality. This is its political function. Operational thought analyses in terms of the 
present. It has a therapeutic652 function which attempts to adjust things to the present 
without leaving space for the conceptual critique of this situation. For Marcuse, the 
therapeutic character of operational thought is manifested in forms of research devoted to 
                                                 
649 Ibid. p.86 
650 Here, Marcuse seems to be referring to Hegel’s notion of wirklichkeit, where the actuality or reality of a 
thing denotes its fulfillment. In opposition to this, I am reading it here, in line with my general Heideggerian 
reading of Marcuse, as denoting the ontological aspect of a concept; its relation to the question of being and the 
manner in which this exceeds its present determination.  
651 Marcuse, ODM, p.92 
652 Recall, from Ch.1, Rorty’s understanding of philosophy as a therapeutic practice best oriented to ignoring 
questions which are no longer useful. The point there was not to challenge the present structure or set of 
limitations on thought but to merely change the status accorded to those questions through a pragmatic form 
of therapy. Similarly, operational thought reconciles us with the present.  
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improving existing institutions within their present framework. Here, the ideological and 
political character of this pragmatic empiricism is revealed. It, ‘…insulates and atomizes 
the facts, stabilizes them within the repressive whole, and accepts the terms of this whole 
as the terms of the analysis. The methodological translation of the universal into the 
operational concept then becomes repressive reduction of thought.’653 The result is that 
the horizon of consideration is restricted to the particulars within any situation. The 
context itself (its structure and limitations) is beyond critical consideration.  
For Marcuse, the functionalization of language reflects a redefinition of the function of 
thought. While this is a philosophical development, it is part of wider tendencies within 
advanced technological liberalism.654 For him, the origin of these trends is the 
methodology of the sciences. The scientific management and organization of society 
produces a pattern of thought which reinforces the technological domination of humanity. 
For Marcuse, this is not a specific application of science but a dynamic connected to its 
rationality. ‘I think that the general direction in which it [technological rationality] came to 
be applied was inherent in pure science even where no practical purposes were intended, 
and that the point can be identified where theoretical Reason turns into social practice.’655 
The scientific basis of modern technology is illustrated in the former’s separation of fact 
and value; the notion that there could be a form of thought entirely without values. Part of 
this process is the operationalization of science and the loss of a principle of reality (in its 
ontological sense). In its operational logic, it replaces the metaphysical question of “what 
is?” with the functional “how…?”. Metaphysical certainty is replaced with a practical 
certainty which eschews anything but operational questions. This organizes all of 
experience and reality. In this manner, science projects a world, as a historical totality, 
through a “technological a priori” that understands nature as, ‘potential instrumentality, 
stuff of control and organization.’656 Science leads to a technological structuring of the 
social. Marcuse is conscious of the significance of this claim and the question around 
whether science can be connected to its application in this way. However, to even ask this 
question assumes the distinction between two spheres, science and technology (theory 
                                                 
653 Marcuse, ODM, p.93 
654 Ibid. p.91  
655 Ibid. p.121 –Marcuse vacillates over whether this is a necessary consequence of science or merely one of 
several dynamics compatible with its logic. His attempts to rethink the role of technology in science indicate 
the latter. Further, the unity of theory and practice would seem to suggest that, for Marcuse, applications of 
theories are always connected to the theories themselves. They represent potentialities inherent within the 
thing. However, a thorough investigation of this is beyond the scope of the present discussion. See: Feenberg, 
Heidegger and Marcuse, op cit. Ch.6 
656 Marcuse, ODM, p.126 – This argument recalls Heidegger’s in QT. It is, in fact, the only place in ODM where 
Marcuse actually cites him.  
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and practice), and the neutrality of the former.657 As discussed above, this neutrality is 
contradicted by the mechanism of veiling and the limitations it imposes on thinking. 
Science and technology both, inevitably, establish barriers in thought. The argument here 
is that it is necessary to expose these limitations. Further, the particular violence of this 
enframing is its mechanism to obscure this dynamic. In this element, both science and 
technology enact the same logic of domination.  
Like Rorty (and Dewey), Marcuse argues that the pragmatic understanding of 
scientific enquiry is consistent with science’s logic. In this sense, the logic within science 
makes it technological. It becomes about the use of reality rather than objectively knowing 
it with certainty. Further, again with Rorty, rationality now can only have a methodological 
sense. Following Heidegger, the technical and instrumental approaches are “correct.”658 
There is no explicit telos within this rationality. In this sense, it is neutral. However, for 
Marcuse, it is in its neutral character, its relativity to various ends, and the claim to this 
neutrality that its limitation occurs. Technology is connected to a specific historical 
project. The neutrality of pragmatic science and technology has a positive character. 
‘Scientific rationality makes for a specific societal organization precisely because it 
projects mere form… which can be bent to practically all ends. Formalization and 
functionalization are, prior to all application, the “pure form” of a concrete societal 
practice.’659 The scientific universe, the projection of nature as a quantifiable set of 
relations, sets a horizon on both social practice and thought. It leads to a particular form of 
thought and practice; one that assumes and projects a world.660 Feenberg clarifies this 
argument and its significance for the present question. For him, Marcuse’s argument is 
illustrated by a distinction in the manner in which technology is biased, rather than 
neutral.  
Neutrality and bias in technology are complexly interrelated. Modern pragmatic 
technology is biased towards the status quo; it closes off opposition. However, the bias of 
modern pragmatic technology is not simply the opposite to the conception of its neutrality.  
In order to understand this, Feenberg distinguishes between two kinds of bias: 
substantive and formal. Substantive bias is applying different standards to things that 
                                                 
657 Ibid. p.127 – This connection is crucial as I am making, in a sense, a corresponding linkage in Rorty’s 
philosophy.  
658 Marcuse’s repetition of an ontological distinction between the correct and the true and the centrality of this 
aspect to his theory may be, in addition to the focus on technology, the most convincing argument for a 
Heideggerian aspect to his thought. It is, oddly, ignored by commentators.  
659 Marcuse, ODM, p.129 
660 For Marcuse, this revelation is given to social domination through the organization and instrumentalization 
of humanity. A detailed account of this is beyond the present argument which is focusing on the way in which 
advanced technological society restricts thought. See: Marcuse, ODM, pp.130-1 
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should be judged by the same requirements (e.g. racist discrimination). Formal bias is 
applying the same standard but under conditions that predispose the effects in a certain 
direction. It is distinct in involving no necessary prejudice. In fact, there is usually a 
plausible general claim to fairness where there is only formal bias. For Feenberg, 
importantly, this plausibility only occurs on the level of facts. These facts are not under 
dispute. Rather, formal bias can be criticized for the restricted horizon under which those 
facts are understood as the extent of relevant considerations. Feenberg emphasizes that 
criticism of this sort is compatible with a variety of epistemological standards among 
which Marcuse’s is only one. It only necessitates a viewpoint that emphasizes the presence 
of relations in a structured totality.661 Marcuse’s ontological critique of the claim to the 
neutrality of technology focuses on that claim’s separation of technology from the 
surrounding social, cultural, institutional, intellectual and economic (etc.) framework. As 
Feenberg notes, ‘the technical reason the basis of which modern technology has been 
developed may in itself be “neutral” in some sense, but it is an abstraction insofar as it is 
considered outside the entire context of the involvements in which it emerged as theory 
and to which it returns as practice.’662 The novelty of this position is in its reversal of the 
claims of formally neutral systems. In contrast, Marcuse explicitly connects formal 
neutrality to both domination and the circumscription of thought.  
Formal bias is a covert horizon of possibility. For Marcuse, the dominance of 
pragmatic technical reasoning and the assumption of its neutrality limits thought to 
technical issues. This establishes the current universe as the horizon of possibility while 
claiming that this logic has no values inherent within itself. Humanity is formally biased 
towards the acceptance of the present.663 It is in this sense that science, for Marcuse, 
projects a limited world and why the limitations it imposes are ultimately political. This 
world is one which is experienced and comprehended in terms of calculable relations and 
approached to be mastered.664 Because this pragmatic technology is the logic of a 
particular determination of being, for Marcuse, it cannot transcend that determination. 
This is the limitation of the scientific perspective. It can only extend its current framework, 
‘…without altering its existential structure – that is without envisaging a qualitatively new 
                                                 
661 Feenberg, “The Bias of Technology,” op cit. pp.232-4 – This is the assumption that Rorty and pragmatic 
technology reject. Below, this chapter will argue for its necessity.  
662 Ibid. p.239 – this point depends upon the Hegelian distinction between the “abstract” and the “concrete.” 
The former is the part isolated from the whole. The latter is the thing in its network of relations binding it to 
the whole. Feenberg’s point here is that Marcuse’s critique of the neutrality of technology is that it understands 
technology from its own perspective, as a thing in isolation. It does not consider it as the part of a totality. 
See:Ibid. p.232 
663 The conceptual process in which this occurs is examined subsequently in the discussion of truth and the 
appearance-reality distinction.  
664 Recall Rorty and Dewey’s’s elaboration relationisms in Chs.1&3.  
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mode of “seeing” and qualitatively new relations between men and between man and 
nature.’665 Thus, with respect to thought and social life, science has a conservative effect. 
All of its revolutionary reversals and developments, which Rorty highlights in his use of 
Kuhn, are all shifts within this horizon of limitation. Its much-lauded method of continual 
self-correction (and the pragmatic spirit Rorty equally values) which fuels those 
revolutions only extends the same historical universe of thought.  
These conservative dynamics within science are matched by certain trends within 
modern philosophy. While these trends pervade much of the philosophy, they are 
particularly apparent in the therapeutic empiricism of 20th century linguistic 
philosophy.666 Linguistic analysis understands philosophy as having a therapeutic function. 
It cures thought of the vestiges of its metaphysical past, extirpating the lingering “ghosts” 
of the pre-scientific age. In this, it explicitly situates itself in the common, current use of 
words and concepts. It normalizes the prevailing mode of thinking and acting. In order to 
understand Marcuse here, it is necessary to clarify a distinction which has emerged at 
several points during this discussion. This is the distinction between positive and 
negative.667 For Marcuse, the battle between negativity and positivity is the most 
significant contest in contemporary thought. This is a conflict over critical thinking. In 
every aspect of his work, he was attempting to combat the effects of positive thinking and 
open a space for a negative confrontation with the present. It is important to understand 
these terms. Negativity is not mere negation. Genuine negativity, or what Marcuse called 
“determinate negation,” is a negativity that reveals. It is a negativity that attempts to 
uncover something hidden. Drawing on Hegel, he emphasizes that negativity is the tension 
between reason and the positivity of the existing social reality. ‘In terms of the established 
universe, such contradicting modes of thought are negative thinking. “The power of the 
negative” is the principle which governs the development of concepts, and contradiction 
becomes the distinguishing quality of Reason.’668 As discussed above, concepts exceed 
their objects. Negativity is the logic under which this proceeds. Marcuse goes as far as 
claiming that being itself is negative. For him, the significance of Hegel is in the latter’s 
                                                 
665 Marcuse, ODM, pp.134-5 
666 Here, Marcuse seems to be focusing on the Analytic philosophy of language. While Rorty is a notable critic 
of this tradition (see Ch.1), he also draws on it. Specifically, there was also an anti-metaphysical aspect of 
Analytic philosophy. The focus here is on this approach and other they share and which reveal the limitation of 
thought in the pragmatic, technical universe. See: Rorty, Richard. “A Pragmatist View of Contemporary Analytic 
Philosophy” in PCP; Rorty, Richard. “Introduction” in The Linguistic Turn: Recent Essays in Philosophical Method 
(ed. Richard Rorty). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1967. 
667 Recall this language in earlier chapters in relation to Rorty. In his work, this contrast was merely the 
difference between critical thought and positive constructive efforts to articulate a new philosophy. While not 
unrelated to Marcuse’s use, this in no way covers the depth of the latter’s meaning. 
668 Marcuse, ODM, p.140 – See also: Bernstein, “Negativity” op cit. p.14 
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movement from thought to being. The pre-existing philosophical tradition had often been 
negative in opposing the facts as they appear.669 Here, negativity is a thought. In Hegel, 
negativity is understood as at the heart of being in all its forms. Being and social reality 
contain negativity; within them there are opposing forces and the potential for their 
negation. In this manner, freedom, reason, and negativity are all linked in Marcuse’s 
thought.670 Freedom can then be understood, like in Heidegger, as seeing the veil as what 
veils. That is, as the critical identification (negation) of the present.  
For Marcuse, understanding reason and negativity in terms of ontology changes the 
task of thought. Critical theory, as opposed to traditional philosophy, attempts to map and 
overcome the existing order through the identification of the limits of that framework and 
the elements of negation therein. These latter elements are always immanent to the 
existing framework which contains multiple and contradictory tendencies. With this aim, 
Marcuse’s thought, especially ODM, is a rigorous identification and critique of the positive. 
The positive, broadly, are those elements that reinforce the present. They do this through 
a restriction of the negative. Marcuse develops the concept of the positive to refer to the 
broad tendency within positivism and its manifestations within advanced technological 
society in general. For him, positivism is defined by making the experience of facts the 
criterion of cognitive thought, the orienting of cognitive thought to science as a model of 
certainty, and the belief that knowledge depends on this orientation. From this, and this is 
fundamental when considering Rorty who may not share these, positivism entails a 
consequent rejection of metaphysical and transcendental modes of thought. Positivistic 
philosophy is only affirmative. Philosophical critique can only criticize internally, from 
within the present. For Marcuse, it is the eschewal of this level of questioning that destroys 
philosophy’s critical capacity. ‘The contemporary effort to reduce the scope and the truth 
of philosophy is tremendous, and the philosophers themselves proclaim the modesty and 
inefficacy of philosophy. It leaves the established reality untouched; it abhors 
transgression.’671 Thus, it is this anti-metaphysical orientation that gives positivism its 
conservative character. It is important to emphasize that empiricism is not necessarily 
positive. Its relation to the established reality depends upon which dimension of 
experience it reveals. Certain material empiricisms, by virtue of their contradiction of the 
present, are negative. Whereas, for Marcuse, the empiricism of Analytic philosophy, by 
                                                 
669 For an in-depth examination of this theme, see: Coole, Diana. Negativity and Politics: Dionysius and Dialectics 
from Kant to Poststructuralism. London, UK: Routledge, 2000.  
670 Bernstein, “Negativity: Theme and Variations,” 1988. p.15  – This chapter is merely drawing on Marcuse’s 
work here in order to offer a critical posture that counters Rorty’s pragmatism. For his reading of Hegel that 
makes the points summarized above, see: Marcuse, Herbert. Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of 
Modern Social Theory. New York, US: New Humanities Press, 1963.  
671 Marcuse, ODM, p.141 
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restricting us to the present behavioural universe of language, is thoroughly positive. The 
salient issue again, is the relation to the dominant public logic of the everyday. It is correct 
in this but it destroys the unique capacity of philosophy for critical thought.672 In contrast, 
negativity assumes that the given obscures some dimension of reality; that the legitimate 
range of thought is never exhausted by the present; that there is always a veil. For 
Marcuse, it is the dynamic that pushes against the current horizon of thinking.  
Negative thinking accomplishes this feat through the appearance/reality distinction. 
This distinction stands at the base of Marcuse’s critical philosophy. Like Rorty (and 
Dewey), he reads the history of philosophy in relation to it. He contrasts Greek and 
modern thought in terms of the presence of a concept of truth and this distinction. In this, 
he provides a history of the concept of Reason. Greek philosophy understood reality as 
antagonistic, a two-dimensional conception where there is both appearance and truth. The 
latter must be striven for; the former must be overcome. In this manner, ‘philosophy 
originates in dialectic; its universe of discourse responds to the facts of an antagonistic 
reality.’673 This explains the convergence of reason and freedom in Greek thought. Through 
reason, humanity overcomes the limitations of a particular viewpoint that limits its modes 
of thought and existence. In this manner, it is freed. For Marcuse, this understanding is not 
without its problems.674 However, the important point is that it presents a fundamental 
contrast to the modern conception (which Rorty shares). As discussed above, this universe 
is fundamentally one-dimensional. It is confined to a consideration of the present; 
meaning the internal dynamics within the given totality.675 It does not consider this 
totality as a critical object. In fact, it veils its very presence. Through readings of Plato and 
Aristotle, Marcuse defines a dialectical logic based on this two-dimensionality. For him, 
dialectical thought is in explicit opposition to given reality. By distinguishing between 
being and non-being, essence and fact, potentiality and actuality, dialectical thought 
pushes beyond the given. ‘Judged in the light of their essence and idea, men and things 
exist as other than they are; consequently thought contradicts that which is (given), 
opposes its truth to that of the given reality.’676 This feature makes dialectical thought 
                                                 
672 Ibid. p.143 
673 Ibid. p.107 
674 Principally, it invalidates all non-philosophical modes of existence as “untrue.” It thus leads to the 
normative distinction between contemplation and action within the history of Western philosophy that Dewey 
and pragmatism rightly opposed (see Ch.1). See: Ibid. p.107 
675 Marcuse argues this through a critical account of “formal thinking.” While an this account is beyond the 
scope of the present discussion, it should be noted that Marcuse argues that formal thinking is inherently 
connected to social domination. It is formally biased towards this qualitative mode of life. The important point 
here is that in rejecting the concept of potentiality, formal thinking is biased towards the present. See: Ibid. 
pp.112-6 – also, for a clear account of this argument, see: Feenberg, “The Bias of Technology,” pp.244-8 
676 Marcuse, ODM, p.111 
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imperative. By asserting the truth of something outside the present given, it creates an 
“ought.” Dialectical thought does not state facts but the necessity to create a fact. It 
identifies the critical tension between “is” and “ought” as an ontological condition. In an 
account with striking similarities to Dewey’s in the Quest for Certainty, Marcuse argues 
that this division between two realms in Greek dialectical thinking unfortunately led to a 
distinction between a pure realm of contemplation and certainty and an empirical realm of 
contingency. Further, to protect certainty, these worlds (empirical and intellectual, action 
and thought, etc.) were isolated from each other. This move inaugurates the formal 
(empirical) side of modern thinking. As separate, the tension and contradiction between 
essence and fact disappears and independent logics arise in both. In the calculative 
mastery of empirical science, the preeminent viewpoint of modern pragmatism, humanity 
loses the ability to judge the given reality. It loses the normative.  
Marcuse argues that dialectical thought as a necessary, critical resource for society. 
For him, without it critical judgement is impossible. Science, lacking an appearance/reality 
distinction and a tension therein, cannot condemn established reality. Consequently, he 
opposes a sole emphasis on either theory or practice in their isolated forms. In opposition, 
he offers his own dialectical ontology which ‘undoes the abstractions of formal logic and of 
transcendental philosophy, but it also denies the concreteness of immediate 
experience.’677 Dialectical thought involves a reduction of contingency which makes 
possible the assertion of the essence, as a critical counterpoint to the given, of something. 
Essence is about potentiality. It is the historical potential of a thing given the present 
structures, limitations and contradictions of its given form. Located in these latter 
elements, potentialities are not ideal but immanent to the things. In this manner, the split 
between “ought” and “is” is transcended and a critical consciousness is manifest. Like 
concepts, the examination of these potentialities is explicitly intended to explore the 
processes and conditions on which the facts of society depend. It is meant to pierce 
pragmatic reality and reveal the structure and frame. ‘By virtue of their reference to this 
historical totality, cognitive concepts transcend all operational context, but their 
transcendence is empirical because it renders the facts recognizable as what which they 
really are.’678 Through engaging with a historical totality, this perspective reveals a 
qualitatively different picture of the present, empirical world. When applied in this way, 
                                                 
677 Marcuse, ODM, p.117 – Marcuse often does seem to restrict critical logic solely to its dialectical form. While 
this is only one current within his text, it is problematic insofar as it establishes limits to critical thinking. 
Nonetheless, there are also the resources for a multidimensional perspective that exceeds this limitation. 
While it is only nascent in his text, it is the argument of this chapter that it offers a productive pathway for 
critical thought. This is addressed below. 
678 Ibid. p. 117– See also: Feenberg, “The Bias of Technology,” p.246 
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the ontological tension between appearance and reality becomes a historical tension about 
the potentialities of the future. For Marcuse, in this manner, the concept of potentiality is a 
demand for freedom. It is a critical consideration of the present outside of its own 
categories and as a totality.679 This is a step toward a genuine and collective decision about 
the future.  
The question now is, what does this mean for philosophy? Marcuse articulates this 
question well. 
‘One might ask what remains of philosophy? What remains of thinking, 
intelligence, without anything hypothetical, without any explanation? However, 
what is at stake is not the definition or the dignity of philosophy. It is rather the 
chance of preserving and protecting the right, the need to think and speak in terms 
other than those of common usage—terms which are meaningful, rational, and 
valid precisely because they are other terms.’680 
And.  
‘The philosopher is not a physician; his job is not to cure individuals but to 
comprehend the world in which they live – to understand it in terms of what it has 
done to man.’681 
Philosophy must comprehend the present outside of its categories. Further, it must speak 
to and about reality outside of the public logic of modern liberalism. It must be oriented to 
an (new) understanding of the world and the situation of humanity. The danger of Rorty 
and modernity is that they understand thought outside the given present as merely 
normative. It is only subjective, cultural, or particular. It does not offer a conception of 
reality that contains a critical dimension within itself. They destroy this project. For 
Marcuse, this task is necessary because philosophy is uniquely situated to think in this 
way. Only theory can examine the totality necessary for this dimension of critical thinking. 
This is the perspective, excluded by technological liberalism, that we must search for.682 
How do we consider conditions that exceed the empirical and are independent of 
quantitative identification? Empirical methods become mystifying and ideological in this 
context. They cannot help us understand the frame within which the facts occur. In this, 
for Marcuse, the ontological level of reality is more real than the empirical because it 
determines the facts to be calculated.683 To take the meta-perspective is to hypostatize the 
whole over the parts. For Marcuse, this hypostatization has reality. It is a real dimension of 
existence with real effects (though they may not be measurable) that need to be engaged. 
                                                 
679 Marcuse, ODM, pp.117-8 
680 Ibid. p.145 
681 Ibid. p.148 
682 Ibid. p.146 
683 Ibid. p.153  
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This is not to deny the correctness of empirical measurements but only to emphasize that 
in their correctness, they obscure another dimension of reality.   
ODM is an enactment of this project. It attempts to identify and map the structural 
limitations of thought within contemporary technological liberalism. In this, it assumes the 
inevitable presence of a veil and the need of exposing the historical nature of that veiling.   
‘Under the repressive conditions in which men think and live, thought—any mode 
of thinking which is not confined to pragmatic orientation within the status quo 
can recognize the facts and respond to the facts only by "going behind" them. 
Experience takes place before a curtain which conceals and, if the world is the 
appearance of something behind the curtain of immediate experience, then, in 
Hegel's terms, it is we ourselves who are behind the curtain. We ourselves not as 
the subjects of common sense, as in linguistic analysis, nor as the "purified" 
subjects of scientific measurement, but as the subjects and objects of the historical 
struggle of man with nature and with society. Facts are what they are as 
occurrences in this struggle. Their factuality is historical, even where it is still that 
of brute, unconquered nature.’ 684  
The inevitability of a veil necessitates a constant critical engagement. Marcuse’s claim here 
indicates a broad critical perspective that exceeds his particular articulation of it. While 
this chapter has articulated it in his terms, it is the premise of this entire argument that 
this disposition should exceed the particular ontological-political determination. This 
perspective calls for the broad and critical confrontation of the limits of our political 
thinking. It argues that the ontological frame in which that thinking occurs limits our 
politics. A truly critical encounter then requires philosophy and ontology. Yet, this is not 
the only political perspective. While it is not the focus of his account, there is a 
subterranean call for a multidimensional, critical perspective in Marcuse’s work. In these 
moments, he calls not simply for two-dimensional thought, or the addition of a dialectical 
to the existing formal logic, but for a multidimensional critical pluralism. ‘For such an 
analysis, the meaning of a term or form demands its development in a multi-dimensional 
universe, where any expressed meaning partakes of several interrelated, overlapping, and 
antagonistic systems.’685 Resonating with Connolly’s analysis of political concepts 
addressed in Ch. 2, Marcuse emphasizes that the reduction of these dimensions to one-
dimensional thinking occurs through the loss of these multiple meanings. Without other 
dimensions and meanings, the historical totality, whereby thought is critiqued on the 
whole, is lost. While he fails to develop it, this is a positive development in Marcuse’s work. 
While it is beyond the scope of the present study, it is a productive pathway that deserves 
scholarly attention.686 This section has illustrated Marcuse’s identification of the 
                                                 
684 Ibid. p.149 
685 Ibid. 182 
686 The work of Foucault would also be key here. As indicated above, Feenberg has connected him to his 
analysis of Heidegger and Marcuse. Specifically, in later works, he has drawn on Foucault in rectifying 
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circumscription of thought and its internal mechanisms. It has argued that Marcuse’s work 
carries on Heidegger’s analysis of the veiling of modernity, by identifying how an 
intellectual, political, and material matrix in contemporary society excludes nonpublic 
(transcending) forms of thought. Before relating this back to Rorty’s philosophy in detail, it 
is now necessary to turn briefly to Rorty and Marcuse’s readings of the politics of the New 
Left in order to understand how their philosophies manifest in the analysis of an actual 
political event.  
SECTI ON 3:  A  C I RCUM SC RI BED LE FT:  RORTY ’S SOCIA L HOPE I N AC TI ON  
Like most Western intellectuals active in the late twentieth century, both Rorty and 
Marcuse had strong reactions to the countercultural, political movements of the late 
1960’s. Both had readings of these movements that both reinforce their philosophies and 
politics. Finally, both interpreted the shift in Leftist politics in these years as extremely 
politically significant. However, where Rorty understood the dynamics that of this period 
as the death of genuine Leftist progressivism (and its communal project), Marcuse saw a 
unique opportunity for a form of authentic resistance to the structural inequalities of 
advanced technological capitalism. He saw it as the manifestation of opposition 
appropriate to the conditions of that time. This section will critically analyse Rorty’s 
reading with Marcuse’s in order to bring into relief some of the contrasts established 
above. The purpose is to show how the dynamics identified in Rorty’s liberalism and 
politics of social hope and the critical resources present in Marcuse’s critique manifest in 
their respective analyses of political practice.  
Achieving the Left: Rorty’s (Restricted) Vision of Progressive Politics 
Rorty’s critique of the American Left is rooted in an understanding of American 
history and its project. While present throughout his career, especially in his relationship 
to Dewey and American democracy, the mythology of the American project is central to his 
                                                                                                                                               
Heidegger’s (and implicitly Marcuse’s) top down and totalizing understanding of technology and its ability to 
structure and exclude other forms of thinking. After criticizing Heidegger for such “technological 
determinism,” he finds in Foucault the identification of possible sources of resistance in the many ‘subjugated 
knowledges that arise in opposition to a dominating rationality.’ (Feenberg Questioning Technology  p.8) 
Feenberg highlights how Foucault’s work identifies specific practices of technological domination and offers a 
general ontological framework and specific empirical practice to identify opportunities of resistance within 
this dominant universe. While it is beyond the present study, this aspect of Foucault’s work (which is 
contained mainly within his earlier thought before the “aesthetics of the self”) resonates with Ch.2’s discussion 
of the need for an ontology of ambiguity and resistance. It also indicates the applicability of Foucault to the 
critical methodology of veiling established here. His ability to identify specific practices, obscured by modern 
dispositifs of governmentality, would complement Marcuse’s total perspective. This connection is a fruitful 
possibility for later work.  
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later work.687 His concern is not so much to argue for the distinctiveness of America688 but 
to emphasise the importance of identifying with that tradition as a precursor of any 
progressive politics. For him, it represents a narrative entirely compatible with his 
account of pragmatic liberalism as tolerance. In a sense, where that liberalism is the 
formalization of his philosophical pragmatism (see Ch. 4), the mythology of American 
social hope represents (one of) the (possible) concrete narrativizations of that politics. It 
is a concretization of that political and philosophical frame; a narrative of political 
progress that confirms both his pragmatic (philosophical) understanding of reality (as 
contingent, naturalistic, and historical) and his liberal (political) understanding of politics 
(as piecemeal, reformist, and experimental). Consequently, the values and ideals of that 
mythology set the bounds of Rorty’s public vision.   
While politics and philosophy are strictly separate for Rorty, that pragmatism, as a 
philosophical project, and America, as a political one, do share a particular disposition. 
This is, ‘a hopeful, melioristic, frame of mind’689 that substitutes hope for knowledge. This 
orients both pragmatism and America toward the future and to the task of self-invention. 
To recall, in Rorty’s philosophy, the distinction between past and future is substituted for 
the one between appearance and reality (as well as all other philosophical dualisms) as 
the basis of social change. On his reading, the pragmatism of James and Dewey drew on 
American transcendentalism and embraced the understanding of America as an ideal.690 
“Democracy” and “America” were sacred words situated against Europe. Where Europe 
looks backward towards its traditions, America and pragmatism are future oriented. They 
share ‘a willingness to refer all questions of ultimate justification to the future.’691 This 
constitutes a new conception of humans and their relation to each other and the world. 
For Rorty, pragmatism’s anti-essentialism and Darwinian naturalism (discussed in Ch. 3) 
contain this future emphasis. Its understanding of the world emphasizes non-teleological 
                                                 
687 Philosophy and Social Hope is particularly steeped in this language. Its introduction begins with a discussion 
distinguishing American pragmatic thought from European traditions. See also: Voparil, Christopher J. Richard 
Rorty: Politics and Vision. Oxford : Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006. pp.3, 156-8 
688 Rorty does not overtly endorse the argument for “American exceptionalism.” His concern is only to 
emphasize the importance, politically, of identifying with that tradition. The danger re-emerges though in that 
there is an implicit claim here to the (pragmatic) neutrality of that identification. Such a commitment limits 
our critical perspective on the present. For an account of the various forms of exceptionalism, see; Ceaser, 
James W. “The Origins and Character of American Exceptionalism” in American Political Thought. Vol. 1 (1), 
2012 
689 Rorty, Richard “Truth without Correspondence to Reality” in PSH, p.24 – Here, Rorty overtly acknowledges 
such a connection. Further, in this essay many of the themes of Rorty’s own philosophy are repeated and 
interpreted into the American narrative. It thus serves as a fundamental connection between his philosophy 
and his politics.  
690 See: West, Cornel. The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism. London: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1989. 
691 Rorty, “Truth without Correspondence” op cit. p.27 
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development. Neither pragmatism nor America desire a specific future, only that it is 
different from (and better than) the present. Diversity and growth are its deliberatively 
“fuzzy” ideals.  
The shift from the eternal to the future is characteristic of the difference between 
Europe and America for Rorty. The former, its thought emerging from a privileged leisure 
class, is concerned with stability over change. In contrast, American thought (Dewey 
specifically) places philosophy in the service of change. By denying knowledge, it rejects 
the idea of an extra-cultural foundation to custom. The consequence of this, for Rorty, is 
the claim that pragmatic thinking is the mode of thought appropriate to democracy; that it 
is in fact the result of this shift of political structure. Thus, the change of emphasis to the 
future and away from the permanent and the certain amounts ‘to an Americanizing of 
philosophy.’ America, uniquely, ‘counts for its “reason and justification” upon the future, 
and only upon the future.’692 There is a naturalization of the pragmatic perspective and the 
American project at work here. This is a repetition of the implicit claim to neutrality 
identified within Rorty’s pragmatism in early chapters. The unique danger here is that 
Rorty links it to the American political project.  
The quest for certainty should be replaced with the demand for imagination – that 
philosophy should stop trying to provide reassurance and instead encourage what 
Emerson called “self-reliance”. To encourage self-reliance, in this sense, is to 
encourage the willingness to turn one’s back on the past and on the attempt of “the 
classical philosophy of Europe” to ground the past in the eternal. It is to attempt 
Emersonian self-creation on a communal scale.693  
Pragmatic neutrality becomes American exceptionalism. Rorty connects a philosophical 
argument about a necessary progression in thought to a particular (national) political 
project. Further, the latter, he freely admits, contains its own set of values. For him, there 
is a “mythic individualism” in much of this American mythology which understands 
America itself as a individual changing itself and the world. For example, the emphasis in 
Emerson is not so much on democracy ‘… but of private self-creation, of what he called 
“the infinitude of the private man”. Godlike power was never far from Emerson’s mind. His 
America was not so much a community of fellow citizens as a clearing in which Godlike 
heroes could act out self-written dramas.’694 The obvious question is: Does this 
neutralization of a particular set of values not violate his understanding of the contingency 
of language and culture? Here, Rorty raises a particular set of values above contingency 
                                                 
692 Ibid. p.32 
693 Ibid. p.34 – See also, Emerson, Ralph Waldo. “Self-Reliance” in The Selected Writings of Ralph Waldo 
Emerson op cit.   
694 Rorty, “Truth without Correspondence” op cit. p.26 – See also, West, The American Evasion of Philosophy, 
pp.12-3. Such an ontology of individual mastery is succinctly summarized in the epitaph to this chapter from 
Emerson.  
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merely because they are part of what Cornel West has called “The American Religion of 
Possibility.”695 This religion is privileged because it is the cultural manifestation of the only 
form of critical thought after (European) foundations, when the only sense in which one 
can have an appearance-reality distinction, or make a claim to truth, is in terms of the 
future. ‘The only point in contrasting the true with the merely justified is to contrast a 
possible future with the actual present.’696 
Rorty’s AOC is steeped in his understanding of this mythology as inaugurating a new 
project and (pragmatic) relation to the world. Rorty begins that work lamenting 
contemporary America. For him, it suffers from a deficit in pride. It lacks positive 
narratives of progress with which to identify. Further, this pride is necessary. He begins, 
‘National pride is to countries what self-respect is to individuals: a necessary condition for 
self-improvement.’697 Drawing on contemporary literature, Rorty argues that 
contemporary American intellectuals approach America only with mockery and disgust.698 
The consequence is that American intellectuals find pride in America and participation in 
its politics impossible. Their focus on the violence of American society and history make 
them incapable of seeing its strengths. As a result, ‘this insight does not move them to 
formulate a legislative program, to join a political movement, or to share in a national 
hope.’699 It inspires no action. Rorty’s purpose in this work is to contrast two moods and 
their resulting politics: hope and self-disgust, the reformist and cultural Lefts respectively. 
For him, the American pragmatic and transcendentalist narratives achieved the former, 
while contemporary culture suffers from the latter.  
Drawing upon Whitman, Dewey, and James Baldwin (among others), Rorty 
emphasises the necessity of a national narrative and ideal. This image of America was 
fundamental to the reformist Left in which he identifies a more genuine form of 
progressive politics.  In this account, he argues that the most important element of this 
narrative is its orientation; it is turned toward the country and project of achieving it as an 
ideal. This goes back to the function of narrative. As discussed in earlier chapters, there is 
a fundamental connection between narrative and identity. ‘Stories about what the nation 
has been and should try to be are not attempts at accurate representation, but rather 
                                                 
695 West, Cornel and Roberto Unger. The Future of American Progressivism: An Initiative for Political and 
Economic Reform. Boston, US: Beacon Press, 1998. p.6 
696 Rorty, “Truth without Correspondence” op cit. p.39 
697 Rorty, Richard. Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth Century America. London, UK: Harvard 
University Press, 1997. p.3 
698 Their understandings, he is quick to assert, draw on and resemble those of Foucault and Heidegger.  
699 Rorty, Achieving, op cit. p.8  
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attempts to forge a moral identity.’700 The academic Left, in rejecting this narrative, has 
become spectatorial. It has no vision of where the collective should go. In contrast, Dewey 
and Whitman offered a “civic religion” for America. Key to this understanding is an 
assumption of American exceptionalism, which Rorty seemingly endorses. America is 
unique, not in divine favour, but in pragmatic and anti-authoritarian secularism. Here, a 
finite, historical project is the object of ultimate significance rather than something 
eternal. ‘They wanted to put hope for a casteless and classless America in the place 
traditionally occupied by knowledge of the will of God. They wanted that utopian America 
to replace God as the unconditional object of desire. They wanted the struggle for social 
justice to be the country’s animating principle, the nation’s soul.’701 In this account, 
democracy, America, and the primacy of consensus are all intertwined in what Dewey 
called, ‘a metaphysic of the relation of man and his experience to nature.’702 This 
metaphysic places the democratic individual and collective at the centre. It redefines God 
as the future and the task of self-creation. Once again using Europe as a contrast, Rorty 
argues that America chooses hope over knowledge. Rather than searching outside 
humanity for its meaning and normative standard, it looks to the hope for a better future. 
In this sense, the American mythology is politics, pragmatized.  
Together with the language of tolerance and the mythic individualism discussed 
above, the distinctiveness of the American project for Rorty is its desire for diversity. 
Rejecting an external standard for humanity, and replacing it with hope, makes the 
purpose of our societies an endless diversity of human forms. While the future is the norm, 
there is no template for it. ‘The future will widen endlessly. Experiments with new forms 
of individual and social life will interact and reinforce one another. Individual life will 
become unthinkably diverse and social life unthinkably free.’703 Rorty emphasises that this 
diversity is not the multiculturalism of separate groups preserving themselves from 
others. Rather, it is about interaction and movement to a greater unity. This is a “variety in 
unity” where all the different elements create a larger whole. The basic individualism of 
this account is obvious. For Rorty, to see America specifically and government in general 
in this manner is to think that the only purpose of social institutions is to make a new sort 
of individual possible; one who will understand authority only as free consensus amongst 
a diverse set of citizens. Further, it is the diversity of individuals, which is the aim. For this 
                                                 
700 Ibid. p.13 
701Ibid. p.18 
702 Dewey, John. “Mateterlinck’s Philosophy of Life” in The Middle Works of John Dewey, vol. 6 (Carbondale: 
Southern Illinois University Press, 1978). p.135.  
703 Rorty, Achieving, op cit. p.24 
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to be possible Rorty emphasises, a basic equality is necessary. Thus, this is not a project 
with a foundation to support it, but only an image to offer as an incentive.  
With this narrative and normative standard, Rorty redraws the lines within Leftist 
thought of the late twentieth century. His primary concern is with the divide between 
leftists and liberals. For Rorty, this division originates within Marxist and socialist 
elements of the Left. His imperative is to overcome this division and reunite this group. To 
this end, he offers the label of “reformist Left.” This term covers anyone working within 
the confines of constitutional democracy to “protect the weak from the strong.” This group 
he juxtaposes to the “New Left.” Not significantly deviating from the latter’s traditional 
meaning, this term denotes those, from the late 60’s on, who did not think it was possible 
to work for social justice within that system.704 Through a narrative of the key moments of 
the reformist Left, an adequate account of which is beyond the present discussion, Rorty 
describes how this group, ‘preached that America could be true to itself only if it turned 
left—that socialism, in some form or another, was necessary if our country, its 
government, and its press were not to be bought up by the rich and greedy. The ministers 
of this national church told America that it would lose its soul if it did not devote itself to “a 
conscious social ideal”.’705 The language is key here. This movement spoke to the moral 
identity of America. It claimed it had failed by its own standards.706 For Rorty, fundamental 
to this argument is rereading the relationships between movements and figures. 
Narratives of national hope require synopses of similarities and the ignoring of 
differences.707 They require identification with past social movements, not abstract 
philosophers. Thus, they require the imposition of unity and the disregard of difference.  
It is important to emphasize here that while critical of the New Left’s break with the 
Old Left, and its lack of hope in America, Rorty does acknowledge its achievements.708 
Further, he does acknowledge that their civil disobedience and rejection of the liberal-
democratic system may have prevented the loss of American democracy. However, it 
becomes clear throughout this text that while attempting to reconcile diverse elements of 
the Left, Rorty proceeds entirely on his own terms. For example, ‘I think we should 
abandon the leftist-versus- liberal distinction, along with the other residues of Marxism 
that clutter up our vocabulary—overworked words like “commodification” and 
                                                 
704 This division seems to repeat earlier divides in Rorty between pragmatists and metaphysicians, and liberal 
and radical thought (see Ch.4) 
705 Rorty, Achieving, op cit. p.50 
706 This is the hermeneutic form of cultural critique addressed in Ch.4. This is a form of loyal internal criticism.  
707 Recall Rorty’s conception of justice and manner of expanding his “we” (Ch.4).  
708 He also simultaneously critiques and lauds the politics of identity. See: Rorty, Achieving, op cit. p.82 and; 
Rorty, Richard. Against Bosses, Against Oligarchies: A Conversation with Richard Rorty. Chicago, US: Prickly 
Paradigm Press, 2002. pp.23-4 
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“ideology.”’709 What Rorty is suggesting here is a Left without Marxism, a Left without the 
elements he dislikes. This is not so much a reconciliation but a redefinition of the Left. In 
this manner, his analysis reflects the confines of his thought. He can only prescribe in 
terms of his own categories. He can only think within the (pragmatic) confines of his own 
values.  
Rorty’s final target in AOC are the heirs of the New Left (mainly within the 
academy).710 This “Cultural Left” specializes in the “politics of difference/identity.” It 
replaces economic concerns with cultural ones. Beginning an exhaustive history, Rorty 
concludes that this group is defined by its rejection of reformism. Crossing over with his 
analysis of Radical thought (Ch. 4), here liberal politics is infected with dubious 
philosophical presuppositions and, consequently an inherently oppressive mind-set. Thus, 
rather than concrete opposition, it is opposed to an entire manner of thinking. For the 
Cultural Left, to resist oppression, we need “otherness711.” This brings Rorty to his main 
critical object. For him, otherness impedes our ability to participate in collective politics. A 
constant attention to otherness and the inherent oppressiveness and illegitimacy of the 
American state impedes that Left from making alliances and creating the “common 
dreams” necessary to progressive politics. This requires inspiring images of the country. 
The focus on otherness divides. It does not provide for the unity needed.712 For Rorty, such 
commonality is the necessary condition of progressive politics.  
Rorty’s argument for the necessity of communal politics and his critique of the 
Cultural Left is informed by a reading of contemporary global economic and political 
conditions.713 For him, the most salient factor is the globalization of the economy and its 
particular effects on labour. In the West, wage-levels and social benefits enjoyed by 
workers bear little relation to the increasingly fluid global labour market, leading to the 
steady immiseration of workers since the 1970s. For Rorty, the issues of industrialization 
and wage-slavery have re-emerged in a new form with globalization. However, in this 
instance, the ability of each state to manage or mitigate this situation has disappeared. 
These dynamics exceed them.  Further, a global and cosmopolitan managerial upper-class 
has emerged that whose interests are served by these new trends and who consistently 
work against any national attempts to protect labour. Just as in the cultural Left and the 
                                                 
709 Rorty, Achieving, op cit. p.42  
710 See also, Rorty, “The Unpatriotic Academy” in PSH. 
711 For Rorty, this term denotes a cultural, rather than economic, form of oppression. His point is not that it is 
not a real form of oppression but that an exclusive focus on it proves incapable of genuinely progressive 
politics. See: Rorty, Achieving, op cit. pp.78-82, 92-7 
712 Ibid. p.101 
713 See also, Rorty, “Back to Class Politics” in PSH 
  
237  CH.5:  T H E  F U T U R E  O F  S O C I A L  H O P E  
 
politics of otherness, cultural issues become the main substance of politics in this context 
as the actual politics and economics of the situation are avoided by the “international, 
cosmopolitan super-rich.”714 For Rorty, the Cultural Left has, in its singular focus on 
otherness and its refusal to engage in the practical affirmative politics of the present 
nation, ignored this dire situation.  
To regain relevance and address these issues, the Left must open relations with the 
old reformist Left and trade unions. For Rorty, there are two necessary movements. First, 
the academic Left must “kick its theory habit.” Rorty’s critique of theory has been 
addressed in earlier chapters extensively, and so it will not be rehearsed here. However, it 
is important to understand that his criticism of the Cultural Left and its use of theory 
centres on its depoliticizing effects. The totalizing level of abstraction of this Foucauldian 
Left715 makes it incapable of prescribing specific social and political practices. Instead, in a 
religious fashion, they mythologize “power” into a ubiquitous presence that haunts every 
practice. For Rorty, such analyses are obstacles to effective political organization and 
action. Philosophy in general is not necessary to this project. ‘For purposes of thinking 
about how to achieve our country, we do not need to worry about the correspondence 
theory of truth, the grounds of normativity, the impossibility of justice, or the infinite 
distance which separates us from the other. For the purposes, we can give both religion 
and philosophy a pass. We can just get on with trying to solve what Dewey called “the 
problems of men.”’716 Second, the cultural Left must also regain national pride through a 
narrative ideal717 to be achieved. Only through embracing an ideal for America, and 
thereby rejecting simple anti-Americanism, can the academy make alliances outside of 
itself. This entails a shift away from the politics of otherness to focus on our similarities 
and ignore our differences in order to build a collective.  
These two changes result in the imperatives that the Left must become both more 
reformist and pragmatic (i.e. procedural) in its approach to politics and more narrative 
and utopian (hermeneutic) in its intellectual culture. For the former, the Left must focus 
on actual social and political practices and thereby participate in reform. This is where the 
                                                 
714 The political need to oppose this upper class is the subject of Rorty’s Against Bosses, Against Oligarchies, op 
cit.  
715 Foucault and his followers are Rorty’s most frequent targets here. For an account of Rorty’s various 
readings and critiques of Foucault, see: Malecki, Wojciech.“If Happiness if not the aim of Politics, the what is?” 
in Foucault Studies, No. 11, 2011. And; May, Todd. “A New Neo-Pragmatism: From James and Dewey to 
Foucault” in Foucault Studies, No. 11, 2011. – May argues that, in contrast to the pragmatism of Rorty and 
Dewey, Foucault’s analysis of social practices contains a political element they lack. He illustrates how 
Foucault could extend this argument in the future.   
716 Rorty, Achieving, op cit. p.97 
717 The only narrative possible for Rorty is the narrative of Whitman and Dewey addressed above. 
Fundamental to this is accepting the present necessity of the nation state. See, Ibid. p.98 
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country is addressed as it actually is; here, the pragmatic logic rules. Second, it must 
describe the country in terms of hope, rather than knowledge. In hermeneutic narratives, 
America must be described as it hopes to be. ‘You have to be loyal to a dream country 
rather than to the one to which you wake up every morning.’718 This twofold approach, 
between reform and narrative, repeats Rorty’s political division of labour between 
proceduralism and hermeneutics identified in Ch. 4. By substituting hope for knowledge in 
this manner, the Left will become an agent rather than a spectator in politics.  
Rorty’s account here is not without insight. The Left has seemingly failed to 
successfully oppose the economic trends of the past forty years. This failing is surely 
connected to the death of the alliance between labour and the academy and the shift of 
focus, in the New and Cultural Lefts, to the politics of identity. Finally, effective opposition 
of these trends and their current consequences does require a different set of relations 
between these groups. However, as discussed below, Rorty’s prescriptions ultimately 
suffer from the self-imposed limitations of this thought. This section has illustrated that 
Rorty’s prescriptions in AOC and his use of the American mythology of democracy, are 
entirely consistent with his philosophy and politics. In fact, they represent the ultimate 
forms of his ideals. In this sense, this text is the narrativization of Rorty’s pragmatic 
philosophy and his liberal politics.  
Hope and Liberation: Rorty’s Politics in (a Marcusean) Perspective 
Where Rorty reads the New and Cultural Lefts as depoliticized “cultural” politics lost 
in abstraction, Marcuse uses their manifestation to probe the limits of political thinking.719 
This reveals the extent of their differences. Where Rorty considers only success and 
failure, or whether they have offered a plausible alternative organization (i.e. 
pragmatically), Marcuse illustrates the possibility of a critical perspective. He illustrates 
how these groups reveal the limits of our present society. In this, he turns the focus not 
onto the legitimacy of their protest, but on the legitimacy of the status quo. This difference 
reveals the respective standpoints of these two thinkers. Rorty and Marcuse have entirely 
different relations to the given. They confront the question of the justifiability of the 
present from within different philosophical and ontological systems. The former’s is a 
pragmatic and naturalistic account of reality and existence. Here, there is a priority of the 
                                                 
718 Ibid. p.101 
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represents a truer understanding. The point in this contrast is to understand the limits of their philosophies 
for understanding a political event. How Rorty removes an entire level of questioning from his analysis. 
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social and a politics built upon that basis. The latter’s is an ontological and materialist 
account which emphasizes the structured nature of our experience and social and political 
lives. It necessitates a totalizing vision. However, this perspectival difference does not 
leave us with mere relativism. Where Rorty attempts to close down the perspectives on 
the present, Marcuse’s thought has the resources to open up our critical encounters. In this 
manner, they are judged by the consequences of their views. However, this is a more 
genuine pragmatic criterion; one that judges a philosophy and politics by its consequences 
within a totality. This section will utilize Marcuse’s An Essay on Liberation in order to 
introduce this Marcusean critique of Rorty. It will move beyond that text and back to ODM 
in order to draw together the critical threads of this chapter.  
In An Essay on Liberation, Marcuse thinks freedom and change very differently.720 
Discussing the new social forces that emerged in the 1960s and their opposition to the 
current society, he argues that their salience is not found in a concrete alternative they 
offer.  
‘None of these forces is the alternative. However, they outline, in very different 
dimensions, the limits of the established societies, of their power of containment. 
When these limits are reached, the Establishment may initiate a new order of 
totalitarian suppression. But beyond these limits, there is also the space, both 
physical and mental, for building a realm of freedom which is not that of the 
present: liberation also from the liberties of exploitative order — a liberation 
which must precede the construction of a free society, one which necessitates an 
historical break with the past and the present.’721  
Where Rorty thinks of politics as the pragmatic positing of alternative social practices 
and forms of organization, Marcuse wants to create a space to think liberation as beyond 
the present limitations on our collective and individual lives. The significance of 
opposition movements, in the first instance, is not the alternatives they offer but the limits 
of the present they expose. It is in this sense that  ODM and this text argue for a conception 
of freedom explicitly opposed to the present and the actual. The natural question is: why 
should freedom be thought in this manner? Why not define it pragmatically in a set of 
particular conditions (as Rorty does)? The answer is compelling. For Marcuse, freedom 
must be thought as a contradiction to the present because of the historical nature of 
reality. The social, economic and intellectual conditions of society change and develop. 
Liberation must react to these changes. Thus, when Rorty laments the loss of a labour-
centred opposition and the excesses of the new countercultural movements, he 
misunderstands historicism (which he broadly endorses) and its significance. The 
changing nature of global capitalism has engendered new and different sources of 
                                                 
720 The purpose of this section is not to rehearse the entire argument of this text but just to indicate some 
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721 Marcuse, Herbert. An Essay on Liberation. Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1999. p.viii 
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opposition. Marcuse emphasises that these forces do not replace earlier ones; they provide 
a new consciousness for freedom.  
‘It is of course nonsense to say that middle-class opposition is replacing the 
proletariat as the revolutionary class… What is happening is the formation of still 
relatively small and weakly organized (often disorganized) groups which, by virtue 
of their consciousness and their needs, function as potential catalysts of rebellion… 
their consciousness and their goals make them representatives of the very real 
common interests of the oppressed… in the advanced monopoly-capitalist 
countries, the displacement of the opposition (from the organized industrial 
working classes to militant minorities) is caused by the internal development of 
society.’722 
A truly historical perspective must accept and respond to changing social, political and 
economic conditions. To remain critical, freedom must be thought as outside of this 
shifting present. If it is defined internally according to any particular stabilization of 
conditions, such as the pragmatic account internal to modernity, one risks circumscribing 
politics to that universe. Marcuse’s point is not that all political activity must be thought in 
this manner. There is space for the operational and experimental frameworks.723 His 
argument is only that this is a necessary dimension of political thought.  
The central problem of Rorty’s AOC is its inability to engage with these changing 
circumstances in a critical way. While Rorty is surely aware of some dynamics within 
contemporary global capitalism (i.e. the globalization of labour), he fails to explore new 
modes of resistance. His solution is more of the same type of politics that failed to prevent 
these dynamics. The fault here lies within his framework. He contrasts the cultural and Old 
Lefts in terms of a focus on “sadism” and “greed” respectively.724 The former is concerned 
only with cultural violence against “others,” while the latter is concerned with the 
attempts of one class to politically disenfranchise and economically exploit another. This 
manner of casting the difference between these two groups is indicative of his limitations. 
While Marcuse would see these as structural responses to new conditions, Rorty 
understands them culturally and socially.725 The problem is not a structure or a wider 
logic, but a culture of greed or sadism. Rorty ‘s solution to the failure of the Left is to then 
shift away from the politics of otherness to a “politics of greed.” There are two problems 
here. First, Rorty’s account of cultural Left is subject to his own criticism of that group. By 
reading them socially, he has only understood this group as a cultural response. His vision 
is constricted in the same way he accuses theirs of being. He ignores how they may be 
involved in wider dynamics. Second, he creates a false dualism between the “politics of 
                                                 
722 Ibid. pp.51-2 
723 Ibid. p.86 
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otherness” and pragmatic “reformist politics.” He judges a whole by one of its parts and 
assumes that all philosophical analysis of politics is invalid because he can argue that 
particular form of it is. Some of his criticisms of the Foucauldian Left may have merit, but 
those do not prove the general uselessness of philosophy for politics. Assuming they do 
compromises our resources for critically assessing the American tradition.726  
The desire to dissociate philosophy from politics structures Rorty’s choice here.727 In 
this desire, his preference for one type of politics (reformism) and one political group (the 
Old Left) over others has a philosophical basis. In their use of the American democratic 
narrative, this method and group represent a pragmatic and liberal approach to politics. 
There are several key themes here that illustrate this: liberalism as pragmatic tolerance, 
the individual and diversity, and hope as the future ideal. As previously discussed, Rorty’s 
liberalism depends upon a pragmatic justification. Liberalism has been uniquely successful 
in arbitrating amongst the variety of groups and individuals in contemporary society. 
Specifically, its ethos of tolerance, like pragmatism, allows for the encouragement of 
diversity outside of substantive norms. Rorty’s claim is that the pragmatic logic of 
tolerance allows for a diverse yet non-relativistic form of liberalism. However, this non-
substantive claim is compromised by AOC. There, Rorty argues that the American 
democratic myth is a narrative capable of the commonality required of progressive 
politics. Its democratic emphasis and focus on diversity makes it capable of addressing 
both economic and cultural issues. In this manner, this myth represents a narrativization 
of pragmatic and liberal neutrality. However, his attachment to this norm compromises 
the claim to the pragmatic tolerance of liberalism. Both that narrative and its philosophical 
justification contain covert values and marginalize others. The individualism of the 
American myth identified previously thus infects his entire theory. In a particularly telling 
interview, Rorty clarified his support of diversity. ‘I’m thinking of individual difference 
rather than group difference. I don’t care whether anybody thinks of themselves as 
Vietnamese-American, Italian-American, or Baptist. I would just like them to be free to 
make up their own lives, in a good Nietzschean manner.’728 In order to protect the 
American public realm, alternative collective identities and perspectives must be excluded. 
Thus, the ideal of American democracy does not embrace or provide for diversity outside 
of certain bounds. It only values a limited diversity of (American) individuals in an 
individualistic (i.e. liberal) culture. ‘I just don’t see what’s wrong with the politics of 
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individuality, conjoined with the usual attempt to repeal this or that law, overcome this or 
that prejudice, and so on… Why not narrate a politics of contempt for group difference, a 
glorification of individual difference.’729 In Rorty’s American ideal, citizens do not only 
privatize their identities, they reject them. Rather than ignoring differences in favour of 
similarities, we must reject differences in favour of the unity of the present public. This 
neutralizes a quite particular narrative and generalizes it to all. 
In “Repressive Tolerance,” Marcuse argues that the liberal framework of tolerance 
serves only to reinforce the status quo. While an adequate account of this essay is beyond 
the present study, it is relevant to note that, here, tolerance is liberating only under certain 
conditions. A pluralistic, persuasive democracy, where procedures weigh alternatives 
within an ethos of tolerance, is not sufficient. When meaning is closed, such as in the 
reduction of thought to the operational, non-public modes of thinking are precluded and 
genuine tolerance is impossible. ‘These conditions invalidate the logic of tolerance which 
involves the rational development of meaning and precludes the closure of meaning.’730 
Genuine tolerance is rational (i.e. critical). It is critical of the present and its meaning. 
Pragmatic tolerance is necessarily precluded because it is not critical. In this sense, it is 
understandable why Rorty’s pragmatic and tolerant liberalism ends up repeating the 
values of the dominant American narrative. His politics of future social hope lacks the 
critical capacity to transcend them.   
Marcuse illustrates that a philosophy focused on the future can only be critical if it 
exceeds the pragmatic and retains the appearance-reality divide. This is the fundamental 
difference between Rorty and Marcuse’s philosophies. Where this divide depends upon an 
untenable notion of contact between thought (or language) and world for the former, for 
Marcuse, it is a necessary presumption of critical thought on the level of totality. As 
discussed above, the limitation of thought in pragmatic, technological liberalism extends 
to consciousness and its products. The imagination is compromised. ‘The order and 
organization of class society, which have shaped the sensibility and the reason of man, 
have also shaped the freedom of the imagination… Between the dictates of instrumentalist 
reason on the one hand and a sense experience mutilated by the realizations of this reason 
on the other, the power of the imagination was repressed; it was free [only] to become 
practical.’731 Marcuse also sees a key role for the imagination in political change. However, 
it is an imagination liberated from the present (pragmatic) framework; one that has taken 
on a “total character.” The imagination is only free at the level of totality. In the 
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circumscribed universe of liberal pragmatism, where thought is restricted to the 
operational, the imagination loses it capacity. Marcuse makes a similar point regarding 
hope. Hope is only free when it is a refusal of the actual; when it can dream in languages 
and thoughts beyond the present.732 Constricted to the present, Rorty’s hope ends up 
empty. It remains unclear what change it is meant to effect.733  
A totality is necessary for critical thought. For Rorty, totalizing is apolitical. It prevents 
opposition to specific practices. For Marcuse, totality conditions how those practices are 
experienced. As such, a political engagement with totality is a necessary precondition of 
political action. The appearance-reality divide allows one to analyze a totality. It allows 
one to identify the formal bias of such a totality. By referring to a historical totality, 
thought can transcend the current and establish an alternative potentiality of the present 
outside of a furthering of its present pathway. Operating on this level allows us to think a 
qualitatively different set of structures and limitations. Totality and potentiality can 
function as a sort of ground. While not open to confirmation, as their dynamics exceed 
assured empirical verification, they are theoretically and normatively necessary levels of 
reality. We cannot assure their contents but only their existence and we must take the 
political step of characterizing them. For Marcuse, there is no theory-practice divide. 
Rather, applications of a logic are always intimately connected to the logic itself. They 
represent one (most likely of many) of its potentialities. There are always multiple 
possibilities. In this sense, Rorty’s philosophy and liberalism are only one set of possible 
consequences of pragmatic technology. However, it is the position of this thesis that they 
represent a potentially dangerous dynamic that does manifest in the political world. As 
such, it is a trend that needs to be critically confronted and unveiled.  
If we ignore this task, our totality remains under its present, assumed framework. 
Rorty, in his pragmatic response to the failure of philosophical foundations, fails to 
understand that contingency requires a political commitment to overturn the present. It 
requires a commitment to engage with totality. Marcuse is no less aware of contingency 
and the dangers of purging it from the empirical context. However, the necessary political 
response to contingency is to acknowledge the historical nature of reality. Conditions will 
change. The totality will shift. Thus, we require modes of thought that engage that shifting 
horizon of possibility. The claim to pragmatic neutrality, to the absence of a veil between 
our determination of the present and its alternative possibilities, obscures this necessary 
level of analysis. Genuine progress requires more than mere hope.  
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‘To teach what the contemporary world really is behind the ideological and 
material veil, and how it can be changed… not empathy and feeling, but distance 
and reflection are required. The “estrangement-effect” (Verfremdungseffekt) is to 
produce this dissociation in which the world can be recognized as what it is.’734  
It requires the critical distance of a distinction between appearance and reality. 
CONC LUSI ON:  
The politics of social hope is Rorty’s further elaboration of the cultural side of 
liberalism. It is meant to be the forum for progress compatible with the pragmatic (i.e. 
non-substantive) procedures of contemporary liberalism; the means he offers that culture 
to respond to the present crises (of hope) in the Left.  Through an emphasis on the 
undefined future and the use of hope as ground, it is Rorty’s mechanism for a genuinely 
progressive politics. For him, in pragmatism and modernity, the future replaces the past as 
the critical standard of philosophy. However, the future, unlike the past, does not 
immutably ground principles for social change. Rather, its function is to pragmatize social 
change. With an emphasis on the future, one can only respond to contemporary problems 
in terms of concrete alternatives (in narrative form). Social hope is the dreaming of those 
alternatives and method designed to achieve it. Only in this way does the glorious social 
future serve as a “hypergood” in Rorty’s work. However, this chapter has argued that, 
following Rorty’s reduction of politics to a division between a pragmatically justified 
proceduralism and reformist liberal culture, this politics fails in that role. Hope and the 
future are compromised by pragmatic conditions. If philosophy is only reactive, can only 
respond to present tensions, and its (cultural) role is only to offer piecemeal alternatives 
to that present, it cannot be critical. In this manner, the future is bound by pragmatic 
limitations. As discussed in earlier chapters, Rorty’s philosophy suffers from an inability to 
connect to the present.735 Consequently, social change occurs solely through human 
imagination and its ability to create new languages. The reason for this is the division of 
duties in Rorty's politics between pragmatic proceduralism and a hermeneutic culture of 
liberalism. As noted above, imagination and social hope require the frame of pragmatic 
liberalism to function. Pragmatic proceduralism is the political logic within which 
piecemeal, social change occurs. Thus, it cannot provide free and critical progress because 
it lacks the ability to think outside of the political and intellectual categories of the current 
public.  
                                                 
734 Marcuse, ODM, p.65 
735 Voparil connects this point to the lack a critical perspective in Rorty. See; Richard Rorty, op cit. p.47 
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Marcuse’s philosophy has been essential here. Developing Heidegger and Connolly’s 
critique of pragmatic mastery discussed in Chs. 2 and 3, it has revealed how the pragmatic 
reduction of thought to the operational and the behavioural (i.e. the scientific) 
circumscribes the universe of political thinking. This reduction and its rejection of an 
appearance-reality distinction, veils the partiality and limitations of the pragmatic 
perspective. It formally biases thinking to the present liberal universe. In this way, the 
pragmatic framework and logic Rorty imposes on his politics restricts it to liberalism and 
produces a self-reinforcing mode of thought for that present. Marcuse’s work has served 
two purposes here. First, it has illustrated how Rorty’s thought fails to be critical, through 
the lack of appearance-reality distinction and resulting inability to connect to reality. 
Second, it has revealed how Rorty’s pragmatic, liberal mastery obscures both this 
circumscription and its implicit claim to neutrality through an ideological mechanism of 
veiling. The point is not that Marcuse’s is the correct perspective; that we should always 
view things through the lens of an ontological totality. The argument here is only that it is 
a necessary aspect of a critical politics. One that Rorty’s thought excludes in order to 
naturalize its own restricted vision of philosophy and politics.  
This point has been illustrated through a reading of AOC. This text represents the 
mature development of the inherent trend towards critical stagnation and conservatism of 
Rorty’s philosophy. His inability to understand new social movements and conditions 
outside a previous form of resistance that confirms his philosophy and politics reveals the 
limitations of his thought. It reveals that thinking of the future solely in terms of a 
pragmatic assessment of the present circumscribes the critical utopian project. 
Consequently, Rorty’s positive reformist politics ends up as a mere narrativization of his 
pragmatic philosophy and his liberal tolerance results only in tolerating individuals and 
politics that fit the mainstream, present public. Once again, Marcuse exposes these limits. 
Not through a revelation of the truth of these groups but through a different approach 
which uses those forces to expose the confines of the present. In the end, this is his unique 
offering: a philosophical orientation which allows for a critical posture to the present. 
Here, this manifests as a holistic criticism of Rorty that extends to every aspect his 
philosophy (e.g. instrumentalism, contingency, naturalism, historicism). By tracking the 
dynamics and trends of one-dimensionality into the major sectors of our social, political 
and intellectual lives, Marcuse provides unique insight into the unity of Rorty’s thought; 
the connection between his philosophical pragmatism and political liberalism.  
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CONCLUSION:  PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS 
AFTER RORTY  
Do we participate in a politics of cynicism or a politics of hope? … I'm not talking 
about blind optimism here — the almost wilful ignorance that thinks unemployment 
will go away if we just don't talk about it, or the health care crisis will solve itself if 
we just ignore it. No, I'm talking about something more substantial… Hope in the face 
of difficulty. Hope in the face of uncertainty. The audacity of hope! 
Barack Obama, Democratic National Convention, 2004 
 
Here is the danger of too much hope – sceptics are treated like blasphemers, and 
indifference becomes equal to hate.  
The Boondocks 
INTRODUC TI ON:  THE OP PORTUN ITY A ND CON FIN ES OF  RORTY ’S PE RSPEC TIVE  
The thought of Richard Rorty is enigmatic. Whenever one identifies a critical 
perspective on some aspect of his work, there is a caveat there designed to elude that line 
of criticism. Rorty was adept at weaving a pathway through an argument only to return to 
its beginning to declare it just one more redescription.736However, his philosophical self-
awareness failed in one manner. While he could skilfully reduce a philosopher’s work to a 
single significance, thereby placing them along a narrative path designed to end with his 
own pragmatism, he failed to turn this integrative vision on himself. He never managed to 
see how his entire work, his pragmatic philosophy and liberal politics, all “hung 
together.”737 This is clearly evident in his autobiographical essay discussed in the 
introduction to this thesis. In “Trotsky and the Wild Orchids,” Rorty radically divided his 
philosophical and political projects and argued for the impossibility of a total vision. 
Further, he argued that the imperative now was to remove the desire for some bridging 
framework overtop of all human activity and accept that, ‘it is human solidarity, rather 
                                                 
736 See, for example; Rorty, CIS, pp.44, 48 
737 The ubiquity of this phrase in his work is perhaps ironic then.  
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than knowledge of something not merely human, that really matters.’738However, Rorty 
ignored the contradiction here. By placing the human community in the position of a 
philosophical vision, he reinstituted a common framework connecting his philosophy and 
politics. While it may not be a metaphysical abstraction, it nonetheless links these two 
aspects of his work and has allowed this study to investigate the relationship between his 
philosophy and politics.  
The philosophical and political centrality of the human community is Rorty’s 
alternative to foundationalist philosophy and the logics of grounding and unmasking. As 
discussed above, if in his work on the contingency of language and pragmatic naturalism 
he drew the limits of thought back to the human community, his work on history, 
narrative and redescription illustrated the positive pathways open to communities. Thus, 
the disposition and orientation of those groups becomes fundamental.739 This thesis has 
argued that Rorty’s pragmatic disposition contains an ontological undercurrent of 
mastery; one that places the human at the centre of philosophy and politics by assuming 
that the world and humanity are susceptible to our desires. However, for Rorty, this 
disposition was characterized by hope. Hope links philosophy and politics, pragmatism 
and America.  
Pragmatism and America are expressions of a hopeful, melioristic, experimental 
frame of mind. I think the most one can do by way of linking up pragmatism with 
America is to say that both the country and its most distinguished philosopher 
[Dewey] suggest that we can, in politics, substitute hope for the sort of knowledge 
which philosophers have usually tried to attain. America has always been a future-
oriented country, a country which delights in the fact that it invented itself in the 
relatively recent past.740 
Philosophy and politics can be linked by a common disposition for him. This disposition of 
hope attempts to reduce politics, away from universalist principles, to human desires. 
Further, it locates these desires within the linguistic frameworks of existing communities. 
The imperative then is the loyal, linguistic reform of the practices of these groups in terms 
of the values they already hold.741 
It is this disposition to criticism in the present community that links Rorty with both 
pragmatism and America. This thesis has followed Cornel West in arguing that from this 
                                                 
738 Rorty, Richard. “Trotsky and the Wild Orchids” in PSH. p.20 
739 Voparil also acknowledges the centrality of vision and orientation for understanding Rorty’s thought. See; 
Voparil, Christopher J. Richard Rorty: Politics and Vision. Oxford : Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006. p.36 
740 Rorty, Richard. “Truth Without Correspondence to Reality” in PSH. p.24 – Here, Rorty nears advocating a 
version of American exceptionalism around the notion that the former is uniquely capable of a foundationless 
(and fully pragmatic) politics. See; pp.31-4 
741 Allen, Jonathan. “The Situated Critic or the Loyal Critic? Rorty and Walzer on Social Criticism” in Philosophy 
and Social Criticism, vol. 24 (6), 1998. pp.32-3 
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disposition, Rorty’s work shares common features with pragmatism and this 
understanding of America. West sums this up well.  
‘American pragmatism is a diverse and heterogeneous tradition. But its common 
denominator consists of a future-oriented instrumentalism that tries to deploy 
thought as a weapon to enable more effective action… [this] evasion of 
epistemology-centered philosophy – from Emerson to Rorty – results in a 
conception of philosophy as a form of cultural criticism in which the meaning of 
America is put forward by intellectuals in response to distinct social and cultural 
crises. In this sense, American pragmatism is … a set of interpretations to explain 
America to itself at a particular historical moment.’742 
Rorty formalizes this implicit posture into a pragmatic philosophy and liberal politics in 
response to the absence of philosophical foundations. He theorizes the present as a new 
motivational ground. This was the power and originality of Rorty’s project. As some 
commentators have noted, for someone so universally rejected, he was so often discussed. 
As one obituary described on his death, ‘Rorty’s enormous body of work, which ranged 
from academic tomes to magazine and newspaper articles, provoked fervent praise, 
hostility and confusion. But no matter what even his severest critics thought of it, they 
could not ignore it.’743 While we can only speculate as to the exact reason for this, it is the 
position of this thesis that his project intentionally spoke to and resonated with his 
communities. He managed, in one body of work, to address several ongoing conversations 
(e.g. pragmatists, analytic thinkers, philosophers in general, Western liberals, and 
Americans744) and draw them together into one intellectual discourse on how philosophy 
should connect to politics.  
While discussed throughout this thesis, it is necessary to return to the significance 
and opportunity of Rorty’s thought.  As briefly discussed in Ch.5, Rorty was attempting to 
reactivate American culture and politics. He was trying to resurrect an intellectual project, 
central to American culture, which had been lost. To do this, and in light of his constriction 
of social criticism to the present, Rorty attempted to formalize the present in his 
philosophy. He attempted to establish philosophical conditions which limit thought to that 
conversation and then argue for a form of politics within the American context which only 
operates within those conditions; the conditions of actual social change. This is his 
                                                 
742 West, Cornel. The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism. London, UK: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1989. p.5 
743 Cohen, Patricia. “Richard Rorty, Philosopher, Dies at 75.” In The New York Times, June 11, 2007.  
744 The reactions of most of these groups to Rorty’s work have been addressed in some manner in this thesis. 
His reception from more journalistic sources however, has been passed over. For a succinct summary of this 
literature, see; Gross, Neil. Richard Rorty: The Making of an American Philosopher. London, UK: University of 
Chicago Press, 2008. p.25  
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pragmatic, liberal politics of hope.745As represented above in the quotation from President 
Barack Obama, this language of hope and future are still central to American politics. The 
success of this rhetoric in the latter’s campaigns only further indicates how deeply within 
America these themes still resonate. This is not meant to suggest that the 44th President of 
the United States is a Rortian,746 but only that they are both accessing a dominant language 
within progressive American politics.747 It may only be one dynamic, one thread of that 
conversation. But it is a real and persistent limit on thought.  
The implicit connection between Rorty and the frame of current politics is the spur of 
this study; its prompting intuitive faith. For Heidegger, every thinker only asks one 
question. This thesis has read Rorty through the connection between philosophy and 
politics. It has attempted to clarify and critique his answer to the question of the role of 
philosophy in politics after foundations. Rorty himself permits this type of reading. ‘I am a 
hedgehog who, despite showering my reader with allusions and dropping lots of names, 
has really only one idea: the need to get beyond representationalism, and thus into an 
intellectual world in which human beings are responsible only to each other.’748 If this 
thesis were reduced to one question, it would be: what are the current limitations of 
political thinking? What assumptions set those boundaries and barriers? It has attempted 
to use a critique of Rorty to enact this; to inaugurate a philosophical and intellectual 
confrontation of the present.  
To this end, this study has not sought to pick out particular flaws in Rorty’s work but 
stand back and read it as a totality; to understand its internal dynamics and its external 
consequences. It has attempted to rigorously connect his philosophy to his politics. 
Further, contradicting Rorty’s mandates for social criticism, it has attempted to 
recontextualize it out of his context (Anglo-American thought) in order to critically assess 
                                                 
745 As noted in Ch. 5, this politics makes narrative essential. For an approach that draws on Rorty’s, see; Green, 
Judith M. Pragmatism and Social Hope: Deep Democracy in Global Contexts. Chinchester, UK: Columbia 
University Press, 2008. Ch. 1  
746 This has been suggested. See; Berkowitz, Peter. “Pragmatism, Obama Style” in The Weekly Standard 
Magazine, Vol. 14 (31), 2009. – It should be noted that this rather reactionary piece of journalism is only cited 
to note a popular recognition of the similarity between Rorty and President Obama. There is also forthcoming 
academic work. For example; "Symposium on Obama and Pragmatism", (eds. Colin Koopman and Mark 
Sanders), Contemporary Pragmatism, vol. 8 (2), Dec., 2012.  
747 What West, in another work, has called “the American Religion of Possibility.” See, Unger, Roberto 
Mangabeira and Cornel West. The Future of American Progressivism: An Initiative for Political and Economic 
Reform. Boston, US: Beacon Press, 1998. Ch. 2.  
748 Richard Rorty, "Philosophy as a Transitional Genre" in Pragmatism, Critique, Judgment: Essays for Richard J. 
Bernstein (eds. Seyla Benhabib and Nancy Fraser). Cambridge, US: MIT Press, 2004. p.4 -- Rorty's reference 
here is to Isaiah Berlin's noted distinction between the hedgehog, who "knows one big thing," and the fox, 
"who knows many things." See, Berlin, Isaiah. The Hedgehog and the Fox. New York, US: Simon and Schuster, 
1970. p.1 
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it on different terms; terms, Rorty rejected. However, this is a very Rortian gesture.749How 
it has done this will be addressed below, it is important presently to indicate what it has 
hoped to expose through this.  
This thesis has often accused Rorty of attempting to formalize a pragmatism, 
naturalism and instrumentalism he sees as already operative within social communities. 
This is his language of “how justification actually occurs;” his sociological and pragmatic 
eliding of philosophy. This strategy reintroduces a claim of neutrality in his work. Further, 
this neutrality contradicts his very framing of the problem of liberalism and foundations, 
as a problem of combining individual development with collective justice. This tension in 
the combination of these two projects is a particularly American one which, on Rorty’s 
understanding, is central to the context of American democracy. However, Rorty is entirely 
comfortable with this particularity. He can, on his own method, only speak within the 
terms of his community. This is a self-imposed restriction of his thought to a particular 
community. Nevertheless, as illustrated throughout this thesis, he does have a basic 
philosophical disposition (mastery) and method (the pragmatist-historical method) which 
shapes the project he offers his community. This disposition produces the aforementioned 
claim to neutrality by placing the human, beyond foundations, at the centre of our 
epistemological and political lives. There is a circularity here. Rorty uses a neutralized 
understanding of enquiry, to justify a particular (and limited) form of politics. And that 
limited form of politics ensures the conditions for this way of knowing the world (the 
priority of the pragmatic and the privatization of other forms of thinking). In this manner, 
he creates a Rortian circle750 by providing for the (pragmatic) epistemological conditions 
for a liberal politics and the (liberal) political conditions for a pragmatic form of 
knowledge. He walks into a social and intellectual dynamic, designed to match how he 
thinks justification occurs, with no exit. In this manner, Rorty’s narrative of the American 
present, which exists within this account, comes to dominate his thought.751 
THE ONTOLOGIC AL  CRI TI QUE OF  RORTY  
Through the ontological perspective, this thesis has recontextualized Rorty by 
removing him from his self-imposed universe of thought and revealing the hidden 
dynamics of both his philosophy and his context. This perspective is not a universal 
                                                 
749 While this contradicts Rorty’s description of the loyal critic, I have called this gesture Rortian as he often 
uses it on the philosophers he reads.  
750 This circle represents the closure of the political universe theorized in Ch. 5 in the work of Marcuse.  
751 West, The American Evasion of Philosophy, op cit. p.209 
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criterion of critique but an ontological double-entry form of questioning meant to retain 
critical ground from within an acknowledgement of the partiality of all revelations of 
Being. This questioning has intended to show the limits of Rorty’s thought, philosophically 
and politically. Further, it has intended to reveal the mechanisms whereby those 
limitations are imposed and obscured. It has argued that Rorty’s work is characterized by 
an anti-foundational rejection of ontology for philosophical and political reflection. 
Instead, Rorty offers a pragmatic understanding of the primacy of the social community in 
these two areas. Further, our social lives are constrained by the contingency (and priority) 
of language and situatedness in a naturalized environment. Consequently, the only way to 
shift our communities, to enact social and political change is through changing our 
languages and the narratives that inform those communities. Thus, politics must match 
these constraints and model itself on a division of labour between a procedural and 
reformist set of practices and institutions that avoid philosophical assumptions and a 
hermeneutic politics of hope that, by speaking loyally to the community in its present, can 
shift its language and narrative to effect progressive change. Finally, for Rorty, America 
represents an attempt at this pragmatic politics of the future.   
Ch.1 situated Rorty within his initial critiques of epistemology and the philosophy of 
mind. It argued that Rorty’s method here was to sociologically circumvent the 
epistemological question by focusing on the manner in which justification and linguistic 
change occurs within human groups. It then examined Rorty’s relation to the philosophy 
of John Dewey from whom Rorty draws a basic ontological disposition of instrumentalism. 
Paired with his emphasis on the social, Rorty’s use of Dewey reveal a basic social 
instrumentalism in his philosophy; one that constricts his thought rather than opening it 
up as his hermeneutic of freedom intended. All of this is prompted by a basic anti-
authoritarianism in Rorty’s philosophy that attempts to put human communities at the 
centre of our epistemology and politics (rather than some external standard). This 
analysis continued in Chs.2 and 3 through an examination of Rorty’s positive pragmatic 
philosophy. By confronting Rorty with the critique of mastery, the three central elements 
of his pragmatism (contingency, naturalism, and historicism) were illustrated. Ch.2 
critically confronted Rorty’s opposition to ontology and theorization of the contingency of 
language with the work of William E. Connolly. Connolly’s double-entry orientation to 
ontological thought, understanding of contestability and ontology of ambiguity reveals the 
social foundationalism within Rorty’s positive thought. Further, Rorty’s domestication of 
contingency in his reading of Heidegger revealed his turn to a disposition of mastery 
which furthered the instrumentalism identified in Ch.1. Finally, this chapter introduced 
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the language of the veil and the argument for the necessity of ontologically accounting for 
the partiality of all of our understandings of reality. Ch.3 extended these arguments into 
Rorty’s naturalism and historicism. Through readings of Heidegger and Connolly on 
modernity, it illustrated the effects of Rorty’s mastery. Rorty assumes that truth is one, 
that the world is available for unproblematic pragmatic use and that no assumptions or 
limitations enter. Further, the ontological perspective was developed here by illustrating 
how it allows us to understand the mechanisms of exclusions that exist within modernity 
and Rorty’s work. Thus, it is through an analysis of these themes that the veiling 
mechanism of neutrality is revealed in Rorty’s work. Through a purported lack of 
metaphysics, Rorty assumes the pragmatic neutrality of his conceptions and obscures 
their own partiality. He reduces any particularity to culture and ignores their 
philosophical significance.  
Finally, in Chs.4 and 5, this thesis connected Rorty’s anti-ontological pragmatism to 
his procedural liberalism. It argued that the same mechanism of veiling and resulting claim 
to pragmatic neutrality operates in both. After metaphysics, philosophy can only be 
pragmatic (i.e. concrete, piecemeal problem-solving) and politics can only be procedural 
and liberal (i.e. without permanent substantive content). In this, liberalism is the political 
formalization of the acknowledgement of human finitude within pragmatic mastery. It was 
argued here that this position, and Rorty’s resulting public-private divide, serves only to 
exclude non-pragmatic and non-liberal forms of political thinking through two divisions of 
labour: one, between public and private which constricts political thinking to the present 
framework, and a second within the public between procedural and hermeneutic modes of 
thinking. The latter division is meant to provide for the possibly of social change but only 
within the pragmatic and reformist logic of social criticism that places the philosopher 
primarily within the thought of their community (Ch.4). Finally, through a confrontation 
with Herbert Marcuse’s critique of the one-dimensionality of the contemporary universe 
of thought (in Ch.5), it became clear that rather than opening thinking, Rorty’s political 
pragmatism restricts thought to the present range of options. His philosophy of the future 
and politics of hope is still bound by the philosophical and political confines of the present. 
Rather than providing a basis for political criticism, they deepen the present thinking and 
structure. What Rorty offers in his philosophical pragmatism and political liberalism is not 
a method for cultural change but a self-reinforcing mode of thought for contemporary 
liberalism. His liberal attempt to provide for a political framework without philosophical 
predetermination fails. In his pragmatic elaboration and justification of mastery 
(philosophy) and liberalism (politics) he obscures the deep connections between his 
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philosophy and his politics. In opposition, this thesis has argued for the necessity of 
ontology for a truly critical, political form of questioning. 
POSIT IVE  PATHWAY S:  TOWA RD S A CRIT ICA L PLU RA LI TY  
Ontology is the attempt to gesture outside of the present universe at its widest. 
However, the ontological perspective is both necessary and insufficient to this task. It is 
necessary for a genuinely critical approach to the thought and politics of our present. 
However, it is insufficient to complete this. Several productive pathways for the future 
have emerged in the course of this study. All of these have been encountered in some form 
here. This final section will briefly indicate a few.  
While the reading of Dewey above, which identified him as the sources of 
instrumentalism in Rorty, was generally critical, there are also great resources in his work 
for thinking the use of philosophy in politics. While also embracing a language of social 
hope, Dewey’s political philosophy asserts the need for a non-foundational critical ground 
to thought. He rooted this within a form of critical intelligence based in the instrumental 
method. This thesis has not intended to reject this approach entirely but to reveal its 
problematic mechanisms in Rorty where it becomes the only disposition. Combined with 
other forms of thinking, in a pluralistic critical methodology, Dewey’s thought offers a 
critical form of democratic thinking that attempts to move democracy beyond the 
institutional752 to a genuinely critical method of reform.753 While this thesis has 
emphasized the necessity of exceeding the present, it has also noted its insufficiency. We 
cannot engage in perpetual revolution, a critical logic of reform is also necessary. Thus, 
Dewey’s work could provide some of the resources for thinking one aspect of this 
pluralistic, critical form of political thought.  
This thesis has only broached the possibilities of a disclosive critique of society. 
Further, it has by no means meant to suggest the sufficiency of Heidegger and Connolly’s 
work here. Both offer us the possibility of an orientation. However, their critical resources 
tend to remain on the level of entire revelations of being rather than specific practices. 
                                                 
752 See: “Democracy and Education” in The Middle Works of John Dewey vol. 9 (ed. Jo Ann Bordston) Carbondale, 
US: Southern Illinois University Press, 1980; and “Philosophy and Democracy” in The Essential Dewey Volume 
1: Pragmatism, Education, Democracy (ed. Larry A. Hickman and Thomas M Alexander). Indianapolis, US: 
Indiana University Press, 1998; and, “Reconstruction in Philosophy” in The Middle Works of John Dewey Vol. 12 
(ed. Jo Ann Boyston) Carbondale, US: Southern Illinois University Press, 1982.   
753 While Dewey’s philosophy has the capacity for some change, at least on the reformist level, Rorty’s loses 
that capacity through his absolute detachment of philosophy from the world. Rorty’s instrumentalist 
disposition becomes paired with a social foundationalism which isolates it from anything transcending that 
community. It becomes entirely immune to critique in this way. Its public goes unchallenged. In contrast, 
Dewey’s attempt to think democracy as a wider project of education and culture is a valuable source of 
political criticism.  
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This is not so much a flaw as an incompletion. Marcuse, in parts of his work, makes 
significant strides toward such a perspective. But he also remains on the level of totality.754 
There are two productive possibilities here for rounding out a plural critical perspective 
that can operate on multiple levels of thought. First, Critical Theory, long dominated by 
Habermasians who have rejected the broad project of a critical theory of society, has been 
murmuring. Recently, Nikolas Kompridis has attempted to re-orient the project of this 
school towards disclosure. Attempting to evade the binary between locking us within our 
traditions and assuming we can transcend them, he theorizes a more reflective approach 
to modernity; one that acknowledges the need to look to the future for our normative 
guide while retaining a critical perspective on the present. To this end, he attempts to wed 
the project of critical theory to a Heideggerian logic of disclosure.755 In this manner, his 
work is in the same spirit as the above wedding of Heidegger and Marcuse.  
Further, recently there have been attempts to examine the compatibility of 
pragmatism and Foucault. While this work often also addresses William James and Rorty’s 
connections to Foucault,756 the most significant focus has been on Foucault and Dewey. 
These analyses tend to focus on the common opposition in these figures to traditional 
epistemology and philosophical dualisms, and the attempt to offer a new critical method 
for studying concrete social practices. For example, Colin Koopman, central to this 
movement, argues that pragmatism and genealogy need each other. Pragmatism focuses 
generally on the positive reconstruction of problematic situations. It is “forward-facing.” In 
contrast, genealogy exposes and articulates the problematizations which condition the 
possibilities of doing, thinking and being in the present world.757It is “backward-facing.”  
                                                 
754 However, there is room for a productive dialogue between Marcuse and Dewey. While the latter never 
engaged with the former, Marcuse did review one of Dewey’s books. While critical, Marcuse does note that 
Dewey gestures beyond other pragmatisms toward a “material logic of ends.” See: Marcuse, Herbert. “ Review 
of John Dewey’s Logic: The Theory of Enquiry” (trans. Phillip Deen) in Transactions of the Charles S Peirce 
Society, vol. 46 (2), 2011; and, Deen, Phillip.“Dialectical vs. Experimental Method: Marcuse’s Review of Dewey’s 
Logic: The Theory of Enquiry” in Transactions of the Charles S Peirce Society, vol. 46 (2), 2011.  
755 Kompridis, Nikolas. Critique and Disclosure: Critical Theory Between Past and Future. London, UK: The MIT 
Press, 2006. For an account of Kompridis, see; Sinnerbrink, Robert. “The Future of Critical Theory? Kompridis 
on World-disclosing Critique” in Philosophy and Social Criticism, vol. 37 (9), 2011. Axel Honneth too, in recent 
years, has hinted at the need for a reorientation of the project of Critical Theory. See his: “The Social Dynamic 
of Disrespect: On the Location of Critical Theory Today” in Disrespect: The Normative Foundations of Critical 
Theory. Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2007; and, “ The Possibility of a Disclosing Critique of Society: The Dialectic of 
Enlightenment in Light of Current Debates in Social Criticism” in Disrespect, op cit.  
756 Malecki, Wojciech. “If Happiness is not the aim of politics, then what is?: Rorty versus Foucault” in Foucault 
Studies, no. 11, 2011; and Edmonds, Jeffrey S. “Criticism Without Critique: Power and Experience in Foucault 
and James” in Foucault Studies, no. 11, 2011; Marchetti, Sarin. “James, Nietzsche and Foucault on Ethics and the 
Self” in Foucault Studies, no. 11, 2011.  
757 In this focus, genealogy is clearly linked to Heidegger’s ontological questioning discussed above. For an 
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In fact, pragmatism and genealogy need one another. Any full-scale practice of 
critical inquiry requires the fulfillment of both intellectual desiderata of 
reconstruction and problematization – hence critical inquiry calls for something 
like pragmatism that provides a reconstructive service as well as something like 
genealogy that performs a diagnostic service. To perform only one of these 
services is to chagrin the responsibilities we have assumed in embracing the task 
of thought as work. We must kick up the dust, and then work to settle it again. We 
must meliorate in the midst of a problem, and then look hard to see what new 
problems we may have inadvertently facilitated.758 
Reconstruction and problematization. In the combination of genealogy and pragmatism, 
Koopman and others are attempting to develop a more holistic form of critical inquiry.  
This thesis has not argued for the sufficiency of the ontological perspective to our 
political lives. Rather, it has only defended that form of thought from Rorty and anti-
foundationalism. It has argued that an ontological analysis can identify real assumptions 
and limitations on political thinking. Beyond this, philosophy has other roles to play in the 
world. There is a need for a critical, methodological pluralism in the theoretical analysis of 
politics; many perspectives that identify different aspects or dynamics within the world. In 
the end, such an orientation is exactly what Rorty’s pragmatic philosophy and political 
liberalism preclude. As I hope to have indicated here, there is much more to do. This study 
of Rorty has been the initial step in this process of learning to think outside the confines of 
the present. 
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